International opinion on the South China Sea Issue part II

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INTERNATIONAL OPINION
ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE
PART II

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TITLE PUBLISHER COUNTRY PAGE
I. Defending Japan and the
Philippines is not Entrapment
The National
Interest
United
States
4
II. Comment: Why Beijing should let
international law reign in the
South China Sea
Special Broadcasting
Service Australia 7
III. Obama will step warily Bangkok Post Thailand 9
IV. Asia’s Cauldron: is geography
destiny?
The Conversation Australia 11
V. Philippines throws rocks at China The Nation Thailand 14
VI. Settle maritime claims through
jaw-jaw
The Straits Times Singapore 17
VII. The Post-Deng China: The End of
China’s Soft Power?
Huffington Post
World
United
States
18
VIII. China’s Military Chiefs Lecture the
Visiting US Defense Secretary
Bloomberg United
States
22
IX. Can China Rise Peacefully? The National
Interest
United
States
24
X. Keynote Address at the Asia
Society Policy Institute Launch
US Department of
State
United
States
58
XI. Philippines China Dispute: One-up
Against China
The Establishment
Post
Singapore 66
XII. ASEAN's challenge: A swaggering
China
Los Angeles Times United
States
67
XIII. Creative countermeasures needed
to deal with Manila’s S. China Sea
schemes
Global Times China 69
XIV. Rusty “Cauldron” The National
Interest
United
States
71
XV. El Indio: Divided by Two? Jakarta Globe Indonesia 74
XVI. When is a Rock Not a Rock? Foreignpolicy.com United
States
76
XVII. Tom and Jerry in the South China
Sea – OPED
Eurasia Review United
States
79
XVIII. Ma may face questions on China
stance: academic
Taipei Times Taiwan 82
XIX. The Philippines Takes China to
Court, but It's Public Opinion That
Will Decide
Huffington Post
Politics
United
States
85
XX. China’s Rise is Waking Up the
Neighbors
China Spectator China 87
XXI. Risky Games in the South China
Sea
New York Times United
States
90

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XXII. Crimea and South China Sea
Diplomacy
The Diplomat Brussels 91
XXIII. The Philippines' UNCLOS Claim
and the PR Battle Against China
The Diplomat United
States
94
XXIV. Philippines Takes China to Court:
End of Diplomacy in the South
China Sea?
Huffington Post
World
United
States
97
XXV. Countering China in the South
China Sea
The National
Interest
United
States
101
XXVI. South China Sea disputes: The
gloves are off
Aljazeera Qatar 105
XXVII. South China Sea Disputes Enter a
Dangerous Phase: The U.S. Pivot
Gathers Steam
Huffington Post United
States
108
XXVIII.The U.S. and China’s Nine-Dash
Line: Ending the Ambiguity
Brookings United
States
112
XXIX. Binding Vietnam and India: Joint
energy exploration in South China
Sea
Observer Research
Foundation
India 116
XXX. The Sino-Philippine Maritime
Row: International Arbitration
and the South China Sea
Center for a New
American Security
United
States
119
XXXI. A question of Chinese sovereignty The Japan Times Japan 124
XXXII. China and Vietnam: Danger in the
South China Sea
China-US Focus United
States
127
XXXIII.China's Benign Foreign Policy
Image at Odds with South China
Sea Stance
Oilprice.com United
States
130
XXXIV. ANALYSIS/ South China Sea
disputes: Harbinger of regional
strategic shift?
The Asahi Shimbum Japan 133

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Defending Japan and the Philippines Is Not Entrapment
Jeffrey Ordaniel | April 15, 2014
In August 2013, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel declared while in Manila that the
US-Philippines alliance is ―an anchor for peace and stability‖ in the region. In October of
the same year, US Secretary of State John Kerry emphasized in Tokyo that the ―US-
Japan alliance is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in Asia Pacific.‖
Notwithstanding these bold pronouncements from high-ranking US officials, some in
America have expressed concerns over the possibility of entrapment in case the two US
allies‘ separate disputes with China turn violent. Some are concerned that Washington
could get dragged into a war with China over tiny islands that the US has no national
interest in. Others argue that Washington‘s long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity
should be applied on the East and South China Seas in order to deter the Chinese from
changing the relevant status quos, and the Japanese and the Filipinos from getting too
emboldened. These beg two important questions. First, will militarily defending Japan
and the Philippines over their disputes with China really mean entrapment of the US?
Second, will ambiguity in American security commitments to Tokyo and Manila result in
Regarding the first question, it is important to dissect what the East and South China
Sea disputes involve.
On the East China Sea dispute, it must be noted that it was only in 2008 when China
started to send civilian law-enforcement vessels to the territorial waters of the islands in
contention. In retrospect, this was the start of Beijing‘s attempt to revise the status quo
of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Over the years, the frequency of incursions increased
dramatically. Recently, such attempt to alter the status quo was extended to the
relevant airspace with China sending paramilitary aircraft and declaring an air-defense
identification zone. In 2010, Beijing used economic coercion to prevent Tokyo from
sentencing a Chinese fishing trawler captain who deliberately rammed his ship into
Japanese Coast Guard vessels. Furthermore, the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute involves
maritime boundary questions. This is significant because the East China Sea is an
important sea lane, where energy and trade for South Korea and Japan pass through. It
is also a strategic common that is the gateway to mainland East Asia and an immediate
connection to the South China Sea, a very important choke point.

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On China‘s dispute with the Philippines, it must be noted that Beijing‘s ambiguous ―nine-
dash line‖ claim effectively turns much of the South China Sea, including areas long
considered part of the global commons, as China‘s own territorial waters. Given that
$5.3 trillion worth of trade passes through the South China Sea every year, $1.2 trillion
of which is US trade, the significance of the dispute between Manila and Beijing cannot
be underestimated.
Beijing has been using coercion and intimidation to change the status quo of the islands
and maritime domains in the South China Sea. In 1995, Chinese forces occupied and
built a garrison on the Mischief Reef, a submerged maritime feature located 129
nautical miles west of a major Philippine landmass and 599 nautical miles southeast of
Hainan, the nearest Chinese landmass. Under customary international law and its
codified version, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
submerged maritime features cannot be claimed by any state as a territory under its
sovereignty. Hence, their control is dependent on whichever exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) or continental shelf they are located. Moreover, in 2012, China also successfully
flipped the status quo of the Scarborough Shoal, another maritime feature within the
Philippines‘ exclusive economic zone, after a tense standoff. Quite recently, China has
been attempting to eject Manila‘s military presence in the Second Thomas Shoal,
another submerged maritime feature within the Philippines‘ UNCLOS-mandated
continental shelf. In March 2014, China twice implemented a blockade which tried to
prevent the Philippine military from provisioning and rotating its troops in the shoal.
Months prior to those incidents, China has been sending naval frigates and civilian
maritime law enforcement vessels to contested waters in an apparent attempt to
intimidate the Philippine government.
All of these reveal two issues. First, the disputes in the East and South China Seas
involve a rising revisionist power trying to alter the status quo, not by the rule of law or
peaceful, nonhostile means, but by intimidation and coercion. Second, the disputes
involve not just the islands themselves, but maritime domains critical for the control of
valuable trade routes and strategic commons.
What then do these two issues mean for the United States? They mean that militarily
defending Japan and the Philippines is not simply giving a favor to longstanding allies.
It‘s not entrapment. Clearly committing to their defense means defending two important
US national interests: 1) the rule of law, and 2) securing freedom of navigation and
unimpeded lawful commerce in very strategic trade routes and critical choke points.
These two alone are enough justifications for Washington to clearly stand by with its two
Pacific allies.
Regarding the second question, it is obvious that America‘s ―strategic ambiguity‖ has
not been effective in preserving East Asian status quo. Strategic ambiguity is not a wise
answer to China‘s approach of ―salami slicing‖ and ―talk-and-take‖ policy in East Asian
seas. China has shown that it is not interested in signing a binding code of conduct in
the South China Sea nor in clarifying its claims to be in line with UNCLOS. While both

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Philippine president Benigno Aquino and Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe have
been repeatedly stressing the importance of upholding the rule of law, Beijing has been
continually rejecting multilateral platforms and international arbitration for resolving
disputes. Recent incidents indicate that China is becoming more inclined to use
intimidation, coercion and even force against its neighbors to attain its objectives.
With all these, Washington should be very specific with its security commitments to both
Tokyo and Manila, before it‘s too late. If Japan doubts the security guarantee of its US
alliance, the ramifications would be deleterious. Other American allies would
consequently also doubt the US. Why? Because if the US could consider an
abandonment of the world‘s third largest economy, what guarantee is there that
Washington would not do the same to other allies? In a way, the US-Japan alliance is
the ultimate measure of America‘s rebalance to Asia. Furthermore, doubts in the US-
Philippines alliance are more likely to embolden China to use force since, unlike Tokyo,
Manila has a weak military and a significantly lower deterrent capability.
Ambiguity also increases miscalculation and could result in a vicious arms race. On the
one hand, China might perceive the two US alliances as not very credible—resulting in
military adventurism. On the other hand, Japan and the Philippines might perceive the
ambiguous US commitments to be too weak a security guarantee and so result in an
overshoot of military buildup, increasing regional tensions further. Those are just a few
possible consequences of US commitments being open to interpretation, in addition to
others that can exacerbate the already tensed geopolitical and security landscape of the
region.
In conclusion, while it is understandable for some to put an emphasis on America‘s
economic relations with China, Washington should be clear with its treaty allies in the
Pacific for reasons outlined above—promoting the rule of law, preserving freedom of
navigation and unimpeded lawful commerce, and protecting strategic global commons
and critical chokepoints. These are indispensable and long-term US national interests.
Being clear with its security commitments could drastically restrain China from further
destabilizing revision of relevant status quos and deter it from using threat or force,
while at the same time reducing the security uncertainties of US allies and smaller
powers in East Asia. The US-Japan and the US-Philippines alliances, would then be the
cornerstone and an anchor, respectively, of peace and stability in the region—not an
entanglement.
Jeffrey Ordaniel is a PhD Student at the School of Security and International Studies,
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo.

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Comment: Why Beijing should let international law reign in
the South China Sea
By ZiadHaider
Source Foreign Policy
14 APR 2014 - 12:41PM
The perilous churn in the South China Sea, dubbed "Asia's Cauldron" by one leading
strategic analyst, stems from the overlapping claims of six states - Brunei, China,
Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam - over a body of water vital to global trade,
which contains energy resources and abundant fish stock in its vast depths.
Negotiations over a maritime Code of Conduct to stabilize interactions in the South
China Sea have been outpaced by the jockeying of ships between China and the
Philippines. In the wake of a dangerous and asymmetric two-month standoff over the
disputed Scarborough Shoal beginning in April 2012, Manila has rightly sought recourse
in international law to manage the dispute through arbitration. For the sake of regional
stability and its own interests, Beijing should follow suit.
The legal wrangling started in January 2013, when the Philippines notified China of its
intent to bring a challenge under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
an international treaty governing the rights and responsibilities of states in their use of
the oceans and seas. (Both China and the Philippines are parties to UNCLOS, while the
United States has yet to ratify it.) The Philippines argued then that China's so-called
"nine-dash line," which encompasses virtually the entire South China Sea, was unlawful
and contrary to UNCLOS.
China's response was to reject the Philippines' notification letter altogether, noting
Beijing had opted out of UNCLOS procedures for settling disputes that involve
sovereignty claims or maritime boundaries.
Beijing must now take a clear and hard look at the merits of abstaining any further.
While it may have a legal basis to abstain, acting on it could be strategically
shortsighted. Given Beijing's assertions that its nine-dash line is grounded in
international law, a greater show of confidence would be to defend its position before a
neutral tribunal.
Beijing will have the chance, if it chooses. Despite China's protestations, a five-member
Arbitral Tribunal was assembled to hear the Philippines' claims; on March 30, the
Philippines announced that it had filed its brief, here called a Memorial, elaborating its

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challenge. (Intriguingly, Beijing may have asked Manila to delay filing its Memorial in
exchange for a mutual withdrawal of ships from the contested Scarborough Shoal.)
China's willingness to abide by international norms would not only telegraph confidence,
but could help offset the growing anxiety generated by its military modernisation and
maneuverings among neighbors who fear the Beijing doctrine may be veering toward
realpolitik. For its part, the United States has expressed its support for the Philippines'
submission. President Barack Obama's visit to the Philippines in late April will provide
an opportunity to reaffirm the importance of such a rules-based approach to managing
the dispute. Yet that largely depends on how Beijing responds.
To be sure, nationalist public sentiment stoked by Beijing may have painted China into a
corner.
Hours after the Philippine Foreign Secretary announced the Memorial's submission on
March 30, the Chinese Foreign Ministry responded that it did not accept the Philippines'
submission of the dispute for arbitration and called on the Philippines to return to
bilateral talks. With its Foreign Minister stating that China will never accede to
"unreasonable demands from smaller countries" in the South China Sea, its Defense
Minister stating that China will make "no compromise, no concessions," and official
media outlets wading in with criticism of the Philippines' "unilateral" actions in filing its
Memorial, it will be that much harder to backtrack. Yet submitting to an international
tribunal is by no means beyond the pale for Beijing. China regularly engages in the
WTO dispute settlement system and has a relatively strong compliance record in the
face of adverse rulings, largely due to the reputational costs of non-compliance.
Arbitrating the South China Sea dispute is assuredly more fraught than commercial
disputes, grating as it does on China's rawest nerve: territorial sovereignty. That is why
it must be complemented by all claimant states exploring the equivalent of an amicable
settlement: shelving questions of who owns what and focusing on joint development of
resources for which compelling precedent exists. For now, however, Manila's lawyers
have staked out important legal ground in the South China Sea. Beijing should consider
meeting them there.
© 2014, Foreign Policy

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Obama will step warily
Published: 14 Apr 2014 at 00.13
Newspaper section: News
US President Barack Obama will travel to East Asia and our region next week. It is a
―make-up‖ visit for having missed last October‘s Asean meetings because of the US
government‘s financial crisis and partial shutdown. His visit will focus on issues that
could have strong effects on this country and its neighbours.
Three of his four stops are in Japan, Malaysia and the Philippines. The common topic is
how to respond to steadily increasing pressure from China over disputed areas of the
South China Sea. At his other stopover, in South Korea, the major common issue is the
always vexing North Korea. Again, Beijing‘s role in the problem is central, since China
continues to maintain tight ties with Pyongyang.
The visit to Southeast Asia comes at a time when relations with China have grown
prickly. Earlier this month, Indonesia changed its long-standing policy, and announced it
contests Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, specifically in the Natuna
Island chain. That means China now has territorial disagreements with half the Asean
countries – Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia.
Jakarta‘s reversal; from its previous position of having no such disputes with Beijing
followed almost directly on the heels of a similar statement by Malaysia. While Kuala
Lumpur has often registered formal claims to territory claims by China, the situation
recently became more tense. Chinese ships began patrols near islands long claimed by
Malaysia. To add tension, Chinese-Malaysian relations have plummeted recently. China
has criticised Kuala Lumpur‘s handling of the disappearance of Malaysian Airlines Flight
MH370.
Mr Obama will visit the Philippines last, on April 28-29. Manila and Hanoi both are
resisting China‘s South China Sea claims. The Philippines has taken China to the
United Nations‘ court of opinion, whileVietnam has begun a military buildup, marshalling
friends including both the US and China. Recently, the Philippines made Beijing look
foolish when its troops evaded Chinese ships to resupply a few soldiers flying the
Philippines flag on barren Second Thomas Shoal.
On the military side, Mr Obama has a tough job ahead, and it is unclear just how he will
handle it. The US has long maintained it has no official opinion about ownership of
disputed territory in the China Sea. But it has strong military defence treaties with both
Japan and the Philippines. In the case of the latter, Mr Obama is likely to sign an

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agreement to build a new US base on Philippines territory, in waters facing the Spratly
Islands.
It is certain the US does not back Chinese claims to the Spratlys. This gives Mr Obama
precious little wriggle room to try to make the case that Washington offers some sort of
neutral position. Manilaand Tokyo will look for Mr Obama to voice strong support. The
wrong word, even the wrong nuance, by Mr Obama could badly damage the often tense
ties with Beijing.
It will be a delicate manoeuvre for theUS leader to balance a greater military buildup in
the Asean region with assurances it will not directly challenge China over Beijing‘s
assertive territorial claims. Mr Obama will also be trying to press the region into moving
ahead on his moribund Trans-Pacific Partnership.
The White House spin is that Mr Obama will be stressing close ties with friends and
allies on his trip next week. In fact, he will be tip-toeing along a diplomatic tightrope with
no dependable safety net.

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Asia’s Cauldron: is geography destiny?
12 April 2014, 6.31pm AEST
Mark Beeson
Professor of International Politics at Murdoch University
How times change. One of the more unexpected ideas to emerge from Tony Abbott‘s
largely successful tour of northeast Asia is that Australia‘s relationship with China can
be built on mutual trust.
It‘s a nice idea, no doubt, but one that seems strikingly at odds with not only China‘s
recent behaviour, but Australia‘s, too. After all, Australian strategists are currently urging
the greatest expenditure on military modernisation ever undertaken in this country.
Actions, as they say, speak louder than words.
Nevertheless, the growing consensus in this country is that Australia doesn‘t need to
make a choice between its geography and its history. Australia can have amicable and
productive relationships with countries that see themselves as potential rivals – even
foes.
This is a beguiling idea, but is it true? Can Australia have mutually enriching commercial
ties with China while simultaneously playing a prominent role in an alliance relationship
with the US, which many in China see as designed to contain them?
In the absence of outright conflict, perhaps. But Australia‘s behaviour, and that of many
of its Asian neighbours, suggests that there aren‘t too many regional leaders who are
prepared to place much reliance on the emollient words of their counterparts elsewhere.
Such scepticism also pervades Robert Kaplan‘s latest book, Asia‘s Cauldron: The South
China Sea and the End of the Stable Pacific.
The unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea provide the particular focus
for a set of realist arguments about power and what he sees as the implacable logic of
geography. As Kaplan spelled out in his earlier book, The Revenge of Geography:
China‘s most advantageous outlet for its ambitions is in the direction of the relatively
weak states of Southeast Asia.
The current volume takes up the story of China‘s rise and what he sees as the
inevitable desire to extend its power and influence throughout its immediate
neighbourhood. Plainly, an Asian region dominated by China would be very different;
China is of the region in a way the US is not. America‘s role as a so-called ―off-shore
balancer‖ has made it more attractive for many of its allies for this reason.

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East Asia without an American presence would, Kaplan thinks, be devoid of moral and
ideational struggles over the future basis of international order. Kaplan claims:
It is not ideas that Asians fight over, but space on the map.
Recent events in Eastern Europe serve as a sobering reminder that occupying the
philosophical and ethical high ground may be of little efficacy or comfort when dealing
with an autocratic thug who treats international norms and principles with contempt.
A similar calculus informs policy in the South China Sea and helps to explain China‘s
continuing reluctance to allow legal principles or multilateral institutions to address the
region‘s long-running and increasingly fraught territorial disputes.
Given China‘s growing predilection for exploiting its growing strategic leverage over its
weaker neighbours, there is consequently only one option, Kaplan believes:
…because China is geographically fundamental to Asia, its military and economic
power must be hedged against to preserve the independence of smaller states in Asia
that are US allies. And that, in plain English, is a form of containment.
Random House
Click to enlarge
Whether you agree with Kaplan‘s analysis or not, he does have the great merit of calling
a spade a spade. Such language stands in sharp contrast to the circumlocutions that
our own policymakers adopt – possibly for very understandable reasons – when dealing
with China. Whether their Chinese counterparts will be convinced by our declarations of
friendship remains to be seen.
Ultimately, however, it may not matter. China cannot afford to alienate all its neighbours.
There are good material reasons for believing that Chinese policymakers may exercise
self-restraint. China‘s all-important economic development is not going to happen in
isolation. Territorial boundaries may still matter more in East Asia than just about
anywhere else, as Kaplan claims, but this does not mean that they inevitably dictate
national policy choices as a consequence.
Certainly war remains a real possibility in East Asia. But as even Kaplan concedes:
Beijing‘s goal is not war—but an adjustment in the correlation of forces that enhances it
geographical power and prestige.
This is a long way short of the pursuit of territorial expansion that fuelled many of the
conflicts of the 19th and 20th centuries. In this regard, at least, the underlying logic of
conflict really does seem to have been reshaped by greater economic interdependence.
The big question, as ever, is whether human beings have the capacity to learn from
their mistakes and not repeat them. One might have hoped that the proverbial penny
had dropped about the ultimate efficacy of war by now. There are good, empirically

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robust reasons for thinking that it may have, given the remarkable decline in inter-state
violence.
Any long-term decline in conflict is a refutation of the materially and geographically
deterministic logic Kaplan sees as determining our collective fate. Current events in
Eastern Europe and the South China Sea in particular provide compelling and
consequential experiments that may demonstrate whether such optimism is justified.

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Philippines throws rocks at China
Keith Johnson
Foreign Policy
Washington April 10, 2014 1:00 am
Beijing's bid to grab South China Sea from regional rivals faces first major challenge at
international tribunal
A diplomatic stand-off between China and the Philippines that flared up two years ago in
a dispute over fishing rights at a tiny shoal in the South China Sea is coming to a head
after Manila decided to ignore Chinese threats and sue Beijing at an international
tribunal.
The legal case marks the first time that an arbitration panel will examine China's
contentious and disputed claims to most of the South China Sea, one of the world's
busiest byways for shipping and a potentially rich source of oil and natural gas.
The 4,000-page suit, filed before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague,
amounts to what is basically an existential question about rocks. Or rather, it's about the
Philippines' desire for scores of specks in the South China Sea to be officially classified
by the international panel as rocks, rather than islands. On such arcane definitions can
hang the fate of nations - or in this case, the extension of economic rights of states to
the seas and seabed off their coasts.
Simply put, islands are land, which entitle their owners to enjoy exclusive economic
rights for 200 nautical miles in all directions, including rights to fishing and energy
extraction. Rocks aren't, and don't.
If the tribunal rules against the Philippine claim, then the stakes in the battle for those
specks of land would be much higher: whichever side eventually has its claims to the
specks recognised by international law would be able to lay claim to vast areas
potentially rich in resources. If Beijing loses the case, it will have to choose whether to
abide by an international court or ignore its ruling and claim those seas anyway.
"What kind of great power will China be? Are they willing to play by the rules of the
game or overthrow the system?" said Ely Ratner, deputy director of the Asia-Pacific
Security Programme at the Centre for a New American Security, a think-tank.
"As much as there ever is, this is a clear-cut test of their willingness to bind themselves
to rules that may end up not being in their favour."

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It hasn't started well. China has refused to participate in the international arbitration, and
has several times admonished Manila for what it calls "unilateralism" and "provocation".
Beijing summoned the Philippine ambassador last week for a tongue-lashing, two days
after Chinese coast guard vessels tried unsuccessfully to block a Philippine resupply
run to another disputed shoal.
Much of the world is watching. The United States has expressed support for the
Philippines' effort to seek arbitration under international laws governing the use of the
sea; Japan, embroiled in its own volatile territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku
Islands in the East China Sea, has also publicly backed Manila. But other countries in
Southeast Asia who have their own territorial disputes with China have stayed quiet so
far. Meanwhile, big oil companies are watching the legal showdown to see if it helps
establish clarity that could make it easier to explore for oil and gas in a region that could
have plenty of both.
The case is meant as a frontal challenge to China's infamous "Nine-dashed line",
Beijing's vague but threatening effort to lay claim to nearly the entirety of the South
China Sea to the detriment of neighbours including the Philippines, Vietnam and
Malaysia.
Many scholars, though, think that China's claims are essentially bunk. The Law of the
Sea Convention, which China signed and ratified, abolished the idea of historical claims
as a way to determine maritime rights. Not surprisingly, Paul Reichler, the Washington
lawyer who helped craft Manila's lawsuit, agrees. China, he says bluntly, "is violating
international law and the [Law of Sea] Convention".
The suit doesn't seek to determine who actually owns the disputed specks of land,
which include, fittingly enough, Mischief Reef. Instead, the issue is who owns the waters
around them. Manila argues that the waters between its shores and the specks belong
to the Philippines, because they are inside the 200-mile exclusive economic zone every
country has. China says those waters belong to it.
In a nutshell, China says that it has the right to defend its own territory, and any
disputes should be settled in a bilateral fashion, rather than through international
arbitration.
The stand-off is sparking fresh fears of an armed conflict in the region.
"China was winning all its neighbours over to China's peaceful rise, and they have
completely unravelled that in the region. Now, there are very few countries in the region
who are not somewhere on the wary to sceptical to outright scared part of the
spectrum," said Holly Morrow, an Asia expert at Harvard University's Belfer Centre.

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Particularly acute have been the naval tensions between China's muscular civilian patrol
vessels and the overmatched coast guards of neighbouring states. US navy ships,
including a guided missile destroyer, have also recently had close calls with Chinese
vessels in the South China Sea. Experts worry that the lawsuit will prompt Beijing to
take an even more aggressive stance in a bid to cow Manila.
"The rhetoric is becoming more shrill, and it's designed to dial up the pressure on the
Philippines. In my mind, it's to threaten the use of force to change the dynamics in the
negotiations" between the two sides, said Peter Dutton, the director of the China
Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College.
Manila's quest for legal satisfaction in The Hague is an uphill struggle. The arbitration
panel can't impose a settlement, and relies on the acquiescence of both parties to
implement any ruling; China has made clear it will not cooperate. But in the court of
public opinion, a Philippine victory sometime next year would make it much easier for
Manila and Southeast Asian nations to push back against what they see as Chinese
encroachment.

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Settle maritime claims through jaw-jaw
Published on Apr 10, 2014
The Philippines' decision to contest China's vast claims over the South China Sea was
advanced when it recently submitted a formal plea before the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (Itlos). A 4,000-page, 10-volume memorial contains Manila's
arguments, evidence and maps to support its case against China's nine-dash line,
which encloses 90 per cent of the South China Sea. Those expansive claims have put
Beijing at loggerheads with Manila and others who are determined to defend what they
too believe to be legitimately theirs.
That the Philippines has gone about the defence by appealing to international law might
be dismissed as an instance of a weaker country taking its case to the world because it
cannot hope to win it militarily against a far stronger country. But that precisely is what
international law is for. The law exists as an impartial forum where countries big and
small can present and argue their cases on legal merit. So it is with Itlos,which has no
conceivable reason to be partial to any side.
By taking its case to the United Nations tribunal, Manila has secured a tactical victory, if
nothing else yet. When the tribunal rules, it will clarify the legal position for the world to
see. Its ruling will be legally binding, whether or not it can be enforced. That the
Philippines has submitted its detailed case in the face of acute Chinese displeasure
constitutes a political victory, both at home and among its international partners who are
watching how it behaves under Chinese pressure.
By responding angrily to Manila's move, Beijing has demonstrated a certain impatience
bordering on intemperance that is troubling. Indeed, it has declared flatly that it will not
budge even if the Philippines wins its case. China's dismissive attitude does not sit well
with the reputation which it is building of being a responsible member of the
international community, since it gave up economic isolationism and political prickliness
to rejoin the global mainstream after the Cultural Revolution. It is in Beijing's interest to
counter perceptions of high-handedness that might erode the welcome which countries
great and small have extended to China as it took its rightful place in regional and global
affairs. China remains an invaluable international partner as the world's economic
centre shifts to Asia.

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The Post-Deng China: The End of China's Soft Power?
Posted: 04/09/2014 8:24 pm EDT Updated: 04/09/2014 8:59 pm EDT
In the last three decades the world came to witness one of history's most dramatic
stories of economic transformation in the once-isolated, formerly frail China. It marked a
decisive end to the country's "century of national humiliation" (beginning with the First
Opium War in 1839 and ending with the conclusion of World War II in 1945) and
decades of political instability, ideological zealotry, and economic mismanagement
under the watchful gaze of Mao Zedong.
The rise of Deng Xiaoping, a pragmatist in practice and a nationalist at heart,
represented the inflection point that eventually propelled China to the top of the global
economic and political hierarchy. In retrospect, however, one could argue that it was
precisely Mao's radical ideological experimentation that provided a perfect Hegelian
antithesis to a centuries-old process of political decay and economic stagnation in China
that coincided with the rise of Western colonialism.
Following this line of argumentation, Deng reflected a new synthesis in China's national
consciousness, one that was founded upon an astute mixture of technological
modernity and traditional Confucian thought. China's pragmatic turn in the last decades
of the 20th century represented its growing appreciation of and confidence in mastering
the virtues of capitalism for the benefit of national development. And along this process
China managed to inspire both admiration and fear among its peers.
Falling back on a long tradition of sophisticated statecraft, however, the post-Cold War
era saw not only the demise of the Soviet threat to China (a critical factor in binding
Washington and Beijing in the twilight years of Chairman Mao) but the emergence of a
capable diplomatic core that impressively burnished China's public diplomacy and
international image. The first decade of the 21st century saw a perceptible shift in public
opinion with respect to China, thanks to the Bush administration's aggressive display of
unilateral hubris. But there was also a critical economic component.
China's economic miracle not only represented an attractive model of state-led capitalist
development (with a so-called "Beijing Consensus" supposedly reshaping the terms of
international trade and investment) but created a "commodity boom" that dramatically
enhanced the economic fortunes of many developing and emerging economies. This
represented the "peaceful rise" dimension of China's unrelenting national development.
In recent years, however, more and more countries have come to focus on China's
military might rather than its economic success.

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The sheer scale of environmental challenges in China and the breadth of structural
vulnerabilities afflicting its economy have partially undermined the attraction of its
development strategy. And the brewing territorial disputes between China and its East
Asian neighbors have played a critical role in reshaping international discourse vis-à-vis
its intentions -- and the long-term implications of a prospective Sino-centric order in
Asia.
The Age of Skepticism
Western powers can understandably treat China's rise as a direct challenge to their
centuries-old global dominance. Although both China and the West are essentially
capitalist in economic practice, there is a palpable difference in terms of their politico-
ideological outlook. China's (arguably) successful management of capitalist
accumulation in recent decades progressively undercuts the purported inseparability
between private enterprise and parliamentary representation -- the cornerstone of
(official) Western political thought.
But what is even more interesting is how many countries across Asia have come to view
China's rise with growing skepticism. Throughout my engagements across Asia, from
Tehran to Tokyo, I sensed growing anxiety toward China's international influence. A
decade ago perceptions of China were significantly more sympathetic.
For instance, in sanctions-hit Iran, which has been forced into barter deals with China,
many businessmen have been complaining about China's allegedly opportunistic
business practices. Ordinary consumers have been complaining about the safety of
cheap Chinese imports, which have also battered local manufacturers. In Japan the
ongoing dispute in the East China Sea has alarmed many ordinary citizens, who are
worried about their country's ability to defend itself. Gradually the Abe administration is
gaining more public support for his proposed revision of Japan's pacifist post-World War
II constitution, paving the way for proactive and nimble Japanese armed forces in the
near future. Across Southeast Asia popular views toward China have been mixed, but
the ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea have set off alarm bells in the
Philippines and Vietnam, which have welcomed a greater American strategic footprint in
the region to stave off Chinese territorial assertiveness.
While China has consistently maintained that it prioritizes harmonious and peaceful
relations with its neighbors and accords equal respect to fellow developing countries,
there is a growing consensus that "balance of power" dynamics explain Beijing's
renewed assertiveness in international affairs. After all, the aftermath of the 2008-09
Great Recession, which severely undermined the global standing of Western powers,
precipitated the emergence of a new China that is more vocal about its interests and
more capable of asserting it

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The Post-Deng China
Throughout the 1990s the Clinton administration vigorously encouraged the integration
of China into the global networks of production, arguing that a poor and isolated China
with little stake in the international system is always more dangerous. The liberals
argued that subjecting China to economic globalization and integrating it as a status-
quo power would redress its historical grievances and tame its excessive passions.
Refusing to opportunistically revalue its currency, China played an extremely
constructive role during the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis. It devoted a lot of energy to
resolving many of its territorial disputes, even proposing joint development in areas of
overlapping maritime interests. By the first decade of the 21st century, China had
become the leading trading partner of most Asian countries, serving as a pivotal
element of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region.
In recent years, however, the views of American political scientist John Mearsheimer, a
major proponent of the thesis that China's rise will not be peaceful, have gained more
currency. The world is beginning to see the less-benign dimensions of China's rise. In
the words of Indian strategist Brahma Chellaney, China's territorial strategy represents
"a steady progression of steps to outwit opponents and create new facts on the ground."
The swift defeat of (Soviet-armed) Iraq in the Gulf War served as a formative
experience in China's modern military strategy, inspiring a massive military
modernization program that focuses on information warfare, blue-water naval power,
and Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The short-term objective is to secure
and consolidate China's territorial claims in the region while preparing the country for a
long-term run at Pacific supremacy -- obviously at the expense of Washington.
The rapid expansion in China's military capabilities, meanwhile, has been reinforced by
the country's ability to sustain its economic momentum, while most leading Western
powers have struggled to recover from the 2008-09 Great Recession. In this sense
China has managed to rise in both absolute and relative terms. The other critical factor
is how the erosion of communist ideology amid massive economic liberalization has
reignited popular nationalism, with many ordinary Chinese citizens eager to witness
China's restoration to its historical glory as the center of East Asian order.
As an economic powerhouse armed with a nuclear deterrent, China is well aware that
neither the West nor its neighbors can afford a direct confrontation. From a military
standpoint, the hardliners in China believe that they can afford to constantly push the
boundaries of their territorial claims without triggering a massive backlash.
Their strategic calculus is not based on chess, which places a premium on decisive
victory, but on the ancient Chinese game of Go. As veteran Filipino journalist Narciso
Reyes argues, a Go-inspired strategy aims at gaining "more territory than your
adversary" and, in contrast to chess-like strategies, represents a "low-risk, incremental

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undertaking involving the consolidation of gains, focusing its attack on the enemy's
weak points and group, and avoiding their strong positions."
After all, it might take decades before China can credibly match the conventional
capabilities of the U.S. As China confronts the prospect of a regional counter-alliance
comprising Japan, India, the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, Singapore and the U.S.,
the moderates within the Chinese leadership can once again reassert Deng's emphasis
on self-discipline, humility, and strategic restraint. But the advent of popular nationalism
combined with China's continued struggle with shoring up its domestic legitimacy amid a
difficult period of economic reform could prevent a moderate recalibration of China's
territorial posturing.
It will take immense political will and creative diplomacy by disputing countries to
prevent the tragedy of a great power confrontation in Asia. At the end of the day, China
is a legitimate powerhouse that should be peacefully integrated into the the emerging
global order.

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China's Military Chiefs Lecture the Visiting U.S. Defense
Secretary
By Bruce Einhorn April 09, 2014
U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel is visiting Beijing, and yesterday he got an earful
about China‘s favorite bête noir: Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The Chinese are
waging rhetorical war against Japan‘s nationalist leader, who spent much of last year
traveling around the region and courting support from other Asian countries that feel
threatened by China‘s rise.
Now Hagel enters the scene after having dared to express support for Japan—and
criticism of China—shortly before arriving in Beijing. That evidently was too much for
some Chinese military officials. After meeting the Pentagon boss, Chinese Defense
Minister Chang Wanquan made sure to emphasize China‘s determination to stick to a
hard line in the dispute with its longtime rival. ―We will not compromise, nor concede,
nor trade on territory and sovereignty,‖ he said, according to a report in the official China
Daily newspaper.
Hagel may have been hoping for some sign of flexibility from the Chinese in their
dispute over a collection of deserted rocks in the East China Sea, but Chang said he
shouldn‘t bother. ―We will not tolerate these being infringed upon,‖ the Chinese defense
chief declared, ―even the least bit.‖
And Chang wasn‘t the only official souring Hagel‘s welcome. Fan Changlong, one of the
country‘s top military officials, reprimanded Hagel for criticizing China‘s unilateral
declaration of an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea. ―I can tell you,
frankly,‖ the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission told Hagel, ―the Chinese
people, including myself, are dissatisfied with such remarks.‖
The men running the People‘s Liberation Army have good reason to be in a testy mood.
China has territorial disputes with many of its neighbors, some of which are treaty allies
of the U.S., and as China attempts to throw its weight around its backyard, the U.S. is
there to backstop these rivals.
And it‘s not just U.S. support for Japan that irks Chinese leaders. The Philippines, one
of several Southeast Asian countries with territorial disputes with China, is another
American ally. President Benigno Aquino‘s government took to the United Nations
Permanent Court of Arbitration on March 30 to challenge Chinese claims in the South
China Sea. The response from Beijing was to dismiss the court‘s authority to hear the
case in the first place.

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That plays into the hands of Japan‘s Abe, who wants other Asian countries to join Japan
in standing up to China. The rejection of the Court of Arbitration‘s authority feeds the
impression that a country that decides to annex the entire South China Sea and declare
an air-defense zone in the East China Sea just wants to play by its own rules. ―China‘s
refusal to join the arbitration will cost it both from a legal standpoint and public-opinion
view,‖ Ramon Casiple, executive director of the Institute for Political & Electoral Reform
in Manila, told Bloomberg News. ―It will be viewed by the global community as a rogue
state that doesn‘t recognize international law.‖
Compare China‘s treatment of the court with the way Japan has reacted to a legal
setback of its own. The day after the Philippines made its argument to the Court of
Arbitration, the International Court of Justice, another United Nations body that meets in
the Hague, ruled that Japan must halt its annual whale hunt in the Southern Ocean. The
Japanese government quickly announced it was calling off next year‘s hunt. Japan, said
Foreign Ministry spokesman Koji Tsuruoka, will ―abide by the judgment of the court as a
state that places great importance on the international legal order.‖
The whale hunt was already an embarrassment for the Japanese, so Abe is probably
relieved an outside court has given him a reason to call it off. At the same time, the
court provided a welcome opportunity for Abe to show that Japan, unlike a certain
neighbor, is an Asian power that‘s ready to follow international law.

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Can China Rise Peacefully?
John J. Mearsheimer | April 8, 2014
(Editor‘s Note: The following is the new concluding chapter of Dr. John J.
Mearsheimer‘s book The Tragedy of the Great Power Politics. A new, updated edition
was released on April 7 and is available via Amazon.)
With the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union
two years later, the United States emerged as the most powerful state on the planet.
Many commentators said we are living in a unipolar world for the first time in history,
which is another way of saying America is the only great power in the international
system. If that statement is true, it makes little sense to talk about great-power politics,
since there is just one great power.
But even if one believes, as I do, that China and Russia are great powers, they are still
far weaker than the United States and in no position to challenge it in any meaningful
way. Therefore, interactions among the great powers are not going to be nearly as
prominent a feature of international politics as they were before 1989, when there were
always two or more formidable great powers competing with each other.
To highlight this point, contrast the post–Cold War world with the first ninety years of the
twentieth century, when the United States was deeply committed to containing potential
peer competitors such as Wilhelmine Germany, imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the
Soviet Union. During that period, the United States fought two world wars and engaged
with the Soviet Union in an intense security competition that spanned the globe.
After 1989, however, American policymakers hardly had to worry about fighting against
rival great powers, and thus the United States was free to wage wars against minor
powers without having to worry much about the actions of the other great powers.
Indeed, it has fought six wars since the Cold War ended: Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995),
Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001–present), Iraq again (2003–11), and Libya (2011). It
has also been consumed with fighting terrorists across the globe since September 11,
2001. Not surprisingly, there has been little interest in great-power politics since the
Soviet threat withered away.
The rise of China appears to be changing this situation, however, because this
development has the potential to fundamentally alter the architecture of the international

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system. If the Chinese economy continues growing at a brisk clip in the next few
decades, the United States will once again face a potential peer competitor, and great-
power politics will return in full force. It is still an open question as to whether China‘s
economy will continue its spectacular rise or even continue growing at a more modest,
but still impressive, rate. There are intelligent arguments on both sides of this debate,
and it is hard to know who is right.
But if those who are bullish on China are correct, it will almost certainly be the most
important geopolitical development of the twenty-first century, for China will be
transformed into an enormously powerful country. The attendant question that will
concern every maker of foreign policy and student of international politics is a simple but
profound one: can China rise peacefully? The aim of this chapter is to answer that
question.
To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory of international politics that explains
how rising great powers are likely to act and how the other states in the system will
react to them. We must rely on theory because many aspects of the future are
unknown; we have few facts about the future. Thomas Hobbes put the point well: ―The
present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only, but
things to come have no being at all.‖ Thus, we must use theories to predict what is likely
to transpire in world politics.
Offensive realism offers important insights into China‘s rise. My argument in a nutshell
is that if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia the way
the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. The United States, however, will
go to enormous lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony. Most of
Beijing‘s neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and
Vietnam, will join with the United States to contain Chinese power. The result will be an
intense security competition with considerable potential for war. In short, China‘s rise is
unlikely to be tranquil.
It is important to emphasize that my focus is not on how China will behave in the
immediate future, but instead on how it will act in the longer term, when it will be far
more powerful than it is today. The fact is that present-day China does not possess
significant military power; its military forces are inferior to those of the United States.
Beijing would be making a huge mistake to pick a fight with the U.S. military nowadays.
Contemporary China, in other words, is constrained by the global balance of power,
which is clearly stacked in America‘s favor. Among other advantages, the United States
has many consequential allies around the world, while China has virtually none. But we
are not concerned with that situation here. Instead, the focus is on a future world in
which the balance of power has shifted sharply against the United States, where China
controls much more relative power than it does today, and where China is in roughly the
same economic and military league as the United States. In essence, we are talking
about a world in which China is much less constrained than it is today.

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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section contains a brief
review of the core elements of my theory, which are laid out in detail in Chapter 2. I then
summarize my discussion of America‘s drive for hegemony in the Western Hemisphere,
which is considered at length in Chapter 7. It is clear from this story that the United
States has acted according to the dictates of offensive realism for most of its history.
The subsequent section focuses on how an increasingly powerful China is likely to
behave. I maintain that it, too, will act according to my theory, which is another way of
saying it will effectively emulate the United States. In the next section, I explain why the
United States as well as Beijing‘s neighborsare likely to form a balancing coalition to
contain China. Then I consider the chances that a Sino-American war will break out,
making the argument that it is more likely than a war between the superpowers was
during the Cold War. In the penultimate section, I attempt to refute the two main
counterarguments to my gloomy forecast. Finally, I argue in a brief conclusion that the
best reason to think my prognosis may be wrong has to do with the limits of social
science theory.
OFFENSIVE REALISM IN BRIEF
In its simplest form, my theory maintains that the basic structure of the international
system forces states concerned about their security to compete with each other for
power. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power
and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this means that the most
powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world while also
ensuring that no rival great power dominates another area.
The theory begins with five assumptions about the world, which are all reasonable
approximations of reality. First of all, states are the key actors in international politics,
and no higher authority stands above them. There is no ultimate arbiter or leviathan in
the system that states can turn to if they get into trouble and need help. This is called an
anarchic system, as opposed to a hierarchic one.
The next two assumptions deal with capabilities and intentions, respectively. All states
have offensive military capabilities, although some have more than others, indeed
sometimes many more than others. Capabilities are reasonably easy to measure
because they are largely composed of material objects that can be seen, assessed, and
counted.
Intentions are a different matter. States can never be certain about the intentions of
other states, because intentions are inside the heads of leaders and thus virtually
impossible to see and difficult to measure. In particular, states can never know with
complete confidence whether another state might have its gun sights on them for one
reason or another. The problem of discerning states‘ intentions is especially acute when
one ponders their future intentions, since it is almost impossible to know who the
leaders of any country will be five or more years from now, much less what they will
think about foreign policy.

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The theory also assumes that states rank survival as their most important goal. This is
not to say it is their only goal, for states invariably have numerous ambitions. However,
when push comes to shove, survival trumps all other goals, basically because if a state
does not survive, it cannot pursue those other goals. Survival means more than merely
maintaining a state‘s territorial integrity, although that goal is of fundamental importance;
it also means preserving the autonomy of a state‘s policymaking process. Finally, states
are assumed to be rational actors, which is to say they are reasonably effective at
designing strategies that maximize their chances of survival.
These assumptions, when combined, cause states to behave in particular ways.
Specifically, in a world where there is some chance—even just a small one—that other
states might have malign intentions as well as formidable offensive military capabilities,
states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by what I call the ―9-1-1‖
problem—the fact that there is no night watchman in an anarchic system whom states
can call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Accordingly, they recognize they must
look out for their own survival, and the best way to do that is to be especially powerful.
The logic here is straightforward: the more powerful a state is relative to its competitors,
the less likely its survival will be at risk. No country in the Western Hemisphere, for
example, would dare attack the United States, because it is so much stronger than any
of its neighbors. This reasoning drives great powers to look for opportunities to move
the balance of power in their favor, as well as to prevent other states from gaining
power at their expense. The ultimate aim is to be the hegemon: that is, the only great
power in the system.
When people talk about hegemony today, they are usually referring to the United
States, which is often described as a global hegemon. However, I do not believe it is
possible for any country—including the United States—to achieve global hegemony.
One obstacle to world domination is that it is very difficult to conquer and subdue distant
great powers, because of the problems associated with projecting and sustaining power
over huge distances, especially across enormous bodies of water like the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans. This problem is less acute when dealing with minor powers, but even
so, the power of nationalism makes it extremely difficult to occupy and rule a hostile
country. The paramount goal a great power can attain is regional hegemony, which
means dominating one‘s surrounding neighborhood. The United States, for example, is
a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. Although it is plainly the most powerful
state on the planet by far, it is not a global hegemon.
Once a state achieves regional hegemony, it has a further aim: to prevent other great
powers from dominating their geographical regions. In other words, no regional
hegemon wants a peer competitor. The main reason is that regional hegemons—
because they are so dominant in their neighborhood—are free to roam around the globe
and interfere in other regions of the world. This situation implies that regional hegemons
are likely to try to cause trouble in each other‘s backyard. Thus, any state that achieves
regional hegemony will want to make sure that no other great power achieves a similar
position, freeing that counterpart to roam into its neighborhood.

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Most Americans never think about it, but one of the main reasons the United States is
able to station military forces all around the globe and intrude in the politics of virtually
every region is that it faces no serious threats in the Western Hemisphere. If the United
States had dangerous foes in its own backyard, it would be much less capable of
roaming into distant regions.
But if a rival state achieves regional dominance, the goal will be to end its hegemony as
expeditiously as possible. The reason is simple: it is much more propitious to have two
or more great powers in all the other key areas of the world, so that the great powers
there will have to worry about each other and thus be less able to interfere in the distant
hegemon‘s own backyard. In sum, the best way to survive in international anarchy is to
be the sole regional hegemon.
THE AMERICAN PURSUIT OF HEGEMONY
The United States is the only regional hegemon in modern history. Five other great
powers—Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and
the Soviet Union—made serious attempts to dominate their respective regions, but they
all failed. The United States did not end up dominating the Western Hemisphere in a fit
of absentmindedness. On the contrary, the Founding Fathers and their successors
consciously and deliberately sought to achieve hegemony in the Americas. In essence,
they acted in accordance with the dictates of offensive realism.
When the United States finally gained its independence from Britain in 1783, it was a
relatively weak country whose people were largely confined to the Atlantic seaboard.
The British and Spanish empires surrounded the new country, and hostile Native
American tribes controlled much of the territory between the Appalachian Mountains
and the Mississippi River. It was a dangerous neighborhood for sure.
Over the next seven decades, the Americans responded to this precarious situation by
marching across their continent to the Pacific Ocean, creating a huge and powerful
country in the process. To realize their so-called Manifest Destiny, they murdered large
numbers of Native Americans and stole their land, bought Florida from Spain (1819)
and what is now the center of the United States from France (1803). They annexed
Texas in 1845 and then went to war with Mexico in 1846, taking what is today the
American southwest from their defeated foe. They cut a deal with Britain to gain the
Pacific northwest in 1846 and finally, in 1853, acquired additional territory from Mexico
with the Gadsden Purchase.
The United States also gave serious thought to conquering Canada throughout much of
the nineteenth century. Indeed, the Americans invaded Canada in 1812 with that goal in
mind. Some of the islands in the Caribbean would probably have become part of the
United States had it not been for the fact that numerous slaves were in that area and
the northern states did not want more slaveholding states in the Union. The plain truth is
that in the nineteenth century the supposedly peace-loving United States compiled a

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record of territorial aggrandizement that has few parallels in recorded history. It is not
surprising that Adolf Hitler frequently referred to America‘s westward expansion as a
model after Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. ―Here in the East,‖ he
said, ―a similar process will repeat itself for a second time as in the conquest of
America.‖
There was another job to be done to achieve regional hegemony: push the European
great powers out of the Western Hemisphere and keep them out. This goal is what the
Monroe Doctrine is all about. The United States was not powerful enough to act on
those principles when President James Monroe articulated them in 1823; but by the end
of the nineteenth century, the European great powers had become minor players in the
Americas. The United States had achieved regional hegemony, which made it a
remarkably secure great power.
A great power‘s work is not done once it achieves regional hegemony. It must then
ensure that no other great power follows suit and dominates its own area of the world.
During the twentieth century, four countries had the capability to strive for regional
hegemony: Wilhelmine Germany (1890–1918), imperial Japan (1937–45), Nazi
Germany (1933–45), and the Soviet Union (1945–90). Not surprisingly, each tried to
match what the United States had achieved in the Western Hemisphere in the
preceding century.
How did the United States react? In each case, it played a key role in defeating and
dismantling those aspiring hegemons.
The United States entered World War I in April 1917, when it looked as if Wilhelmine
Germany might win the war and rule Europe. American troops played a critical role in
tipping the balance against the Kaiserreich, which collapsed in November 1918. In the
early 1940s, President Roosevelt went to great lengths to maneuver the United States
into World War II to thwart Japan‘s ambitions in Asia and especially Germany‘s
ambitions in Europe. After entering the war in December 1941, the United States helped
to demolish both Axis powers. Since 1945, American policymakers have taken
considerable pains to limit the military capabilities of Germany and Japan. Finally, the
United States steadfastly worked to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Eurasia
during the Cold War and then helped relegate it to the scrap heap of history between
1989 and 1991.
Shortly after the Cold War ended, George H. W. Bush‘s administration boldly stated in
its famous ―Defense Guidance‖ of 1992, which was leaked to the press, that the United
States was now the lone superpower in the world and planned to remain in that exalted
position. American policymakers, in other words, would not tolerate the emergence of a
new peer competitor. That same message was repeated in the equally-famous National
Security Strategy issued by George W. Bush‘s administration in September 2002. There
was much criticism of that document, especially its claims about the value of
―preemptive war.‖ But hardly a word of protest was raised regarding the assertion that

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the United States should check rising powers and maintain its commanding position in
the global balance of power.
The bottom line is that the United States worked hard for over a century to gain
hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, and it did so for sound strategic reasons. After
achieving regional dominance, it has worked equally hard to keep other great powers
from controlling either Asia or Europe.
What does America‘s past behavior tell us about the rise of China? In particular, how
should we expect China to conduct itself as it grows more powerful? And how should
we expect the United States and China‘s neighbors to react to a strong China?
FOLLOWING IN UNCLE SAM‘S FOOTSTEPS
If China continues its striking economic growth over the next few decades, it is likely to
act in accordance with the logic of offensive realism, which is to say it will attempt to
imitate the United States. Specifically, it will try to dominate Asia the way the United
States dominates the Western Hemisphere. It will do so primarily because such
domination offers the best way to survive under international anarchy. In addition, China
is involved in various territorial disputes and the more powerful it is, the better able it will
be to settle those disputes on terms favorable to Beijing.
Furthermore, like the United States, a powerful China is sure to have security interests
around the globe, which will prompt it to develop the capability to project military power
into regions far beyond Asia. The Persian Gulf will rank high on the new superpower‘s
list of strategically important areas, but so will the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, China
will have a vested interest in creating security problems for the United States in the
Western Hemisphere, so as to limit the American military‘s freedom to roam into other
regions, especially Asia. Let us consider these matters in greater detail.
Chinese Realpolitik
If my theory is correct, China will seek to maximize the power gap with its neighbors,
especially larger countries like India, Japan, and Russia. China will want to make sure it
is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that
China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer other
Asian countries. One major difference between China and the United States is that
America started out as a rather small and weak country located along the Atlantic
coastline that had to expand westward in order to become a large and powerful state
that could dominate the Western Hemisphere. For the United States, conquest and
expansion were necessary to establish regional hegemony. China, in contrast, is
already a huge country and does not need to conquer more territory to establish itself as
a regional hegemon on a par with the United States.
Of course, it is always possible in particular circumstances that Chinese leaders will
conclude that it is imperative to attack another country to achieve regional hegemony. It

31
is more likely, however, that China will seek to grow its economy and become so
powerful that it can dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring
countries, and make it clear they will pay a substantial price if they do not follow the
rules. After all, this is what the United States has done in the Western Hemisphere. For
example, in 1962, the Kennedy administration let both Cuba and the Soviet Union know
that it would not tolerate nuclear weapons in Cuba. And in 1970, the Nixon
administration told those same two countries that building a Soviet naval facility at
Cienfuegos was unacceptable. Furthermore, Washington has intervened in the
domestic politics of numerous Latin American countries either to prevent the rise of
leaders who were perceived to be anti-American or to overthrow them if they had
gained power. In short, the United States has wielded a heavy hand in the Western
Hemisphere.
A much more powerful China can also be expected to try to push the United States out
of the Asia-Pacific region, much as the United States pushed the European great
powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. We should expect
China to devise its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as imperial Japan did in the
1930s. In fact, we are already seeing inklings of that policy. For example, Chinese
leaders have made it clear they do not think the United States has a right to interfere in
disputes over the maritime boundaries of the South China Sea, a strategically important
body of water that Beijing effectively claims as its own.
China also objected in July 2010 when the United States planned to conduct naval
exercises in the Yellow Sea, which is located between China and the Korean Peninsula.
In particular, the U.S. Navy planned to send the aircraft carrier USS George Washington
into the Yellow Sea. Those maneuvers were not directed at China; they were aimed
instead at North Korea, which was believed to have sunk a South Korean naval vessel,
the Cheonan, in the Yellow Sea. However, vigorous protests from China forced the
Obama administration to move the exercises out of the Yellow Sea and farther east into
the Sea of Japan. Sounding a lot like President Monroe, a Chinese spokesperson
succinctly summed up Beijing‘s thinking: ―We firmly oppose foreign military vessels or
planes entering the Yellow Sea and other waters adjacent to China to engage in
activities that would impact on its security and interests.‖
More generally, there is considerable evidence that Chinese leaders would like to
develop the capability to push the U.S. Navy beyond the ―first island chain,‖ which is
usually taken to include the Greater Sunda Islands, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
If this were to happen, China would be able to seal off the East China Sea, the South
China Sea, and the Yellow Sea, and it would be almost impossible for the U.S. Navy to
reach Korea in the event of war. There is even talk in China about eventually pushing
the U.S. Navy beyond the ―second island chain,‖ which runs from the eastern coast of
Japan to Guam and then down to the Moluccan Islands. It would also include the small
island groups like the Bonin, Caroline, and Marianas Islands. If the Chinese were
successful, Japan and the Philippines would be cut off from American naval support.

32
These ambitious goals make good strategic sense for China (although this is not to say
China will necessarily be able to achieve them). Beijing should want a militarily weak
and isolated India, Japan, and Russia as its neighbors, just as the United States prefers
a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. What state in its right mind would
want other powerful countries located in its region? All Chinese surely remember what
happened over the last century when Japan was powerful and China was weak.
Furthermore, why would a powerful China accept U.S. military forces operating in its
backyard? American policymakers object when other great powers send military forces
into the Western Hemisphere, because they view those foreign forces as potential
threats to American security. The same logic should apply to China. Why would China
feel safe with U.S. forces deployed on its doorstep? Following the logic of the Monroe
Doctrine, would not China‘s security be better served by pushing the American military
out of the Asia-Pacific region? All Chinese surely remember what happened in the
hundred years between the First Opium War (1839–42) and the end of World War II
(1945), when the United States and the European great powers took advantage of a
weak China and not only violated its sovereignty but also imposed unfair treaties on it
and exploited it economically.
Why should we expect China to act differently than the United States? Are the Chinese
more principled than we are? More ethical? Are they less nationalistic? Less concerned
about their survival? They are none of these things, of course, which is why China is
likely to follow basic realist logic and attempt to become a regional hegemon in Asia.
Although maximizing its prospects of survival is the principal reason China will seek to
dominate Asia, there is another reason, related to Beijing‘s territorial disputes with some
of its neighbors. As Taylor Fravel points out, China has managed to settle most of its
border conflicts since 1949—seventeen out of twenty-three—in good part because it
has been willing to make some significant concessions to the other side. Nevertheless,
China has six outstanding territorial disagreements, and there is little reason—at least at
this juncture—to think the involved parties will find a clever diplomatic solution to them.
Probably China‘s most important dispute is over Taiwan, which Beijing is deeply
committed to making an integral part of China once again. The present government on
Taiwan, however, believes it is a sovereign country and has no interest in being
reintegrated into China. Taiwanese leaders do not advertise their independence, for fear
it will provoke China to invade Taiwan. In addition, China has ongoing disputes with
Vietnam over control of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, and with Brunei,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands, which are also
located in the South China Sea.
More generally, China maintains that it has sovereignty over almost all of the South
China Sea, a claim disputed not only by its neighbors but by the United States as well.
Farther to the north in the East China Sea, Beijing has a bitter feud with Japan over who
controls a handful of small islands that Tokyo calls the Senkaku Islands and China
labels the Diaoyu Islands.

33
Finally, China has land border disputes with Bhutan and India. In fact, China and India
fought a war over the disputed territory in 1962, and the two sides have engaged in
provocative actions on numerous occasions since then. For example, New Delhi
maintains there were 400 Chinese incursions into Indian-controlled territory during 2012
alone; and in mid-April 2013, Chinese troops—for the first time since 1986—refused to
return to China after they were discovered on the Indian side of the Line of Actual
Control. It appears that China has been stepping up its cross-border raids in recent
years in response to increased Indian troop deployments and an accompanying growth
in infrastructure.
Given the importance of these territorial disputes to China, coupled with the apparent
difficulty of resolving them through the give-and-take of diplomacy, the best way for
China to settle them on favorable terms is probably via coercion. Specifically, a China
that is much more powerful than any of its neighbors will be in a good position to use
military threats to force the other side to accept a deal largely on China‘s terms. And if
that does not work, China can always unsheathe the sword and go to war to get its way.
It seems likely that coercion or the actual use of force is the only plausible way China is
going to regain Taiwan. In short, becoming a regional hegemon is the best pathway for
China to resolve its various territorial disputes on favorable terms.
It is worth noting that in addition to these territorial disputes, China might become
embroiled in conflict with its neighbors over water. The Tibetan Plateau, which is located
within China‘s borders, is the third-largest repository of freshwater in the world, ranking
behind the Arctic and Antarctica. Indeed, it is sometimes referred to as the ―third pole.‖ It
is also the main source of many of Asia‘s great rivers, including the Brahmaputra, the
Irrawaddy, the Mekong, the Salween, the Sutlej, the Yangtze, and the Yellow. Most of
these rivers flow into neighboring countries, where they have a profound effect on the
daily lives of many millions of people.
In recent years, Beijing has shown much interest in rerouting water from these rivers to
heavily populated areas in eastern and northern China. Toward that end, China has
built canals, dams, irrigation systems, and pipelines. This plan is in its early stages and
has yet to change the flow of these rivers in a meaningful fashion. But the potential for
trouble is substantial, because the neighboring countries downstream are likely to see a
marked reduction in their water supply over time, which could have devastating
economic and social consequences. For example, the Chinese are interested in
diverting the Brahmaputra River northward into the dying Yellow River. If this happens,
it would cause major problems in India and especially in Bangladesh. China is also
working to redirect water from the Mekong River, a diversion that is almost certain to
cause big problems in Southeast Asian countries like Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and
Vietnam.
In its efforts to begin rerouting the rivers flowing out of the Tibetan Plateau, China has
acted unilaterally and shown little interest in building international institutions that can
help manage the ensuing problems. Given that water is becoming an increasingly

34
scarce resource in Asia, this problem is likely to get worse with time and, given the
enormous stakes involved, might even lead to war between China and one or more of
its neighbors.
In addition to pursuing regional hegemony, a rising China will have strategic interests
outside of Asia, just as the United States has important interests beyond the Western
Hemisphere. In keeping with the dictates of offensive realism, China will have good
reason to interfere in the politics of the Americas so as to cause Washington trouble in
its own backyard, thus making it more difficult for the U.S. military to move freely around
the world.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union formed a close alliance with Cuba in good part
for the purpose of interfering in America‘s backyard. In the future, relations between the
United States and a country like Brazil will perhaps worsen, creating an opportunity for
China to form close ties with Brazil and maybe even station military forces in the
Western Hemisphere. Additionally, China will have powerful incentives to forge ties with
Canada and Mexico and do whatever it can to weaken America‘s dominance in North
America. Its aim will not be to threaten the American homeland directly, but rather to
distract the United States from looking abroad and force it to focus increased attention
on its own neighborhood.
This claim may sound implausible at present, but remember that the Soviets tried to put
nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba in 1962, had more than 40,000 troops in Cuba that
same year, and also provided Cuba with a wide variety of sophisticated conventional
weapons. And do not forget that the United States already has a huge military presence
in China‘s backyard.
China will obviously want to limit America‘s ability to project power elsewhere, in order
to improve Beijing‘s prospects of achieving regional hegemony in Asia. However, China
has other reasons for wanting to pin down the United States as much as possible in the
Western Hemisphere. In particular, China has major economic and political interests in
Africa, which seem likely to increase in the future. Even more important, China is
heavily dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf, and that dependence is apt to grow
significantly over time. China, like the United States, is almost certain to treat the
Persian Gulf as a vital strategic interest, which means Beijing and Washington will
eventually engage in serious security competition in that region, much as the two
superpowers did during the Cold War. Creating trouble for the United States in the
Western Hemisphere will limit its ability to project power into the Persian Gulf and
Africa.
To take this line of analysis a step further, most of the oil that China imports from the
Gulf is transported by sea. For all the talk about moving that oil by pipelines and
railroads through Myanmar and Pakistan, the fact is that maritime transport is a much
easier and cheaper option. However, for Chinese ships to reach the Gulf as well as
Africa from China‘s major ports along its eastern coast, they have to get from the South
China Sea into the Indian Ocean, which are separated by various Southeast Asian

35
countries. The only way for Chinese ships to move between these two large bodies of
water is to go through three major passages. Specifically, they can go through the Strait
of Malacca, which is surrounded by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, or they can go
farther south and traverse either the Lombok or the Sunda Strait, each of which cuts
through Indonesia and leads into the open waters of the Indian Ocean just to the
northwest of Australia.
Chinese ships then have to traverse the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea to reach the
Persian Gulf. After that, they have to return to China via the same route. Chinese
leaders will surely want to control these sea lines of communication, just as the United
States emphasizes the importance of controlling its primary sea routes. Thus, it is hardly
surprising that there is widespread support in China for building a blue-water navy,
which would allow China to project power around the world and control its main sea
lines of communication.
In brief, if China continues its rapid economic growth, it will almost certainly become a
superpower, which means it will build the power-projection capability necessary to
compete with the United States around the globe. The two areas to which it is likely to
pay the greatest attention are the Western Hemisphere and the Persian Gulf, although
Africa will also be of marked importance to Beijing. In addition, China will undoubtedly
try to build military and naval forces that would allow it to reach those distant regions,
much the way the United States has pursued sea control.
Why China Cannot Disguise Its Rise
One might argue that, yes, China is sure to attempt to dominate Asia, but there is a
clever strategy it can pursue to achieve that end peacefully. Specifically, it should follow
Deng Xiaoping‘s famous maxim that China keep a low profile and avoid becoming
embroiled in international conflicts as much as possible. His exact words were ―Hide our
capacities and bide our time, but also get some things done.‖ The reason it makes
sense for China to bide its time is that if it avoids trouble and merely continues growing
economically, it will eventually become so powerful that it can just get its way in Asia. Its
hegemony will be a fait accompli. But even if that does not happen and China eventually
has to use force or the threat of force to achieve hegemony and resolve its outstanding
disputes, it will still be well positioned to push its neighbors and the United States
around.
Starting a war now, or even engaging in serious security competition, makes little sense
for Beijing. Conflict runs the risk of damaging the Chinese economy; moreover, China‘s
military would not fare well against the United States and its current allies. It is better for
China to wait until its power has increased and it is in a better position to take on the
American military. Simply put, time is on China‘s side, which means it should pursue a
low-key foreign policy so as not to raise suspicion among its neighbors.
In practice, this means China should do whatever it can to signal to the outside world
that it has benign intentions and does not plan to build formidable and threatening

36
military forces. In terms of rhetoric, Chinese leaders should constantly emphasize their
peaceful intentions and make the case that China can rise peacefully because of its rich
Confucian culture. At the same time, they should work hard to keep Chinese officials
from using harsh language to describe the United States and other Asian countries, or
from making threatening statements toward them.
In terms of actual behavior, China should not initiate any crises with its neighbors or the
United States, or add fuel to the fire if another country provokes a crisis with China. For
example, Beijing should go out of its way to avoid trouble over sovereignty issues
regarding the South China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. It should also do what
it can to limit defense spending, so as not to appear threatening, while working to
increase economic intercourse with its neighbors as well as the United States. Chinese
leaders, according to this logic, should emphasize that it is all to the good that China is
growing richer and economic interdependence is on the rise, because those
developments will serve as a powerful force for peace. After all, starting a war in a
tightly connected and prosperous world is widely believed to be the equivalent of killing
the goose that lays the golden eggs. Finally, China should play an active and
cooperative role in as many international institutions as possible and work with the
United States to keep the North Korean problem under control.
While this approach is intuitively attractive, it will not work in practice. Indeed, we
already have evidence that China cannot successfully employ Deng Xiaoping‘s
prescribed foreign policy over the long run. Before 2009, Beijing did a good job of
keeping a low profile and not generating fear either among its neighbors or in the United
States. Since then, however, China has been involved in a number of contentious
territorial disputes and is increasingly seen as a serious threat by other countries in
Asia.
This deterioration in China‘s relations with other countries is due in part to the fact that,
no matter what Beijing does to signal good intentions, they cannot be sure what its real
intentions are now, let alone in the future. Indeed, we cannot know who will be in charge
of Chinese foreign policy in the years ahead, much less what their intentions will be
toward other countries in the region or the United States. On top of that, China has
serious territorial disputes with a number of its neighbors. Therefore, China‘s neighbors
already focus mainly on Beijing‘s capabilities, which means they look at its rapidly
growing economy and increasingly formidable military forces. Not surprisingly, many
other countries in Asia will become deeply worried because they know they are
probably going to end up living next door to a superpower that might one day have
malign intentions toward them.
This problem is exacerbated by the ―security dilemma,‖ which tells us that the measures
a state takes to increase its own security usually wind up decreasing the security of
other states. When a country adopts a policy or builds weapons that it thinks are
defensive in nature, potential rivals invariably think that those steps are offensive in
nature. For example, when the United States moves aircraft carriers near the Taiwan
Strait—as it did in 1996—or when it redeploys submarines to the western Pacific,

37
American leaders honestly believe those moves are defensive in nature. China, on the
other hand, sees them as an offensive strategy of encirclement, not as part of a
defensive strategy of containment. Thus, it is not surprising that the Economist reported
in 2009, ―A retired Chinese admiral likened the American navy to a man with a criminal
record ‗wandering just outside the gate of a family home.‘‖
All of this is to say that almost anything China does to improve its military capabilities
will be seen in Beijing as defensive in nature, but in Tokyo, Hanoi, and Washington it
will appear offensive in nature. That means China‘s neighbors are likely to interpret any
steps it takes to enhance its military posture as evidence that Beijing not only is bent on
acquiring significant offensive capabilities but has offensive intentions as well. And that
includes instances where China is merely responding to steps taken by its neighbors or
the United States to enhance their fighting power. Such assessments make it almost
impossible for Chinese leaders to implement Deng Xiaoping‘s clever foreign policy.
In addition, China‘s neighbors understand that time is not working in their favor, as the
balance of power is shifting against them as well as the United States. They therefore
have an incentive to provoke crises over disputed territorial claims now, when China is
relatively weak, rather than wait until it becomes a superpower. It seems clear that
Beijing has not provoked the recent crises with its neighbors. As Cui Tiankai, one of
China‘s leading diplomats, puts it, ―We never provoked anything. We are still on the
path of peaceful development. If you look carefully at what happened in the last couple
of years, you will see that others started all the disputes.‖ He is essentially correct. It is
China‘s neighbors, not Beijing, that have been initiating most of the trouble in recent
years.
Nevertheless, it is mainly China‘s response to these crises that has caused its
neighbors as well as the United States to view China in a more menacing light than was
the case before 2009. Specifically, Chinese leaders have felt compelled to react
vigorously and sometimes harshly because the disputes ―concern China‘s sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and there is strong public sentiment on these issues.‖ As
Suisheng Zhao notes, since 2008, the Chinese government ―has become increasingly
reluctant to constrain the expression of popular nationalism and more willing to follow
the popular nationalist calls for confrontation against the Western powers and its
neighbors.‖
This means in practice that Beijing boldly restates its claims and emphasizes not only
that there is no room for compromise but that it will fight to defend what it considers to
be sovereign Chinese territory. In some cases, the Chinese feel compelled to deploy
military or paramilitary forces to make their position crystal clear, as happened in April
2012, when a crisis flared up between China and the Philippines over control of
Scarborough Shoal, a small island in the South China Sea. The same kind of
intimidating behavior was on display after September 2012, when China and Japan
became embroiled in a crisis over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The Chinese
government has also shown little hesitation in threatening or employing economic
sanctions against its rivals. Naturally, such hard-nosed pronouncements and actions

38
raise the temperature and undermine Chinese efforts to pursue a low-profile foreign
policy.
Finally, at the most basic level, the United States and almost all of China‘s neighbors
have powerful incentives to contain its rise, which means they will carefully monitor its
growth and move to check it sooner rather than later. Let us look more closely at how
the United States and the other countries in Asia are likely to react to China‘s
ascendancy.
THE COMING BALANCING COALITION
The historical record clearly demonstrates how American policymakers will react if
China attempts to dominate Asia. Since becoming a great power, the United States has
never tolerated peer competitors. As it demonstrated throughout the twentieth century, it
is determined to remain the world‘s only regional hegemon. Therefore, the United
States will go to great lengths to contain China and do what it can to render it incapable
of ruling the roost in Asia. In essence, the United States is likely to behave toward China
largely the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
China‘s neighbors are certain to fear its rise as well, and they, too, will do whatever they
can to prevent it from achieving regional hegemony. Indeed, there is already substantial
evidence that countries like India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers like
Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, are worried about China‘s ascendancy and are
looking for ways to contain it. In the end, they will join an American-led balancing
coalition to check China‘s rise, much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
and eventually China, joined forces with the United States during the Cold War to
contain the Soviet Union.
Uncle Sam versus the Dragon
China is still far from the point where it has the military capability to make a run at
regional hegemony. This is not to deny there are good reasons to worry about potential
conflicts breaking out today over issues like Taiwan and the South China Sea; but that
is a different matter. The United States obviously has a deep-seated interest in making
sure that China does not become a regional hegemon. Of course, this leads to a
critically important question: what is America‘s best strategy for preventing China from
dominating Asia?
The optimal strategy for dealing with a rising China is containment. It calls for the United
States to concentrate on keeping Beijing from using its military forces to conquer
territory and more generally expand its influence in Asia. Toward that end, American
policymakers would seek to form a balancing coalition with as many of China‘s
neighbors as possible. The ultimate aim would be to build an alliance structure along
the lines of NATO, which was a highly effective instrument for containing the Soviet
Union during the Cold War. The United States would also work to maintain its
domination of the world‘s oceans, thus making it difficult for China to project power

39
reliably into distant regions like the Persian Gulf and, especially, the Western
Hemisphere.
Containment is essentially a defensive strategy, since it does not call for starting wars
against China. In fact, containment is an alternative to war against a rising China.
Nevertheless, war is always a possibility. There is no reason the United States cannot
have substantial economic intercourse with China at the same time it implements a
containment strategy. After all, Britain, France, and Russia traded extensively with
Wilhelmine Germany in the two decades before World War I, although they had also
created the Triple Entente for the purpose of containing Germany. Even so, there will
probably be some restrictions on trade for national security reasons. More generally,
China and the United States can cooperate on a variety of issues in the context of a
containment strategy, but, at root, relations between the two countries will be
competitive.
Given its rich history as an offshore balancer, the ideal strategy for the United States
would be to stay in the background as much as possible and let China‘s neighbors
assume most of the burden of containing China. In essence, America would buck-pass
to the countries located in Asia that fear China. But that is not going to happen, for two
reasons. Most important, China‘s neighbors will not be powerful enough by themselves
to check China. The United States will therefore have little choice but to lead the effort
against China and focus much of its formidable power on that goal. Furthermore, great
distances separate many of the countries in Asia that will be part of the balancing
coalition against China—think of India, Japan, and Vietnam. Thus, Washington will be
needed to coordinate their efforts and fashion an effective alliance system. Of course,
the United States was in a similar situation during the Cold War, when it had no choice
but to assume the burden of containing the Soviet Union in Europe as well as in
Northeast Asia. In essence, offshore balancers must come onshore when the local
powers cannot contain the potential hegemon by themselves.
There are three alternative strategies to containment. The first two aim at thwarting
China‘s rise either by launching a preventive war or by pursuing policies aimed at
slowing Chinese economic growth. Neither strategy, however, is a viable option for the
United States. The third alternative, rollback, is a feasible strategy, but the payoff would
be minimal.
Preventive war is an unworkable option simply because China has a nuclear deterrent.
The United States is not going to launch a devastating strike against the homeland of a
country that can retaliate against it or its allies with nuclear weapons. But even if China
did not have nuclear weapons, it would still be hard to imagine any American president
launching a preventive war. The United States is certainly not going to invade China,
which has a huge army; and crippling China with massive air strikes would almost
certainly require the use of nuclear weapons. That would mean turning China into a
―smoking, radiating ruin,‖ to borrow a phrase from the Cold War that captures how the
U.S. Air Force intended to deal with the Soviet Union in the event of a shooting war. The
nuclear fallout alone from such an attack makes it a nonstarter. Furthermore, it is hard

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