1. ISLAMIC
INSURGENCY AND
TACTICAL
ADOPTION OF
TERRORISM BY
GLOBAL JIHADIST’S
The Global Insurgency Paradigm, Tactical Adoption and Improving
Operational and Analytical Capacity for Future Conflict against Radical
Islamic Groups and Global Jihad
Patrick Cannon
BSST 332: Practices
of Terrorism
12/8/2014

2. Abstract
Since the 1970’s, the Middle East has seen an increase in political activism and violence.
The United States has been involved with efforts to counter extremist groups in this region, post
9/11 our efforts have increased drastically, specifically in Iraq and the Afghanistan/Pakistan
(AFPAK) region. Ten years after the both Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom many
lessons have been learned and new perspectives have emerged. Globalization and increased
connectivity have created a new view on insurgency and extremist activity. The purpose of this
paper is to further look into this notion and address how the United States government has to re-define
and re-think the violence of Global Jihad and Islamic Extremists as Radical Islamic
Insurgency Based Terrorism. Along with looking at the role of tactical adoption to further make
recommendations in research and policy to fix operational and analytical pitfalls in future
conflicts.
I. Radicals or Patriots? Unconventional Tactics in a Globalized World
a. Terminology and Methodology
b. Insurgency and Terrorism: Complementing and Competing Paradigms
II. The Importance of Definition: Tactics, Logic and the Real World
a. Guerilla Warfare and Terrorism as Tactics
b. Failure of Old School Logic: Tactical Adoption and Group Efficacy
c. Caliphates and Sharia Law: A Case Study of Radical Islamic Groups
III. Gaps and Analysis: Redefine the Enemy and Rethink our Tactics
a. Conclusion: Recommendations on the Enemy and Tactics

3. Radicals or Patriots? Unconventional Tactics in a Globalized World
Change is inevitable, regimes change and new figures come to power. These shifts occur
both violently and non-violently. More then not as history has shown most of these changes
come at the end of a sword or in our modern era, the barrel of a gun. Insurgency and Terrorism
are not new venues of warfare, we have seen their increase use post globalization and
colonization of areas worldwide. What is new is our understanding of both concepts, post 9/11
the government has increased focus and research of non-state actor groups. Insurgency can be
traced back as far as the Roman Empire, but the earliest mention of insurgent and guerilla tactics
is in the “Art of War” written by Sun Tzu. But it wasn’t until the 18th century that these state on
non-state actor violence began to become noticeable. During this time of proper warfare these
tactics were seen as cowardice and “a manifestation of criminality” (Sr & Gray, 2011). The
French Revolution, The American Revolution, even the Napoleonic wars saw rise of these
unconventional tactics of conflict manned by the common people.
In the 20th century many insurgent conflicts were seen especially with the rise of anti-colonialism
sentiments, the earliest being the rise of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) against
British occupation. This conflict would in one shape or form until the Good Friday Agreement in
1998. In the late 50’s to early 70’s, Americas fear of communism would lead us into a war in
Vietnam were the Viet Cong army would employ these guerilla tactics against a well-trained and
well equipped U.S. army that would eventually retreat in 1972. Last but not least the Soviet
Union would attempt to occupy Afghanistan but were beaten back by the Mujahedeen. The
mujahedeen fully employed guerilla tactics against the feared Russian army forcing them to
retreat as well. This case of insurgency in Afghanistan during the 1980’s would lead to the
problem we have today. It’s been thirteen years since the U.S. invasion of Afghanis tan and

4. eleven since the invasion of Iraq. The Islamic insurgence has reached new heights in violence
and it global reach. Many lessons have been learned from this conflict, but one still remains;
what are we actually fighting?
In our post 9/11 world policy makers and the media have been so hung up on “Terrorism”
because of the events of that day that the government has labeled everything following that day
as “an act of terror”. But just because it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, doesn’t mean
it is a duck. Terrorism is an issue of the modern day, like guerrilla warfare it is an asymmetrical
tactic used by non-state actors to further agendas. But some experts and scholars in the various
fields of terrorism, insurgency, and modern conflict view terrorism differently than those making
policy. David Kilcullen one of the top experts in counter-insurgency and modern conflict has
stated the he believes that we are not fighting a war on terror, but a war on insurgency on a
global scale. This lead to my belief that many of the groups fighting this global jihad are not pure
terrorist groups, rather they are insurgencies that have adopted terrorism as one their primary
tactics because of its coercive effect and simplicity.
Terminology and Methodology
Much of my research is centered on the work of David Kilcullens and his notions and
claims and the data set I am currently working on at START. My goal was to use this as a base to
build a further case of why the United States Government need to re-define who we are fighting
and in turn re-think our current strategy and policy. I also looked into Dr.Mark Lichbach and
Robert Pape’s work. Mark Lichbach headed a dataset called Guerilla Insurgency: A Springboard
for Terrorism, which I worked on as a START intern. The dataset looked at the correlation of
insurgent groups and their use of terrorist tactics in a conflict. Dr. Robert Pape wrote Dying to
Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism which analyzed the adoption of suicide tactics by

5. terrorist groups. All three of these figures work helped me establish a framework in which I
could define what Radical Islamic Insurgency Based Terrorisms was and why we need to view
jihadist violence as such.
I also found that certain definitions were crucial for context and understanding of this
topic. The definitions of insurgency and terrorism are not include because they have their own
dedicated section. Operations definitions also have their own dedicated section. The following
terms are important:
 Nationalism- “is a belief, creed or political ideology that involves an individual
identifying with, or becoming attached to, one's nation” (Rothi, Lyons, & Chryssochoou,
2005)
 Religious Nationalism- the relationship of nationalism to a particular religious belief,
dogma, or affiliation. This relationship can be broken down into two aspects; the
politicization of religion and the influence of religion on politics. (Xypolia, 2011)
 Non-State Actor- are entities that participate or act in international relations. They are
organizations with sufficient power to influence and cause a change even though they do
not belong to any established institution of a state.
 Globalization- the process of international integration arising from the interchange of
world views, products, ideas and other aspects of culture.
 Guerilla Warfare- “a form of irregular warfare in which a small group of combatants
such as armed civilians or irregulars use military tactics including ambushes, sabotage,
raids, petty warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and mobility to fight a larger and less-mobile
traditional military”. (Department of Defense, 2014)

6.  Asymmetrical Warfare- “is war between belligerents whose relative military power
differs significantly, or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly”. (Tomes, 2004 )
Insurgency and Terrorism: Complementing and Competing Paradigms
Non-state actor violence comes in many forms, while terrorism and insurgency both stem
from a political grievance and indifference they are very different. Insurgency is better defined
then terrorism, the Department of Defense defines the concepts as:
 Insurgency- “an organized resistance movement that uses subversion,
sabotage and armed conflict to achieve its aims. Insurgencies normally seek to
overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country.
They may also seek to” (Department of Defense, 2014);
o Overthrow an established government without a follow-on social
revolution Establish an autonomous national territory within the
borders of the state, Cause withdrawal of an occupying power, Extract
political concessions that are unattainable through non-violent means.
 Terrorism- “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate
fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit
of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological” (Department of
Defense, 2014).
Right of the bat one difference can be seen, terrorism (not terrorist’s or terrorists groups) is a
tactic and nothing more. This has caused problems with our current strategy against global
jihadist groups, we view them solely as terrorist groups and terrorism as a physical problem. The
truth is, not all radical Islamic groups are solely terrorist groups, and rather they are insurgents

7. using terrorist tactics. There are benefits and fall backs to this, the benefit is that terrorist style
attacks can significantly impact a large opposing force with just a few men and will coordinated
execution. This seems similar to guerrilla warfare the key difference being that terrorist tactics
are usually conducted in a manner that targets civilians to punish the government.
The complementing and unifying factor between insurgency and terrorism is that both
live and die by the populace they claim to fight for. A Non-State group relies on its people for
funding, support, safe heavens and may other key needs to maintain a group’s capacity to
operate. This can be swayed by a group’s ideology and tactics, if a groups demands are too
unreasonable and there tactics to brutal a population will not support a given group. As stated
before the real contrasting factor is target selection between the two tactics. Donald Black states
that “terrorism is unilateral and covert…and its targets are civilian rather than military” (Black,
2004), On the other hand insurgency has a covert nature but its actions are much more overt, so
too is their presence once they come into full swing. Scholars like black also highlight that target
selection can change for terrorist and insurgent groups, “those popularly known as guerillas may
sometimes engage in terrorism, and those known as terrorists sometimes engage in guerilla
warfare” (Black, 2004). This shows that there are pure terrorist groups and pure insurgencies, the
trouble is that they are few and far between are pure or do not remain pure.
Terrorism and Insurgency may thrive in the same environment but by no means are they
exactly identical. Between the two concepts insurgency is much easier to disrupt, this is because
an insurgency itself is a physical body as the DOD definition states “an organized resistance
movement” (Department of Defense, 2014). The issue with radical groups in the Middle East is
that they are not like traditional insurgencies. Killcullen argues that we are fighting a war on
global insurgency in not global terrorism (Killcullen, 2004 ). This notion of a global paradigm

8. has shifted understandings and definitions which posse the challenge of new counter strategies
(status quo strategy will be addressed in conclusion) to combat these non-state actor threats.
The Importance of Definition: Tactics, Logic and the Real World
The ability to define a person or concept is to show an understanding. What most people
forget is that times change, so do perceptions and understandings. Pre 1945 warfare logic saw
that the stronger side in a conflict not only instigated a fight, but almost always won it as well.
This logic assumed that conflict was state on state combatants. Post 1945, that all changed “the
modern action of nation building, insurgencies, and the use of guerilla and terrorist tactics” (Sr &
Gray, 2011) have become cornerstones of political and social change. If we look at an
insurgency as a physical being then tactics are “personalities” a way of expression that is dictated
by influential factors in a non-state actors environment. Often insurgencies are swayed by
government response, population interaction, amount of resources, and ideology.
If the United States is to better its operational and analytical capacity it must do a better
job of understanding why non-state actor groups adopt different tactics and view them as tactics
and nothing more. “Terrorism has become merely another derogatory word, rather than a
descriptor of a specific type of activity” (Merari, 1993 ). Further, the United States must
distinguish the various tactics employed by non-state actors. Specifically terrorism and guerilla
warfare as they are the most utilized by these groups.
Guerilla Warfare and Terrorism as Tactics and the Difference between Them
“As strategies of insurgency, however, terrorism and guerrilla are quite distinct” (Merari,
1993 ). Merari speaks how the two words are used interchangeably but highlights there
distinctness in many ways. First is the physicality, “unlike terrorism, guerilla tries to establish

9. physical control of a territory” (Merari, 1993 ). Guerrilla warfare is the primary tactic used by
insurgencies, in the 1980’s the anti-Soviet jihad used these tactics to combat the Russians, and it
was also very popular with South American revolutionary groups as well. These tactics include
ambushes, raids and hit run style attacks. When guerilla tactics are utilized a group or
movements goal is to assert dominance and control, this can be seen in some Islamic groups like
the Taliban for example who in the 1990’s not only seized Kandahar but the province as well.
Terrorism as a tactic does not dwell in a physical domain so to speak. The act itself is physical,
the goal and consequence is not. “As a strategy, terrorism remains in the domain of
psychological influence” (Merari, 1993 ). Coercion and fear are the endgames of a terrorist
attack, to influence a target state government in too giving in or meeting “demands” of the non-state
actor. This can include car bombing, suicide bombings and kidnappings. Simply put one
tactic is used to gain physical progress, the other to sway an enemy and cause disruption among
the populace.
Size and target selection also plays a factor, with guerilla tactics targets are almost
entirely of a military or of strategic importance (I.E. weapons depots). In guerilla warfare large
forces are utilized by non-state actors “guerillas usually wage war in platoon or company size
units” (Merari, 1993 ). When acts of terrorism are conducted size and target are the opposite of
guerilla warfare. With terrorism non-state actors work in smaller and more convert units for their
operations. This involves tactics such as bombings, kidnappings, and small arms conflict. As
stated before the goal of terrorism is coercion of a psychological manner, this is accomplished by
the unorthodox selection of civilian targets. Robert Pape discuss the strategies of denial vs
punishment in non-state actor conflict. The trouble he says is “Denial is impossible, this is due to
the fact that even groups that have state backing do not poses the means for full scale invasion”

10. (Pape, 2005). There by this logic terrorism uses punishment to produce a coercive effect on a
state actor adversary.
It’s easy to establish these concepts merely as tactics, the real question becomes what
makes an insurgency decide between the two. Is the adoption of one tactic or another a choice of
reason? Or one that comes out of necessity or forced adaptation based on event within a conflict?
If the might of a state actor force outweighs most non-state actor and insurgent groups, why do
governments have such a tough time extinguishing and dismantling these groups?
Failure of Old School Logic: Tactical Adoption and Darwinian Selection
When it comes to warfare “most models of human conflict tend to focus on military
power, predicting that- all else equal- the stronger side will prevail” (Johnson, 2009). While this
logic has proven true many times, post WWII it does not hold the argument that it used to. The
reason being that before 1945 most conflicts where state on state conflict. Today’s modern
conflicts have been primarily sate on non-state actors, this is due to more globalized network of
interaction between different parts of the world. When states go head to head with a non-state
actor group, whether in their own country and another recent history has shown that traditional
warfare and “cold war” tactics cannot prevail against an insurgency. Killcullen talks about an
insurgency and the environment it works in as biological system. In terms of tactics, Darwinian
Selection has been applied to why non-state groups change and adopt tactics to take on more
powerful state actors.
According to Johnson application on Darwinian selection shows “stronger sides may
suffer a disadvantage” (Johnson, 2009). The three areas he highlights are Variation, Selection,
and Replication. Essentially “weaker sides adapt faster and more effectively” (Johnson, 2009) in

11. this case Islamic insurgencies, whom Johnson also looked at as well. Johnson states that much
like in the wild, insurgencies change tactics through natural selection. The reason this is
applicable is “organisms must constantly adapt just to stay in the same strategic position relative
to their enemies” (Sagrain, 2003), such is the case with any insurgency. Non-state actors have to
adapt to counter-reactions by state actors as well as stay one step ahead. But have Islamic groups
used variations of tactics? Selected the successful ones and continue to replicate these tactics?
Caliphates and Sharia Law: A Case Study of Radical Islamic Groups
Tactical adoption and Darwinian Selection sound good in theory, but what of its real
world application? Have we seen Islamic groups go from traditional insurgencies to insurgencies
utilizing terrorism? With the Islamic resurgence the world began to see an increase Islamic
activism, starting with the Iranian revolution in 1979. This is an example of a pure insurgency,
and others have occurred such as the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq and the Houthi Rebellion in
Yemen. The well-known insurgency that has come out of the conflict in the Middle East is the
Taliban in Afghanistan. The Center of Security Studies in Switzerland recently published an
article discussing what they call the “Talibanization of Insurgency” (Mahadevan, 2014). The
Taliban got its start with the mujahedeen that fought against the soviet invasion in the 1980’s but
was officially founded by Mullah Omar in 1994 as a milita that then took over governmental
control until 2001. The Taliban serves as a forefather of sorts within the present day Islamic
insurgent groups.
The Taliban
Post-soviet invasion there was a power vacuum in Afghanistan, one that the Taliban filled
quickly and efficiently. “The Taliban have long had an innate understanding of guerrilla tactics

12. at the field level, based on the accumulated wisdom of three decades of civil war in Afghanistan”
(Mahadevan, 2014), this has allowed them to sustain a prolonged insurgency against the afghan
government and U.S. forces. The Taliban has used guerilla tactics against U.S. forces, Taliban
fighters were notorious for ambushes and raids against U.S convoys and patrols in the Helmand
and Kandahar provinces. Subversion was also part of the Taliban arsenal, “It is known that the
Taliban spent the years 2002–05 infiltrating large numbers of cadres into Afghanistan, from safe
havens in Pakistan” (Mahadevan, 2014). This would allow the Taliban to expand its insurgency
across Afghanistan, thus gaining territory and a foothold.
While original Taliban tactics were successful, counter measures by U.S. and Afghan
forces forced them to adopt new tactics to keep an edge. Post 2005 the Taliban increased its use
of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s) against U.S. and Afghan forces, this terrorist style
tactic proved effective, “Afghan IEDs can be built for as little as $265 apiece. The US
government, in contrast, spent $ 18 billion on designing and manufacturing bomb-detection
equipment” (Mahadevan, 2014). Not only has the Taliban changed the existing social order
before but wishes to do so again, which makes them an insurgency. However as the fight has
raged new tactics have been adopted to react to pressure. The Haqqini network, a faction within
the Taliban has used Kidnapping for Ransom as a fear tactic and as way to raise funds. But some
scholars believe this has left Afghanistan, many Taliban fighters came from outside of
Afghanistan and such have taken those tactics back home. “Although the Taliban model of
insurgency has yet to be exactly replicated in other contexts, some aspects can already be noticed
elsewhere” (Mahadevan, 2014), this shows the influence of the global paradigm that has
developed from globalized jihad into other areas such as North Africa.
Al Shabbab in Somalia

13. Al-Shabbab is a radical Islamic group out of Somalia that formed out of the Islamic
Courts union in 2006. From their beginnings Al-Shabbab was an insurgency, engaging Ethiopian
forces and forming strongholds. However when African Union and other governmental forces
began to successfully combat them Al-Shabbab shifted its tactics. “Late September 2013, a small
team of gunmen attacked the upscale Westgate shopping center” (Bryden, 2014). This attack
highlighted Al-Shabbab’s shift into implementing terrorist attacks to further their agenda. They
have also employed suicide bombings and “suicide infantry”. This and the July 2010 bombings
were both conducted by Al-Shabbab’s Martyrdom Brigade. This brigade carries out many
terrorist style suicide missions, usually outside of Somalia. In comparison the group utilizes its
insurgency component in country. On a global perspective Al-Shabbab is not hiding trade secrets
“ Jacob Zenn, an expert on Boko Haram who has advised the State Department on the terror
group, said worrying signs have emerged of the extremists communicating and sharing tactics
with al Shabaab” (Vos & Smith , 2014).
Boko Haram in Nigeria
Organized by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 out of Northern Nigeria Boko Haram is radical
Islamic group that despite having been around for more than a decade has recently gained
momentum in their cause. Originally Boko Haram was seen as a pure terrorist group employing
suicide bombing attacks and drive by assassinations of key political figures. The group has
become a full- fledged insurgency, attacking government forces to remove them a seize territory
to establish bases of operation. “Boko Haram's tactics have changed accordingly, from smash
and dash attacks, killing thousands, into attempts to grab and hold territory” (Grossman &
Joscelyn, 2014). Despite this image change Boko Haram still utilizes terrorist tactics, their latest
being kidnapping. “Perhaps less sophisticated than other tactics, kidnapping has become one of

14. the group’s primary funding sources, a way to extract concessions from the Nigerian state and
other governments” (Zenn, 2013). The spotlighted kidnapping was that of 276 young girls from a
school in northern Nigeria.
While Boko Haram does not fall into a straight forward transition of insurgency adopting
terrorism, they still qualify. Not only is Boko Haram another example of an insurgency utilizing
terrorist tactics, it reinforces the global paradigm threat as both groups not only have affiliation
with each other, but Al-Qaeda as well.
Gaps and Analysis: Redefine the Enemy and Rethink our Tactics
When it comes to insurgency and the ins and outs of its practice there is an abundance of
literature and scholarly research. Even with this abundance, there are area that have yet to be
covered or thoroughly explored. Most insurgency literature still follows classical thought process
a structure, meaning they still view individual insurgencies as singular entities. As Killcullen
discusses in his thesis, he views these insurgencies as a global movement. These Islamic
insurgencies are united through their common religious beliefs. Add our fast paced globalized
society and you have a vast network. On top of this when it comes to globalized insurgency
practitioners and academics have not studied if this globalized is unique to radical Islam or if it
can be replicated. When it comes to terrorism vs insurgency, many scholars have done extensive
work on both areas and compared and contrasted them. The areas that need to be covered is the
pressing of terrorism as at tactic and not a living thing.
In the realm of tactical adoption there were some gaps to consider. Much literature covers
how tactical adoption occurs and that in fact it’s a phenomena; but why does it occur? Many
scholars have looked into the histories and timelines of groups like the Taliban and Boko Haram

15. adopting terrorism as tactic along with distinguishing pure terrorists from insurgency movements
but the real how has not been established. What kind of government actions push non-state actors
to terrorism in an insurgency? When do these groups find it acceptable to target their own
population that they are relying on for support? Is there a point of no return for the use of
terrorism, one this tactic is adopted can the use of guerilla tactics not make up for the use of
terrorism?
Conclusion: Recommendations on the Enemy and Tactics
If there is anything Killcullen and Lichbach agree on is this “Terrorism is only a means to
an end” (Killcullen, 2004 ). Lichbach’s work has also shown that the adoption of terrorism by
insurgency groups is not a new thing. Along with the global paradigm perspective one thing is
clear, we need to re-think our adversary and the use of tactics on both sides. Through some
research and my own viewpoints I have defined these two terms:
 Radical Islamic Insurgency- Non-State actors who use insurgent tactics in hope to
obtain the goals of a radical Islamic ideology as well as overthrow the existing social
order and establish shria law or other radical Islamic influences as the governing body.
 Insurgent Based Terrorism- Non-State/Insurgent actors that adopt the use of terrorism
as a tactic in their armed/guerilla conflict against a state actor.
As other scholars have shown that classic logic and classic counter paradigms have become
archaic and present day logic and understanding must come into play. But to change logic, must
change definition and enhance our understanding. Insurgencies are complex but have simple
motivations and needs, they become part of the very environments they wish to change making
them difficult to up root.

16. What I recommend is not more research or new policy, it is both. We do need to change
policy to improve the effectiveness of both counter-terrorism (CT) and counter-insurgency
(COIN) operations. This is a tweak of Killcullen’s proposal of focusing on COIN operations.
Both forms of counter-operations are required but both need to be formatted to a global scale.
Unlike traditional insurgencies which are usually tied to an individual areas, the campaigns of
the Taliban, Boko Haram, Al-Shabbab and other radical groups are tied together through
religious nationalism of Radical Islam (I say radical because the schools of thought and
ideologies of these groups differ from non-radical Islam). This has allowed the global jihadist
movement to extend far beyond the mountains of Afghanistan or the Arabian Peninsula. So how
do we improve? There are four areas of effectiveness we need to improve:
1. Tactical Adoption Factors- we must understand how and why a group decides to use
guerilla or terrorist tactics
2. Advising and Low Key Presence- if U.S. intervention is required, we do not need an
invasion force, teach and monitor should be our motto.
3. Accurate Framework- goals and objectives must be set before stepping foot in-country.
Eradicating a group is not enough, we have to stabilize.
4. Networking and Cultural Awareness- proposed by Killcullen, one must understand the
area he is in. outsiders have the disadvantage of no local knowledge.
At the end of the day, most insurgencies must be dealt with by the locals, that being said in our
highly globalized world outside interventions from super powers and other countries is
inevitable. The line between a radical and a patriot is a thin one and only time and a final
outcome will decide what the history books will say. Knowledge is said to be power, but is
useless unless it is utilized to better yourself and any situation that needs resolution. If this logic

17. is adopted then we can effectively combat non-state extremist violence and the global jihadist
movement more effectively, maybe to bring an end but at least turn the tide.

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