Libya - Security 2006

SECURITY, Libya
Date Posted: 06-Jan-2006

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa

SECURITY
Terrorism and Insurgency TOP

· Libya experienced an Islamist insurgency in the mid 1990s in the form of militant groups
that sought to overthrow the regime.
· By the end of the 1990s the regime had succeeded in wiping out these groups, although
some remnants are rumoured to still be operating.
· Ghadaffi remains vigilant against any resurgence of Islamist activity and continues to
suppress any suspected Islamist opponents.
· Ghadaffi has used the threat of international terrorism as a means of increasing his
domestic security apparatus to guard against possible domestic unrest.

Terrorist/Insurgent Threat TOP

Libya has faced threats from Islamist insurgents in the passed, but currently there is no major
terrorist or insurgent threat to the security of the regime.

Religious Militant TOP

Militant Islamist

Like all of the countries of North Africa Libya experienced an Islamist revival following the
Iranian revolution of 1979 and Libyan volunteers went to fight in Afghanistan during the
1980s. It was at this time that the stirrings of Islamist militancy began to appear inside Libya
as a number of Sheikhs began covertly preaching jihad. After the end of the war against the
Soviets in Afghanistan Libyan veterans turned their attentions towards the Ghadaffi regime.
This came to the fore in the mid-1990s when a number of extremist groups began to emerge.
There was a series of clashes between security forces and Islamic militants around Benghazi
in 1996 and to a lesser extent in 1997. Many of the attacks were attributed to the Fighting
Islamic Group of Libya (FIGL) that was set up by a group of veterans of the war in
Afghanistan in 1990. Major counter-insurgency operations were launched in the east of the
country under the guise of military exercises or anti-crime operations and suppressed the
insurgency in concert with a vigorous intelligence operation against dissidents. Many of those
members of the organisation that had escaped death or arrest fled the country and sought
refuge either in Europe or in Afghanistan. However, some remnants of these militants are
thought to still be active in the mountains in the east of the country, although they are thought
to consist of a few pockets of individual jihadists who are not linked to any particular

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organisation or group. It also appears that a number of Libyans have joined the jihad in Iraq.
Despite this, the regime remains vigilant against any potential Islamist opponents and as such
these elements cannot be considered to pose a real threat to the security of the regime.

In fact the FIGL has been greatly weakened in the past two years. Two of the movement's
main leaders, Abu Munder al-Saidi and Abdullah Sadeq were captured in the Far East where
they had fled after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The two men were returned to Libya
in 2004 and there has been no information as to their fate since. In October 2005 the
organisation received another blow when the British authorities arrested five Libyans
suspected of membership of the FIGL that the British like the Americans designated as a
terrorist organisation. In December 2005 the British authorities charged three of the men with
terrorist related support activities. In October 2005 the British government also signed an
agreement with Libya making provision for the men to be returned to Libya if convicted.

Counter-terrorism TOP

Prevention

Ghadaffi has repeatedly cited the threat of terrorism as a key area of concern. Indeed Libya
issued a warning about Osama Bin Ladin as early as 1995 and since the 11 September attacks
the Libyan leader has spoken publicly about the dangers of terrorism on many occasions. In
2004 Libyan Public Security Secretary announced that Libya had arrested a number of
suspects from Asia who were trying to enter the country and who it asserted had 'cultural
links' to Bin Ladin. However, this information was not publicly confirmed.

Whilst Ghadaffi is anxious about the possibility of Libya becoming a target for international
terrorists especially in light of its recent rapprochement with the US, the Libyan leader's main
worry continues to be domestic unrest, particularly that of an Islamist nature. In order to
counter the possibility of domestic terrorism or a rerun of the events of the mid 1990s, the
regime has adopted a zero-tolerance approach. It has brutally suppressed its Islamist
opposition regardless of whether it is violent in nature and regularly monitors those it
suspects of having Islamist tendencies. It has also taken steps to increase its internal security
apparatus to secure against potential dissent but has couched these moves in terms of counter-
terrorism measures. For example in 2004 Ghadaffi awarded the police military powers in
order for them to be able to tackle terrorism and also increased the number of security
personnel.

Revolutionary Guards Corps

A force of about 3,000 trained personnel with access to a variety of weapons, including main
battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers and helicopters. Some units are also reported to
have anti-aircraft artillery and guided weapons in their inventories. These units are linked to
the Revolutionary Committees Movement and their main duty is to protect the Leader and his
family.

Jamahiriya Security Organisation

Hayat Ann al Jamahiriya is Libya's intelligence/security service. It is divided into two main
wings, one dealing with domestic security and the other with foreign intelligence gathering
and operations. The latter is sometimes known as the Secretariat of External Security (SES)


and has been involved in operations outside the country aimed at liquidating opponents of the
regime. About 200 agents are thought to be active.

Proliferation and Procurement TOP

· Libya's military procurement programmes were hit hard by the imposition of sanctions.
Its ageing stocks of Soviet-era equipment are now in desperate need of replacing or
updating. Tripoli is looking to the West to help with this.
· Libya had an extensive illegal procurement network linked to A Q Khan to facilitate its
WMD aspirations. This network has been disbanded following Libya's decision to
abandon its WMD programme.

State legal TOP

During the Cold War Libya relied heavily on arms supplies from Russia and other Soviet
states, although it also looked to France and Italy. However as a result of the long period
under which Libya was subject to international sanctions combined with the end of the Cold
War, its military equipment became downgraded and is currently thought to be limited and in
very poor condition.

In light of the country's rehabilitation, the regime is now looking to upgrade its capabilities
and equipment. It has sought to buy from European countries, including the UK and France.
In February 2005 French Defence Minister, Michele Alliot-Marie, travelled to Libya where
she signed a letter of intent with Tripoli on military co-operation and procurement. In
addition in 2005 Libya attended the major arms fair that was held in London.

State illegal TOP

In December 2003 Libya announced it would abandon its weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) programs and open the country to immediate and comprehensive verification
inspections. This move brought to light details about Libya's proliferation programmes that
had long been the subject of international speculation.

In terms of nuclear proliferation it became clear that in 1997 Libya acquired 20 pre-
assembled P-1 centrifuges and the components for another 200. It was also in the process of
constructing three enrichment cascades. In 2000, Libya placed an order for 10,000
centrifuges of a more advanced design. Libya's involvement in the A Q Khan network also
came to light and the Pakistani scientist is reported to have supplied Libya with a nuclear
weapons design. This design was handed to the IAEA following the December 2003
announcement.

Libya was also engaged in trying to develop its chemical weapons programme and admitted
that it had produced around 23 tons of mustard gas agent in the Rabta facility during the
1980s.

However, under the terms of the agreement, Libya agreed to dismantle these programmes and
to eliminate all ballistic missiles with a range of 300 kilometres and a payload of 500


kilograms or greater. From 2004 US officials began airlifting components of the nuclear and
ballistic missiles programmes out of the country and in March 2004 over 1,000 tons of
centrifuge parts and missile parts were shipped to the US. Libya's chemical components were
also destroyed. In addition Russia removed 13 kg of enriched uranium that it had supplied in
the 1980s to the reactor at Tajura.

In light of the December 2003 announcement illegal proliferation and procurement is no
longer considered to be an issue.

Organised Crime TOP

· Human trafficking is considered to be the most pressing organized crime issue in Libya.
It is a transit country for migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa into
Europe.
· Drugs and consumer goods trafficking are also prevalent.
· Despite the government introducing legislation to deal with some of these issues, it
appears to have made few inroads into the problem.

Trafficking TOP

Human

Human trafficking is a major problem in Libya primarily as a result of its proximity to
Europe. It is a transit and a destination country for men, women, and children trafficked from
Africa and Asia for the purposes of sexual and labour exploitation. In a speech in March 2005
Ghadaffi noted that Libya is threatened by international challenges that include trafficking in
humans - particularly women and children. Articles 415 and 420 of the penal code
criminalise prostitution and prostitution-related activities, including sexual trafficking. The
state has arrested some of those involved, but there is little information on exactly what steps
the regime has taken and how effective they have been. There have been suggestions that
high-ranking officials are involved in some of these trafficking networks.

Those who have been trafficked that are caught are punished, generally through
imprisonment or deportation. However, Libya has begun working with foreign governments
to tackle the problem. In 2003, Italy and Libya signed a bilateral agreement to patrol their
waters jointly to try to prevent human trafficking. In February 2004, Libya extradited an
Eritrean trafficker to Italy after Rome issued her arrest warrant.

Drugs

Due to its geographical location, Libya has problems with transit trafficking, particularly for
drugs destined for Egypt. It is also believed that some heroin is trafficked into Tunisia
through Libya.

According to Libyan officials, although the country does not produce drugs, drugs trafficking
increased substantially in Libya from the end of the 1980s onwards and remains a serious
problem and drug use has also increased as a result. The country has introduced tough anti-


drug laws to limit trafficking but these appear to have limited effect.

Consumer goods

Smuggling of consumer goods is rife in Libya. Clothes and foodstuffs in particular are
smuggled across the borders primarily to Tunisia and Egypt. In addition sub-standard goods
are smuggled into the country and sold cheaply. There is also a major problem with people
smuggling foods and basic goods that have been subsidised by the government and selling
them abroad. However, the regime is currently working to cut subsidies, partly in order to
limit this illegal trade.

Many Libyans are motivated to export goods illegally by the complexities and bureaucratic
delays associated with formal import and export procedures.

Financial TOP

Tax/duty evasion

Tax evasion is a common problem in Libya and the tax system is subject to widespread
corruption and bribery. The regime is reported to be considering introducing a special police
force in order to deal with tax evasion.

Money laundering

In 2005 Libya introduced Law no. 2 to combat money laundering making it a crime
punishable by imprisonment and fines. The extent of the problem however is not known.

Front companies

It has been alleged that Libya was using front companies to finance and provide cover for irs
acquisitions from the A Q Khan network.

Counterfeiting TOP

Documents

Document forgery is prevalent in Libya and is relatively easy to do due to the inefficient
nature of the bureaucracy and the rampant corruption. Counterfeited documents include
passports, ID cards and education certificates. There are reported to be groups of individuals
behind this racket.

Currency

The Libyan dinar has been subject to counterfeiting especially in recent years. This forced the
government in 2003 to change the bank notes to higher denominations.

Countermeasures TOP

The state has introduced a number of laws in order to deal with organised crime, such as the
anti-money laundering law described above. It has also brought in anti-drugs legislation. In
addition Libya has also acceded to the United Nations Convention on Transnational


Organized crime.

As for human trafficking, in 2004 the Libyan government began engaging with other
countries to combat the problem. In June 2004, the Libyan Government organized a regional
conference where affected countries discussed, among other concerns, trafficking issues.
However, the regime has drawn criticism for its treatment of the victims of trafficking that it
generally deports back across the borders or to their country of origin. Furthermore, a
delegation of a group of MEPs that visited Libya towards the end of 2005 discovered that the
authorities were doing little to police the country's coastline and as a result boats of illegal
immigrants including trafficking victims were able to cross to Europe largely unhindered.

State Stability TOP

· Despite increased frustration among the Libyan population, there is no real challenge to
the security of the regime.
· Succession is an issue of discussion and many believe Saif al-Islam, Ghadaffi's son, will
one day take over, although this is by no means certain.
· Although the country is facing serious socio-economic challenges, the continued influx
of oil and gas revenues enables the regime to maintain control and manage the potential
for unrest.
· The most pressing issue for the regime is how far to implement reforms that will satisfy
western government without losing power.
· Despite the regime's repeated assertions about the need to encourage private sector
activity it has done little to promote this and continues to rely on revenue that comes
directly into the state purse.

Political stability TOP

Having secured its rapprochement with the Western powers in 2003-04, Libya's ostensibly
monolithic regime faces a more uncertain future internally as the economy struggles to
recover from a decade of crisis and society opens up to external influences. The main
question facing the regime is how far to go down the path of reform in order to secure better
relations with the West, while ensuring domestic stability. There is thus a struggle being
played out within the regime on this issue between those of a more reformist inclination and
the regime hardliners, who fear change.

The former include the current Secretary of the General People's Committee (GPC), Shukri
Ghanem (often referred to as Libya's Prime Minister), Foreign Minister Abd el-Rahman
Shalgam and Ghadaffi's son Saif el-Islam, who subscribe to the idea that Libya has to open
up somewhat if it is to take its place in the globalised environment. The latter group consists
primarily of Revolutionary Committee members - including Deputy Secretary of the GPC
Ahmed Ibrahim, and Secretary for Public Security Nasser el-Mabrouk - who are deeply
suspicious of reform and fear that such change may leave them sidelined. Ghadaffi
meanwhile is skilfully playing one side off against the other, using both sides to his
advantage as he navigates his way in the new environment. However, it appears that now that
foreign business is once again bringing money into the state purse, Ghadaffi is currently less
inclined to implement genuine reforms.


Governance

Having seized power in 1969 at the age of 27, Muammar Ghadaffi is still not an old man and,
short of an assassination, there is no reason to believe that he will cease to lead the country
and its esoteric revolution in the near future. Assuming that oil revenues will continue to flow
into the coffers of the state and that some sections of the economy can be opened up, there is
little reason to believe that internal pressures will force Ghadaffi to make more than token
political concessions.

Succession

After 36 years of charismatic personal leadership, there is much preoccupation over the issue
of succession in Libya and there are suggestions that Ghadaffi is preparing his eldest son by
his second wife, Saif el-Islam, to succeed him. Despite repeated denials that he is earmarked
as heir, Saif al-Islam has succeeded in consolidating his position in Libya's political and
economic life. Ghadaffi's other children are also playing an increasingly active role.
Mohammed controls the telecommunications sector and Olympic committee, Saadi controls
Libyan football and Hannibal the marine transportation industry. Others have important
positions within the armed forces, despite their youthfulness. However, it is currently Saif el-
Islam who has the ear of his father and is playing the most significant role.

Despite Saif al-Islam's closeness to his father however, his ability to retain control should he
take over remains doubtful. He has limited influence within the security services and is not
considered to be as charismatic or as shrewd as his father. He is also extremely unpopular
with large sections of the population despite his recent attempts to engage with them directly
and to convince them that he is serious about reform.

Military

Aside from an attempted coup in 1993 by a group of army officers from the Werfella tribe in
Bani Walid which the regime put down swiftly, the armed forces have not represented any
challenge to the regime. Ghadaffi is acutely aware that he came to power through a military
coup and as such is astute enough to ensure something similar will not unseat him. He
regularly engages in purges of the armed forces and has been able to assure loyalty.

Economic

As 95 per cent of the Libyan economy is reliant on energy income, economic stability is
related to oil price fluctuations. During the 1990s, aside from the fact that the country was
under sanctions, the economy suffered as a result of falling oil prices. Whilst the regime is
aware of this problem, it has taken few genuine steps to remedy the problem. However, there
continues to be a steady stream of oil and gas revenue coming into the public purse and in
this respect there is economic stability.

Societal

Despite the widespread frustration of much of the population that continues to suffer socio-
economic hardship, the regime remains firmly in control. Due to the fact that Ghadaffi has
prevented any opposition movement, genuine civil society or alternative power base from
even being set up and has a multi layered security apparatus Libyans have limited room to be


able to organise any sort of opposition or protest that might upset the status quo.

However, the gap between the regime and the population continues to widen with large parts
of Libyan society displaying an increasing religiosity that may be interpreted as a form of
passive resistance. Whilst there have been a number of small scale outbreaks of spontaneous
unrest in recent years linked largely to issues such as the non-payment of salaries, the security
services have no problem in containing the disruption.

Corruption

Corruption is widespread throughout every layer of Libyan society. Muammar Ghadaffi
depends heavily on the loyalty of his inner circle in both the military and government and has
access to the intelligence and sanctions of an effective security network as well as the lavish
rewards of state patronage.

Moreover key regime figures and increasingly their offspring are all benefiting from the
rewards and opportunities that Libya's opening up has brought. This is fuelling resentment
among the population that is seeing little of the benefits of Libya's new openness.

Social stability TOP

Ghadaffi is facing numerous problems at home as the population becomes increasingly
frustrated by ongoing socio-economic problems. These include an unemployment rate of 30
per cent and the burden of a state sector that employs 700,000 people, around 13 per cent of
Libya's population. State sector wages have not increased since the early 1980s and as prices
continue to rise the population is becoming increasingly restless as they are forced to take on
additional jobs or find alternative ways of making money. In the past, Ghadaffi was able to
blame Libya's economic woes on the UN sanctions and the US. However, this excuse is no
longer valid and the regime has to find a way to manage the potential for increased social
unrest. It has tended to do so by increasing security measures. It is also relying on its
favoured technique of buying off certain sections of the population in return for loyalty -
something that has been made easier since the lifting of sanctions and subsequently renewed
income flows.

Crime

Crime rates are thought to be relatively low in Libya although its is reported that there are
growing problems of theft and muggings. Violent crime however is not common. There is a
perception among the Libyan population that the influx of immigrants especially from Sub-
Saharan Africa in recent years has brought increased crime levels.

Drugs

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime no significant illicit drug production has
been reported in Libya. Drug abuse meanwhile is an increasing issue of concern in Libya,
especially among youths in urban areas. Heroin in particular is a problem.

Health

International sanctions and economic mismanagement gradually eroded Libya's health sector
during the 1990s and whilst the government is currently taking steps to improve the situation,

health care provision remains woefully inadequate. Health services are particularly poor in
the east of the country that has traditionally been starved of resources and infrastructure as a
punishment for its rebellious nature. Those who can afford to go abroad for treatment, many
to Tunisia or to Europe. Indeed, important figures within the regime generally travel to
European countries for health care, with the local Embassy usually expected to foot the bill.

Health training is also extremely inadequate and medical students regularly complain that
they do not have sufficient equipment in order to undertake their studies properly. As a result
some Libyans say they prefer to go to foreign doctors or dentists working in Libya.

Another problem within the health sector is that the wages of those working in the state
sector, like all state sector wages, have not increased since the 1980s. As a result most
medical staff who work in public hospitals also work in private clinics where most of their
attention is focused. Moreover there have been some doubts as to the quality of a number of
these private facilities.

Demography

Like all of the states of North Africa, Libya suffered from significant demographic pressures
during the 1980s and 1990s and as a result large numbers of the population are under the age
of 18. Although rates are now slowing the regime is struggling to meet the employment
demands of the youth population.

Environment

Libya's main environmental problem is desertification. It also has very limited natural fresh
water resources.

Human rights

The Libyan regime is authoritarian in nature and human rights abuses are widespread.
Anyone suspected of being involved in or sympathising with opposition or unauthorized
political activities is subject to severe retribution. Even belonging to an outlawed organisation
remains punishable by death and anyone who dares to publicly criticise the regime or the
Jamahiriyah system is liable to arrest and imprisonment. Torture is thought to be
commonplace. As part of its new opening to the West following the decision to abandon
WMD in December 2003 and its attempt to prove to the international community that it is
changing its attitude to human rights, the regime allowed Amnesty International to visit the
country for the first time in over a decade in February 2004. However, when Amnesty
launched its highly critical report after the visit the regime accused the organisation of being
politicised and threatened to sue it.

Social division

Ghadaffi continues to play Libya's tribal system to his advantage. Three major tribes are
important - the Ghadhafa (Ghadaffi's clan), the Magharfa (supporters of the marginalised
former deputy leader Major Abd el-Salam Jalloud) and the Warfella (accused of supporting
the October 1993 coup attempt) - from which Ghadaffi has traditionally drawn many of his
security personnel. Other tribes include the Barassa and Ubaydah tribes implicated in
resistance in the east.


More widely Libya remains divided by region. The three main areas - Tripolitania, Benghazi
and the Fezzan - retain highly separate identities not least because of the large uninhabited
areas that separate the regions. Some analysts have suggested that should the Ghadaffi regime
collapse, the three areas would separate. This is likely to be overplayed, as the country has
developed a sense of national identity over the past three decades. However, these divisions
remain acutely felt by the population.

There is also a growing social division between the rich and poor. The new class of
entrepreneurs that has been able to take advantage of Libya's opening up to the international
community has been able to amass vast sums of wealth. However, these individuals are
generally linked closely to the regime or are part of the informal power network that
surrounds Ghadaffi, provoking increased resentment among the wider population.

Arms prevalence

The large numbers of security personnel including the People's militias that were set up to
encourage the population to police each other has meant that there are significant numbers of
weapons in circulation. However, the nature of the regime is such that there is unlikely to be
any unauthorised group that could access arms or ammunition freely.

One major problem however is the fact that the sons of important figures within the regime
appear to have access to arms and as a result are able to threaten other citizens and engage in
low level violence. The police and security services are unwilling to intervene in such
situations because they are afraid of the connections of those involved.

Economy TOP

Black economy

Libya has a thriving parallel economy. This was in fact encouraged by the regime during the
period that Libya was under sanctions as a means of easing some of the pressures on the
population. However, as part of its rehabilitation the regime has made some efforts to limit
the black economy. In 2002 for example the government devalued its official dinar exchange
rate to bring it more in line with the unofficial one which has helped reduce illegal money
exchange. However, there continues to be significant illegal economic activity.

Single source reliance

The oil-dependent economy has allowed what is, by North African standards, a high level of
income per capita. However, this reliance on one commodity leaves the economy highly
responsive to world fuel prices. Economic hardships during the oil price slump of 1997-98
seriously affected government stability and the threat of economic collapse led to cuts in
public spending. Failure to release reliable economic data has meant that Libya's economic
performance can only be guessed at but it is believed that the economy has grown at a low
level since 1999 due to rising oil prices after the prior slump. Even so, GDP growth in 2004
and 2005 is predicted at just 5 per cent per year.

In recent years Ghadaffi has repeatedly stressed the need for Libya to diversify away from its
reliance on energy and to develop a private sector - something that was banned after he came
to power in the interests of pan-Arab socialism. However, despite the talk there has been little


action to try to remedy the problem and private sector activity remains extremely limited.

Financial collapse

Libya has significant income from oil and gas and as such there is no risk of financial
collapse. Libya's production of high quality low sulphur content oil suggests that there will be
a market so long as Libya has reserves, which is expected to be for at least a number of
decades.

Labour

Unemployment remains a major issue and it is estimated that around 30 per cent of the
population is unemployed. This problem is particularly acute among the young, many of
whom have drifted into the cities in search of work. The prospect of large numbers of
disaffected unemployed young men is a concern that Ghadaffi has expressed. However, there
is little evidence that the regime is doing anything serious to tackle the problem.

The other pressing issue for the regime is the bloated and inefficient public sector. State
sector wages have been frozen since the 1980s and as a result public sector pay is not enough
to live on. Most people take on additional jobs in the private sector in order to survive.
Moreover due to bureaucratic delays people often do not receive their salaries for months on
end.

Threat response TOP

Defence posture

Despite its small population and available manpower, Libya has attempted to maintain armed
forces of comparable strength to its much larger neighbour Algeria. The capability of these
forces has been largely untested since the late 1980s but is understood to have deteriorated
significantly from an already low level. The view in the West is that Ghadaffi's disastrous
1977-87 military operations in Chad, the military's only real experience of sustained
conventional combat, proved how ineffective the armed forces are. The military was further
disabled by purges of the senior ranks that followed a coup attempt against Ghadaffi in 1993.
Such conventional weakness doubtless spurred Libya in its pursuit of unconventional and
strategic weapons systems in the 1990s.

International Relations TOP

· Libyan foreign policy has gone through a number of phases encompassing pan-Arabism,
support to international terrorist groups and more lately, pan-Africanism.
· Libya's relations with the West are now on the mend following Tripoli's admission of
responsibility for a series of terrorist atrocities in during the 1980s. All sanctions on the
country have now been lifted.
· Libya remains on the US Sponsors of State Terrorism list, although it is working to
remove itself from this.
· Foreign affairs are now dominated by Europe's concerns over illegal immigration and
Ghadaffi's desire to be seen as 'the leader of Africa'.


Ghadaffi came to power in 1969 on a platform of anti-imperialism and Arab nationalism and
Libya's foreign policy has been based upon these concepts ever since. As a result, Libya has
had problematic relations with many Western states over the years. Ghadaffi's adventurist
policies have resulted in his being accused of supporting international terrorism and in Libya
being isolated for much of the past two decades. However, since 2001, Libya has worked to
resolve many of its outstanding issues with the West, notably the 1988 Lockerbie bombing,
the 1989 attack on a French UTA airliner and the La Belle disco bombing in Berlin in 1986.
Currently the major obstacles to Libya enjoying full relations with the West are the cases of
the Bulgarian nurses sentenced to death for allegedly infecting 400 Libyan children with HIV
and the alleged Libyan plot to assassinate Crown Prince (now King) Abdullah II of Saudi
Arabia. Both cases are thought to be on the road to resolution.

Bilateral TOP

United States

Libyan rapprochement with the US began following the events of 11 September 2001, as the
Libyan regime seized the opportunity of its common opposition to political Islam and jihadi
movements to lobby for a strategic realignment. From 2002, this alignment of interests
increasingly coincided with Ghadaffi's disillusionment with his African projects and his
rejection of the Arab League over its failure to mediate growing crises in Palestine and Iraq.
US rhetoric continued to denounce Ghadaffi, albeit linking him to proliferation rather than
terrorism issues. It appears that secret trilateral talks to end Libya's unconventional weapons
programme and bring it back into the fold appear to have begun on a British initiative in
March 2003. On 19 December 2003, British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that Libya
had decided to dismantle its WMD programme. Libya ratified the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in
January 2004 and joined the Chemical Weapons Convention in February 2004.

The repeal of the main part of the economic embargo - on US investment in Libyan oil and
financial sectors - in late April 2004 opened up possibilities for new investment in Libya by
US oil and gas companies. This followed the late February 2004 announcement that the US
was lifting a 23-year old ban on travel to Libya by US citizens, which was clearly intended to
aid companies wishing to do business with Tripoli. Libya is an attractive proposition for US
corporations as the country is not wracked by war or civil disturbance and much of Libya has
not yet been parcelled out for resource exploration, thus offering the possibility of major
long-term increases in returns on investment. In September 2004, the Bush administration
announced that it had ended the National Emergency that had been declared under President
Reagan in 1986. The US also formally revoked all remaining trade sanctions, lifted the
remaining economic restrictions on aviation services, permitted direct flights between the two
countries and unblocked approximately USD1.3 billion in assets that were frozen under the
Libya Sanctions Programme.

Libya's remaining aim is to get itself removed from the US state sponsors of international
terrorism list so that it can undertake the modernisation of its defence and transport sectors

and acquire the necessary technical competence to overhaul its energy sector.

Italy

As the colonial power in Libya between 1911 and 1943, and, together with Greece and Malta,
the nearest EU neighbour to Libya, Italy has long taken an active diplomatic and commercial
interest in Libyan affairs. Italy is the principal customer for Libyan oil and gas, buying over
40 per cent of Libyan crude and drastically increasing its gas supplies for the future. Libya
has at various times also posed a threat to Italy. With the US Mediterranean fleet based near
Naples, Libya attempted to launch a missile attack on the Italian island of Pantellaria in 1986
and could easily reach mainland Italy with its ballistic missile programme. However the
current threat is seen to arise more from the flow of African immigrants sailing from Libya to
Italy, and both states have an interest in countering this. In December 1999, Italian Prime
Minister Massimo D'Alema became the first Western head of government to visit Tripoli and
meet the Libyan leader since UN sanctions were imposed. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi
has made four visits to Libya since 2002, including in February, August and October 2004.

Multilateral/Regional TOP

Alignment/Alliances

African Union

Although Ghadaffi originally saw Libya as an integral part of the Arab world, the other Arab
states did little to help lift the sanctions imposed on Libya during the 1990s. Ghadaffi
consequently eschewed the Arab world in favour of closer relations with other African states.
The culmination of this policy was the founding of the African Union in mid-2002. Based on
the EU, this body superseded the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and aimed to unify
the continent's economic and security policies. In Ghadaffi's anti-imperialist vision, the AU
should go further and engender a unified continental polity and a single African army,
preferably based in Libya. While not strictly a Ghadaffi initiative, the AU relied on the
Libyan leader's determination and financial support to become a reality.

Ghadaffi has gone on to position himself as one of the principal statesmen of Africa -
certainly the leading Arab proponent of pan-Africanism - and is frequently consulted by
many other African leaders. While he has used this prestige to broker peace agreements for
some of the continent's civil wars, there have all too often been allegations that his regime
had a hand in spurring on such conflicts in order to broker a settlement dependent on or
favourable to Tripoli.

Arab League

Although probably on cordial terms with many Arab leaders, it no longer appears that
Ghadaffi believes in the pan-Arab cause and his boycotting of Arab League summits suggests
he has little faith in the organisation's ability to make a difference. In May 2004, he staged a

melodramatic walk out of the Arab League summit in Tunis, condemning it as worthless, yet
despite asserting in September 2004 that the Arab League was "finished", Ghadaffi is likely
to maintain a presence within the organisation as it is too important to withdraw from
completely.

European Union

Libya has yet to join the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (also known as the Barcelona
Process). European and Mediterranean foreign ministers had promised Libya in April 1999
that it would be given full membership of this co-operation programme for southern
Mediterranean states once all UN sanctions were lifted. This ambitious EU initiative is
designed to strengthen ties between EU members and southern Mediterranean countries and
aims to create a free trade zone throughout the Mediterranean region by 2010. Libyan
representatives attended some meetings of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as observers
before then. Full Libyan membership is dependent on written guarantees pledging to uphold
human rights, democracy, regional stability and free trade.

Libya is being strongly encouraged to co-operate with European governments in stemming
the flow of illegal migrants from Africa to the EU. It has signed a bilateral agreement with
Italy to this effect and is likely to work more closely with the EU on this in the future.
Relaxation of the arms embargo in September 2004 was specifically designed to allow Libya
to upgrade its coast guard and border surveillance capabilities to impede the flow of migrants
to the EU.

Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

The AMU (Union du Maghreb Arabe) was formed in Marrakech by the five Northwest
African states (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) in February 1989 during a
rare period of rapprochement between regional rivals Algeria and Morocco. Its original intent
was to promote political unity and an economic common position from which to approach the
consolidating states of the European Community/Union. However, the increasing isolation of
the Libyan leadership and the re-emergence of antagonism between Algeria and Morocco
over the Western Sahara effectively froze the fledgling institutions from 1995.

Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)

Representatives from eight Sahelian and Saharan African states met in Algiers in August
1995 to formulate a common policy to improve economic co-operation and improve security
in the region. Apart from Libya, delegates also came from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad,
Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. This Community of Sahel-Saharan States
(known as CEN-SAD) was subsequently founded by Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad
and Sudan. It has since expanded to take in most states of North Africa (excluding Algeria
and Mauritania) and Muslim West Africa (Benin, The Gambia, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo)
as well as the Horn (Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia) and the CAR.

NEW ENTRY
2006 Jane's Information Group


Libya - Security 2006

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