Lecture delivered at a Public Forum on Violent Extremism organized by the Department of International Studies and International Studies Society of Miriam College on 11 March 2019.

1.
ROMMEL
C.
BANLAOI,
PhD
Delivered
at
a
Public
Forum
on
Violent
Extremism
organized
by
the
Department
of
Interna>onal
Studies
and
Interna>onal
Studies
Society
of
Miriam
College
on
11
March
2019.

3. Violent
Extremism
It
is
an
intolerant
faith,
belief,
ideology
or
worldview
that
endorses
and
glorifies
the
use
of
violence
against
others
not
sharing
that
faith,
belief,
ideology
or
worldview.

4. In
the
Philippines,
violent
extremism
is
currently
associated
with
ISIS/ISIL/DAESH

5. Because
of
the
presence
of
ISIS
followers
in
the
country,
violent
extremism
poses
a
clear
and
present
danger
to
Philippine
security!

6. Threats
of
violent
extremism
in
the
Philippines
is
real
and
not
imagined!

7. ISIS
claims
to
have
established
in
the
Southern
Philippines
its
East
Asia
Wilayah
or
Islamic
State
East
Asia
(ISEA).

8. Pro-­‐ISIS
Groups
In
Southeast
Asia
Source:
InternaQonal
Center
for
PoliQcal
Violence
and
Terrorism
Research,
2018

10. AVer
Marawi
LiberaQon……
ISIS
Philippines
(ISISP)/Islamic
State
Philippines
(ISP)/Daulah
Islamiya
Alfalabin
(DIA)
is:
• Down,
but
not
fully
defeated.
It
is
aIemp>ng
to
rise
again.
• Broken,
but
not
really
dissolved.
It’s
resolved
to
wreak
havoc.
• Wounded,
but
not
dead.
It
is
struggling
to
survive.
• Weak,
but
can
s>ll
mount
very
strong
violent
aIacks.
• Smaller
in
size.
But
it
can
s>ll
create
big
trouble.

11. “ISIS-­‐directed”
violent
a[acks
aVer
Marawi
siege
• Lamitan
City
bombing
–
31
July
2018
• Isulan,
Sultan
Kudarat
bombings
–
28
August/2
September
2018
• General
Santos
City
bombing
–
16
September
2018
• Cotabato
City
bombing
–
31
December
2018
• Jolo
Cathedral
bombing
–
27
January
2019
Next?

12. • Followers
are
conQnuously
on
the
run.
– But
they
s>ll
have
a
strong
mass
base
from
community
support
networks
of
many
friends,
rela>ves,
classmates,
and
neighbors.
– Support
network
includes
some
unscrupulous
local
officials,
violent
entrepreneurs,
and
scalawags
in
uniforms.

13. • Networks
are
solidified
by
blood
rela>ons,
intermarriages,
ethnic
>es,
personal
rela>ons,
shared
belief,
shared
grievances,
and
common
love
for
money
and
power.
• They
thrive
in
depressed
areas,
especially
in
IDP
camps/refugee
centers,
where
there
seem
to
be
no
presence
of
a
government…
where
people
feel
being
forgoIen.

14. • Not
yet
a
spent
force.
–
It
con>nues
to
be
a
lethal
force
that
can
wreak
havoc
any>me
now,
even
in
the
near
future,
anywhere
in
the
Philippines.
• Preven>ng
and
countering
violent
extremism
will
be
a
long
struggle.
– We
need
to
deal
with
violent
extremism
as
long
as
it
takes.

15. Where
are
threats
of
violent
extremism
in
the
Philippines
coming
from?

16. ISLAMIC STATE EAST ASIA /WILAYAT SHARQ ASSIYA

17. ISLAMIC STATE PHILIPPINES
HATIB
HAJAN
SAWADJAAN
(AMIR)
ASG-­‐SULU/AJANG
AJANG
GROUP
ASG-­‐BASILAN
PURUJI
INDAMA
RADZMIL
JANNATUL
BIFF-­‐TURAYFE
GROUP
Maguindanao/N
Cot
ESMAEL
ABDULMALIK
HUMAM
ABDULNAJID
Owayda
Marohombsar
ABU
DAR
GROUP
Maute
Group
Remnants
Lanao
Provinces
MOHAMAD
KAREM
@Abu
Mohammad
AKP-­‐MAGUID
GROUP
SoCSarGen/CDO

18. ISLAMIC STATE PHILIPPINES
HATIB
HAJAN
SAWADJAAN
(AMIR)
ASG-­‐SULU/AJANG
AJANG
GROUP
ASG-­‐BASILAN
PURUJI
INDAMA
RADZMIL
JANNATUL
BIFF-­‐TURAYFE
GROUP
Maguindanao/N
Cot
ESMAEL
ABDULMALIK
HUMAM
ABDULNAJID
Owayda
Marohombsar
ABU
DAR
GROUP
Maute
Group
Remnants
Lanao
Provinces
MOHAMAD
KAREM
@Abu
Mohammad
AKP-­‐MAGUID
GROUP
SoCSarGen/CDO

19. Around
250
followers
Jolo
Cathedral
bombing
–
27
January
2019
Daula
Islamiya
Alfalabin
Daula
Islamiya
Fi
Sulu

20. Around
250
followers

21. Source:
PNP

22. Source:
Eastern
Sabah
Security
Command
(ESSCOM)

23. Around150
followers
Lamitan
City
bombing
–
31
July
2018
Daula
Islamiya
Wilayatul
Mashriq
Daula
Islamiya
Fi
Basilan

24. Around
200
followers
Isulan,
Sultan
Kudarat
bombings
–
28
August/2
September
2018
Cotabato
City
bombing
–
31
December
2018
Daula
Islamiya
Fi
Maguindanao/Daula
Islamiya
Fi
Mindanao

25.
Mohaiden
Animbang
@
Karialan
Esmael
ABDULMALIK
@Abu
TORAYPE/
Turaifie

26. 30-­‐
50
followers
Daula
Islamiya
Fi
Ranao

27. 30-­‐
50
followers
Daula
Islamiya
Fi
Ranao
Abdul
Jalil
Romato

28. 10-­‐
20
followers
General
Santos
City
bombing
–
16
September
2018

29. 10-­‐
20
followers
NILONG
GROUP

30. FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS
Close to 100 FTFs are currently in the
Philippines
u Around 45 Indonesians
u 8-10 Malaysians
u 7-10 Arabs mostly Saudis
u 7 Sri Lankans (Tamils)
u 3 Thais (Patanis)
u 2 Singaporeans
u 1 each: Bangladesh/Pakistani/Turkish
u Others ( e.g. Arabs, Europeans, Uyghurs) being
investigated, verified and validated

31. FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS
40 Watchlisted FTFs presently in
Mindanao are led by:
u Abdul Azis Rajman and Abdul Malik
Yamen (Indonesians)
u Mohammad Ali Bin Al-Rahman @
Muawiyah (Singaporean)
u Engr. Hattab @ Hattab (Malaysian)

32. FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS
REGARD THE SOUTHERN
PHILIPPINES AS:
• NEW LAND OF
JIHAD
• SAFE HAVEN
• ALTERNATIVE
HOME BASE

33. ROUTE
1
ROUTE
2
ROUTE
3
ROUTES OF ISIS FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO MARAWI
ROUTE
4
ROUTE
5
ROUTE
6
MARAWI
CITY

34. THE MOST ECONOMICAL ROUTE
OF ISIS FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO MARAWI

37. SUYUFUL KHILAFA FI LUZON
Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement
Jamal
al-­‐Tawhid
Wal
Jihad
Philippines
(JTJ)

38. XX
X

39. PRE-­‐MARAWI
IS
NETWORK
IN
RP
1994
2001
2014
2017
Al
Qaeda
Era
ISIS
Era
2016
Jamal
al-­‐Tawhid
Wal
J
ihad
Philippines
(JTJ)
NOW
2012

40. Post-­‐Marawi/BTA
SituaQon
• ISIS
followers
are
currently
regrouping/
reorganizing/recrui>ng
for
“Caliphate
rebuilding”.
• Some
followers
are
now
shicing-­‐back
to
Al-­‐
Qaeda
tac>cs
of
“winning
the
hearts
and
minds”.
•
Others
con>nue
to
apply
ISIS’
“shock
and
awe”
tac>cs.

41. Post-­‐Marawi/BTA
SituaQon
• The
resurgence
of
JI
in
Indonesia
(as
well
as
the
reinvigora>on
of
Al-­‐Qaeda
and
decline
of
ISIS
worldwide)
will
affect
the
new
landscape
of
violent
extremism
in
the
Philippines.
• Increasing
involvements
of
the
local
communist
movement
in
the
“Bangsamoro
struggle”
will
complicate
the
nature
of
con>nuing
armed
conflicts
in
Mindanao.

42. Post-­‐Marawi/BTA
SituaQon
• Effec>ve
governance
of
the
BTA
for
the
next
three
years
can
serve
as
a
strong
an>-­‐dote
to
violent
extremism.
• But
unintended
governance
deficit
can
make
the
soil
of
discontents
more
fer>le
for
violent
extremism
to
grow
and
flourish
in
Mindanao.

43. THANK
YOU