This document summarizes the preliminary findings of the European Online Grooming Project. It discusses interviews with stakeholders who provided insights into how online groomers operate and analyze offender case files. Based on this, an initial model of the online grooming process is presented, which includes phases like preparation, establishing contact, and intensifying the relationship. Interviews with online groomers to date suggest groomers utilize multiple identities and tailor their approaches. Next steps include further analysis of groomer interviews and discussion groups to inform safety education.

1. The European Online
Grooming Project_
Preliminary Findings
EC Safer Internet Programme Safer Internet Forum ,
Luxembourg, 20th – 22nd October 2010
Professor Julia Davidson
Centre for Abuse & Trauma Studies
Kingston University

2. I think grooming is planned out in advance. In my
opinion, they have a very precise game plan.‟
(Belgium SH4 - Police)

3. Presentation overview
 The consortium
 The European Online Grooming Project_
 Design
 Scoping findings & context
 Online groomers preliminary analysis
 Reflections
 Next steps

4. European consortium
 UK
– Stephen Webster, National Centre for Social Research
– Professor Julia Davidson, Kingston University
– Professor Antonia Bifulco, Royal Holloway University of London
 Belgium
– Professor Thierry Pham, Universite de Mons-Hainaut
 Italy
– Professor Vincenzo Caretti, Rome University
 Norway
– Professor Petter Gottschalk, BI Norwegian University

5. The European Online Grooming
Project_
 Largest study of online grooming to date
 Aims:
– to understand the different ways sexual offenders approach,
communicate and ‘groom’ young people online
– to empower policy makers, front line professionals, teachers,
carers and young people to effectively manage online risks
 Funded by the EC Safer Internet Plus Programme
 Running from June 2009 to December 2011

6. The Context
Internet sex offender behaviour can include:
1. The construction of sites/virtual communities to be used for the
exchange of information, experiences, and indecent images of
children at an informal level (not PPV);
2. The organization of criminal activities – production of indecent
child images at a professional level ;
3. The posting of explicit profiles;
4. The grooming of children for the purposes of sexual abuse
(CEOP, 2009, 4 reports of young people planning to meet
following sexual grooming per day)

7. The Context
 30 million US children used Web in 2000 (Gottschalk,
2010); 2,660 incidents of inappropriate approaches reported
by Centre for Exploited and Missing Children
 Evidence about online sexual offending primarily focussed
on indecent image use (Seto & Eke 2005; O’Brien &
Webster 2007) and not contact behaviours
 Cannot explain online grooming without understanding the
offender – computer – young person interaction.

8. EU Legislative Context
• A recently published EU (2009) document entitled ‘Combating the
Sexual Abuse, Sexual Exploitation of Children and Child
Pornography‟ outlines the difficulty in protecting young people when
there is such widespread variation in national criminal law and law
enforcement practice in Europe.
• Article 5 -online grooming ‘solicitation of children for sexual
purposes’ (p5) and asks that each member state ensure that such
conduct is punishable in law.
• Refers to cases involving children under the age of consent under
national law (which varies considerably across Europe), where an
adult arranges to meet for the purposes of sexual abuse via the
means of ‘an information system‟ (p5).

9. Lisbon Treaty
 New rules proposed March 2010 by the European
Commission would see child porn websites blocked
from the Internet and ask for human traffickers to be
handed maximum sentences of five to ten years in
prison.
 The proposal's scope would also punish grooming -
luring victims via online chat forums - and seek to
ensure that abusers cannot re-offend in another EU
country.

10. Legislative Context :Grooming
 The United Kingdom (UK) was one of the first EU
member states to initiate legislation to make it illegal to
groom children with the intent of committing a sexual
offence ( s15, Sexual Offences Act 2003, England and
Wales).
 Norway followed the UK’s example (2007) and Sweden
(2009)

11. Research Design
 Three interlinked research phases:
– Scoping interviews with stakeholders (police officers, treatment
providers, industry specialists), review of police case-files;
development of theoretical model, literature review
– In-depth interviews with online groomers in the UK, Norway,
Italy & Belgium
– Workshops with parents, teachers and young people
 Data analysed using Framework, case and theme based approach
to analysis.

12. Stakeholder Interview & Offender Case
File Analysis Findings

13.  Some offenders may be engaging with 30 to 50 young people at
different stages of the grooming process at any one time
 Offenders tend to refine their activities on the basis of what had
„worked well‟ in previous encounters.
 Actual process of online grooming may take minutes, hours, days
or months.
 Online groomers remain at different phases of the model for various
lengths of time according to a dynamic inter-relationship between
their goals and needs and the style or reactions of the young
person.

14. Offender Behaviour
Grooming behaviour planned:
„The groomer gradually increases his control on the victim, who
doesn‟t really realize it. An example of this control is online
blackmail. I remember a (case of) a young girl seduced on a chat-
line by a groomer who started to recharge her mobile phone, as a
normal favour one friend to another. He then started asking her to
send him pictures of her bare-breasted, and then with only her
underwear on. When she refused to give him pictures of her totally
naked, the groomer had enough photos to blackmail her.‟
– (Italy SH4 – Internet expert)

15. Groomer Identities & Language
Multiple identities:
I‟ve got suspects at the moment who have four identities. They‟ve
created two identities of 13-year old girls, and two males, and what
this guy has done is absolutely plan it to make sure that he can
have backup. He‟ll have one on Yahoo! Messenger, one on MSN.
Why? Well, you can‟t be on two MSN at the same time but you can
be on others, so he can actually be two people.‟
– (UK SH 4 - police)
„If he hopes to communicate, he‟s got to speak the same lingo. If they
don‟t communicate the same way, if the groomer isn‟t familiar with
the language the kid uses, it just isn‟t going to happen.‟
– (Belgium, SH3 police)

16. Victim Behaviour
 …‟it blows my mind to know that there are more and more young girls out
there who know they‟re chatting with a grown man. Paedophiles need to
hide their age less and less, it‟s becoming less and less necessary for
them to say they‟re 12 years old; they might say they‟re 39 instead of 45.
More and more, young girls are chatting with grown men even if they know
that they‟re way older than them.‟ -
(Belgium, SH3 police)
 …..‟they (young people) are thinking, “ I am sitting here in my bedroom,
what can possibly go wrong?”‟
– (UK, SH5, young person specialist)
 ……..‟they appreciate being taken seriously, they (the online groomers)
give them compliments, say that they are grown-up. So the child will get
confirmation of being somebody and a grown-up.‟
– (Norway, SH1, young people expert)

17. Scoping findings: Model development
1. vulnerability factors
2. grooming style
3. preparation and scanning Pre contact
4. identity assumed 1
5. initial contact
6. identity assumed 2
7. desensitisation
8. offence maintenance & intensity Contact
9. outcomes

18. Online Groomers
Emerging Findings

19. What do we know about online groomers?
 Like contact sexual offenders – not a homogeneous group. Where they
do seem to differ:
– Relatively few with any criminal convictions (previous offending?)
– High IQ but not a particularly high level of educational attainment
– IT competence seems to be primarily self taught, via workplace,
observing family and online research
 Using full range of ICT interaction facilities, chatrooms, file-sharing sites
and game platforms to contact young people

20. Young people online: 1
 Young people reported to behave in a range of ways – from robust
to disinhibited participants(validated by stakeholder interviews and
case file analysis)
 Resilient young people
– Evidence of safety messages getting through as offenders told
by some to ‘go away’ in no uncertain terms. Supported by other
recent research with young people(Davidson et al , 2010).
 Where young people were reported to be disinhibited this
involved: use of sexual screen names; sexual chat; populating adult
chat rooms; sending explicit images of self

21. Young people online: 2
 Disinhibition does appear to be underpinned by a range of vulnerability
factors, expressed online:
– Negative self-image
– Parental problems/disrupted care
– Difficulties at school
– Loneliness
– Self-harm
– Concurrent sexual abuse
 Online disinhibiton and the self-regulation model may help explain
these differences between young people and feed into targeted
awareness programmes – further research required- ROBERT

22. Developing a Model of Online Grooming:
Key Points 1
 No ‘one size fits all’ model – range and fluidity of
behaviours
 Image use does seem to serve as a motivator but can
appear at any phase in the process of online grooming.
No evidence of a causal relationship between image
use and behaviour.
 Image use does not apply to all - evidence that it played
no part in some offenders grooming.

23. Developing a Model of Online Grooming: Key
Points 2
 The process can take months or minutes , can be direct or indirect
 Phases of the model are not numbered - no hirerarchy or linear
relationship. For some it is linear but for others only a few phases
apply.
 Evidence of some groomers using different combinations of phase
for different young people. What this suggests is a tailored
approach for some, based on their self-regulation style and goals,
and the online behaviour/response of young people.

24. Revised model of online grooming
Vulnerability
Offender
Desensitisation
Adult
Chat
Adult
Pornography
Child Abuse
Images
Preparation &
Scanning
Identity
Initial Contact
Risk
Management
Desensitisation &
Intensity
Outcomes
©Webster, Davidson, Bifulco, Caretti, Gottschalk, Pham 2010

25. Implications for Online Safety
Safety and Awareness
• Consider online disinhibition in context of safety campaigns – majority probably
not at ‘risk’
• Why are some young people more resilient, less likely to interact?
• Implications for the design of safety awareness educational initiatives
• Need to really understand young people’s online behaviour and the norms
guiding behaviour
• Not just ‘risk’ but ethical Internet use- digital footprint etc
What can the industry do?
• Ensure social networking pages cannot be cloned
• Pages first activated with privacy fixed – Young person has to unlock
• Work more proactively with educators and young people to raise awareness but
not spread alarm

26. Implications for Offender Treatment
– Nature of online reality for individuals. How easy it is for some
offenders to feel anonymous and disinhibited
– Risks that accompany certain behaviours and how offender
needs to recognise this
– Attempts to exit the offending process challenging once chat
begins. Risk awareness need to happen at early phase of model
– ensure all offenders are screened for PCL-R (Psychopathy
Checklist Revised)

27. Next steps
 Analysis of full online groomers dataset (Dec 10
– January 11)
 Launch of full findings (February 11)
 Discussion groups with parents, teachers and
young people (February – May 11)
 Final report (December 11)

28. Further information
 www.european-online-grooming-project.com
 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities
/sip/index_en.htm
 J.davidson@kingston.ac.uk