A presentation about the history of the post-Soviet Communist Party, its impact on Russian politics, its ideology, and the extent to which it really challenges Kremlin orthodoxy. Received a First Class grade at Exeter University.

1. The Communist Party of
the Russian Federation
Its history, role in Russian politics today, and future
Owen Bell

2. Introduction to the Party
• A divided, catch-all party. Broadly split into anti-Marxist social
democratic reformists, orthodox Marxist-Leninists, and nationalistic
communists.
• Informed by both the internationalism of Lenin and Trotsky, and the
‘Socialism in One Country’ of Stalin and Bukharin.
• Not revolutionary in the conventional sense. A conservative communist
party.
• Like Putin’s United Russia, the CPRF is opposed to the US-led liberal
world order, albeit from a Marxist as well as a nationalist perspective.
• Led by Gennady Zyuganov since February 1993, a Duma deputy who was
a prominent critic of both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. He advocated a
return to pre-Perestroika Communism. Zyuganov’s nationalism and
charismatic leadership is the primary reason for the CPRF’s success.

3. History
• The CPRF is the successor organisation to the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, which was banned by Yeltsin in 1991.
• In December 1992, the Russian Constitutional Court ordered that
former Communist Party property was now the property of the
new Russian state. But Yeltsin could not ban new parties, nor
could he successfully supress the CPSU’s grassroots infrastructure.
• The CPRF emerged the strongest of a plethora of communist
parties. Since 1993, it has been the main opposition party.
• Its influence is exerted through both effective parliamentary
organisation and strong links with extra-parliamentary groups.
• The CPRF’s status as the political legacy of the Soviet Union, and
its affinity for cultural nationalism, have prevented it from being
the left of centre opposition seen in other former Soviet Republics
and Warsaw Pact nations.

4. The Party in the present day
• The CPRF played a prominent role in celebrating the centenary of
the Russian Revolution, despite the Kremlin’s silence. It held
week-long celebrations in Moscow and St Petersburg, including a
wreath-laying ceremony at Lenin’s tomb.
• This drew criticism from the Russian Orthodox Church, which
believes the Party is ignoring the Soviets’ anti-Christian
persecution, despite Zyuganov being a Christian.
• The Soviet adulation of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Statin continues to
the present, embodying those figures in the cult of personality.
• The party has 160 000 members and 42 out of 450 seats in the
Duma. Despite being the second largest party, it has no hope of
entering government. It lost 50 seats in 2016.
• The CPRF run Pravda, the Bolshevik newspaper founded in 1912,
but the online edition is privately owned.

5. Presidential Election 2018
• At the time of making this presentation, the election results were yet
to be announced. But Putin’s victory is inevitable, with even a run-off
vote unlikely.
• Pavel Grudinin is the CPRF’s candidate, with Zyuganov as his campaign
manager. He somewhat bourgeois for a communist, having successfully
privatised a state-owned strawberry company and turning a profit.
• The party is running on a social democratic platform. It wants taxes to
be higher and more progressive, pensions to be more generous, and
state investment to increase.
• In theory, this would be an effective; Russia is currently suffering from
high inflation and slow growth due to low commodity prices.
• Putin has failed to diversify the economy. The power of the oligarchs
has been curbed post-Yeltsin, but they remain highly influential.
• But most Russians approve of Putin, particularly his record on foreign
affairs. Trump’s non-interventionism gives Putin the change to
demonstrate Russian strength and competence, i.e. Libya and Syria.

6. The Kremlin’s ‘Useful Idiots’?
• The CPRF’s revolutionary socialism and limited organisational capacity
makes them a favourable opposition party to United Russia.
• Putin’s re-election prospects become certain when the alternatives are
so unpalatable.
• The CPRF provides no opposition to Putin’s foreign policies, nor the
encroachments of the Russian state. The ban on ‘gay propaganda’ was
endorsed by CPRF Duma deputies, as well as all other opposition
parties.
• The party is plagued by internal divisions, whereas Putin’s control of
the government is virtually absolute.
• The Kremlin’s control of the media means that all opposition, the CPRF
or anyone else, is unviable. The CPRF submitted 70 complains about
unfair and scant coverage of Grudinin’s campaign to the Central

7. The CPRF’s future
• The CPRF maintains links with communist parties around the world,
attending the annual International Meeting of Communist and Workers’
Parties and the International Communist Seminar.
• But although it would like to assist revolution abroad, it has come to
accept parliamentary democracy, markets and private property at
home. Its theoretical commitment to one-partyism has limited its
effectiveness in the global era of increasing democratisation.
• In my view, communist parties are never viable in multi-party systems.
Their revolutionary nature requires a political monopoly.
• Rather, the CPRF can only stay relevant by abandoning any notion of
revolution in favour of a constructive alternative to Putin’s economic
policies.
• Opposition to Putin’s foreign policies and authoritarianism is likely to be
futile, because both are popular amongst the public.
• But Russia’s insignificance relative to the Soviet Union means there is
still a fair amount of Soviet nostalgia amongst the older generations,
which the CPRF can capitalise on.

8. Conclusion
• The CPRF is the undisputed leader of the Russian far left. After the
early 1990s, it has had no serious opposition.
• But such a status has never mattered less. United Russia’s control over
the country, even when Putin steps down, will not face a credible and
threatening challenge in the medium term.
• Nostalgia for the Soviet Union has been largely satisfied by Putin’s
foreign policy. With Russia an increasingly significant player in world
affairs, Putin has restored the country’s place as a global player,
without bringing back Communist ideology or symbolism.
• Anti-communist philosophies- ethnic Russian nationalism, Pan- Slavism,
liberalism and religious conservatism- are too influential for the CPRF to
monopolise its opposition status.
• There is no widespread demand for the Communist economic system,
even if there is resentment at the power of the oligarchs and wealth
inequality.

9. Bibliography
• CPRF, “About us”, http://cprf.ru/about-us/, accessed 17 March 2018
• Flikke, Geir. “Patriotic Left-Centrism: The Zigzags of the Communist Party of
the Russian Federation.” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 51, no. 2, 1999, pp. 275–
298.
• Hinks, Joseph, “Your Complete Guide to Russia’s 2018 Presidential Election,”
Time Magazine (online), 13 March 2018
• Lipman, Masha, “Why Putin won’t be making the hundredth anniversary of
Bolshevik Revolution,” The New Yorker (online), November 3, 2017
• March, Luke. “For Victory? The Crises and Dilemmas of the Communist Party
of the Russian Federation.” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 53, no. 2, 2001, pp. 263–
290.
• Reisinger, William M., and Bryon J. Moraski. “Post-Soviet Russia’s Political
Trajectory.” The Regional Roots of Russia's Political Regime, University of
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2017, pp. 21–52.
• Pigman, Lincoln, “Putin’s Last Hurrah? Cementing his legacy,” RUSI (online),
15 March 2018
• Sputnik International, “Russia Communist Party Made 70 Complaints Over
Coverage of Candidate Grudinin,” https://sputniknews.com/russia-elections-