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2017 R.A.I.D. Webinar Series
• What’s it about?
• Insights from our Research, Analysis, Intelligence Division and other PhishLabs’ experts
• Hosted every month, exact dates TBD
• Focus on current threat campaigns – dissect attacks, scams, campaigns, and discuss threat
actors
• Goal: equip you to better secure your network, your employees, your company and your
customers
• Who should attend?
• Open invitation – feel free to share!
• Security leaders and professionals responsible for managing cyber threats
February agenda
2017 Phishing Trends & Intelligence Report: Hacking the Human
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017 PhishLabs
4
Crane Hassold
Senior Security Threat Researcher
Phishing Trends & Intelligence Report Purpose
• Provide insight on significant trends, tools, and techniques used by
threat actors to carry out phishing attacks
• Provide context and perspective into HOW and WHY these trends
are occurring
• By understanding the threat, we can better defend against it
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
7
Methodology
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
8
• Analysis of nearly 1 million confirmed malicious phishing sites hosted on more
that 170,000 unique domains and more than 66,000 unique IP addresses
• “Attack” = domain hosting phishing content
• Volume vs. Share
• Volume relates to the raw, cumulative number of attacks
• Share references the percentage of attacks relative to the entire attack population
Industry Trends: Who is Being Targeted?
• 976 brands from 568 parent institutions targeted by phishing attacks in 2016
• 91% of all attacks targeted five industries
• Financial institutions
• Cloud storage services
• Webmail/online services
• Payment services
• E-commerce sites
• Attack volume targeting the top 5 industries grew by an average of 33%
• Financial institutions still the most targeted industry…barely
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
9
The Rise of Cloud Storage Phish
• Attacks targeting cloud storage services
expected to surpass those targeting
financial institutions in 2017
• Percentage of attacks targeting FIs have been
steadily declining
• Cloud storage phish made up less than 10%
in 2013; now account for nearly a quarter
• 90% of cloud storage phish target only
two companies (Google, Dropbox)
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
10
Evolving Motivations
• Three primary motivations for fraud-based phishing:
1. Immediate Account Takeover
2. Credential Proliferation
3. Data Diversification
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
11
Motivation #1: Immediate Account Takeover
• Historically, the primary motivator for phishing
attacks
• Targets are usually banks and payment service
companies
• Immediate, direct profit
• Industries impacted by these attacks have seen
a decline in volume
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
12
2013
64%
2016
37%
Motivation #2: Credential Proliferation
• Attackers mass harvest credentials for the
purpose of attacking secondary targets
• Focused on web services that use email
addresses as a primary credential
• Indirect profit
• Significant increase in targeting
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
13
2013
21%
2016
46%
A Systemic Vulnerability
• The shift in targeted industries is driven by a major vulnerability -- the use of email
address as a primary credential
• Target one = target all
• Facilitates password reuse attacks
• 39% of users reuse passwords across services (Pew Research, 2017)
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
14
A Systemic Vulnerability
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
15
Motivation #3: Data Diversification
• Purpose is to collect more comprehensive
information about a victim
• Impacted industries include e-commerce
sites and government services
• Phishing attacks targeting tax agencies have
increased 300% since 2014
• IRS phish in January 2016 exceeded volume of
attacks seen in all of 2015
• Less frequent, higher impact
• Used to commit other types of crimes (e.g.,
identify theft, tax fraud)
• Also used to facilitate future phishing activity
(e.g., phone numbers)
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
16
Why are We Seeing This Shift?
• Phishing threat actors are evolving their tactics to:
1. Make their jobs easier
2. Expand the avenues of profit
3. Take advantage of ease-of-use features built into many websites
• By shifting their targets and techniques, phishers have:
1. Made credential collection more efficient
2. Focused on collecting a wider breadth of information to facilitate other crimes
3. Moved to a more indirect, but likely more lucrative, profit motive
4. Adapted to security controls used by FIs and payment service companies
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
17
What are the Implications?
• Password reuse attacks serious threat to secondary targets
• Cloud storage and SaaS accounts are not the primary targets
• Expect that customers have already been compromised elsewhere
• “It’s not my problem” paradox
• Brand reputation issues
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
18
Country Trends: Where are the Attacks Happening?
• 81% of phishing attacks target US-based
entities
• Significant increase in attacks targeting
Canadian targets (+237%)
• Focused on financial institutions
• Sustained increase, not a quick spike
• Switzerland, France, Italy, Germany also
saw increases
• China, Australia, Great Britain saw
significant declines in attacks
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
20
Hosting Locations: Where are Phish Hosted?
• More than half of all phishing sites
hosting in the United States
• Sharp increase in the number of phish
hosted in Eastern Europe
• Decline in phish hosted in East Asia
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
21
Top-Level Domains: How are Phish Hosted?
• 51% of phishing sites hosted on .COM TLD
• New gTLDs still associated with a small
fraction of phishing sites, but they’re
growing
• 220 new gTLDs observed in 2016 vs. 66 in 2015
• Inexpensive option for phishers looking to have
control over their infrastructure
• Allow phishers to create legitimate-looking
domains
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
22
Phish Kits: How are Phish Made?
• Kits are the “recipe” for creating most phishing sites
• Collecting & analyzing kits give us a more in-depth understanding of techniques
used to carry out phishing scams
• Anti-detection techniques
• Access controls
• Code obfuscation
• Data exfiltration
• Collected more than 29,000 kits in 2016 targeting 300+ different companies
• More than a third used techniques to evade detection
• 29% used methods to evade browser-based blocking
• 22% utilized mechanisms to restrict access to phishing site
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
23
Ransomware: Yeah, That Happened…
• Ransomware has been around for decades, but saw a massive surge in 2016
• Phishing was, by far, the most common method of delivery
• Simplicity led to copycats
• Ransomware-as-a-service
• High rate of infection, low rate of payment
• Threat actors evolved targeting tactics to change from individuals to strategic
businesses
Proprietary and Confidential
Copyright 2017PhishLabs
24
2017 Phishing Trends & Intelligence Report: Hacking the Human
2017 Phishing Trends & Intelligence Report: Hacking the Human

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2017 Phishing Trends & Intelligence Report: Hacking the Human

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  • 2. 2017 R.A.I.D. Webinar Series • What’s it about? • Insights from our Research, Analysis, Intelligence Division and other PhishLabs’ experts • Hosted every month, exact dates TBD • Focus on current threat campaigns – dissect attacks, scams, campaigns, and discuss threat actors • Goal: equip you to better secure your network, your employees, your company and your customers • Who should attend? • Open invitation – feel free to share! • Security leaders and professionals responsible for managing cyber threats
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  • 4. February agenda 2017 Phishing Trends & Intelligence Report: Hacking the Human Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017 PhishLabs 4 Crane Hassold Senior Security Threat Researcher
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  • 7. Phishing Trends & Intelligence Report Purpose • Provide insight on significant trends, tools, and techniques used by threat actors to carry out phishing attacks • Provide context and perspective into HOW and WHY these trends are occurring • By understanding the threat, we can better defend against it Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 7
  • 8. Methodology Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 8 • Analysis of nearly 1 million confirmed malicious phishing sites hosted on more that 170,000 unique domains and more than 66,000 unique IP addresses • “Attack” = domain hosting phishing content • Volume vs. Share • Volume relates to the raw, cumulative number of attacks • Share references the percentage of attacks relative to the entire attack population
  • 9. Industry Trends: Who is Being Targeted? • 976 brands from 568 parent institutions targeted by phishing attacks in 2016 • 91% of all attacks targeted five industries • Financial institutions • Cloud storage services • Webmail/online services • Payment services • E-commerce sites • Attack volume targeting the top 5 industries grew by an average of 33% • Financial institutions still the most targeted industry…barely Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 9
  • 10. The Rise of Cloud Storage Phish • Attacks targeting cloud storage services expected to surpass those targeting financial institutions in 2017 • Percentage of attacks targeting FIs have been steadily declining • Cloud storage phish made up less than 10% in 2013; now account for nearly a quarter • 90% of cloud storage phish target only two companies (Google, Dropbox) Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 10
  • 11. Evolving Motivations • Three primary motivations for fraud-based phishing: 1. Immediate Account Takeover 2. Credential Proliferation 3. Data Diversification Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 11
  • 12. Motivation #1: Immediate Account Takeover • Historically, the primary motivator for phishing attacks • Targets are usually banks and payment service companies • Immediate, direct profit • Industries impacted by these attacks have seen a decline in volume Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 12 2013 64% 2016 37%
  • 13. Motivation #2: Credential Proliferation • Attackers mass harvest credentials for the purpose of attacking secondary targets • Focused on web services that use email addresses as a primary credential • Indirect profit • Significant increase in targeting Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 13 2013 21% 2016 46%
  • 14. A Systemic Vulnerability • The shift in targeted industries is driven by a major vulnerability -- the use of email address as a primary credential • Target one = target all • Facilitates password reuse attacks • 39% of users reuse passwords across services (Pew Research, 2017) Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 14
  • 15. A Systemic Vulnerability Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 15
  • 16. Motivation #3: Data Diversification • Purpose is to collect more comprehensive information about a victim • Impacted industries include e-commerce sites and government services • Phishing attacks targeting tax agencies have increased 300% since 2014 • IRS phish in January 2016 exceeded volume of attacks seen in all of 2015 • Less frequent, higher impact • Used to commit other types of crimes (e.g., identify theft, tax fraud) • Also used to facilitate future phishing activity (e.g., phone numbers) Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 16
  • 17. Why are We Seeing This Shift? • Phishing threat actors are evolving their tactics to: 1. Make their jobs easier 2. Expand the avenues of profit 3. Take advantage of ease-of-use features built into many websites • By shifting their targets and techniques, phishers have: 1. Made credential collection more efficient 2. Focused on collecting a wider breadth of information to facilitate other crimes 3. Moved to a more indirect, but likely more lucrative, profit motive 4. Adapted to security controls used by FIs and payment service companies Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 17
  • 18. What are the Implications? • Password reuse attacks serious threat to secondary targets • Cloud storage and SaaS accounts are not the primary targets • Expect that customers have already been compromised elsewhere • “It’s not my problem” paradox • Brand reputation issues Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 18
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  • 20. Country Trends: Where are the Attacks Happening? • 81% of phishing attacks target US-based entities • Significant increase in attacks targeting Canadian targets (+237%) • Focused on financial institutions • Sustained increase, not a quick spike • Switzerland, France, Italy, Germany also saw increases • China, Australia, Great Britain saw significant declines in attacks Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 20
  • 21. Hosting Locations: Where are Phish Hosted? • More than half of all phishing sites hosting in the United States • Sharp increase in the number of phish hosted in Eastern Europe • Decline in phish hosted in East Asia Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 21
  • 22. Top-Level Domains: How are Phish Hosted? • 51% of phishing sites hosted on .COM TLD • New gTLDs still associated with a small fraction of phishing sites, but they’re growing • 220 new gTLDs observed in 2016 vs. 66 in 2015 • Inexpensive option for phishers looking to have control over their infrastructure • Allow phishers to create legitimate-looking domains Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 22
  • 23. Phish Kits: How are Phish Made? • Kits are the “recipe” for creating most phishing sites • Collecting & analyzing kits give us a more in-depth understanding of techniques used to carry out phishing scams • Anti-detection techniques • Access controls • Code obfuscation • Data exfiltration • Collected more than 29,000 kits in 2016 targeting 300+ different companies • More than a third used techniques to evade detection • 29% used methods to evade browser-based blocking • 22% utilized mechanisms to restrict access to phishing site Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 23
  • 24. Ransomware: Yeah, That Happened… • Ransomware has been around for decades, but saw a massive surge in 2016 • Phishing was, by far, the most common method of delivery • Simplicity led to copycats • Ransomware-as-a-service • High rate of infection, low rate of payment • Threat actors evolved targeting tactics to change from individuals to strategic businesses Proprietary and Confidential Copyright 2017PhishLabs 24