2.  Ford Motor Company
 Jacques Nasser
▪ CEO of Ford at time of Incident
 Alan Mulally
▪ Later CEO of Ford; resumed business with Bridgestone/Firestone that Nasser terminated
 FirestoneTire
 JohnT. Lampe
▪ Chairman & CEO of Bridgestone/Firestone at time of incident
 Others/Independents
 Joan Claybrook
▪ President of public advocacy group “Public Citizen”
▪ Former administrator of the National HighwayTraffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
 Clarence Ditlor
▪ Executive director for the Center for Auto Saftey
 Sam Boyden
▪ State Farm Insurance agent
▪ One of the first to notice the correlation between Ford Explorers and their high failure rate
with Firestone tires
▪ Notified NHTSA which is what formally started an investigation

3.  Ford Motor Company and Firestone tire (Now owned
by Japanese BridgestoneTire) have been closely
related since their conception, and there have even
been multiple marriages between members of the
Ford and Firestone family
 An agreement between the two parties was forged;
Firestone would produce the Wilderness AT/ATX tires
specifically for the Ford Explorer SUV from 1990
onwards
 An trend started to occur with the pairing of these
tires and Ford’s SUVs; the tires seemed to be prone to
catastrophic failure at high speeds or high rates of
turning, often resulting in rollovers of the SUVs
causing serious injury and often death.

4.  In 1998, an insurance agent from State Farm named Sam Boyden was
notified about the excessive numbers of insurance claims involving tread
separation on Firestone tires. Further research from Sam showed that
every single case in question involved Firestone Wilderness AT and ATX
tires, and almost all of them were installed on the Ford Explorer SUV.
 Boyden then notified the NHTSA via e-mail, but did not receive any
formal response other than a “thank you” from NHTSA.With another 30
similar cases between 1998 and 1999 he sent more and more
notifications to the NHTSA.
 After more and more news programs, radio stations, and insurance
agencies reported more and more accidents involving injury and death,
the NHTSA finally decided to step up and begin a full Investigation in
May of 2000
 The investigation involved more than 47 million Wilderness AT and ATX
tires, and by August of 2000 the NHTSA had recorded 68 fatalities since
1990, with many still left to uncover. By September 19, 2000, the NHTSA
had uncovered 103 deaths and more than 400 serious injuries.
 In the fall of 2000, Bridgestone/Firestone announced a recall of their AT
and ATX tires under strong recommendation from both Ford and the
NHTSA

5. Additional Facts and
Information
• Most of the rollovers were caused from tread separation
• Engineers from Ford did testing on the tires and the SUV before
the model was released, and recommended the suggested tire
pressure to be no less than 30 psi, but Ford decided to label the
“safe operating pressure” as 26-30. Many people went by the
lower number, and it is thought this caused many accidents
• Almost all rollovers were caused by rear tire failure, and it was
often the left rear, this is attributed to the fuel tank being on the
left
• The Explorer was released in Eastern countries including Saudi
Arabia and Malaysia.The rollover problems were reported back
to Ford then, but they decided to ignore the reports, telling the
public that the terrain in these countries does not pertain to the
data that would be obtained from testing in America.
• In late 2000, Ford had had enough, and encouraged Explorer
owners to replace their tires, and even gave Explorer owners
enough money to buy a set of tires from a manufacturer of their
preference. Jacques Nasser ended the Ford/Firestone
partnership after this.
• During production at the Decatur, Illinois FirestoneTire plant
(where most of the defective tires came from), workers reported
that they were told to stop using the chemical solvent that
adhered the critical bond between steel and rubber on the tire in
order to speed up production.This lack of adhesive is most likely
the reason why the Decatur plant had such a high failure rate

6.  Section II.1, part b –
 Engineers shall approve only those engineering documents that are in
conformity with applicable standards
▪ Although some engineers at Ford pointed out that the Explorer needed tires pressurized at
a minimum of 30 psi, preferably more, Ford’s chief engineers decided to label the tires as
26-30psi, due to the fact they would need to use more expensive tires if they were to label
them at greater than 30psi
 Section I.3, Section III.3
 Engineers shall issue public statements only in an objective and truthful
manner
 Engineers hall avoid all conduct or practice that deceives the public
▪ Ford and Firestone knew from the early release of the Explorer in other countries that the
SUV would be prone to potentially lethal accidents, yet assured the public that these
accidents were due to the indigenous terrain of these countries, and not to a design flaw
of the SUV or ATX/AT tires.
 Section III.2, part b
 Engineers shall not complete, sign, or seal plans and/or specifications that are
not in conformity with applicable engineering standards. If the client of
employer insists on such unprofessional conduct, they shall notify the proper
authorities and withdraw from further service on the project
▪ Workers in the Decatur Firestone plant knew that skipping the adhesive that held the steel
and rubber tire layers together would most likely result in catastrophic failure, and yet
continued production without question

7.  Natural Rights
 Many, many people were killed due to the corners
cut on both Ford and Firestone/Bridgestone’s
side, so the Right to Life was most definitely
violated.
 The Right to the Security of One’s person was also
violated; even if one of the SUVs in question did
not catastrophically fail, killing or maiming the
driver, any Explorer equipped with Firestone AT or
ATX tires was in great risk of tread separation and
in turn rollover.

8.  Universalizability
 Maxim – It would be acceptable for any
corporation to endanger and possibly kill users of
their product if they could cut cost and production
time.
 The NHTSA would definitely not agree with this
principle, and as such the universalizability test is
failed

9. FORD
 Knew the Explorer was prone
to failure from an early
release in other countries,
and lied to the public saying it
was safe
 Willingly mis-labeled safe
operating tire PSI to prevent
having to change tire design
to a stronger (and more
expensive) version.
FIRESTONE/BRIDGESTONE
 Intentionally cut corners to
increase production of tires
 Workers and engineers who
spoke up on the issues were
called “disgruntled” by Firestone
and promptly fired.
 This caused a lack of workers,
and combined with strikes from
other workers, Firestone decided
to cut more corners by stopping
the application of a crucial
adhesive that bonded the steel
and rubber layers of tires.
The NHTSA can also be considered partially at fault; they overlooked many complaints for
years from bother engineers at both companies, as well as independent whistle-blowers like
Joan Claybrook and Sam Boyden.The NHTSA only stepped up and launched an investigation
after the death toll was in the hundreds

10.  Structured Whistle-blowing System
 Many employees from both companies tried to alert their superiors and the
NHTSA, but were mostly ignored or blown off; not taken seriously.There
needed to be a system where an engineer or employee could report a serious
problem, and have action taken immediately, not years later.
 Ethical/HR Departments
 There needs to be a small group of people in each company who’s job is to
monitor the projects being worked on, as well as the engineers working on it,
and ensure both are operating in an ethical fashion. If such a group existed, the
corners cut would most likely never have been cut, and hundreds of people
would not have been killed.
 Whistle-blowing choices for independents
 As stated earlier, many people such as Joan Claybrook, Clarence Ditlor, and Sam
Boyden noticed the problem with the Explorer and ATX/AT tires early on, but
were mostly ignored when they notified the NHTSA, most likely due to the fact
that they were not employed in the involved companies.
 Better AmericanTire Regulations
 Joan Claybrook pointed out that in other parts of the world, such as the
European Union, tire safety is taken much more seriously, with routine
inspections and additional nylon layers to prevent tread deseparation. Joan
believed that if America had a tighter hold on their tire regulation and
legislation, the entire crisis could have been averted