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1. A Review of Kevin J. Vanhoozer's Is there a meaning in this text?
Tom McCormick
April 1999
©
I. INTRODUCTION
Kevin Vanhoozer's almost 500-page-small-font Is there a meaning in this text? gives us a rich
and rather far-reaching presentation of the contemporary hermeneutical lay-of-the-land. We can
be very grateful for this stimulating work which raises so many of the right questions while also
offering creative and thought-provoking answers. In this critical review I'd like to address the
question raised in Vanhoozer's title to his own text, as he himself invites: that is, Is there a
meaning in his text? and if so, What is it? His own "properly basic belief" is, he said, "'that
there is a meaning in this text'" (290). Since I myself am not so sanguine, I'd like to indicate a
few of my concerns. Most basically, when all is said and done, it's not at all clear to me what has
been either said or done, perhaps a rather serious charge against one for whom the idea of
"speech act"—a doing!—is "the basic unit of meaning" (209.7). I say "perhaps" because there is
a rather large “loop hole” here which we will take note of in the concluding remarks. It is this:
these issues never arise in a context in which “all has been said and done." Regardless, it seems
to me that what he has done is not what he intended to do. And that would be an equally serious
concern if "the author's intention" plays the role it does for Vanhoozer as more or less normative
and determinative of textual meaning. In short, it seems to me that though Vanhoozer has said
many, many meaningful (i.e. enlightening, helpful, insightful, informative, enjoyable and
sometimes innovative) things, I am not persuaded that as yet he has either a coherent or clear
position, as required by his position. As long as we take seriously his own (I think rightful)
claim that "interpretive work...is never-ending" (335), this need not be an overly alarming
concern, though there would be consequences to be reckoned with.
My most significant discomforts regarding these basic concerns are: 1. many of the
positions Vanhoozer so vehemently and expressly rejects in one context, he affirms in other
contexts, thus frustrating my attempts at a coherent reading, and 2. his own proposed Trinitarian
hermeneutic violates an orthodox understanding of the Trinity. First, then, is Vanhoozer's
position in Is there a meaning in this text? coherent? Does this text communicate either "a" (i.e.
"1") meaning (a key conviction), or indeed, taken in itself and as a whole, is it meaningful,
according to the author's intention?
Regardless of even negative replies to those questions, Vanhoozer's book remains a
"valiant effort," even an "heroic struggle" with and against a lot of sophisticated, difficult and
troubling contemporary reflections on just about everything relevant to hermeneutics. I prefer to
see this outstanding endeavor as a work in progress, a "journey," albeit a journey which has not
(yet) arrived. It is in that light that we can be genuinely grateful for this almost encyclopedic gift
to the Christian community. Nonetheless, we must be cautious and vigilant, especially those
who are not themselves conversant with the primary literature with which Vanhoozer takes issue.
Finally, though, I wouldn’t want the impression following from my review to be that I have
destroyed or pried apart his argument, but rather that while probing his formulations, I am
perplexed and still trying to understand that argument for what it is.
Let's join him, then, limiting ourselves for now to Vanhoozer's understanding of
"meaning," and ending with what I consider to be the most hopeful indications. In doing so I

2. 2
simply begin where he begins, and end where he ends, leaving out his 2 intermediate steps (due
to editorial limitations).
1
II. MEANING AND THE AUTHOR
I begin by clarifying Vanhoozer's understanding of meaning in relation to the author. After
introducing, criticizing, and redefining Hirsch's "meaning as authorial intention" in terms of
Speech Act Theory, Vanhoozer identifies "meaning with the author's communicative action"—
the “author’s attention span” (260)—"communicative action" being the Speech Act contribution
meant to rescue authorial intention from its critics (259). As he put it, "these corrections
notwithstanding, I nevertheless agree with Hirsch that the author's intended meaning should
remain the regulative principle for interpretation" (260), the point being to defend "hermeneutical
realism" (260) against all forms of non-realism. According to Vanhoozer, non-realists—his
"Undoers and Users" (458); Derrida and Rorty being the associated names—"acknowledge
neither the possibility nor the actuality of a genuine cognitive contact with reality" (458). Or, in
terms of hermeneutics, "Undoers and Users—deny the existence of a determinate message that
transcends the surface play of the text" (455). What the non-realists deny, the realists (like
Vanhoozer) affirm. Thus, we must take special note of Vanhoozer's defense of "realism" in
terms of "the author's intended meaning," especially the form and the foundations of this
"realism" as he understands it.
But does this "regulative principle" of the author's intention live up to the requirements of
Hirsch's concern for "stable determinacy" (259; Aims, 1), that is, that fixed-and-unchanging-
throughout-the-history-of-its-interpretation understanding of meaning required by Vanhoozer's
hermeneutic realism? So I ask, How stable is this intended meaning?
A. HOW "FREE" FROM THE READER'S INFLUENCE IS "INTENDED MEANING"?
Vanhoozer readily acknowledges that the determination of such an "intended meaning" is a
"reconstruction" by the reader irrevocably influenced, if not governed, by the varying
'competencies,' and 'attempts' or 'construals' of the reader "to take into account as far as possible
the context in which the author assumed the anticipated audience would place the utterance or
text" (Vanhoozer 260, quoting with approval Harris). There are two concerns here. First,
Vanhoozer's talk of "reconstruction," "competence," "attempts," "as far as possible," etc., does
not inspire confidence that a clear and univocal determination of the unchanging fixity of
meaning can, in fact, be ascertained. Second, it is important to note the interplay between
"intended meaning" and "context" in this affirmation. This interplay is of utmost importance for
Vanhoozer because "hermeneutic realism ultimately rests...on the distinction, 'between an object
of knowledge [meaning] and the context in which it is known'," what he calls, following Hirsch,
the "distinction between meaning and significance" (260, quoting with approval Hirsch, Aims 3).
If I have this right, then, Vanhoozer's whole project rests, according to the author's own
stated intention, on a clear distinction (between meaning and context) which the interpreter must
attempt to construe or reconstruct according to competencies which at least present an ongoing
"challenge" (Vanhoozer's word, 260), and at most an impossibility ("as far as possible").
2
Either
1
The structure of his text is this: it is in two parallel parts, each successive chapter of Part 2 responding to a corresponding chapter of Part 1.
The three topics considered in each part are (1) the Author, (2) the Text, and (3) the Reader. "The Author" is the first and the most determinative
of Vanhoozer's position, for meaning is defined in terms of the author; finally, though, it seems to me, Vanhoozer shifts from "the author" to "the
text," as the primary locus of meaning.
2
In fact, Vanhoozer says, “After Derrida, every honest interpreter will have to acknowledge that his or her interpretation always falls short”
(458). Let me emphasize Vanhoozer’s “always”!

3. 3
way, or anywhere in-between, this project seems beset with difficulties from the start. Let's look
first at the most hopeful end of this spectrum, the "challenge" presented to the interpreter by the
need to re/construct the meaning/context distinction and relation.
This "challenge" is quite formidable indeed, for the interpreter's discernment of this
meaning/context distinction has to do not only with the discernment of the author's intended
meaning and context (already admitted to be a less than certain endeavor), but the interpreter
must also discern this author-to-be-interpreted's discernment of the contexts (Vanhoozer says,
"context," singular!) in which his anticipated audience would place the work in question.
Placing the work within contexts not assumed or presumed by the author would be a matter of
the text's significance, not it's meaning (260).
Vanhoozer would not deny that authors cannot anticipate all such contexts; however, if
there were a failure at this point, would the text become (significant, though) meaningless? I
remember my surprise and delight when a missionary from Zaire contacted me about my book
on Nursing Homes Ministry which she had discovered in the mission compound library. Not a
context I had anticipated! nor did that make her task of reading my text insurmountable nor
meaningless, though no doubt (in this case) in large part due to our shared cultural (and
linguistic) background, especially that having to do with North American Nursing Homes.
Nonetheless, I would also claim that meaningful principles regarding loving and honoring the
elderly as such also fit whatever non-Western (missionary) contexts in which she might have
placed my text. These would be contexts which I would have in no way anticipated, unless we
were to admit some universal or at least generalizable context of "humanity 'in general'." I might
even go so far as to say that due to the influence of such a non-Western context she may have
been positively enabled and thereby even more able to discern the heart of my intentions and
concerns, whether or not she had known about N. American nursing homes. The reason being
this: so many non-Western cultures honor the elderly in ways that correspond more deeply with
the Bible than even I myself, as the author, do. The reason I am uncomfortable with calling such
a case a matter of significance and not meaning, has to do precisely with two issues: 1. The
generalizable context of humanity in general, because of the Bible's status as Word of God to all
mankind, and 2. The fact that I, and all authors, always fall short of a complete or fulfilled
realization of our intentions. In this case I mean (1) honoring the elderly is a valid concern for
all peoples and so my "meaning" (in Vanhoozer's usage) is already only a "significant
application" (in Vanhoozer' sense) of a more universal principle/meaning, and (2) my
understanding of what honoring the elderly means is itself quite partial, as would be my authorial
expression of it in textual form (both because my understanding is partial and because my ability
to express even my understanding is only partially successful).
Further though, the very idea of anticipating audiences and their responses can also be
contested, as it was recently by a novelist (Sister Souljah) in a May 30th (1999) New York Times
Review of Books interview. She said, "If you start to anticipate people's response, it waters
down the potency of your art" (May 30, 1999, p. 13). Inasmuch as creative expression is about
something genuinely new, it itself is creative of the context into which readers are to place the
work, and so any "anticipation" of the context into which readers are to place the work is at best
secondary and reflexive, following from and after the authorial expression, not preceding it. And
further, as so often testified to, authors themselves do not control this context, but the work does,
even for the author, who must read the work to know what it means, rather than being able to
appeal to some (internally) resident and independent intention. I suspect that we understand
what she means, which I take to mean that there is a "universal context of (human) freedom"
touched by creativity which transcends other "worldly contexts."
The challenge, however, does not stop there: as Vanhoozer realizes, the interpreter must
also sort out the relevant and intended authorial contexts from unintended, though perhaps still

4. 4
relevant, contexts reflected in the author's work, like indications of the author's intellectual and
social history, or the state of a given language at the time of writing (333).
This point (regarding the meaning/context relations) is worth further attention for it is
precisely here that Derrida has raised concerns, as Vanhoozer repeatedly acknowledges (86, 111,
131, 132, 208, 313, 388; 1997:148). The point is that Derrida's in/famous "there is nothing
outside the text" (OG 158) means, according to Derrida, "there is nothing outside context" (LI
136); that is, everything is always already "in context(s)." The deconstruction Vanhoozer so
vehemently objects to and defines his position in opposition to is characterized by Derrida as
"the effort to take this limitless context into account" (136). So you see, this distinction between
authorial/textual meaning and context really is the nub of this debate and the heart of
Vanhoozer's position, Vanhoozer claiming that the relevant contexts can (and must) be
adequately delimited, with Derrida demonstrating repeatedly that whatever limits one
acknowledges have, in fact, always already been transgressed.
But is Vanhoozer serious in his claim that this distinction is really so precise and easily
drawn? For instance, we all know that words "take on" contextual meaning, such that the
meaning of "run," for example, largely depends on whether the context has to do with banks or
nylons or noses, whether or not that context is textual or circumstantial. Is this, then, a clear
distinction 'between an object of knowledge [the meaning of 'run'] and the context in which it is
known'" as Vanhoozer and Hirsch claim and require? If so, I need some help seeing it, for it
seems to me the context is not simply external to the meaning, but internally (and mutually)
constitutive of that meaning! In addition, later we will see that Vanhoozer also acknowledges a
determinative role for context(s), context(s) which are also limitless, further troubling his efforts
to clearly distinguish his own position from that of his stated opponents. To say the least, this
formulation of the meaning-context relation is not the kind of distinction upon which I personally
would want my position to 'ultimately rest' (260), especially if I were concerned for stable and
determinate meaning, which actually I am. I will return to this point below, for it is of a piece
with my claim that Vanhoozer's Trinitarianism is sub-orthodox.
3
B. HOW "FIXED-IN/BY-THE-PAST" IS "INTENDED MEANING"?
The situation regarding this meaning/significance distinction is, however, even more
complicated, and attending to Vanhoozer's attempt to rescue it on pages 260-263 will illustrate
my difficulties with achieving a coherent understanding of his intention, while at the same time
attending to this self-professed "basic distinction" (263). Note, though, that I am working very
hard to understand his intention as the author, or perhaps better, to understand his text.
On pages 261ff Vanhoozer introduces Hirsch's more recent attempts to defend an author's
"transhistorical intentions"; that is, Hirsch now recognizes that authors often intend to address
the future, and that therefore, restricting "the author's intended meaning to the original context or
3
Does Vanhoozer, after all, agree with all of this? See, for example, his citation of Silva (250): "the context does not merely help us understand
meaning; it virtually makes meaning." The discussion that follows deserves careful attention, pages 250ff. Compare “communicative action
ultimately only makes sense against some contextual background,” (232). Generally the argumentative structure here is circular: Context is as
broad as is needed "in order to understand the author's intention," including as required "historical, linguistic, literary, canonical, sociological, and
so forth" contexts (250), or again, such contexts can be as large as necessary "in order to make sense of the author's communicative act,"
including background knowledge pertaining "to the author, to the form of literature, to general background knowledge, or to knowledge of
specific situations" (251). I don't dispute this, but I do wonder (1) how this position is different from Derrida's regarding "There is nothing
outside the (con)text" and (2) how one determines just where to stop securing the relevant background information necessary. In answer to point
#2, Vanhoozer offers only understanding the author's intention as the standard or criterion for the determination of the relevant contexts, which
are themselves required for understanding the author's intention: thus the circularity, which is precisely the difficulty Vanhoozer is attempting to
overcome. The circle, regardless, "merely" locates the problem; it does not solve it.

5. 5
content alone" (261) is inadequate. Right away let's note that in 1984 Hirsch had tied the (all-
important) meaning/significance distinction to the reality of the past: "Stable meaning depends,
then, on pastness" (259). Now, as of 1994, he recognizes some authorial intentions are "open-
ended" (261) with regard to time. Before I give his examples, let me note that having considered
and acknowledged these examples, Vanhoozer went on immediately (in the next paragraph, p.
262) to assert, in his italics, "The meaning/significance distinction is fundamentally a distinction
between a completed action [pastness] and its ongoing intentional or unintentional
consequences" (262), explicating this assertion as "a corollary of the belief of the reality of the
past" (263), "which is in turn the authority of truth" (263). That is, Truth itself, which is tied to
the "it is finished" (to put it provocatively) quality of the Past, is at stake in this distinction. My
point is this: How am I to make coherent sense out of Vanhoozer's seeming affirmations of
Hirsch's new point of view regarding the future (and therefore the “open-endedness” of
interpretation, 261) which are given juxtaposed with a reassertion that the past is past, that
meaning is defined in terms of (especially illocutionary; I'll return to this shortly)
"communicative acts" as "a completed action" with "a clear beginning and end," and that this
meaning once-for-all accomplished must be distinguished (rigorously) from meaning applied?
In addition, has not "the author's intention" now transgressed the meaning/significance
distinction, since "intentional…consequences" are now also on the significance side? Later we'll
note the role of eschatology in Vanhoozer's own position regarding reading the Bible. However,
since one big concern here is with a general hermeneutic, I remain first with the non-biblical
examples.
Let me now briefly give Hirsch's examples, which Vanhoozer endorses. First, Vanhoozer
quotes Hirsch (1994) with approval: "When I apply Shakespeare's sonnet to my own lover rather
than his, I do not change his meaning-intention but rather instantiate and fulfill it" (262). As
Vanhoozer put it, this future "instantiation" now must be taken as "not an example of
significance but of meaning, even if Shakespeare himself was not attending to her" (262;
emphasis added). The second example: When Priestly referred to "dephlogisticated air," we now
can say, from the context of our (future with respect to Priestly's original words) times and our
current scientific theories, that he was actually referring to oxygen, "even when the author's
actual mental contents prove to be inadequate or dated" (262). Again Vanhoozer concludes,
"certain applications ['application' had been the key word associated with 'significance'] may
belong to the meaning rather than the significance side of the meaning/significance distinction"
(262). Or again, quoting Hirsch, "Interpretation must always go beyond the writer's letter, but
never beyond the writer's spirit" (262; emphasis added). This of course raises the concern
regarding the criteria of legitimate "application," a point Vanhoozer takes up later, and to which I
will return. Here my point is, what sense does this make? Can we coherently define "the
meaning of a text as what the author attended to in tending to his words," Vanhoozer's "speech
act revision" of Hirsch's "authorial intention" (in Vanhoozer's italics, by the way, p. 262), while
at the same time saying an application is "not an example of significance but of meaning, "even
if Shakespeare himself was not attending to [my lover]"? (And similarly, with regard to Priestly,
"even when the author's actual mental contents prove to be inadequate or dated.")
C. THE PLOT THICKENS: Sensus Plenior
Let me thicken the plot a bit, before proceeding with Vanhoozer's further developments of this
point, developments which will eventually show us a way out, though I also suspect "a way out"

6. 6
which is beyond and other than the distinctions Vanhoozer has invested with such import and
personal commitment.
4
The final section of Part 2 (which is chapter 5), is entitled "Inspired intentions and Sensus
Plenior," a topic dear to many of us, though certainly not uncontroversial. This is Vanhoozer's
effort to "Resurrect the Author," thereby defending authorial intent against its critics. The
challenge from the Bible is, as Vanhoozer poses it: If "the Old Testament has a 'fuller meaning'
than what its human authors could have intended," then "is it possible to hold to a view of
meaning as past communicative action" (264)? Characteristically, Vanhoozer is very clear and
explicit regarding the problem; unfortunately, his answer is not at all clear. Having posed this
question he immediately states, "Perhaps it is [i.e. possible to hold to a view of meaning as past
communicative action"], but only if one is willing to acknowledge the possibility of divine
authorship" (264). The reason for the "perhaps" is not clear to me, for Vanhoozer does indeed
hold to the "divine [indeed dual] authorship" of Scripture, and states quite clearly that his "thesis
is that the 'fuller meaning' of Scripture—the meaning associated with divine authorship—
emerges only at the level of the whole canon" (264). Nor is this point restricted to such a dual-
authored text as the Bible, for not only does Vanhoozer say (often) that "all hermeneutics is
ultimately theological hermeneutics" (407) and "General hermeneutics is...a subset of biblical
hermeneutics" (414; 458), but he also cites with approval Bakhtin's account of "how a work can
grow in meaning," carrying "meaning potential that writers may [or may not?] sense but never
fully command," correlating this growing meaning potential with Childs' understanding of the
canonical (313), the position Vanhoozer himself endorses under Paul Noble's interpretation
(which depends on divine authorship, [279, n. 294]). The troublesome point, for Vanhoozer, is
that "the literal sense...may, at times, be indeterminate or open-ended" (313). But when is this
indeterminate open-endedness operative and when not? And how can this indeterminacy which
is "never fully commanded" by the author be rightly, or at least clearly and consistently,
identified with the author's intention, the illocutionary attending of the author, or the
communicative act "completed in the past"? And, of course, how is this kind of "indeterminacy"
to be distinguished from that of the non-realists?
5
4
In these same pages Vanhoozer sets up his definition of meaning in terms of the speech act distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary
intentional acts. By defining the author's meaning in terms of the former (262), he claims to both maintain the meaning/significance distinction
and rescue it from its critics, especially the so-called non-realists (of whom Derrida is the arch-villain). He himself uses this section as a self-
referential example, claiming that whether or not he is successful in his perlocutionary intent of persuading us as to the validity of the
meaning/significance distinction, we still ought to be able to understanding his argument. My problem, in this section and throughout the book, is
that I do not understanding his argument, for the reasons noted: lack of coherence, contradiction, unresolved juxtapositions, etc. In that case, he
says, "If...I fail in my illocutionary intent, then the communicative act itself is defective" (261). And further, since illocutionary intent is
"constitutive of communicative action and of meaning," if that intent fails or is defective, then the action (in this case, his text), is meaningless
(261, 262). Those are his definitions, and operating on the basis of them, I find an adequate description of my experience of reading his
book...which is why I said at the beginning, I'm not sure there is a meaning to this text. But my experience also testifies to something of the
validity of his definitions and approach. A curious situation indeed!
But we are not finished with our investigation of Vanhoozer's understanding of meaning. As also noted earlier, many meaningful things
have been said, but the current conclusion would be that the project is incoherent, perhaps even self-deconstructs, for on its own terms it is a
failure and meaningless. This would not be nothing, of course, for failures are most instructive, and great failures, greatly so; for example, Kant
or Heidegger...or Derrida, for that matter.
5
Derrida, however, does not speak of "indeterminacy," but rather "undecideability," the crucial difference being that in the latter different
meanings are each sufficiently "determined," while in the former they are not. Derrida has written, "I have never accepted saying, or encouraging
others to say, just anything at all, nor have I argued for indeterminacy as such" (1988:144f; also 1981:63f, 1974:157ff). In fact, Derrida argues
for undecidability, not indeterminacy, from which it is explicitly distinguished: "I do not believe I have ever spoken of 'indeterminacy,' whether in
regard to 'meaning' or anything else" (1988:148). And again, "undecidability is always a determinate oscillation between possibilities.... these

7. 7
The "crucial" point, Vanhoozer tells us, is that "the indeterminacy we are considering is
intended" (313f), but evidently he does not mean by the human author (who "never fully
commands" this intention!), but rather by the divine author who "gather[s] together the various
partial and progressive communicative acts and purposes of the human authors into one 'great
canonical Design'" (314). His ascription of this "intended indeterminacy" to God, and with
reference to the biblical text, seems intended in this context. But even if the human author is
included in this "intended indeterminacy," I'm not sure it helps Vanhoozer's position in the least.
For instance, if indeterminacy is intended (in a 'never fully commanded' manner), then how
determinate can the author's intention actually be, and how coherent or well-conceived (not to
mention, achievable) is it to set the determination of that intention as our hermeneutical goal and
norm? What kind of sense would such a "determined indeterminacy" and/or "indeterminate
determinacy" make?
Before asking if or how this argument extends to non-biblical texts, let's expound
Vanhoozer's position here a bit more.
6
He is quite clear that valid interpretation takes place
against the background of the "intentional context" of a text, and, in the case of the Bible, he
gives three forms for that presupposed intended background. What does Vanhoozer say about
this background "intentional context" of the Bible?
Preliminarily, recall that Vanhoozer's "hermeneutic realism ultimately rests...on the
distinction" (260) between meaning and significance which itself depends, in the general case, on
taking "into account as far as possible the context in which the author assumed the anticipated
audience would place the utterance or text" (260). The question I am posing, then, is this: Not
just to what extent could the biblical authors have taken into account the background "intentional
context" (itself a big problem, especially when below we consider in more detail the 3 forms),
but to what degree of certainty can we as interpreters determine to what extent the biblical
authors took that background "intentional context" into account? According to Vanhoozer, our
hermeneutical confidence depends entirely on such judgments.
Vanhoozer gives three perspectives on this "intentional context" of the Bible. His first
characterization of "the intended background context" is this: he says that "the biblical text is
itself the most appropriate context for interpretation," by which he means the written text of the
completed "canon" (265). In short, "the text itself, in its complete and final form, is the best
evidence for determining what the author is doing" (331; emphasis added). I have several
concerns: (1) How serious are we to take this "determining" especially in light of Vanhoozer's
earlier affirmation that "the literal sense...may, at times, be indeterminate or open-ended" (313)?
Would the "literal sense" of the whole canon (and not just the individual books) also be
characterized by such indeterminate open-endedness? Does he mean to imply that the "closing
of the canon" put an end to such indeterminate open-endedness? This seems unlikely in light of
the second and third characterizations of the Bible's "intentional context." But if so, then we
must ask, why and how that closing is accomplished especially in light of the eschatological
perspective to be considered shortly? (2) To what extent were the individual authors able to
anticipate "the whole canon in its completed form"? Can anyone say with (determinate)
certainty? I cannot, not in a non a priori, non ad hoc manner. And, in fact, Vanhoozer himself
possibilities are themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations (for example, discursive–syntactical or rhetorical–but also political,
ethical, etc.)" (1988:148). (Actually, Derrida has had a lapse of memory here regarding his use of indeterminacy; cf. ??.)
6
NB: I might add that though Vanhoozer clearly raised the question whether the biblical text can go beyond what the human authors could have
intended [264], he did not answer it clearly, though the implication seems to be, Yes. Thus, Isaiah 53 is about Jesus whether or not Isaiah himself
thought so. This is Vanhoozer's position, not mine; I think Isaiah knew the Messiah was indicated (cf. 1 Peter), though perhaps he did not know
the name, Jesus.

8. 8
seems to prefer Noll's definition of "canonical intentionality...[as] that cooperative inspiring
work of the Holy Spirit and [the] traditioning work of the community of faith" (quoted at 314;
emphasis added), in which case the "authorial intentionality" required for Vanhoozer's position is
not available, at least not in the form he otherwise claims it is.
My further concerns are best presented in light of Vanhoozer's two other characterizations
of "the intended background context." Vanhoozer's second characterization affirms
Pannenberg's point that "the whole of history" viewed "from the end of history" is "the ultimate
context" (264). That is, the "final context, in light of which alone the proper meaning of all
things will be seen, is an eschatological, theological horizon," and thus, "interpretive work...is
never-ending" (335; emphases added). I have four concerns with regard to this second
characterization: (1) How certain–i.e. clear, explicit, determinate, etc.–were the individual
biblical authors regarding this "end"? (2) Would any variation regarding that clarity be allowed
amongst the biblical authors? Peter, for one, found Paul's grasp "difficult to understand." (3)
How certain would the individual biblical authors have to be with regard to this eschatological
form of the required "intended background context" to deliver the textual determinacy
Vanhoozer's position seems to require? And (4), How certain can we as interpreters be about
(1)-(3)? Without such certainty Vanhoozer's position does not deliver what it promises. Not so
incidentally, it is here that Vanhoozer acknowledges that Derrida's "protest against totalizing
interpretations...may be pastorally apt" (335). Does this not, as it seems, admit that the totalizing
interpretation required for hermeneutical certainty is, in fact, not available?
Vanhoozer's third characterization of "the intended background context" is related directly
to our Lord: "Jesus Christ...is the literal referent of biblical testimony" (314; emphasis added).
Here I have four more concerns: (1) Presumably he means the Jesus of eschatological revelation,
a glimpse of which we are given, especially in the book of Revelation. But how uniform and
how complete was this "glimpse" amongst the individual authors of the NT, not to mention the
whole Bible? Can we say for sure? I doubt it. (2) Would not we, as interpreters, also have to
have both uniform and complete knowledge of the eschatological Jesus, and indeed a knowledge
thereby conformable to that of the authors, to insure the hermeneutical confidence Vanhoozer
promises with regard to the interpretation of any particular passage of any individual book of the
NT? (3) Do any of us, either the biblical authors or ourselves ever have a complete, exhaustive
view of "the glory of God revealed in the face of Jesus"? Certainly not during the historical
times during which Vanhoozer's hermeneutical concerns are pertinent, and likely not ever. (4)
What does this do to "the author's intention" as the normative standard for textual meaning? For
example, Vanhoozer says, "That Jesus is the referent of the whole relies on, but cannot be
reduced to, the intended meaning of the individual books" (265). So how is Jesus as the literal
referent to be applied to the "intended meaning of the individual books"? Does this not imply
that the intentions of the individual authors are not the (sole?) determinative norms for
interpretation.
7
Here Vanhoozer seems to undercut his own position.
********************************
If one suspects Vanhoozer has a way out of all this by means of a special form of "determinacy"
which is currently available to interpreters, a form which escapes that of the so-called non-
realists, one will likely be disappointed, for his is a determinacy itself determined by the
ascriptions, inferences, imputations, responses, conjectures and reconstructions of the reader.
Further, he claims only approximacy for this determinacy, "one that at least takes a stab" at "the
7
Consider, for example, 2 Corinthians 7:12 (and the context) where, in terms of conscious intentionality, it seems Paul discovered his true
intention for writing only after receiving the response back from the Corinthians.

9. 9
best interpretation" (all Vanhoozer's words from pp. 332f). How is this coherent? On the one
hand, Vanhoozer affirms that "our knowledge...will remain only partial, fallible, incomplete"
(335; emphasis added), "through a glass darkly," if you will; yet, on the other hand, he continues
to insist on the language of determinacy, stability, fixity, completedness, single-oneness, etc.
(423.8, 424.2). Again, is his "approximate determinacy" a coherent notion?
I, though, think there is a way out. Let me conclude with what I consider a better starting
point, a point suggested by Vanhoozer, and in that context, reopen the relevance of all this for the
interpretation of non-biblical texts, as well as suggest "the fly in the ointment" in Vanhoozer's
text.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Ultimately, Vanhoozer affirms a "trinitarian hermeneutics," even claiming that "the best general
hermeneutics is a trinitarian hermeneutics" (456).
8
This is a point I enjoy, though I do not agree
with his formulation. He says, for instance, "My thesis will be that the Spirit is tied to the
written Word as significance is tied to meaning. With regard to hermeneutics, the role of the
Spirit is to serve as the Spirit of significance and thus to apply meaning, not to change it" (265).
He also correlates the tripartite speech act distinction—locution, illocution, and perlocution—
with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, respectively. Finally, my main hesitation regarding
Vanhoozer's hermeneutic is this: Vanhoozer's "trinitarian hermeneutics" falters, at least in terms
of orthodox trinitarianism. Two key points focus this concern: first, with regard to Speech Act
Theory, and second, with regard to the meaning/significance distinction. Let me elaborate.
First, Vanhoozer is explicit with regard to speech act theory and the Trinity. I quote: "If
the Father is the locutor, the Son is his preeminent illocution. Christ is God's definite Word, the
substantive content of his message. And the Holy Spirit...is God the perlocutor" (457; emphases
added). There are all sorts of problems here. Let me mention two: (1) I think Vanhoozer has
misrepresented Speech Act Theory, for "the substantive content of his message" is more
accurately correlated with the locutionary act, not the illocutionary;
9
and (2) now "the Holy
Spirit...is God the perlocutor" (457), while 30 pages earlier he found it important to distinguish
two kinds of efficacy associated with a text, illocutionary and perlocutionary, "and to associate
the Spirit particularly with the latter" (427; emphasis added).
Let me once again elaborate, especially this "particularly." First of all, "particularly"
means, does it not, that the Holy Spirit is associated with both the illocutionary and the
perlocutionary, though perhaps more so with the latter? The context here is important, and will
help us take this point further. Vanhoozer had just entertained the distinction between "the
Bible's efficacy" as "an inherent property" [of the written words] rather than "an empowerment
by the Spirit" (427). His answer to this historical-theological dispute is in terms of "two kinds of
efficacy, illocutionary and perlocutionary," with the Spirit being associated "particularly with the
latter" (427). Presumably, then, there is some sort of "illocutionary efficacy" which may be "an
inherent property" of the written words of the Bible. This, however, is not how Vanhoozer
developed the point. Though the Spirit is here associated "particularly" with "the
8
Incidentally, this is a point Derrida also elaborates, and a perspective I too would heartily endorse, though my position differs from both
Derrida's and Vanhoozer's.
9
"Locution," evidently, has no place in Vanhoozer's tri-partite scheme, though "the Locutor" does. This would be an innovation with regard to
speech act theory. Note, for instance, Ricoeur, who I take to be a fair interpreter here: "The propositional content is only the correlate of the
locutionary act" (IT 17). Vanhoozer, however, elsewhere also recognizes this. For example, on page 312: "...the spirit (read: illocutionary intent)
supervenes on the body (the locutionary event"; and "We grasp the literal meaning of an utterance when we discern its propositional
[locutionary?] matter and its illocutionary force."

10. 10
perlocutionary," not only is the Spirit also correlated with the illocutionary, but the Spirit is
actually identified as the agent of "Illocutionary Efficacy" (the title of the following subsection,
427f).
All this is exceedingly interesting in light of the historical-theological issues at stake. But
my point here is only this: the illocutionary and perlocutionary distinction is not precise. For
one, the Spirit is on both sides of the distinction.
10
This need not be a problem, but it seems to be
for Vanhoozer, for he has associated the Word/Spirit relation both with the
illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction and with the meaning/significance distinction with which
it is correlated, and clearly the latter is intended as radically distinct as noted earlier. Thus, if the
illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction is not clear-cut (due to the role of the Spirit), then likely
the meaning/significance distinction is also not as distinct as Vanhoozer’s position requires, and
for the same reason (the role of the Holy Spirit operative on both sides of these distinctions). We
should at least be alert that perhaps Vanhoozer's understanding of the speech act distinctions is
affecting his reading of both Scripture and the traditional doctrine of the Trinity. I'll get to the
points at issue shortly.
11 12
Second, let's return afresh to this meaning/significance distinction: We have already noted
the non-distinctness of this distinction. In the final pages of the book Vanhoozer is
(unintentionally, I assume) more explicit regarding this non-distinctness: "the significance of the
text [is] its...meaning" (423). This is not unqualified, but I initially state it baldly for effect. The
unellided form reads "the significance of the text [is] its extended meaning"; and again,
"Significance just is 'recontextualized meaning'" (423). The key qualifying words are "extended"
10
And indeed, on all "three sides" of the tripartite speech act distinctions, including also the locutionary (n. 257, p. 450).
11
Likely, in addition to a different form of unity (to be noted shortly), further clarification with regard to the terms used will be required to
develop Vanhoozer's hermeneutic. I have in mind such terms as intent, force, efficacy, meaning, (propositional) matter, etc. It seems likely to me
that a way can be found to retrieve and enrich (as well as clarify) this position.
12
[rework this point, if not delete; attend more to ‘tied to’] The same point could be made another way, beginning with the meaning/significance
distinction. Vanhoozer states, "My thesis will be that the Spirit is tied to the written Word as significance is tied to meaning. With regard to
hermeneutics, the role of the Spirit is to serve as the Spirit of significance and thus to apply meaning, not to change it" (265). We have, though, a
problem: Later Vanhoozer says, "the notion of communicative action allows us to distinguish two kinds of efficacy, illocutionary and
perlocutionary, and to associate the Spirit particularly with the latter" (427). First of all, "particularly" equivocates both with regard to a clear and
precise distinction between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary and with regard to the "tie" of the Spirit exclusively to the perlocutionary.
But if the Spirit is also tied, to whatever degree, to the illocutionary, and the illocutionary is tied to meaning (as it is; earlier Vanhoozer had
clarified his "metaphysics of meaning" by explicitly "defining meaning [in distinction from significance] in terms of illocutionary action," 262),
then you see the problem: on the one hand, the Spirit is tied to significance, and on the other, the Spirit is tied to meaning," while all the time
Vanhoozer has been is asserting a clear, definite, and radical distinction between the text's "objective meaning" and "its ongoing significance"
(409). "Spirit" is on both sides of the distinction, which does not make for the kind of radicality of distinction Vanhoozer desires and claims.
Secondly, though, the Spirit is also explicitly "tied to" the illocutionary, indeed, the Spirit is actually identified as the agent of "Illocutionary
Efficacy" (the title of the following subsection, 427f) in the section which follows. Again, the Spirit's domain is thereby not "particularly [only]
the perlocutionary" nor, as a consequence, is "the Spirit … tied to the written Word as significance is tied to meaning," not if (again) the
illocutionary action is the defining moment of meaning and the meaning/significance distinction is given the importance Vanhoozer in fact gives
it. Recall, for instance, that he says, "The problem with Gadamer's approach is precisely that he is unable to draw this distinction" (409); and no
doubt, for Vanhoozer, this is true a fortiori for Ricoeur and Derrida. So again, on the one hand, Vanhoozer thinks he needs this
meaning/significance distinction to distinguish his position from those non-realists he so vehemently opposes; yet, on the other hand, his
presentation and exposition of this "ultimate distinction" is incoherent, or at least, not very distinct. (The use of "the spirit" on p. 312, in
contradistinction from "the body" also deserves careful attention. Though this is an analogy, and though the discussion is not explicitly about the
Holy Spirit, matters cannot simply rest there. For one, Vanhoozer links the “author’s ‘spirit’” with the Holy Spirit on p. 240. For another, the
relation of the spirit/body distinction on p. 312 needs further clarification both in light of the Spirit/Word distinction and in relation to the
Eucharist (pp. ??). Cf. also n. 257, p. 450 where the Spirit is credited with the choice of the inscripturated words, having to do, I suppose, with
the meaning per se.)

11. 11
and "recontextualized." Note, though, that (1) to say 'significance is meaning,' even if qualified,
is to cross what was to be a very distinct distinction, and, (2) the key qualifiers have to do with
"relationship" (I highlight the word!) relative to particular, relevant contexts.
Now the concerns I have in light of traditional orthodox trinitarianism are these. First, it
should be no surprise that trinitarian distinctions are not "purely distinct" for not only are the 3
persons distinctly 3 (let's insist on it!), but they also coinhabit each other. This is that beloved
doctrine of perichoresis, mutual indwelling, coinherence, or circumincession. I think
Vanhoozer's "confusions" indicate just this point: meaning is not just not significance; illocution
is not just not perlocution/locution.
Second, this trinitarian coinherent form of "being-in" opens new possibilities for what it is
that is "in" the text, this "in" being the point Vanhoozer is so jealous to defend against the "non-
realists." He said, for instance: "The belief that there is something 'in' the text, a presence not of
the reader's own making is the belief in transcendence" (455). And transcendence, in fact, is at
the heart of Vanhoozer's debate with the "false religions" of postmodernity (455-459). He has,
however, evidently relied on a non-trinitarian (i.e. non-perichoretic) form of this "in," the
oddness of which he evidently recognizes by putting the "in" in quotes. My claim is that a
properly trinitarian "in" must be perichoretic and that Vanhoozer's "in" is not, at least not
intentionally. Already we have seen this to be the case with regard to the meaning/significance
distinction and the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction. I say "at least not intentionally"
because while he intends a clear, precise and radical distinction allowing no border crossings, I
have documented how Vanhoozer's formulations belie that intention. Thus, not only are his
distinctions called into question, but also the essential role he gives to authorial intentionality.
We can see this again with regard to Vanhoozer's model of unity, perhaps the core of his
position. And yet, in the process we will see how both his distinctions and his counterintentional
rhetoric can both be retrieved in terms of a more orthodox understanding of the Trinity.
Third, then, let's compare Vanhoozer's form of unity with that modeled by the Trinity.
Vanhoozer's understanding of the "single," as with "the single correct interpretation" (429), is, in
my opinion, a major stumbling block. No doubt, he does claim that his notion of unity is "a
plural unity" (416)—"multifaceted" (417) and "multileveled" (420)—and that it is compatible
with the trinitarian theology he defends (416). Would that it were so! Finally, though, after his
discussion of "The One and the Many" (pp. 416-421), he places the "single" on the side of
"determinate meaning" and the "plurality" on the side of significance.
13
This, I say, is a violation
of orthodox Trinitarianism because, once again recalling Vanhoozer's commitment to clearly and
radically distinguish meaning and significance, the unity (singleness) of God traditionally has not
been distinguished in this manner from the plurality (threeness). Rather, the threeness has been
understood as constitutive of the oneness, and the oneness of the threeness, with the perichoretic
"in" being the form of this co-constitution, as Vanhoozer acknowledges, following Gunton’s
“notion of the three-in-one, a unity of a plural kind” (419).
Fourth, and finally, Vanhoozer's thesis
14
falls short of an orthodox trinitarianism because it
does not adequately (at all?) acknowledge the "ontological reality of trinitarian relationality."
This lack is also reflected in his deficient (existent?) ontology of intentionality, a point I'll
conclude with shortly. My claim is that the "relationality" presupposed by the application of
meaning (putting it "in relation to"/"extending it to" a new context) is co-constitutive of that
13
“There is no contradiction between asserting the a text has a single, though not simplistic, determinate meaning on the one hand, and a
plurality of significances on the other” (421).
14 I refer to the following statement: "My thesis will be that the Spirit is tied to the written Word as significance is tied to meaning. With regard
to hermeneutics, the role of the Spirit is to serve as the Spirit of significance and thus to apply meaning, not to change it" (265).

12. 12
meaning, just as trinitarian relationality is ontologically constitutive. To quote Thomas Torrance
with regard to trinitarian relations: "Relations between persons have ontological force and are
part of what persons are as persons—they are real, person-constituting relations" (Torrance
1984:230).
15
One might think that such relational-constitution should have a prominent place within
Vanhoozer's position in which the Spirit is credited with such relational application as well as
"efficacy." Seemingly, though, it does not, and my thesis, contrary to Vanhoozer's, is that for a
consistent, orthodox, trinitarian understanding of meaning the (valid) relation-of-meaning to a
new context—what Vanhoozer calls significance—would participate in the being of the meaning
of a text just as trinitarian relationality participates in the constituting of the personal being of
God.
16
Perhaps I need to hasten to add that such a “co-constituting” of meaning need not
threaten the surety or certainty or even the “definiteness” of the meaning any more than, for
example, the ontological-relational co-constitution of the Son threatens His identity. On the
contrary, His identity is what it is as so ontologically-relationally co-constituted. What such a
revision would require, though, is a different understanding of “definiteness.”
Clearly something is distorting Vanhoozer's intentions to present a thoroughly trinitarian
hermeneutic. What might that be? I have already suggested that the (form of the) distinctions of
Speech Act Theory contribute to this distortion. Yet I think there are also deeper snares at work.
One I have alluded to already is his notion of "unity." That this is a major Western "prejudice"
probably need not be argued here. But there is a third "prejudice" I'd like to take note of, the
subject-object distinction. Though Vanhoozer is no doubt well-informed about the pernicious
effects of the Cartesian version of this distinction, he nonetheless continues to endorse it in
various forms. I note just two of these. First, he uses the subject-object language explicitly,
even carrying it into the Trinity, Jesus being the "objective reality of revelation" and the Holy
Spirit being "the subjective reality," a conception he takes from Karl Barth (409; cf. also 57.5,
84.5, 260.6). Our previous consideration of the form of unity between Jesus and the Holy Spirit
recommends a reconception of the subject-object relation here.
Second, he often uses the accomplished/applied schema, so common to Reformed theology
(cf. e.g. John Murray's Redemption Accomplished and Applied, where it also correlates with the
subject-object distinction; cf. Vanhoozer 262.7, 406.7, 413.1, 429.5; 1997:163). We have
already seen that for Vanhoozer "meaning" is considered as "accomplished" (fixed, final,
determined, past, etc.) and significance as "applied." Thus all four distinctions (Word-Spirit,
subject-object, meaning-significance, and accomplished-applied) reflect the same paradigm.
Here my concern is with the latter.
Now it is not that this distinction is simply invalid; that must be said with emphasis, and no
doubt, repeatedly! Many Conservative Protestant understandings of "the gospel," for instance,
depend upon this distinction, and so I want to tread most reverently. The problem is that, as it
usually stands, this distinction is itself not accounted for, with the usual account assuming all
sorts of "modernistic," and I'd say, non-biblical, assumptions. This is not the place either to
15
It may be some comfort to recall that all is not relation, both because that constituted by and because that which constitutes relation is not in
and of itself relation per se. That is, though the Father is the Father precisely only in relation to the Son (and in a different sense, to the Spirit),
there is a Father who is not the Son (is not the Spirit). In terms of quantum theory (which will need to be reconceived in light of this higher
reality), there are both static and dynamic attributes. (Torrance’s use of “force” here is a bit opaque, if not troublesome.)
16
I am, however, quite aware that this simply names and locates an area calling for further thought. This (mere) mention of the problem is far
from developing, for instance, the being of this meaning or the meaning of this being or the meaning and being of the participation mentioned.

13. 13
present the critique or to develop an alternative.
17
Nonetheless, I mention the need for such an
alternative here because something like this is required for an adequate ontology of
intentionality, which is also an ontology of transcendence, both of which are at the heart of
Vanhoozer's project. From my perspective this development is also required for a sufficient
exposition, currently also lacking in Vanhoozer's work, of his crucial notion of
"supervenience."
18
It is crucial (1) for an understanding of "dual-authorship": as the
supervenience of the divine intention "on" the human intention in such a way that the human
intention is honored and not contravened (265); (2) for the form of unity among the three forms
of Speech Acts: e.g. the supervenience of the "S/spiritual" illocutionary and/or perlocutionary
"on" the locutionary-body of the text (312); and (3) for the Spirit/Word continuity/discontinuity
represented by point #2. In all these cases, a paradigm other than the "accomplished/applied"
schema is required, something much more like the "instantiation and fulfillment" schema already
noted by Hirsch, Bahktin and Vanhoozer with regard to the future fulfillments of a word which
do not violate the "sameness" of meaning.
19
With that allusion to a schema which honors both
identity and difference, a "schema" which I also claim can only be Trinitarian, I will conclude
this too brief invitation to reconsider, if not reform(ulate), the vital issues presented by this
challenging work.
20
(see also: Vanhoozer, Kevin J. 1997. The Spirit of Understanding: Special Revelation and
General Hermeneutics. Discipling Hermeneutics, ed. By Roger Lundin.)
17
I'd retrieve and radically reinterpret Heidegger's "between," "pure correspondence," etc., and I would do so in terms of our Mediator, the Image
of the Invisible God.
18
"Supervenience" is not so dissimilar from the "superposition" of quantum theory.
19
Some of us would want to begin further exploration of this alternative in terms of the biblical pattern of promise-fulfillment.
20
Those aware of recent develops in "western philosophy" will recognize how central this identity/difference scheme is. For example,
Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Derrida all, in one way or another, reflect profoundly on the identity-difference (cor)relation(s). For those
with eyes to see and ears to hear, there is much in these works available for our benefit.