eco

1. Presentation by- Saisha & Sanidhi

2. Taxi and Limousine Industry
Uber background
The Uber product
Uber business model
Conflict and regulators
Market entry/ employee recruitment
Ride-sharing competition
Promotion and branding
The last mile; UberEATS and UberRUSH
Uber pricing stratergies and marketing communications

3.  The Case Study essentially discusses how, by late March 2016, Uber
Technologies, Inc., an e-hail ride-sharing firm, was on a roll, quickly
extending service to unexplored regions across the globe and
garnering new, passionate consumers, as well as a few vociferous
and conspicuous adversaries.
 Critics emphasized on Uber's practise of "surge pricing," which
hiked fees dramatically during times of strong demand for vehicle
service.
 For example, competing taxi and limo services said that poor
screening and training of drivers hurt customers and made it unfair
for them to compete in a market with a lot of rules.
 Some city governments also put in place rules that limited the
number of cars that ride-sharing companies could put on the road,
while others outright banned the service.

5. • In 2014, the American taxicab and limousine
business employed 233,700 drivers who made
$23,210 annually. Between 2014 and 2024, the
BLS predicted a 13% rise in drivers (more than
twice the average total of all occupations).
Chicago and New York dominated the industry
through medallions. New York City has 13,437
medallion-licensed yellow cabs and 32,000
limousines and livery cars. On the open market,
taxi medallions might sell for over $1 million. The
NYC Taxi & Limousine Commission estimated a
medallion's yearly ROI at 20%. Many cities
employed medallions to guarantee owner income.
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This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND

6.  Taxis were hailed on the street or phoned by
passengers. Prearranged livery vehicle
service protected taxis from competition. In
several circumstances, there was an hour
between a vehicle call and passenger
pickup.
 Taxis were governed by cities and livery
services by states. Regulators regulate
automobiles' look to guarantee they're
licensed. Taxis had a unique appearance
(mustard yellow in NYC) and were obliged to
announce service
What is a Livery service?
It means a business engaged in
the transport of persons that
uses a motor vehicle with four
wheels and at least three doors
including the trunk or
hatchback.

7.  Other taxi and livery restrictions include a
fixed number of vehicle inspections per year,
dispatch station/business site requirements,
and whether clients may be solicited and
automobiles allocated for pickup. Taxicabs
taxed customers depending on time and
distance estimated by a taximeter.
Taximeters charged $3.50 per mile for the
first five miles and $5 per mile beyond that.
Livery cars didn't have taximeters, thus
prices were dependent on time or distance
with an agreed-upon minimum charge.
Livery vehicles couldn't charge by time and
distance.

8.  The International Association of
Transportation Regulators noticed a
new ride-share option in the mid-
2000s. In July 2013, they urged for
the ban of "bogus" and "rogue" ride-
sharing services. The group said it
was protecting the public from
unauthorised drug users or
criminals. The trade association
wanted to outlaw smartphone apps
that let individuals book rides.
 Taxi and rental-car use dropped,
although it remained unclear
whether ride sharing was to blame.
Unrestricted New York City taxi
medallions declined from $1 million
in 2014 to $400,000 in 2016; 19 were
auctioned in 2015. When regulatory
bodies in New York City failed to
safeguard the sector, the attitude
was "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em."
 The New York City Taxi and
Limousine Commission (TLC)
established Alternative Technology
in the autumn of 2015 to test tech
goods in taxis. GPS-based taximeters
and an alternative technology
system (ATS) provided driver
payments through credit-, debit-, and
prepaid-card payment systems
(through an e-hail app), driver
authentication and text messaging,
trip data collection, passenger
notifications with visual accessibility
features, automatic vehicle location
systems, and driver, medallion
owner, and agent reporting.

10.  Uber Technologies, Inc. was created in 2009 by digital start-up veterans Garrett Camp and
Travis Kalanick. Uber originated as a Silicon Valley executive vehicle service. In those days,
riders needed a code from Kalanick to use the app. Kalanick saw profit in vacant limousines and
idle cabs. In 2010, Kalanick was sure that technology could effectively connect drivers and
passengers internationally. Kalanick completed a growth plan by 2010.
 Uber's cofounders had varying responsibilities. Camp cofounded StumbleUpon in 2002 as a
silent partner. After Uber, he founded Expa, which produced consumer goods, systems, and
services. Uber's other cofounder was its face and voice. Northridge, California was Kalanick's
hometown. He dropped out of UCLA to create his file-sharing company, Scour. The MPAA sued
Scour for copyright violation in 2000. Scour entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Akamai
Technologies purchased Kalanick's next business, Red Swoosh, for $15 million in 2007.
 Kalanick overcame regulatory bodies' objections to Uber's development in many locations. He
was characterised as a "brawler" who liked a good battle, whether on Twitter with a competitor's
CEO or with taxi and limousine regulatory agencies he considered as a danger to Uber's
expansion. Portland, Oregon, Paris, France, Miami, Florida, Denver, Colorado, and Washington,
DC all opposed Uber. California penalised the corporation for regulatory infractions. Uber was
prohibited in Germany, Spain, Colombia, France, Australia, Italy, Denmark, China, and
England.
 By March 2016, the firm operated in 400 locations in 65 countries with 162,000 driver partners.
Abu Dhabi, UAE, Amsterdam, Netherlands, Bangalore, India, Bogotá, Colombia, Doha, Qatar,
London, England, Moscow, Russia, New York City, Rome, Italy, Shanghai, China, Tokyo, Japan,
and Zürich, Switzerland were serviced (see Exhibit 2). Kalanick attracted high-profile investors
who fueled Uber's fast expansion. Ashton Kutcher, Jeff Bezos, and Google's investment division
financed Uber in August 2013. Just three years ago, the corporation was worth $62.5 billion.

12.  Uber's app let urbanites summon cars remotely. The firm
didn't hire drivers and fares varied. Uber's proprietary
platform connects riders and drivers digitally. The software
connected "willing" drivers with "needy" consumers: a
prospective passenger using the Uber app on his or her phone
requested a ride to a certain address. Passenger obtained
driver's name, vehicle model, and rating when requesting a
ride. The passenger might accept or refuse based on this
information.
 If accepted, the driver came quickly. Uber's reduced wait times
were aided by algorithms that steered drivers to areas where
consumers were most likely to call. "I found Uber amazingly
easy, given catching a taxi on a New York City Sunday evening
can be difficult," said one client.
 Uber's fares were estimated by a team of nuclear physicists,
computational biologists, and astrophysicists to balance supply
and demand. Peak riding prices were greater. Some users
criticised Uber's surge pricing, which increases rates during
high demand (rush hour, New Year's Eve, Halloween, and bad
weather). Using a mathematical calculation, fares might be
seven or eight times the standard Uber rate. Kalanick justified
surge pricing, saying it motivated drivers to make more
pickups. Scholars who studied taxi driver behaviour discovered
that many (especially novice drivers) didn't complete their 12-
hour job if they met their goal revenue early.

13.  One group of passengers sued Kalanick and won standing in April 2016. A federal
court agreed with the plaintiffs that Kalanick may have broken antitrust laws against
price fixing by arranging "independent contract" drivers to charge higher charges via
surges, an allegation Kalanick called "unwarranted" and promised to fight and win.
 Uber decreased some of its charges in January 2014, but no plans were made to
abolish surge pricing. In 2016, the service-oriented Disney Company stated it will
introduce demand pricing at its theme parks during peak hours.
 Uber charged the customer's credit card after a journey and sent a receipt (see Figure
3). The rider and driver never exchanged cash; Uber pocketed 20% and deposited 80%.
Uber's first-half revenue was $3.63 billion ($2.93 billion the year before). Uber's
portion would be $726 million yearly. Uber made 169 million journeys globally in
March 2016 and 50 million in the U.S., earning $0.19 each ride.

15.  Uber's ride-sharing platform connects customers and drivers. In an essay on the
costs and advantages of the sharing economy, one author noted it "matches
individuals who desire to exchange assets online" and "such efficiency
improvements may come at cost for conventional economy." Uber didn't directly
hire drivers; rather, it promised to link customers with drivers, as Expedia does
with flights. Uber didn't own a fleet of automobiles, but it set restrictions for what
vehicles drivers could use. UberX cars have to be 2000 models or newer (and 2005
models or newer in select areas), have four doors, and seat four people with seat
belts.
 Uber's international services vary. UberX, UberXL, UberBlack, UberSUV, and
UberTaxi were available in most markets. UberX was the cheapest option and
employed smaller cars. Uber said their UberX service (which seats four) was "18%
cheaper than taxis" UberXL accommodated six people and may be a van. UberX
and UberXL used professional and nonprofessional drivers. UberBlack's fares
were 35% more than UberX's. It was called the "poor man's town car" because it
targeted clients who couldn't afford a full-time driver but desired more
comfortable transportation than a taxi or public transit. UberSUV was priced
more than UberBlack and performed effectively for big groups (see Table 1).
UberTaxi let riders hail a cab using the Uber app. UberTaxi clients pay
conventional taxi rates, a $1-$2 booking charge, and a 29% tip in select locations.

17.  After a trip, passenger and driver may give each other 1-5 stars. Uber drivers
might deny a customer with a three-star rating or below. One Uber driver said
low-rated consumers weren't worth the hassle. Passengers whose drivers reported
bad behaviour had their accounts banned.
 Uber drivers didn't have to pay human dispatchers bribes to get fares. Uber has
drivers' credit card information on file. One San Francisco Uber driver said he
made $300 for a 10-hour taxi job, but $700 with Uber. Mohamed Mandour hopes
the new plan works. We'll take over the whole Bay Area. Table 2 compares wages.

18.  Uber's drivers met market requirements. A person interested in driving for Uber
would choose the city on its website to see the qualifications. In March 2014,
someone interested in driving for Uber in NYC was given two sets of criteria: one
for UberBlack (town vehicle) and one for UberTaxi (yellow cab). UberBlack drivers
needed commercial auto insurance, a TCP, and an airport permission. His car has
to be a black "sedan, crossover SUV, or full-size SUV" that seats 4+ people
comfortably. 28 UberX drivers must be 21 or older, have an in-state driver's licence
and in-state vehicle insurance, and drive a four-door sedan. By 2015's conclusion,
162,037 Uber drivers had made more than three rides.

20.  Uber controversies focused on local
taxi and/or state limousine
regulatory agencies arguing Uber
was subject to agency jurisdiction as
a transportation service. These
authorities had tight requirements
for passenger engagement, pricing
structure, and vehicle marking and
appearance. Many issues were based
on Uber's usage of unlicensed drivers
and its fee platform being a high-
tech metered service.
 Uber said it was a service that linked
drivers and riders, not a
transportation corporation. It
shouldn't be subject to taxi and
livery vehicle restrictions. Uber's
debut into San Francisco was an
early regulatory victory.
 In Washington, DC, there weren't
enough taxis, call-ahead service was
unreliable, and drivers were known
to take advantage of tourists.
Passengers claimed that cabs
wouldn't transport them to
particular areas. 34 DC taxis don't
take credit cards, unlike in NYC.
One traveller commented, "This is
my major complaint." “It is 2014.
"I'm broke." Dispatcher at Union
Station ordered customers to share
taxis with strangers. Despite forced
sharing, both riders paid full price.
"In New York City, you'd never be
forced to share a taxi and pay full
rate," claimed one passenger.

21.  Uber tried to enter the DC market in the summer of 2012. Uber's relationship
with DC authorities was fraught, and city officials seized Uber drivers' vehicles in
stings. Uber requested assistance on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and its website.
50,000 personal e-mails and 37,000 tweets with #UberDCLove were addressed to
Mary Cheh, who opposed Uber's arrival into DC. Cheh afterwards withdrew.
 Uber faced political difficulties in Miami. Mid-2013, Miami-Dade County
commissioners declined to pass Uber legislation. Uber ignored warnings and was
forced to fingerprint driver-partners in certain places. By 2016, Uber had won its
fingerprinting fight in some countries, particularly when it threatened to
withdraw and public outcry was significant.
 Uber ran against authorities and lawmakers outside the U.S. Uber's unlicensed
drivers in Amsterdam led to Dutch legal disputes, and in 2015, the firm pulled
UberPOP (equivalent to UberX in the U.S.), but continued to provide UberBlack
and UberLUX. In France and Spain, cabbies staged frequent protests and street
closures against Uber. Taxi trade and union organisations have blocked Uber's
unlicensed-driver services in Germany. In several regions of the county in 2016,
only UberTaxi and licenced services remained.

22.  Uber was also investigated for safety, frequently in
public. Most incidents were drivers arrested for
assaults (physical and sexual), drivers making vulgar
or racist remarks, inebriated driving, or customer
complaints about drivers taking longer routes—
although Uber refunded customers who reported
inefficient routes. Passengers attacked or harassed
Uber drivers in the press. The United States Taxicab,
Limousine & Paratransit Association initiated a
campaign to document ride-sharing hazards and
occurrences.
 Uber stated safety was "baked into" everything
(driving background checks, thorough driver
screening, $1 million commercial insurance policy). In
April 2016, Uber resolved a California lawsuit over
its driver background checks, agreeing to pay $10
million and stop using the phrases "safest ride on the
road" and "gold standard" in its marketing. Uber
refunded its $1 "safe ride charge"