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The Truth About Top-Performing
Money Managers
Why investors should expect – and accept – periods of poor
relative performance
By Baird’s Advisory Services Research
Executive Summary
It’s only natural for investors to look at past performance when selecting
managers of either mutual funds or separate accounts. Almost everyone
is impressed by a strong track record. However, investors may be making
a crucial mistake by fleeing from recent losers and flocking to recent
winners, especially if they act on relatively short-term results.
According to a study conducted by Baird, at some point in their careers,
virtually all top-performing money managers underperform their
benchmark and their peers, particularly over time periods of three years
or less. Rather than abandoning a top-performing manager during one
of these periods, investors should anticipate and, quite often, accept this
performance cycle. Why? By chasing performance, investors fall into an
ongoing pattern of buying after share prices have risen considerably and
selling after they have dropped. This behavior opposes the basic tenet
of investing – buy low and sell high – and can cut dramatically into
investor wealth. In addition, past performance is only part of the story.
Professionals who analyze investment managers know that the drivers of
performance are equally important.
Our study, which updated and built upon prior research,1
revealed that
investors with the patience to stick with a top manager through trying
times are likely to reap greater rewards than those who chase the latest
winner. Although there are times when a change in manager is warranted,
our research revealed that the longer an investor sticks with a top-
performing manager, the better the chances of success.
This paper will explore the tendency of top managers to underperform
and the reaction of investors when they do. It will also offer insights to
help investors uncover the reasons behind a manager’s performance and
make informed decisions based on longer-term results.
- 2 -
Even the Best Investment
Managers Underperform
In general, money managers are
considered top managers when they
have a history of outperforming their
benchmarks and their peers. They
add real value by producing returns
that exceed management fees over
a long period of time. Our study
looked at a group of more than
1,500 mutual funds with a 10-year
track record as of December 31,
2010, and narrowed the list to 600
that outperformed their respective
benchmarks by one percentage
point or more, on an annualized
basis, over the 10-year period.
Furthermore, we included only those
that outperformed and exhibited less
volatility than the market benchmark.
This narrowed our list to a select
370 funds.
In dollar terms, these top performers
generated more than $10,000
in incremental wealth above the
benchmark’s return for every $100,000
invested over the period. The average
top manager in the study beat the
benchmark by nearly three percentage
points annualized, net of fees, adding
$34,000+ in incremental wealth.
Clearly, this is no ordinary subset of
managers. Their 10-year performance
records are truly outstanding. One
of the purposes of this study was
to determine what percentage of
these managers fell short of their
benchmark over any three-year
period within the 10 years.2
The
results are compelling. Despite their
impressive long-term performance,
almost all of these top-performing
managers underperformed at some
point. In fact, evidence confirms
that it is virtually certain that all
top-performing managers will go
through prolonged periods where they
underperform their benchmarks and
lag their peers.
Approximately 85% of those top
managers had at least one three-year
period in which they underperformed
by one percentage point or more. In
fact, on average, they underperformed
during six separate rolling three-year
periods (out of a total of 29). About
half of them lagged their benchmarks
by three percentage points (on average,
three separate times) and one-quarter
of them fell five or more percentage
points below the benchmark for at
least one three-year period.
When compared with their peers,
81% of them fell to below-average in
at least one three-year period – and
they remained below par for an
average of almost four quarters. It
appears that when managers fall below
their peer group median, they tend to
remain there for some time.
Depending on which of the three-year
periods investors looked at, they could
have been highly alarmed by what they
saw. Still, all of these managers were
top performers over the full 10-year
time span.
We also looked at shorter holding
periods of 12 months because, in
our experience, many investors make
decisions based on very short-term
performance. The results were even
more telling. All of the top managers
dropped below their peer group
average at least once. Compared
to their peers, there were many
12-month time periods when these
Evidence confirms that it is
virtually certain that all top-
performing managers will go
through prolonged periods
where they underperform their
benchmarks and lag their peers.
- 3 -
top managers disappointed investors.
Moreover, one-fourth of them went
through at least one 12-month period
where they underperformed their
benchmark by 15 percentage points or
more. Clearly, both the frequency and
magnitude of underperformance become
more dramatic over shorter evaluation
periods. Investors who focus on very
short-term results may be more
susceptible to making imprudent
investment decisions.
By these measures, it looks as though
all great money managers will go
through periods of underperformance.
What should investors do when they
find themselves in the midst of one of
these tough periods?
Shortsighted Investors Leave Wealth
on the Table
Most money managers and mutual
funds report performance results over
one-year, three-year, five-year and
10-year periods, as well as since
inception. However, in our opinion,
many investors take action based on the
first or second number, and begin a
pattern of chasing short-term performance.
85%
50%
25%
81%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1%+
(annualized)
3%+
(annualized)
5%+
(annualized)
Below the
Median
Percent of high-performing mutual funds that underperformed
their style benchmark over any three-year period
%ofTotal
Underperformed Respective Style Benchmark by ...
Investors who focus on very
short-term results may be more
susceptible to making imprudent
investment decisions.
Source: Morningstar; Baird analysis
Virtually all of the best
investment managers, based
on 10-year performance,
experienced three-year stretches
where they underperformed
their benchmarks and peers.
Source: Morningstar; Baird analysis
In at least one of the 37 one-year holding periods, nearly all of the top-performing managers
underperformed their benchmarks by three percentage points or more and fell below their peer
group average.
100% 98%
91%
57%
25%
100%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1%+ 3%+ 5%+ 10%+ 15%+ Below
Peer
Median
%ofTotal
Percent of high-performing mutual funds that underperformed
their style benchmark over any 12-month period
Underperformed Respective Style Benchmark by ...
Frequency of Underperforming Benchmarks
Frequency of Underperforming Over a Shorter Holding Period
- 4 -
As a proxy for gauging investor
behavior, we looked at money flows
into and out of funds following
changes in Morningstar’s star ratings,
which are based on past performance
relative to peers. The star rating ranks
funds based on relative performance
within their category over the
trailing three-, five- and 10-year
periods, adjusted for risk and sales
charges.3
As a result, a fund with
a strong 10-year record could be
downgraded if its three-year
performance fell well short of its
peer group.
We isolated any period over the past
10 years when a high-performing
fund was given a rating upgrade or
downgrade and then measured the
subsequent asset flows for the
following 12 months. When top-
performing funds in our study were
upgraded from three to four stars or
four to five stars, net money flows
over the following 12 months were
sharply positive – to the tune of
$14 and $331 million, respectively, on
average per fund. Similarly, flows were
decidedly negative (by approximately
$65 million on average per fund)
following a top-fund downgrade from
three stars to two stars, and $257
million for funds that experienced a
drop from two stars to one star.
This shows that investors tend to race
into funds after a period of strong
performance. As a result, they appear
to be buying high (as funds are
coming off a strong period) and
selling low (as funds are coming off
a weak period). This pattern of
behavior is in clear violation of the
cardinal rule of successful investing:
buy low and sell high.
So begins the path toward a less-than-
optimal outcome for investors. As
the chart to the left illustrates,
investors who bought a top fund after
it was upgraded would have indeed
fared well. Over the three years
following the rating change, these
funds produced an excess return of
1.4 and 1.7 percentage points over the
peer average, respectively. However,
the downgraded top-performing
funds performed even better, gaining
2.0 and 2.1 percentage points of
excess return, respectively.
This research reveals that most high-
performing managers can and do
make up lost ground and add excess
return following periods of weakness,
particularly over an intermediate-term
time period. By abandoning these
managers and failing to exercise
patience, investors can leave
significant wealth on the table.
Most high-performing managers
can and do make up lost
ground and add excess return
following periods of weakness.
By abandoning these managers
and failing to exercise patience,
investors can leave significant
wealth on the table.
Average three-year annualized excess return
of mutual fund after up/downgrade
Up 3 to
4 Stars
MeanThree-YearAnnualizedExcessReturnperFund
1.4%
0.0%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
1.25%
0.75%
0.25%
2.25%
1.75%
2.00%
Up 4 to
5 Stars
UPGRADE
1.7%
Down 3
to 2 Stars
2.0%
Down 2
to 1 Star
DOWNGRADE
2.1%
Source: Morningstar; Baird analysis
Over the 10 years ended December 31, 2010, top-performing funds that were
upgraded produced less excess return over the subsequent three years than those
that were downgraded. Investors who abandoned these managers would have
left significant wealth on the table.
High-Performing Managers Tend to Outperform
After a Difficult Period
- 5 -
Why a Long-Term Perspective
Is Important
Rather than leaving a top-performing
manager during difficult times, the
evidence suggests it pays to be patient.
Indeed, the longer an investor can wait
the better, as managers’ chances of
beating their benchmarks increase
with longer holding periods. For
example, when we looked at
performance over the shortest time
period, one quarter, the top-
performing funds in our study
outperformed just more than half
of the time. However, by extending
the holding period to five years, the
managers were able to add value
almost 75% of the time. Over
seven-year holding periods, more than
80% of them beat their benchmarks.4
This research confirms that
fluctuations in relative returns are
fairly common over shorter time
periods while outperformance is
achieved more often over longer
periods. Again, it is critical to avoid
making judgments based on short-
term performance and to evaluate
money managers over periods of
time that are long enough for them
to prove their worth.
Does It Ever Pay to Make a
Manager Change?
Manager performance can lag for a
number of reasons. Sometimes the
underperformance is expected and
is no cause for alarm. Other times
there may be signs of deeper
problems. Identifying potential red
flags means doing homework on
money managers – understanding
how managers have historically added
value and discovering the cause of
the underperformance. For example,
what are the managers buying? How
do they invest? Is the underperformance
within the range of expected variation?
Here are some considerations:
1.	Manager style. It’s unfair to paint
all managers in the same asset class
with the same brush. For example,
deep value managers look for stocks
selling at discounts to their historic
valuations, while relative value
managers look for stocks that are
cheap relative to their prospective
growth rates. Likewise, traditional
growth managers may have an
advantage over managers who
adhere to the “growth at a
reasonable price” investment style,
which tends to be more conservative.
In both of these cases, the managers
may be benchmarking to the same
indices, but showing very different
relative performance results.
Fluctuations in relative returns are
fairly common over shorter time
periods. It is critical to evaluate
money managers over periods
of time that are long enough for
them to prove their worth.
54%
59%
68% 73%
82%
46%
41% 32% 27%
18%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1-Quarter 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year 7-Year
Rolling Period Time Horizon
FrequencyofExcessReturn
% Outperform % Underperform
Number of
Observations 14,450 13,650 10,700 7,750 4,800
Source: Morningstar; Baird analysis. For the 10-year period ending 12/31/10.
It may pay for an investor to stay with a top-performing manager through times of poor relative
performance. The manager’s likelihood of success increases over longer holding periods.
Manager Performance Improves Over Longer Holding Periods
- 6 -
2.	Market environment. In our view,
investors should always expect some
of the money managers within their
portfolios to be performing well
and some to be underperforming,
particularly in very turbulent
market environments. Consider the
late 1990s, when money managers’
opinions of technology stocks
largely determined their relative
performance. If an investor retained
only those managers who were
outperforming, they would have
been left with an extremely
attractive portfolio, as defined by
recent performance. However, their
portfolios would also have been
quite poorly positioned for the next
couple of years.
		In turbulent markets, it is especially
important to avoid the herd
mentality, which can implicitly
result in a bet on just one side of the
market. Currently, sector and asset
class leadership is rotating quickly.
A diversity of opinion might achieve
a better balance.
3.	Asset allocation. Disciplined asset
allocation has been shown to add
significantly to investor returns.
Investors who approach manager
selection the way they approach
asset class allocation would
rebalance away from recent strong
performers and toward recent weak
ones. Thus, if they choose to stay
with a manager after a period of
weakness, they might be able to
add wealth by allocating additional
funds toward that manager. If they
decide to change managers after
a period of weakness, investors
should recognize they are selling a
potentially undervalued portfolio.
All that said, while much of this study
highlights the benefits of being patient
with underperforming investment
managers, complacency is not always the
best course of action. There are times
when a change is warranted. For example,
are the weak results sustained and evident
across investment environments? Was
outperformance expected given market
conditions? These could signal that the
manager has made several poor judgment
calls in the portfolio. Also, a manager
change may be prudent if there have been
unexpected qualitative changes, including:
• the departure of a key manager
• a new subadvisor
• a change in the investment process
• achange in firm ownership
• significant shifts in assets under
management
In summary, it’s probably smart to
stick with top managers who are
underperforming, if they are investing
consistently within their style and
process, even if it happens to be out
of favor. Likewise, it is understandable
if managers fall short because they are
underweighted in one or two stocks
or sectors compared with their
benchmark. Evaluating managers
over a full market cycle can offer
deeper insight into the story behind
the numbers. Unless the weak results
are sustained and widespread, or
supported by material changes in the
management team or process at the
firm, patience is likely to pay off.
The Due Diligence Process
How professionals choose and
monitor money managers
When choosing money managers,
it’s clear that past performance
doesn’t tell the full story. The
process of identifying quality
managers and then monitoring
their performance over time is
known as due diligence. In the
legal world, due diligence refers
to the care a reasonable person
should take before entering into
an agreement. In the investment
management world, it refers to
the deep investigation of a money
manager that takes place before,
during and after that manager is
recommended to a client.
At Baird, a team of analysts
conducts investment manager
due diligence. Their goal
is to minimize the risk of
underperformance by gaining a
full understanding of the story
behind the numbers. The process
is continuous with equal effort
applied to manager selection and
ongoing manager evaluation.
It includes these steps:
1. Initial manager screening
using a proprietary, multi-factor
model that encompasses 16
different factors scored over
various times periods
2. Preliminary and detailed portfolio
analysis, which requires weeks
of research and numerous
conversations with the
prospective money manager
3. On-site visits, which often lead
to important observations
that cannot be garnered over
the phone (continued)
- 7 -
A Lesson in Patience
The Baird study and others before it
offer an important lesson for investors:
virtually all top-performing
investment managers underperform
their benchmarks and their peers
sometimes – and when they do, it is
usually for a relatively prolonged
period. Investors who focus on these
short-term results may lose out on the
incremental wealth that top managers
are likely to add in subsequent years.
By extending their focus to long-term
performance, investors may reap the
rewards of their patience.
Investors will always be influenced by
a manager’s past performance. But by
holding managers accountable for
their body of work over time, rather
than their short-term results, investors
have a better chance of witnessing a
top manager’s true potential and
building greater long-term wealth.
To learn more about money manager
selection and performance, please
speak with your Financial Advisor.
4. Written investment thesis that
consolidates all information
gathered in the prior steps to
answer the question,“Why should
clients invest with this manager?”
5. Committee approvals to
ensure full agreement that
the manager is an acceptable
investment option
6. Ongoing due diligence used
to assess consistency among
people, process, philosophy
and performance
Although it is easy for investors to
access historical performance data,
deeper information becomes much
more difficult to uncover. A robust
due diligence process can bridge
that gap. Understanding the drivers
of performance can significantly
improve our chances of identifying
high-performing managers.
(continued from previous page)
- 8 -
1
In addition to the Baird study, see:
	Study of Outperforming Managers Reveals Extent to Which They Underperform Along the Way. B. Netzer and M. Wedel, Litman Gregory. September 2006.
	The Next Chapter in the Active vs. Passive Management Debate. M. Rice and G. Strotman. DiMeo Schneider  Associates LLC. March 2007.
	These research studies analyzed fund underperformance. The Baird study built upon that thesis to examine the peer-relative performance, performance over various time
periods and investors’ trading behavior in buying and selling funds, as well as offering perspectives on how to avoid common mistakes.
2 
For this analysis, we took a “snapshot” of each fund’s three-year relative performance calculated every quarter, much like a client would experience when receiving a quarterly
statement. This resulted in more than 10,000 observations (29 periods x 370 funds = 10,730 observations). The mutual funds were analyzed relative to their style-specific
benchmarks; for example, large growth funds were analyzed relative to the Russell 1000® Growth Index. We analyzed funds at the asset class level (i.e., Large Cap, Mid Cap,
Small Cap and International) and aggregated the data for presentation here.
3 
Mutual Fund Style Universe
Style-specific universe of mutual funds as categorized by Morningstar. The Morningstar-generated categories are created by incorporating all the funds in the respective
Morningstar categories that have at least 12 months of reported performance. The number of funds included in each category as of December 31, 2010, are 472 for Large
Growth, 596 for Large Core, 334 for Large Value, 231 for Mid Growth, 162 for Mid Core, 121 for Mid Value, 228 for Small Growth, 217 for Small Core, 105 for Small
Value and 399 for International.
	 High-Performing Mutual Fund Study
	Style-specific universe of mutual funds as categorized by Morningstar, which are created by incorporating all the funds in the respective Morningstar categories that have
at least 12 months of reported performance. As of December 31, 2010, according to Baird’s study, the number of funds with a 10-year track record and the number
outperforming by 1% or more and having a lower standard deviation are: 166/176/82 for Large Growth, 249/99/50 for Large Core, 142/61/32 for Large Value, 84/66/53
for Mid Growth, 80/17/9 for Mid Core, 80/15/6 for Mid Value, 83/71/53 for Small Growth, 90/66/41 for Small Core, 48/30/17 for Small Value and 187/78/26 for
International.
	 Morningstar Ratings
	The overall Morningstar rating for a fund is derived from a weighted average of the performance figures associated with a fund’s three-, five- and ten-year (if applicable)
Morningstar Rating metrics.
	For each fund with at least a three-year history, Morningstar calculates a Morningstar Rating based on a Morningstar Risk-Adjusted Return measure that accounts for
variation in a fund’s monthly performance (including the effects of sales charges, loads and redemption fees), placing more emphasis on downward variations and rewarding
consistent performance. The top 10% of funds in each category receive 5 stars, the next 22.5% receive 4 stars, the next 35% receive 3 stars, the next 22.5% receive 2 stars
and the bottom 10% receive 1 star. Each share class is counted as a fraction of one fund within this scale and rated separately, which may cause slight variations in the
distribution percentages.
4 
For the past 10 years ending December 31, 2010, we tracked the relative performance of each high-performing manager over various rolling time periods. For example, there
are 40 one-quarter periods over the past 10 years (40 periods x 700 funds = 28,000 total observations). We recorded how often these managers outperformed or underperformed
their respective benchmark over that time period. This same methodology was used to evaluate the managers over one-, three-, five-, seven- and 10-year periods.
Investors should consider the investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses of a fund carefully before
investing. This and other information is found in the prospectus. For a prospectus, contact your Baird
Financial Advisor. Please read the prospectus carefully before investing. Past performance is no guarantee 	
of future results.
© 2011 Robert W. Baird  Co. Incorporated. rwbaird.com 800-RW-BAIRD MC-32044. First use: 03/11

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The Truth about Top-Performing Money Managers - Dec. 2011

  • 1. The Truth About Top-Performing Money Managers Why investors should expect – and accept – periods of poor relative performance By Baird’s Advisory Services Research Executive Summary It’s only natural for investors to look at past performance when selecting managers of either mutual funds or separate accounts. Almost everyone is impressed by a strong track record. However, investors may be making a crucial mistake by fleeing from recent losers and flocking to recent winners, especially if they act on relatively short-term results. According to a study conducted by Baird, at some point in their careers, virtually all top-performing money managers underperform their benchmark and their peers, particularly over time periods of three years or less. Rather than abandoning a top-performing manager during one of these periods, investors should anticipate and, quite often, accept this performance cycle. Why? By chasing performance, investors fall into an ongoing pattern of buying after share prices have risen considerably and selling after they have dropped. This behavior opposes the basic tenet of investing – buy low and sell high – and can cut dramatically into investor wealth. In addition, past performance is only part of the story. Professionals who analyze investment managers know that the drivers of performance are equally important. Our study, which updated and built upon prior research,1 revealed that investors with the patience to stick with a top manager through trying times are likely to reap greater rewards than those who chase the latest winner. Although there are times when a change in manager is warranted, our research revealed that the longer an investor sticks with a top- performing manager, the better the chances of success. This paper will explore the tendency of top managers to underperform and the reaction of investors when they do. It will also offer insights to help investors uncover the reasons behind a manager’s performance and make informed decisions based on longer-term results.
  • 2. - 2 - Even the Best Investment Managers Underperform In general, money managers are considered top managers when they have a history of outperforming their benchmarks and their peers. They add real value by producing returns that exceed management fees over a long period of time. Our study looked at a group of more than 1,500 mutual funds with a 10-year track record as of December 31, 2010, and narrowed the list to 600 that outperformed their respective benchmarks by one percentage point or more, on an annualized basis, over the 10-year period. Furthermore, we included only those that outperformed and exhibited less volatility than the market benchmark. This narrowed our list to a select 370 funds. In dollar terms, these top performers generated more than $10,000 in incremental wealth above the benchmark’s return for every $100,000 invested over the period. The average top manager in the study beat the benchmark by nearly three percentage points annualized, net of fees, adding $34,000+ in incremental wealth. Clearly, this is no ordinary subset of managers. Their 10-year performance records are truly outstanding. One of the purposes of this study was to determine what percentage of these managers fell short of their benchmark over any three-year period within the 10 years.2 The results are compelling. Despite their impressive long-term performance, almost all of these top-performing managers underperformed at some point. In fact, evidence confirms that it is virtually certain that all top-performing managers will go through prolonged periods where they underperform their benchmarks and lag their peers. Approximately 85% of those top managers had at least one three-year period in which they underperformed by one percentage point or more. In fact, on average, they underperformed during six separate rolling three-year periods (out of a total of 29). About half of them lagged their benchmarks by three percentage points (on average, three separate times) and one-quarter of them fell five or more percentage points below the benchmark for at least one three-year period. When compared with their peers, 81% of them fell to below-average in at least one three-year period – and they remained below par for an average of almost four quarters. It appears that when managers fall below their peer group median, they tend to remain there for some time. Depending on which of the three-year periods investors looked at, they could have been highly alarmed by what they saw. Still, all of these managers were top performers over the full 10-year time span. We also looked at shorter holding periods of 12 months because, in our experience, many investors make decisions based on very short-term performance. The results were even more telling. All of the top managers dropped below their peer group average at least once. Compared to their peers, there were many 12-month time periods when these Evidence confirms that it is virtually certain that all top- performing managers will go through prolonged periods where they underperform their benchmarks and lag their peers.
  • 3. - 3 - top managers disappointed investors. Moreover, one-fourth of them went through at least one 12-month period where they underperformed their benchmark by 15 percentage points or more. Clearly, both the frequency and magnitude of underperformance become more dramatic over shorter evaluation periods. Investors who focus on very short-term results may be more susceptible to making imprudent investment decisions. By these measures, it looks as though all great money managers will go through periods of underperformance. What should investors do when they find themselves in the midst of one of these tough periods? Shortsighted Investors Leave Wealth on the Table Most money managers and mutual funds report performance results over one-year, three-year, five-year and 10-year periods, as well as since inception. However, in our opinion, many investors take action based on the first or second number, and begin a pattern of chasing short-term performance. 85% 50% 25% 81% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1%+ (annualized) 3%+ (annualized) 5%+ (annualized) Below the Median Percent of high-performing mutual funds that underperformed their style benchmark over any three-year period %ofTotal Underperformed Respective Style Benchmark by ... Investors who focus on very short-term results may be more susceptible to making imprudent investment decisions. Source: Morningstar; Baird analysis Virtually all of the best investment managers, based on 10-year performance, experienced three-year stretches where they underperformed their benchmarks and peers. Source: Morningstar; Baird analysis In at least one of the 37 one-year holding periods, nearly all of the top-performing managers underperformed their benchmarks by three percentage points or more and fell below their peer group average. 100% 98% 91% 57% 25% 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1%+ 3%+ 5%+ 10%+ 15%+ Below Peer Median %ofTotal Percent of high-performing mutual funds that underperformed their style benchmark over any 12-month period Underperformed Respective Style Benchmark by ... Frequency of Underperforming Benchmarks Frequency of Underperforming Over a Shorter Holding Period
  • 4. - 4 - As a proxy for gauging investor behavior, we looked at money flows into and out of funds following changes in Morningstar’s star ratings, which are based on past performance relative to peers. The star rating ranks funds based on relative performance within their category over the trailing three-, five- and 10-year periods, adjusted for risk and sales charges.3 As a result, a fund with a strong 10-year record could be downgraded if its three-year performance fell well short of its peer group. We isolated any period over the past 10 years when a high-performing fund was given a rating upgrade or downgrade and then measured the subsequent asset flows for the following 12 months. When top- performing funds in our study were upgraded from three to four stars or four to five stars, net money flows over the following 12 months were sharply positive – to the tune of $14 and $331 million, respectively, on average per fund. Similarly, flows were decidedly negative (by approximately $65 million on average per fund) following a top-fund downgrade from three stars to two stars, and $257 million for funds that experienced a drop from two stars to one star. This shows that investors tend to race into funds after a period of strong performance. As a result, they appear to be buying high (as funds are coming off a strong period) and selling low (as funds are coming off a weak period). This pattern of behavior is in clear violation of the cardinal rule of successful investing: buy low and sell high. So begins the path toward a less-than- optimal outcome for investors. As the chart to the left illustrates, investors who bought a top fund after it was upgraded would have indeed fared well. Over the three years following the rating change, these funds produced an excess return of 1.4 and 1.7 percentage points over the peer average, respectively. However, the downgraded top-performing funds performed even better, gaining 2.0 and 2.1 percentage points of excess return, respectively. This research reveals that most high- performing managers can and do make up lost ground and add excess return following periods of weakness, particularly over an intermediate-term time period. By abandoning these managers and failing to exercise patience, investors can leave significant wealth on the table. Most high-performing managers can and do make up lost ground and add excess return following periods of weakness. By abandoning these managers and failing to exercise patience, investors can leave significant wealth on the table. Average three-year annualized excess return of mutual fund after up/downgrade Up 3 to 4 Stars MeanThree-YearAnnualizedExcessReturnperFund 1.4% 0.0% 0.50% 1.00% 1.50% 1.25% 0.75% 0.25% 2.25% 1.75% 2.00% Up 4 to 5 Stars UPGRADE 1.7% Down 3 to 2 Stars 2.0% Down 2 to 1 Star DOWNGRADE 2.1% Source: Morningstar; Baird analysis Over the 10 years ended December 31, 2010, top-performing funds that were upgraded produced less excess return over the subsequent three years than those that were downgraded. Investors who abandoned these managers would have left significant wealth on the table. High-Performing Managers Tend to Outperform After a Difficult Period
  • 5. - 5 - Why a Long-Term Perspective Is Important Rather than leaving a top-performing manager during difficult times, the evidence suggests it pays to be patient. Indeed, the longer an investor can wait the better, as managers’ chances of beating their benchmarks increase with longer holding periods. For example, when we looked at performance over the shortest time period, one quarter, the top- performing funds in our study outperformed just more than half of the time. However, by extending the holding period to five years, the managers were able to add value almost 75% of the time. Over seven-year holding periods, more than 80% of them beat their benchmarks.4 This research confirms that fluctuations in relative returns are fairly common over shorter time periods while outperformance is achieved more often over longer periods. Again, it is critical to avoid making judgments based on short- term performance and to evaluate money managers over periods of time that are long enough for them to prove their worth. Does It Ever Pay to Make a Manager Change? Manager performance can lag for a number of reasons. Sometimes the underperformance is expected and is no cause for alarm. Other times there may be signs of deeper problems. Identifying potential red flags means doing homework on money managers – understanding how managers have historically added value and discovering the cause of the underperformance. For example, what are the managers buying? How do they invest? Is the underperformance within the range of expected variation? Here are some considerations: 1. Manager style. It’s unfair to paint all managers in the same asset class with the same brush. For example, deep value managers look for stocks selling at discounts to their historic valuations, while relative value managers look for stocks that are cheap relative to their prospective growth rates. Likewise, traditional growth managers may have an advantage over managers who adhere to the “growth at a reasonable price” investment style, which tends to be more conservative. In both of these cases, the managers may be benchmarking to the same indices, but showing very different relative performance results. Fluctuations in relative returns are fairly common over shorter time periods. It is critical to evaluate money managers over periods of time that are long enough for them to prove their worth. 54% 59% 68% 73% 82% 46% 41% 32% 27% 18% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 1-Quarter 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year 7-Year Rolling Period Time Horizon FrequencyofExcessReturn % Outperform % Underperform Number of Observations 14,450 13,650 10,700 7,750 4,800 Source: Morningstar; Baird analysis. For the 10-year period ending 12/31/10. It may pay for an investor to stay with a top-performing manager through times of poor relative performance. The manager’s likelihood of success increases over longer holding periods. Manager Performance Improves Over Longer Holding Periods
  • 6. - 6 - 2. Market environment. In our view, investors should always expect some of the money managers within their portfolios to be performing well and some to be underperforming, particularly in very turbulent market environments. Consider the late 1990s, when money managers’ opinions of technology stocks largely determined their relative performance. If an investor retained only those managers who were outperforming, they would have been left with an extremely attractive portfolio, as defined by recent performance. However, their portfolios would also have been quite poorly positioned for the next couple of years. In turbulent markets, it is especially important to avoid the herd mentality, which can implicitly result in a bet on just one side of the market. Currently, sector and asset class leadership is rotating quickly. A diversity of opinion might achieve a better balance. 3. Asset allocation. Disciplined asset allocation has been shown to add significantly to investor returns. Investors who approach manager selection the way they approach asset class allocation would rebalance away from recent strong performers and toward recent weak ones. Thus, if they choose to stay with a manager after a period of weakness, they might be able to add wealth by allocating additional funds toward that manager. If they decide to change managers after a period of weakness, investors should recognize they are selling a potentially undervalued portfolio. All that said, while much of this study highlights the benefits of being patient with underperforming investment managers, complacency is not always the best course of action. There are times when a change is warranted. For example, are the weak results sustained and evident across investment environments? Was outperformance expected given market conditions? These could signal that the manager has made several poor judgment calls in the portfolio. Also, a manager change may be prudent if there have been unexpected qualitative changes, including: • the departure of a key manager • a new subadvisor • a change in the investment process • achange in firm ownership • significant shifts in assets under management In summary, it’s probably smart to stick with top managers who are underperforming, if they are investing consistently within their style and process, even if it happens to be out of favor. Likewise, it is understandable if managers fall short because they are underweighted in one or two stocks or sectors compared with their benchmark. Evaluating managers over a full market cycle can offer deeper insight into the story behind the numbers. Unless the weak results are sustained and widespread, or supported by material changes in the management team or process at the firm, patience is likely to pay off. The Due Diligence Process How professionals choose and monitor money managers When choosing money managers, it’s clear that past performance doesn’t tell the full story. The process of identifying quality managers and then monitoring their performance over time is known as due diligence. In the legal world, due diligence refers to the care a reasonable person should take before entering into an agreement. In the investment management world, it refers to the deep investigation of a money manager that takes place before, during and after that manager is recommended to a client. At Baird, a team of analysts conducts investment manager due diligence. Their goal is to minimize the risk of underperformance by gaining a full understanding of the story behind the numbers. The process is continuous with equal effort applied to manager selection and ongoing manager evaluation. It includes these steps: 1. Initial manager screening using a proprietary, multi-factor model that encompasses 16 different factors scored over various times periods 2. Preliminary and detailed portfolio analysis, which requires weeks of research and numerous conversations with the prospective money manager 3. On-site visits, which often lead to important observations that cannot be garnered over the phone (continued)
  • 7. - 7 - A Lesson in Patience The Baird study and others before it offer an important lesson for investors: virtually all top-performing investment managers underperform their benchmarks and their peers sometimes – and when they do, it is usually for a relatively prolonged period. Investors who focus on these short-term results may lose out on the incremental wealth that top managers are likely to add in subsequent years. By extending their focus to long-term performance, investors may reap the rewards of their patience. Investors will always be influenced by a manager’s past performance. But by holding managers accountable for their body of work over time, rather than their short-term results, investors have a better chance of witnessing a top manager’s true potential and building greater long-term wealth. To learn more about money manager selection and performance, please speak with your Financial Advisor. 4. Written investment thesis that consolidates all information gathered in the prior steps to answer the question,“Why should clients invest with this manager?” 5. Committee approvals to ensure full agreement that the manager is an acceptable investment option 6. Ongoing due diligence used to assess consistency among people, process, philosophy and performance Although it is easy for investors to access historical performance data, deeper information becomes much more difficult to uncover. A robust due diligence process can bridge that gap. Understanding the drivers of performance can significantly improve our chances of identifying high-performing managers. (continued from previous page)
  • 8. - 8 - 1 In addition to the Baird study, see: Study of Outperforming Managers Reveals Extent to Which They Underperform Along the Way. B. Netzer and M. Wedel, Litman Gregory. September 2006. The Next Chapter in the Active vs. Passive Management Debate. M. Rice and G. Strotman. DiMeo Schneider Associates LLC. March 2007. These research studies analyzed fund underperformance. The Baird study built upon that thesis to examine the peer-relative performance, performance over various time periods and investors’ trading behavior in buying and selling funds, as well as offering perspectives on how to avoid common mistakes. 2 For this analysis, we took a “snapshot” of each fund’s three-year relative performance calculated every quarter, much like a client would experience when receiving a quarterly statement. This resulted in more than 10,000 observations (29 periods x 370 funds = 10,730 observations). The mutual funds were analyzed relative to their style-specific benchmarks; for example, large growth funds were analyzed relative to the Russell 1000® Growth Index. We analyzed funds at the asset class level (i.e., Large Cap, Mid Cap, Small Cap and International) and aggregated the data for presentation here. 3 Mutual Fund Style Universe Style-specific universe of mutual funds as categorized by Morningstar. The Morningstar-generated categories are created by incorporating all the funds in the respective Morningstar categories that have at least 12 months of reported performance. The number of funds included in each category as of December 31, 2010, are 472 for Large Growth, 596 for Large Core, 334 for Large Value, 231 for Mid Growth, 162 for Mid Core, 121 for Mid Value, 228 for Small Growth, 217 for Small Core, 105 for Small Value and 399 for International. High-Performing Mutual Fund Study Style-specific universe of mutual funds as categorized by Morningstar, which are created by incorporating all the funds in the respective Morningstar categories that have at least 12 months of reported performance. As of December 31, 2010, according to Baird’s study, the number of funds with a 10-year track record and the number outperforming by 1% or more and having a lower standard deviation are: 166/176/82 for Large Growth, 249/99/50 for Large Core, 142/61/32 for Large Value, 84/66/53 for Mid Growth, 80/17/9 for Mid Core, 80/15/6 for Mid Value, 83/71/53 for Small Growth, 90/66/41 for Small Core, 48/30/17 for Small Value and 187/78/26 for International. Morningstar Ratings The overall Morningstar rating for a fund is derived from a weighted average of the performance figures associated with a fund’s three-, five- and ten-year (if applicable) Morningstar Rating metrics. For each fund with at least a three-year history, Morningstar calculates a Morningstar Rating based on a Morningstar Risk-Adjusted Return measure that accounts for variation in a fund’s monthly performance (including the effects of sales charges, loads and redemption fees), placing more emphasis on downward variations and rewarding consistent performance. The top 10% of funds in each category receive 5 stars, the next 22.5% receive 4 stars, the next 35% receive 3 stars, the next 22.5% receive 2 stars and the bottom 10% receive 1 star. Each share class is counted as a fraction of one fund within this scale and rated separately, which may cause slight variations in the distribution percentages. 4 For the past 10 years ending December 31, 2010, we tracked the relative performance of each high-performing manager over various rolling time periods. For example, there are 40 one-quarter periods over the past 10 years (40 periods x 700 funds = 28,000 total observations). We recorded how often these managers outperformed or underperformed their respective benchmark over that time period. This same methodology was used to evaluate the managers over one-, three-, five-, seven- and 10-year periods. Investors should consider the investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses of a fund carefully before investing. This and other information is found in the prospectus. For a prospectus, contact your Baird Financial Advisor. Please read the prospectus carefully before investing. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. © 2011 Robert W. Baird Co. Incorporated. rwbaird.com 800-RW-BAIRD MC-32044. First use: 03/11