1.
PHILIPPINE
SOLUTION
TO
THE
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
PROBLEM:
MORE
PROBLEMS,
LESS
SOLUTIONS?
Rommel
C.
Banlaoi
Paper
presented
at
the
International
Conference
on
“Security
Environment
of
the
Seas
in
East
Asia:
From
the
East
and
South
China
Seas
-­
Power
Shift
and
Response”
organized
by
the
Ocean
Policy
Research
Foundation
(OPRF),
The
Nippon
Foundation
and
the
S.
Rajaratnam
School
of
International
Studies
(RSIS)
at
Marina
Mandarin
Hotel,
Singapore
28-­29
February
2012
INTRODUCTION
To
provide
an
overarching
solution
to
the
territorial
problem
in
the
South
China
Sea,
the
Philippine
government
launched
the
idea
of
the
Zone
of
Peace,
Freedom,
Friendship
and
Cooperation
(ZoPFFC).
Planned
to
be
discussed
at
the
19th
Summit
of
the
Association
of
Southeast
Asian
Nations
(ASEAN)
and
6th
East
Asia
Summit
(EAS)
in
Bali,
Indonesia
on
17-­‐19
November
2011,
the
idea
failed
to
get
into
the
conference
table
because
of
China’s
vehement
rejection.
Though
Vietnam
endorsed
the
idea
of
ZoPFFC,
China
argued
that
the
Summits
were
not
the
proper
forums
to
discuss
the
South
China
Sea
issue.1
Even
Malaysia
said
that
the
Philippine
proposal
would
"only
complicate
the
matter
further".2
Cambodia,
the
next
ASEAN
Summit
Chair
and
known
to
be
close
with
China,
stressed
that
while
it
was
not
against
the
idea,
"the
problem
is
how
to
avoid
duplication".3
Though
other
members
of
ASEAN
and
EAS
chose
to
be
silent
on
the
issue
after
China
made
its
strong
point,
the
United
States
supported
the
Philippine
initiative
to
promote
regional
stability
and
freedom
of
navigation
in
the
South
China
Sea.4
This
paper
describes
the
current
security
situation
in
the
South
China
Sea
focusing
on
major
incidents
occurring
in
2011
to
the
present.5
This
paper
also
presents
the
“Philippine
solution”
to
the
South
China
Sea
problem,
examines
the
merits
of
this
solution,
and
describes
the
limitations
of
Philippine
proposal.
This
paper
concludes
with
a
policy
recommendation
to
manage,
if
not
to
totally
resolve,
the
current
problem
in
the
South
China.
CURRENT
SECURITY
SITUATION
IN
THE
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
The
year
2011
saw
the
escalation
of
tensions
in
the
South
China
Sea
prompting
Robert
D.
Kaplan
to
describe
the
South
China
Sea
as
“the
future
of
conflict”.6
Increasing
assertiveness
of
claimants
manifested
through
resolute
diplomacy,
naval
capability
development,
and
increased
unilateral
patrols
and
surveillance
ship
activities
in
disputed
waters
is
the
main
source
of
increased
1

2.
security
tensions.
If
security
tensions
continue,
the
South
China
Sea
will
indeed
be
“ripe
for
rivalry”.7
Resolute
Diplomacy
in
the
Spratlys.
All
claimants
have
become
more
resolute
in
their
foreign
policy
positions
in
the
South
China
Sea.
They
all
claim
that
the
South
China
Sea
is
part
of
their
sovereignty
guaranteed
by
international
laws.
Claimants
use
all
possible
diplomatic
means
to
assert
their
sovereignty
claims
in
the
South
China
Sea.
But
clash
of
sovereignties
makes
the
resolution
of
conflicts
in
the
South
China
Sea
very
difficult.8
It
is
even
argued
that
the
South
China
Sea
disputes
will
not
be
resolved
in
the
foreseeable
future
if
sovereignty
issues
will
be
continuously
raised.9
Using
various
diplomatic
channels,
China
strongly
reiterates
its
“indisputable
sovereignty”
of
all
the
waters
and
features
in
the
South
China
Sea.
In
its
latest
Defense
White
Paper
released
in
March
2011,
China
renews
its
commitment
to
defend
its
“vast
territories
and
territorial
seas.”10
Taiwan
has
identical
sovereignty
claim
with
China.
In
August
2011,
the
Taiwan’s
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
released
an
official
statement
asserting
that
their
claim
in
the
South
China
Sea
is
non-­‐negotiable.
Taiwan
re-­‐affirmed
that
all
features
in
the
South
China
Sea
“without
a
doubt
fall
under
the
sovereignty
of
the
government
of
the
Republic
of
China
(Taiwan).”11
The
Philippines
asserted
its
sovereignty
claim
when
the
Philippine
Mission
to
the
United
Nations
submitted
a
Note
Verbale
on
5
April
2011
restating
the
Philippines’
claim
to
sovereignty
over
the
Kalayaan
Island
Group
(KIG).
President
Benigno
Simeon
Aquino
III
even
ordered
in
June
2011
the
use
of
“West
Philippine
Sea”
(WPS)
to
refer
to
its
claimed
waters
in
the
Spratlys,
particularly
around
the
KIG.
The
Philippines
also
hosted
the
Manila
Conference
on
the
South
China
Sea
on
5-­‐6
July
2011
in
the
attempt
of
the
Philippine
government
to
internationalize
the
South
China
Sea
Disputes.
In
Vietnam,
Prime
Minister
Nguyen
Tan
Dung
also
re-­‐affirmed
on
9
June
2011
its
“incontestable
sovereignty”
in
the
South
China
Sea.
The
Prime
Minister
exclaimed,
“We
are
ready
to
sacrifice
everything
to
protect
our
homeland,
our
sea,
and
our
island
sovereignty.”12
To
raise
Vietnam’s
international
profile
on
the
South
China
Sea
issue,
the
Diplomatic
Academy
of
Vietnam
organized
in
Hanoi
on
26
April
2011
the
Second
National
Conference
on
South
China
Sea
with
the
title
“The
Sovereignty
Disputes
in
the
South
China
Sea:
History,
Geopolitics
and
International
Law”.
Malaysia’s
claim
to
sovereignty
in
the
Spratly
is
based
on
the
continental
reef
principle
outlined
by
UNCLOS.
During
the
ASEAN
Bali
Summit
in
November
2011,
the
Malaysian
Minister
of
Foreign
Affairs
reiterated
the
need
to
implement
the
Declaration
on
the
Conduct
of
Parties
in
the
South
China
Sea
(DOC)
and
to
eventually
adopt
the
regional
Code
of
Conduct
in
the
South
China
Sea
(COC).
2

3.
Brunei
does
not
occupy
any
feature
in
the
Spratlys.
But
in
January
2011,
the
Sultanate
of
Brunei
re-­‐asserted
its
position
that
the
Louisa
Reef
being
claimed
by
Malaysia
is
part
of
Brunei’s
Exclusive
Economic
Zone
(EEZ).
Naval
Capability
Development.
All
claimants
in
the
South
China
Sea
strongly
uphold
the
peaceful
resolution
of
disputes
in
the
South
China
Sea.
But
all
claimants
are
also
developing
and
enhancing
their
naval
capabilities
to
assert
their
respective
claims.
Among
the
claimants,
China’s
naval
capability
development
is
the
most
controversial
and
the
much
talked
about.
In
August
2011,
China’s
first
aircraft
carrier,
Varyag,
started
its
sea
trial
and
navigated
the
waters
near
the
disputed
South
China
Sea.
China
also
started
in
2011
the
construction
of
its
indigenous
aircraft
carrier
to
be
finished
in
2015.13
The
People’s
Liberation
Army
(PLA)
Navy
also
deployed
in
2011
some
of
its
60
new
HOUBEI-­‐class
(Type
022)
wave-­‐piercing
catamaran
hull
missile
patrol
boats
in
its
coastal
waters
near
the
South
China
Sea.14
The
PLA
Navy
has
also
expanded
in
2011
its
force
of
nuclear-­‐powered
attack
submarines
(SSN).
China’s
two
second-­‐generation
SHANG-­‐class
(Type
093)
SSNs
started
its
operations
in
2011
and
it
has
been
reported
that
as
many
as
five
third-­‐
generation
Type
095
SSNs
will
be
added
in
the
coming
years.15
In
Vietnam,
the
Defense
Ministry
confirmed
in
August
2011
that
the
country
would
get
its
six
Kilo
Class
submarines
from
Russia
“within
six
years.”16
On
7
December
2011,
the
Rosoboronexport
and
the
Zelenodolsk
Gorky
Plant
finished
the
shipping
of
Vietnam’s
first
two
Gepard
Class
corvettes
and
have
just
signed
a
contract
for
additional
two
units.17
But
unlike
the
first
two
corvettes,
which
are
armed
with
surface
attack
weapons,
the
additional
two
corvettes
will
concentrate
on
anti-­‐submarine
warfare.18
Vietnam
also
received
on
5
March
2011
its
First
Gepard
class
frigate
from
Russia,
naming
it
the
Dinh
Tien
Hoang,
in
honor
of
the
first
Vietnamese
emperor.
In
June
2011,
the
Philippines
and
the
U.S.
navies
held
their
11-­‐day
Cooperation
Afloat
Readiness
and
Train
(CARAT)
in
the
Sulu
Sea,
a
water
less
than
100
nautical
miles
away
from
the
South
China
Sea.
On
17
August
2011,
the
Philippine
Navy
(PN)
received
the
delivery
of
second-­‐hand
Hamilton
Class
Cutter
(named
BRP
Gregorio
del
Pilar)
from
the
United
States.
The
PN
announced
that
it
planned
to
acquire
eight
more
of
this
kind
“within
five
years”
to
patrol
its
vast
maritime
waters.19
President
Aquino
III
even
announced
on
23
August
2011
his
dream
of
acquiring
a
submarine.20
In
October
2011,
the
Philippine
Marine
Corps
and
the
U.S.
Marine
Corps
held
their
Amphibious
Landing
Exercise
(Phiblex)
in
the
waters
West
of
Palawan,
a
maritime
area
close
to
the
South
China
Sea.
The
Royal
Malaysian
Navy
(RMN),
for
its
part,
announced
in
September
2011
the
deployment
of
its
Scorpene
Class
submarines
in
Sabah,
an
island
very
close
to
the
Spratlys.21
The
RMN
also
held
its
annual
Operation
Sea
Training
Exercise
(OSTEX)
on
15
July
2011
in
the
East
Malaysian
portion
of
the
South
China
Sea,
close
to
the
disputed
Spratly
Islands.22
3

4.
Meanwhile,
Taiwan
announced
in
October
2011
its
willingness
to
deploy
missiles
in
Itu
Aba
Island
to
assert
its
sovereignty
claim
in
the
South
China
Sea.
The
Taiwan
Navy
has
four
Kidd
class
destroyers,
eight
Oliver
Hazard
Perry
class
frigates,
eight
Knox
class
frigates,
six
La
Fayette
class
frigates,
two
Zwaardvis
class
submarines
and
two
older
Tench
class
submarines.23
Finally,
Brunei,
though
the
most
benign
and
low
profile
among
the
claimants,
also
joined
the
region
in
naval
development.
In
January
2011,
the
Royal
Brunei
Navy
(RBN)
received
two
new
Darussalam
class
Offshore
Patrol
Vessels
(OPVs)
from
Germany.24
In
November
2011,
the
RBN
commissioned
a
new
fast
interceptor
boat
(FIB
25-­‐012)
called
KDB
Mustaed.25
The
RBN
also
has
in
its
Muara
Naval
Base
four
Itjihad
Class
corvettes,
two
Serasa
Class
Amphibious
Warfare
Craft
(LCM),
three
Bendeharu
Class
patrol
boats,
personnel
launchers
and
patrol
boats
among
others.26
Increased
Unilateral
Patrols
and
Surveillance
Ship
Activities
in
the
South
China
Sea.
In
an
attempt
to
protect
their
territorial
waters
and
assert
their
sovereignty
in
their
claimed
features
in
the
South
China
Sea,
claimants
increased
their
maritime
patrols
and
enhanced
their
surveillance
ship
activities
in
the
disputed
area
in
2011.
These
maritime
patrols
and
surveillance
ship
activities
led
to
some
serious
events
that
raised
security
tensions
in
the
South
China
Sea.
One
major
event
was
the
26
May
2011
Cable
Cutting
Incident
involving
three
Chinese
surveillance
ships
and
Vietnamese
state-­‐owned
Binh
Minh
02
seismic
survey
ship.
Reports
said
that
the
China
Maritime
Surveillance
Ship
84,
escorted
by
two
other
ships,
cut
a
cable
towing
seismic
monitoring
equipment
belonging
to
Binh
Minh
02,
which
at
that
time
was
conducting
drilling
and
seismic
survey
activities
in
an
oil-­‐rich
area
called
Block
48.
The
Chinese
government
argued
that
the
three
Chinese
ships
were
just
conducting
their
“maritime
law
enforcement
activities”
in
their
“jurisdictional
area”
where
Vietnam
ship
was
“illegally
operating”.27
But
the
Vietnamese
government
protested
that
the
Binh
Minh
02
was
operating
in
Vietnam’s
continental
shelf
and
was
not
a
disputed
area.
Another
Cable
Cutting
Incident
occurred
on
9
June
2011
involving
Chinese
fishing
vessel
Number
62226
and
PetroVietnam’s
Viking
2
seismic
survey
ship.
The
Vietnam
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
narrated:
At
6
a.m.
on
9th
June
2011,
when
the
Viking
2
vessel,
chartered
by
PetroVietnam
(PVN),
was
conducting
seismic
explosion
survey
at
lot
136/03:
6o47,5’
North
–
109o17,5’
East
in
the
continental
shelf
of
Vietnam,
the
fishing
boats
from
China
No.
62226
supported
by
two
Chinese
fishing
enforcement
vessels
No.
311
and
303
traveled
the
Viking
vessel
at
the
front
and
then
turned
direction
and
accelerated.
Despite
the
warning
flare
of
the
Vietnamese
side,
the
fishing
boat
No.
62226
intentionally
ran
into
the
exploration
cable
of
the
Viking
2
vessel
and
the
specialized
cable-­‐cutting
device
of
the
fishing
4

5.
boat
No.
62226
got
trapped
into
the
cable
net
of
the
Viking
2
vessel,
making
the
Viking
2
vessel
not
operate
normally.28
But
the
Chinese
government
explained
that
the
cable
cutting
took
place
when
Vietnamese
ships
chased
Chinese
fishing
boats
in
the
waters
near
the
Vanguard
Bank
(Wan
An).
While
moving
away,
the
Chinese
fishing
boat
No.
62226
reached
the
cable
of
Viking
2.
In
order
to
escape
Vietnam’s
hot
pursuit,
the
Chinese
fishermen
cut
the
cable.
According
to
Chinese
Foreign
Ministry,
“The
Vietnamese
ship
put
the
lives
and
safety
of
the
Chinese
fishermen
in
serious
danger.”29
Aside
from
Vietnam-­‐China
cable
cutting
incidents
in
the
South
China
Sea,
the
Philippines
and
China
also
got
into
several
incidents
in
2011
that
raised
the
security
tensions
in
the
Spratlys.
These
incidents
were
the
following:
• 25
February
2011.
The
Armed
Forces
of
the
Philippines
(AFP)
reported
that
the
Chinese
Jianhu
V
Class
missile
frigate
Number
560
fired
three
shots
at
three
Filipino
fishing
vessels
(Jaime
DLS,
Mama
Lydia
DLS
and
Maricris
12)
operating
the
waters
near
the
Quirino
(Jackson)
Atoll.
The
Atoll
is
only
140
nautical
miles
west
of
Palawan
Island.
But
the
Chinese
Ambassador
to
the
Philippines
denied
the
firing
incidents.30
• 2
March
2011:
Two
Chinese
maritime
patrol
vessels
(Number
71
and
Number
75)
threatened
to
ram
MV
Veritas
Voyager,
an
energy
research
vessel
of
Forum
Energy
commissioned
by
the
Philippine
government.
The
research
vessel
was
conducting
a
seismic
survey
in
the
Reed
Bank,
just
85
nautical
miles
north
of
Palawan
Island.
The
MV
Veritas
Voyager
called
for
help
prompting
the
AFP
to
send
two
units
of
OV10
jets
to
the
Reed
Bank
to
look
into
the
incident.
But
the
Chinese
government
said
that
Patrol
Vessels
71
and
75
were
just
doing
their
jobs.31
• 6
May
2011.
The
AFP
reported
a
sighting
of
a
Chinese
maritime
research
vessel
in
Abad
Santos
(Bombay)
Shoal.
This
shoal,
which
surrounds
a
lagoon,
is
still
unoccupied
but
is
under
the
control
of
the
Philippines.
Though
the
Chinese
government
denied
the
incident,
it
stressed
that
there
was
nothing
wrong
for
Chinese
vessels
to
navigate
in
Chinese
territorial
waters.
• 19
May
2011:
Two
unidentified
fighter
jets,
alleged
to
be
Chinese,
are
sighted
near
Palawan
Island.
The
AFP
reported
that
these
two
fighter
jets,
believed
to
be
MIG-­‐29,
harassed
an
Air
Force
OV-­‐10
“Bronco”
while
patrolling
the
Philippines
territory
in
Palawan.32
The
Chinese
Embassy
in
Manila
denied
the
incident.
• 21
May
2011.
The
AFP
reported
another
sighting
of
Chinese
Maritime
Patrol
Vessel
75
navigating
near
Southern
Bank
together
with
Salvage
Research
Ship
707.
5

6.
• 24
May
2011:
While
Chinese
Defense
Minister
Liang
Guanglie
was
enjoying
his
“goodwill”
visit
to
the
Philippines
on
May
21-­‐25
to
“improve”
Philippines-­‐
China
relations,
the
Philippine
military
discovered
in
the
same
period
some
Chinese
ships
unloading
construction
materials
near
the
unoccupied,
but
still
Philippine
controlled,
Amy
Douglas
Bank.33
Based
on
the
report
of
the
Philippine
military,
China
has
erected
an
undetermined
number
of
posts,
and
placed
a
buoy
near
the
breaker
of
the
Amy
Douglas
Bank.
The
AFP
reported
that
Filipino
fishermen
saw
a
Chinese
Marine
Surveillance
Vessel
aided
by
ships
of
the
People’s
Liberation
Army
(PLA)
Navy
laying
steel
posts
and
a
buoy
in
the
Iroquois
Reef
Amy
Douglas
Bank,
100
nautical
miles
off
Palawan.
The
AFP
considered
the
presence
of
PLA
Navy
ships
in
the
waters
of
Amy
Douglas
Bank
as
an
incursion.
The
Philippine
Department
of
Foreign
Affairs
(DFA)
brought
this
incident
to
the
attention
of
the
Chinese
Embassy
in
Manila.
But
the
Chinese
Embassy
denied
any
incursion
of
Chinese
ships
and
argued
that
the
ship
sighted
was
just
a
Chinese
Marine
Research
Vessel
“conducting
normal
maritime
research
activities
in
the
South
China
Sea”.34
• 6
June
2011.
The
Naval
Forces
West
of
the
Philippine
Navy
based
in
Palawan,
reported
that
its
naval
troops
dismantled
a
foreign
marker,
suspected
to
be
Chinese,
that
was
erected
in
the
Boxall
Reef,
105
nautical
miles
from
mainland
Palawan
and
only
20
nautical
miles
from
Ayungin
Shoal
(Second
Thomas
Shoal).35
The
Chinese
Embassy
in
Manila
denied
Chinese
ownership
of
the
marker.
But
China
asserted
that
the
Boxall
Reef
belonged
to
China
arguing
that
the
reef
was
very
close
to
Mischief
Reef.
• 18
October
2011.
The
Philippine
Navy
Patrol
Ship
74
collided
with
a
Chinese
fishing
vessel
that
was
towing
25
smaller
boats
in
the
contested
Spratlys
waters
near
the
Reed
Bank.
The
Philippine
Navy
said
that
the
collision
was
an
“accident”
and
“not
a
hostile
act.”
China
justified
Chinese
fishing
activities
near
the
Reed
Bank
and
claimed
that
the
actions
of
the
Philippines
had
harmed
the
“lawful
right
and
interests
of
fishermen.”36
• 11-­‐12
December
2011.
The
AFP
reported
the
sightings
of
two
Chinese
vessels
and
a
navy
ship
intruding
the
waters
of
Escoda
(Sabina)
Shoal,
70
nautical
miles
off
Palawan.
The
DFA
conveyed
its
“serious
concerns”
to
the
Chinese
embassy
in
Manila.
But
the
Chinese
embassy
replied
that
it
saw
nothing
wrong
with
the
passage
of
three
Chinese
vessels
and
insisted
that
the
Escoda
Shoal
“is
within
China’s
territorial
waters”.37
PHILIPPINE
SOLUTION
TO
THE
SPRATLY
PROBLEM
Amidst
rising
security
tensions
in
the
South
China
Sea
(SCS)
or
WPS,
the
Philippine
government
proposed
the
idea
of
ZoPFFC.
It
recommends
the
adoption
of
a
regional
mechanism
that
aims
to
separate
disputed
and
non-­‐disputed
areas
in
6

7.
the
SCS
pursuant
to
applicable
international
laws,
particularly
the
United
Nations
Convention
on
the
Law
of
the
Seas
(UNCLOS).
The
Philippine
government
further
explains
the
idea
of
ZoPFFC
in
its
official
paper
entitled,
“Philippine
Paper
on
ASEAN-­‐CHINA
Zone
of
Peace,
Freedom,
Friendship
and
Cooperation
(ZoPFF/C)
in
the
WPS/SCS”.
This
paper
identifies
what
the
Philippine
government
calls
as
“10
ways
to
ZoPFFC”,
to
wit:
1. Not
the
whole
of
the
WPS
(SCS)
is
disputed;
2. The
area
of
dispute
in
the
WPS
(SCS)
is
specific,
determinable
and
measurable;
3. The
area
of
dispute
can
be
determined
and
measured
by
clarifying
the
nature
of,
and
distinction
between
“territorial
disputes”
and
“maritime
claims”
in
the
WPS
(SCS);
4. The
nature
of
and
distinction
between
“territorial
disputes”
and
“maritime
claims”
in
the
WPS
(SCS)
can
be
clarified
by:
first,
recognizing
the
distinction
between
geological
features
(i.e.
islands,
rocks,
low-­‐tide
elevations)
and
waters
(including
continental
shelf);
and
second,
by
applying
the
rules
governing
each
of
these
elements
in
accordance
with
the
United
Nations
Convention
on
the
Law
of
the
Sea
(UNCLOS)
5. The
dispute
in
the
WPS
(SCS)
is
principally
on
the
relevant
features
(i.e.,
islands,
rocks,
and
low-­‐tide
elevations).
If
ever
there
is
a
dispute
on
the
water,
this
is
principally
caused
by
the
dispute
on
the
features.
Under
the
principle
of
“la
terre
domine
la
mer”,
or
“the
land
dominates
the
sea,”
he
who
owns
the
land
also
owns
the
sea
around
it.
Therefore,
if
the
owner
of
the
land
is
disputed,
then
the
sea
around
it
could
also
be
assumed
as
disputed;
6. However,
the
extent
of
adjacent
waters
projected
from
the
island
is
limited,
finite,
determinable,
definite,
and
measurable
under
UNCLOS
(1'.e.,
Article
121,
Regime
of
Islands);
7. Once
the
extent
of
adjacent
waters
is
determined
and
measured
in
accordance
with
international
law,
specifically
UNCLOS,
then
the
extent
of
dispute
both
on
the
relevant
features
[“territorial
dispute”]
and
maritime
zones
[“maritime
claims
dispute”]
generated
from
the
said
features,
can
already
be
determined;
8. Once
the
extent
or
limit
of
the
disputed
area
(relevant
features
+
adjacent
waters)
is
determined;
the
same
can
now
be
segregated
from
the
rest
of
the
non-­‐disputed
waters
of
the
WPS
(SCS);
7

8.
9. The
disputed
area
(relevant
features
+
adjacent
waters)
can
be
segregated
from
non-­‐disputed
waters
(and
continental
shelf)
of
WPS
(SCS)
by
enclaving
the
said
disputed
area.
Enclaving
will
literally
operationalize
the
“shelving
of
territorial
disputes”
and
pave
the
way
for
effective
and
meaningful
cooperation
among
the
claimant
countries
in
the
WPS
(SCS).
10. Therefore,
joint
cooperation
in
the
Enclave
(as
Joint
Cooperation
Area)
could
be
conducted
among
the
claimant
countries.
Outside
of
the
Enclave,
the
littoral
states
in
the
semi—enclosed
sea
can
also
engage
in
appropriate
cooperative
activities
under
Part
IX
of
UNCLOS,
while
exercising
their
sovereign
rights
over
these
bodies
of
waters
under
Articles
3,4,
55,
57,
and
76
of
UNCLOS.38
Since
not
the
whole
of
the
WPS/SCS
is
disputed,
the
Philippine
government
recommends
the
separation
of
disputed
and
non-­‐disputed
areas
to
manage
the
conflict
in
the
SCS.
Non-­‐disputed
areas
are
waters
and
continental
shelves,
which
are
“beyond
the
disputed
relevant
features.”39
In
non-­‐disputed
areas,
claimants
can
develop
them
unilaterally
based
on
the
principle
of
sovereign
rights
in
accordance
with
the
application
of
EEZ,
continental
shelf,
and
other
maritime
zones
provided
for
by
UNCLOS.
Disputed
areas
are
the
Spratlys
and
the
Paracels.
The
Philippine
government
explains
that
“disputed
relevant
features
(and
their
adjacent
waters)
could
be
8

9.
segregated
from
the
rest
of
the
waters
of
the
SCS
by
enclaving
the
said
features.
The
adjacent
waters
of
the
relevant
features
could
be
determined
by
applying
Article
121
of
UNCLOS.”40
To
promote
cooperation
and
avoid
conflict
in
the
disputed
areas,
the
Philippine
government
recommends
the
pursuance
of
joint
development
by
converting
all
disputed
territorial
features
as
“enclaves”
and
declare
these
“enclaves”
as
“Joint
Cooperation
Areas”
(JCA)
that
could
be
demilitarized.
In
the
JCA,
the
Philippine
government
says
that
the
following
joint
cooperative
activities
can
be
pursued:
1)
Joint
development.
2)
Marine
scientific
research;
3)
Protection
of
the
marine
environment;
4)
Safety
of
navigation
and
communication
at
sea;
5)
Search
and
rescue
operation;
6)
Humane
treatment
of
all
persons
in
danger
or
distress
at
sea;
7)
Fight
against
transnational
crimes.41
President
Benigno
Simeon
Aquino
III
summarizes
the
wisdom
of
ZoPFFC
in
the
following
words:
“What
is
ours
is
ours,
and
with
what
is
disputed,
we
can
work
towards
joint
cooperation.”
DFA
Secretary
Albert
F.
Del
Rosario
expounds
the
idea
of
ZoPFFC
by
saying,
“There
is
a
need
to
segregate
the
disputed
area
from
non-­‐
disputed
area.
What
is
ours
and
is
ours,
and
what
is
disputed
can
be
shared.”42
MORE
PROBLEMS
IN
THE
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
It
is
very
unfortunate
that
the
idea
of
ZoPFFC
as
the
Philippine
solution
to
the
South
China
Sea
Dispute
is
problematic
for
other
claimants.
Though
Indonesia,
Singapore
and
Vietnam
expressed
its
support
to
the
Philippine
proposal,
some
claimants
and
ASEAN
members
rejected
it.
China
has
expressed
strong
opposition
to
ZoPFFC
as
it
challenges
“China’s
9-­‐
dash
line
claim”.
The
Philippine
paper
on
ZoPFFC
even
underscores
that
the
9-­‐dash
line
claim
of
China
“is
bereft
of
any
legal
basis
under
international
law”.43
Philippine
Foreign
Affairs
Secretary
Albert
F.
Del
Rosario
even
described
China’s
9-­‐dash
line
claim
as
“the
core
of
the
problem”
that
must
be
“subjected
to
rules-­‐based
regime
of
UNCLOS.”44
Though
the
Philippine
government
argues
that
the
ZoPFFC
proposal
is
consistent
with
the
rules
based
framework
of
managing
international
disputes,
China
vehemently
opposes
Manila’s
proposal
because
Beijing
is
not
ready
to
bring
the
South
China
Sea
Disputes
before
international
adjudication.45
In
fact,
China
hijacked
the
agenda
of
the
2011
ASEAN/EAS
Summits
in
Bali
when
it
warned
participants
not
to
discuss
ZoPFFC
and
the
South
China
Sea
Dispute.
Thus,
participants
failed
to
discuss
ZoPFFC
at
the
2011
Bali
Summits.
Secretary
del
Rosario
admitted,
“ZoPFFC
was
not
brought
up
at
all.
We’re
the
only
one
who
brought
up
the
ZoPFFC.
All
the
interventions
were
on
maritime
security
in
the
West
Philippine
Sea.”46 The
Philippine
government
planned
to
raise
ZoPFFC
again
in
the
next
ASEAN/EAS
Summits.
But
without
the
concurrence
of
China,
it
is
utterly
difficult
for
the
Philippines
to
move
the
ZoPFFC
proposal
forward.
9

10.
Malaysia
also
expressed
its
“fundamental
concerns”
on
ZoPFFC.
Dato’
Sri
Anifah
Aman,
Malaysia’s
Minister
of
Foreign
Affairs,
issued
an
official
statement
arguing
that
the
Philippine
concept
of
disputed
and
non-­‐disputed
areas
in
the
South
China
Sea
could
be
a
source
of
disputes,
particularly
in
the
context
of
the
Sabah
Problem.47
Minister
Aman
raised
the
following
points
against
ZoPFFC:
1. Malaysia
has
fundamental
concerns
with
the
Philippine’s
proposal
on
the
Zone
of
Peace,
Freedom,
Friendship
and
Cooperation
(ZOPFF/C);
2. The
Philippines’
proposal
is
premised
on
the
need
to
segregate
the
disputed
area
from
the
non-­‐disputed
area.
The
issue
is,
what
may
be
considered
as
being
disputed
by
one
party,
is
considered
as
an
established
fact
by
another.
Therein
lies
the
source
of
the
dispute
to
begin
with.
This
is
especially
true
in
the
case
of
the
Philippines’s
claim
over
Sabah,
whose
integrity
and
sovereignty
is
recognized
by
the
international
community
as
being
part
of
Malaysia.
For
this
reason,
this
proposal
cannot
be
used
as
a
basis
to
address
the
South
China
Sea
issue.
To
Malaysia,
this
is
non-­‐negotiable;
3. Malaysia
emphasized
that
ASEAN’s
attention
should
instead
be
directed
towards
the
effective
implementation
of
the
Declaration
on
the
Conduct
of
Parties
in
the
South
China
Sea
(DOC)
and
the
eventual
realization
of
the
Code
of
Conduct
in
the
South
China
Sea
(COC).
We
should
not
be
distracted
from
this
effort;
and,
4. Malaysia
strongly
feels
that
it
is
not
opportune
for
ASEAN
to
embark
on
such
an
ambitious
endeavor,
which
is
a
non-­‐starter
and
will
be
counter-­‐
productive
to
our
genuine
effort
to
maintain
peace
and
stability
in
the
South
China
Sea.48
Cambodia
joined
China
and
Malaysia
in
rejecting
the
ZoPFFC.
When
media
asked
the
Cambodian
Foreign
Minister
on
his
take
on
the
issue,
he
reportedly
laughed
and
raised
the
issue
of
duplication.
Though
the
Cambodia
Foreign
Minister
explained
that
his
government
was
not
totally
against
ZoPFFC,
he,
however,
stressed
to
avoid
the
problem
of
duplication.49
Cambodia
is
the
next
Chair
of
ASEAN.
With
the
reputation
of
Cambodia
of
being
a
“China’s
ally
in
ASEAN”,
putting
ZoPFFC
into
the
official
ASEAN
agenda
will
be
a
great
challenge
to
the
Philippine
government.
ASEAN
Secretary
General
Surin
Pitsuwan
lamented
that
ZOPFFC
was
already
put
in
the
diplomatic
back
burner
and
that
it
"remains
to
be
discussed
further”.50
In
diplomatic
parlance,
it
means
that
the
ZoPFFC
has
already
been
"shelved".51
10

11.
SUMMARY
AND
CONCLUSION
The
year
2011
saw
the
escalation
of
security
tensions
in
the
South
China
Sea.
Increasing
assertiveness
of
claimants
through
resolute
diplomacy,
naval
capability
development,
and
increased
unilateral
patrols
and
surveillance
ship
activities
in
disputed
waters
contributed
immensely
to
the
current
security
situation.
The
Philippine
government
proposed
ZoPFFC
as
the
solution
to
the
South
China
Sea
problem.
But
the
Philippine
proposal
raised
more
problems
and
than
solutions
to
the
conflict.
Though
the
Philippine
government
had
the
backing
of
some
ASEAN
members
in
pursuing
ZoPFFC,
major
claimants,
particularly
China
and
Malaysia,
opposed
the
idea.
The
Philippine
government
even
failed
to
bring
ZoPFFC
in
the
official
agenda
of
the
2011
ASEAN/EAS
Summits
in
Bali.
Despite
this
set-­‐back,
there
is
a
need
to
point
out
that
the
ZoPFFC
has
its
merits
in
managing
territorial
disputes
in
the
South
China
Sea,
particularly
the
general
idea
of
joint
development
that
China
and
other
claimants
support.
Though
the
Philippine
government
“failed
to
gain
support
at
the
last
ASEAN
Summit
in
Bali”,
the
ZoPFFC
could
still
“be
an
effective
way
to
address
the
core
problems”
in
the
South
China
Sea.52
ZoPFFC
failed
to
get
enough
support
from
ASEAN
and
EAS
participants
because
the
devil
was
in
the
details.
There
is
no
doubt
that
the
problems
in
the
South
China
Sea
are
complex
and
complicated.
But
there
is
no
shortage
of
idea
to
solve
these
problems.53
What
is
needed
is
a
strong
political
will
for
all
parties
to
“compromise
and
abide
by
all
agreements”
and
to
acknowledge
regional
interests
as
integral
part
of
national
interests.54
11

12.
END
NOTES
1T.J.
Burgonio,
“President
Aquino’s
Spratlys
Plan
Hold
Until
Next
Year”,
Philippine
Daily
Inquirer
(20
November
2011).
2Nusa
Dua,
“ASEAN
Backs
Away
from
Maritime
Stand
Against
China”,
Energy
Daily
(15
November
2011).
3Ibid.
4Aurea
Calica,
“Sea
Dispute:
Noy
Gets
US
Support”,
Philippine
Star
(20
November
2011).
5For
excellent
analyses
of
situations
in
the
South
China
Sea
prior
to
2011,
see
Carl
Ungerer,
Ian
Storey
and
Sam
Bateman,
“Making
Mischief:
The
Return
of
the
South
China
Sea
Dispute”,
ASPI
Special
Report,
Issue
36
(December
2010)
and
Clive
Schofield
and
Ian
Storey,
The
South
China
Sea
Disputes:
Increasing
Stakes,
Rising
Tensions
(Washington
DC:
Jamestown
Foundation,
November
2009).
Also
see
Rommel
C.
Banlaoi,
“Maritime
Security
Environment
in
East
and
South
China
Seas”
(Paper
presented
at
the
International
Conference
on
Maritime
Security
Environment
in
East
Asian
Waters
organized
by
the
Ocean
Policy
Research
Foundation
(OPRF),
Tokyo,
Japan
on
16-­‐17
February
2011).
6Robert
D.
Kaplan,
“The
South
China
Sea
is
the
Future
of
Conflict”,
Foreign
Policy
(September/October
2011).
7The
term
“ripe
for
rivalry”
was
originally
coined
by
Aaron
L.
Friedberg
in
his
"Ripe
for
Rivalry:
Prospects
for
Peace
in
a
Multipolar
Asia,"
International
Security,
Vol.
18,
No.
3
(Winter
1993/94),
pp.
5-­‐33.
8Rommel
C.
Banlaoi,
“Clash
of
Sovereignties
in
the
Spratlys”,
Philippine
Star
(30
June
2011).
Also
at
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=701324&publicationSubCategoryId=200.
9Sam
Bateman,
“Managing
the
South
China
Sea:
Sovereignty
is
not
the
Issue”,
RSIS
Commentaries
(29
September
2011).
10Information
Office
of
the
State
Council,
China’s
National
Defense
in
2010
(31
March
2011).
11Maritime
Information
Center,
“Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
of
the
Republic
of
China
(Taiwan)
reiterates
its
position
on
the
South
China
Sea”
(23
August
2011)
at
http://maritimeinfo.moi.gov.tw/marineweb/LayFromE0.aspx?icase=T02&pid=0000000065.
12“Vietnam’s
Top
Leader
Add
Fire
to
South
China
Sea
Dispute”,
Deutche
Press
Agentur
(9
June
2011).
13Office
of
the
Secretary
of
Defense,
Military
and
Security
Developments
Involving
the
People’s
Republic
of
China
2011:
A
Report
to
Congress
Pursuant
to
the
National
Defense
Authorization
Act
for
Fiscal
Year
2000
(Washington
DC:
Department
of
National
Defense,
2011).
14
Ibid.
p.
4.
15
Ibid.,
16“Vietnam
to
Get
Sub
Fleet
in
6
Years:
State
Media”,
Defense
News
(4
August
2011)
at
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110804/DEFSECT04/108040303/Vietnam-­‐Get-­‐Sub-­‐Fleet-­‐
6-­‐Years-­‐State-­‐Media.
17“Vietnam’s
Russian
Restocking”,
Defense
Industry
Daily
(11
December
2011)
at
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Vietnam-­‐Reportedly-­‐Set-­‐to-­‐Buy-­‐Russian-­‐Kilo-­‐Class-­‐Subs-­‐
05396/
18Ibid.
19“Philippines
would
be
Purchasing
Eight
ex
Hamilton
class
Over
Five
Years”,
RP
Defense
(2
June
2011)
at
http://rpdefense.over-­‐blog.com/article-­‐philippines-­‐would-­‐be-­‐purchasing-­‐eight-­‐ex-­‐
hamilton-­‐class-­‐over-­‐five-­‐years-­‐75533441.html
20
Alexis
Romero,
“Submarine
for
Navy:
Noy
Bares
AFP
Shop
List”,
Philippine
Star
(24
August
2011).
21“Malaysia’s
Scorpene-­‐class
Submarines
in
Service
to
be
Vested
Interests
To
Stick
to
the
Nansha”,
http://www.9abc.net/index.php/archives/26140
22“RMN
Holds
Annual
Drills
in
South
China
Sea”,
Jane’s
Defense
Weekly
(15
July
2011).
12

13.
23Frederik
Van
Lokeren,
“The
Naval
Balance
of
Power:
The
South
China
Sea”,
The
Geopolitical
and
Conflict
Report
(12
May
2011)
at
http://gcreport.com/index.php/analysis/190-­‐the-­‐naval-­‐balance-­‐of-­‐
power-­‐the-­‐south-­‐china-­‐sea
24Waleed
PD
Mahdini,
“New
Sea
Power
for
Brunei”,
Free
Republic
(8
January
2011)
at
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-­‐news/2653421/posts
25KDB
stands
for
Kapal
Diraja
Brunei
(meaning
Royal
Brunei
Ship
in
Malay).
See
“Muara
Naval
Base,
Brunei
Darussalam”
at
http://www.naval-­‐technology.com/projects/muara-­‐naval-­‐base/
26Ibid.
27“China
Reprimands
Vietnam
Over
Offshore
Oil
Exploration”,
Nam
Viet
News
(30
May
2011)
at
http://namvietnews.wordpress.com/2011/05/30/china-­‐reprimands-­‐vietnam-­‐over-­‐offshore-­‐oil-­‐
exploration/.
28“Again,
Chinese
Boats
Cut
Cable
of
PVN’s
Vessels”,
People’s
Army
News
Paper
Online
(9June
2011)
at
http://www.qdnd.vn/qdndsite/en-­‐us/75/72/183/161/163/150636/Default.aspx
29For
an
excellent
analysis
of
the
cable
cutting
incidents,
see
Carlyle
A.
Thayer,
“Chinese
Assertiveness
in
the
South
China
Sea
and
Southeast
Asian
Responses”,
Journal
of
Current
Southeast
Asian
Affairs,
Volume
30,
Number
2,
(2011),
pp.
77-­‐104.
30Tessa
Jamandre,
“China
fired
at
Filipino
fishermen
in
Jackson
atoll”,
Vera
Files
(2
June
2011)
at
http://verafiles.org/2011/06/02/9535/.
31For
an
excellent
scholarly
analysis
of
the
Reed
Bank
incident,
see
Ian
Storey,
“China
and
the
Philippines:
Implications
of
the
Reed
Bank
Incident”,
China
Brief,
Volume
11,
Issue
Number
8
(6
May
2011).
32Rene
Acosta,
“Oban
Downplays
Harassment
of
Air
Force
Plane
by
Chinese
Fighter
Jets”,
Business
Mirror
(19
May
2011).
33For
a
detailed
analysis
of
the
Amy
Douglas
Bank
incident,
see
Rommel
C.
Banlaoi,
“A
Mischief
Reef
in
the
Making?”,
Newsbreak
(2
June
2011)
at
http://archives.newsbreak-­‐
knowledge.ph/2011/06/02/a-­‐mischief-­‐reef-­‐in-­‐the-­‐making/
34
“China
denies
incursion
into
West
Philippine
Sea”,
Philippine
Star
(3
June
2011).
35Dona
Pazzibugan,
“Philippine
Navy
Dismantles
Foreign
Marker
on
Spratlys”,
Philippine
Daily
Inquirer
(15
June
2011).
36
Alexis
Romero,
“AFP
Unfazed
by
China
Threats
in
Spratlys”,
Philippine
Star
(28
October
2011).
37“China:
Intrusion
Charge
Groundless”,
Philippine
Daily
Inquirer
(10
January
2012).
38Philippine
Paper
on
ASEAN-­CHINA
Zone
of
Peace,
Freedom,
Friendship
and
Cooperation
(ZoPFF/C)
in
the
West
Philippine
Sea
(WPS)/South
China
Sea
(SCS)
at
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?um=1&hl=en&client=safari&rls=en&tab=iw&q=cac
he:XwxT_QtzQwsJ:http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/trung-­‐tam-­‐du-­‐lieu-­‐bien-­‐dong/doc_download/364-­‐
philippine-­‐paper-­‐on-­‐asean-­‐-­‐china-­‐zone-­‐of-­‐peace-­‐freedom-­‐friendship-­‐and-­‐cooperation-­‐in-­‐the-­‐south-­‐
china-­‐sea+zone+of+peace+freedom+friendship+and+cooperation+(zopff/c)&ct=clnk
39Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
Albert
F.
del
Rosario,
“On
West
Philippine
Sea”
(Delivered
at
the
ASEAN
Foreign
Ministers’
Meeting
in
Bali,
Indonesia
on
November
15,
2011)
at
http://www.gov.ph/2011/11/15/the-­‐secretary-­‐of-­‐
foreign-­‐affairs-­‐on-­‐the-­‐west-­‐philippine-­‐sea-­‐november-­‐15-­‐2011/
45Aileen
S.P.
Baviera,
“The
South
China
Sea
Disputes:
Is
the
Aquino
Way
the
ASEAN
Way?,
RSIS
Commentaries
(5
January
2012).
46
T.J.
Burgonio,
“President
Aquino’s
Spratlys
Plan
Hold
Until
Next
Year”,
Philippine
Daily
Inquirer
(20
November
2011).
47Dato’
Sri
Anifah
Aman,
“Zone
of
Peace,
Freedom,
Friendship
and
Cooperation
(ZOPFF/C)”
(Press
Statement
during
the
ASEAN
Ministerial
Meeting
(AMM)
held
in
Bali,
Indonesia,
15
November
2011).
http://kln.gov.my/web/guest/home?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_Yt06&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=norm
al&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-­‐
13

14.
2&p_p_col_pos=1&p_p_col_count=5&_101_INSTANCE_Yt06_struts_action=%2Fasset_publisher%2Fvi
ew_content&_101_INSTANCE_Yt06_urlTitle=press-­‐statement-­‐by-­‐the-­‐minister-­‐of-­‐foreign-­‐affairs-­‐
during-­‐the-­‐asean-­‐ministerial-­‐meeting-­‐english-­‐version-­‐
only&_101_INSTANCE_Yt06_type=content&redirect=%2Fweb%2Fguest%2Fhome
48
Ibid.
49Rey
O.
Arcilla,
“Two-­‐Track
Approach”,
Malaya
(22
November
2011)
at
http://www.malaya.com.ph/nov22/edrey.html
50Ibid.
51Ibid.
52Fahlesa
Munabari,
“A
look
into
ASEAN-­‐China’s
DOC”,
The
Jakarta
Post
(7
February
2012).
53National
Defense
College
of
the
Philippines,
Foreign
Service
Institute
and
the
Diplomatic
Academy
of
Vietnam,
The
South
China
Sea
Reader
(Papers
and
proceedings
of
the
Manila
Conference
on
the
South
China
Sea:
Toward
a
Region
of
Peace,
Cooperation
and
Progress,
Manila,
5-­‐6
July
2011),
p.
9.
54Ibid.
14