SlideShare une entreprise Scribd logo

2014-12-16 defense news - shutdown the hackers

•
•
S
Shawn Wells

The document discusses technologies for continuous monitoring and data standardization. It begins with an overview of a presentation on vulnerability management, configuration management, and the DoD Centralized Super Computing Facility story. It then covers various topics related to cybersecurity including reliance on technology over time, the ever-increasing capability and complexity of systems, cybercrime statistics, and the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP).

Logiciels
1  sur  66
Télécharger pour lire hors ligne
Shut  Down  the  Hackers     Presented  with          
50 MINUTES, 3 GOALS (+10MIN Q&A) 1.  Discuss existing & emerging technologies for continuous monitoring - Vulnerability Management - Configuration Management 2.  Share DoD Centralized Super Computing Facility story 3.  Data standardization technologies
Reliance  on   Technology  over   Time  
Reliance  on   Technology  over   Time   2  units  of  0me   Trivial  consequences   ……  IT  as  helpdesk   ……  IT  as  ancillary  cost  
Reliance  on   Technology  over   Time   2  units  of  0me   2  units  of  0me   Severe  consequences  a6er  IT  failure   ……  “IT  Guy”  now  “Chief  Architect”   ……  Rise  of  the  CISO   ……  IT  performance  metrics  to  O5/O6+  
Ever-Increasing Capability & Complexity FUNCTIONALITY & COMPLEXITY OPERATIONAL RISK Biplane: 0 LOC
Ever-Increasing Capability & Complexity FUNCTIONALITY & COMPLEXITY OPERATIONAL RISK Biplane: 0 LOC Lunar Module: 2K LOC
Ever-Increasing Capability & Complexity FUNCTIONALITY & COMPLEXITY OPERATIONAL RISK Biplane: 0 LOC Lunar Module: 2K LOC F-35: 9.9M LOC
April 2013
h2p://www.state.gov/documents/organiza0on/ 225886.pdf   “In  April  2013,  AQI’s  leader  Abu  Bakr  al-­‐Baghdadi   declared  the  group  was  opera0ng  in  Syria  and   changed  its  public  name  to  the  Islamic  State  of  Iraq   and  the  Levant(ISIL).”   “On  April  30,  the  U.S.  State  Department  noted  that  private   dona0ons  from  Persian  Gulf  countries  were  "a  major  source  of   funding  for  Sunni  terrorist  groups,  par0cularly...in  Syria,"  calling   the  problem  one  of  the  most  important  counterterrorism  issues   during  the  previous  calendar  year.  Groups  such  as  al-­‐Qaeda's   Syrian  affiliate,  Jabhat  al-­‐Nusra,  and  the  Islamic  State  of  Iraq  and   al-­‐Sham  (ISIS),  previously  known  as  al-­‐Qaeda  in  Iraq,  are  believed   to  be  frequent  recipients  of  some  of  the  hundreds  of  millions  of   dollars  that  wealthy  ci0zens  and  others  in  the  Gulf  peninsula  have   been  dona0ng  during  the  Syrian  conflict.”  
2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey What percent of Electronic Crime events are known or suspected to have been caused by . . . Insider,  28%   Outsider,  72%   Source: 2014 US State of Cybercrime Survey, CSO Magazine (sponsored by Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Price Waterhouse Cooper, April 2014)
2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey Which Electronic Crimes were more costly or damaging to your organization, those perpetrated by . . . Source: 2014 US State of Cybercrime Survey, CSO Magazine (sponsored by Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Price Waterhouse Cooper, April 2014) Insider,  46%   Outsider,  54%  
2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey Source: 2014 US State of Cybercrime Survey, CSO Magazine (sponsored by Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Price Waterhouse Cooper, April 2014) 75%   10%   12%   3%   How  Intrusions  Are  Handled   Internally  (without  legal   ac0on  or  law  enforcement)   Internally  (with  legal  ac0on)   Externally  (no0fying  law   enforcement)   Externally  (filing  a  civil   ac0on)  
2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey Source: 2014 US State of Cybercrime Survey, CSO Magazine (sponsored by Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Price Waterhouse Cooper, April 2014) 75%   10%   12%   3%   How  Intrusions  Are  Handled   Internally   (without  legal   ac0on  or  law   enforcement)   Internally  (with   legal  ac0on)   Top  5  Reasons  Cyber  Crimes   were  not  referred  for  legal  acNon   Damage  level  insufficient  to  warrant   prosecu0on   34%   Lack  of  evidence/not  enough   informa0on  to  prosecute   36%   Could  not  iden0fy  the  individuals   responsible   37%   Nega0ve  publicity   12%   Don’t  know   21%   è  
Crossing  the  Chasm  
Crossing  the  Chasm  
Crossing  the  Chasm  
Crossing  the  Chasm  
Case  Study:   U.S.  Department  of  Defense   Centralized  Super  Compu0ng  Facility  
“Innova0on  Programs”  –  Review  of  ongoing  work  with   NSA’s  Informa0on  Assurance  Directorate  and  NIST  
h2p://www.gao.gov/assets/120/110329.pdf   “80%  of  a2acks  leverage   known  vulnerabili0es   and  configura0on   management  sekng   weaknesses”  
UNIFIED SYSTEMS -  LOWERING RISK -  Correcting “tunnel vision” -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
UNIFIED SYSTEMS -  LOWERING RISK -  Correcting “tunnel vision” -  Using math and statistics to accelerate corrective action -  -  -  -  -  - 
UNIFIED SYSTEMS -  LOWERING RISK -  Correcting “tunnel vision” -  Using math and statistics to accelerate corrective action -  Daily risk calculations/priorities -  -  -  -  - 
UNIFIED SYSTEMS -  LOWERING RISK -  Correcting “tunnel vision” -  Using math and statistics to accelerate corrective action -  Daily risk calculations/priorities -  Automated business processes (patch distribution, corrective actions, etc) -  … WHILE NOT CHANGING -  Structure of departments or agencies -  Decentralized technology management -  Structure of security program
UNIFIED SYSTEMS -  LOWERING RISK -  Correcting “tunnel vision” -  Using math and statistics to accelerate corrective action -  Daily risk calculations/priorities -  Automated business processes (patch distribution, corrective actions, etc) -  … WHILE NOT CHANGING -  Structure of departments or agencies -  Decentralized technology management -  Structure of security program OBSTACLE:    CxO’s  accountable      for  IT  security          BUT        Directly  supervise  only  a      small  %  of  systems  in  use  
An SCAP Primer -  Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)
An SCAP Primer -  Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) -  Defines standardized formats -  Standardized inputs (e.g. a compliance baseline, status query) -  Standardized outputs (machine readable results) -  NIST 800-117: Guide to Adopting and Using the Security Content Automation Protocol -  NIST 800-126: The Technical Specification for the Security Content Automation Protocol -  NIST IR 7511: Requirements for vendors to attain NIST Validation
An SCAP Primer -  Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) -  Defines standardized formats -  Standardized inputs (e.g. a compliance baseline, status query) -  Standardized outputs (machine readable results) -  Provides the DoD enterprise with liberty with regard to product choices -  Avoids vendor lock-in, enables interoperability -  Provides common technical position to vendors, integrators, mission partners -  Federal procurement language requires SCAP support in some cases (e.g. new Common Criteria language)
SCAP Security Guide https://github.com/OpenSCAP/scap-security-guide
Contributors include . . .
Live Demo
SCAP Security Guide -  ~1.66M lines of code from 80 developers across DoD, IC, Civilian, industry, academia -  NIST Validated tooling (OpenSCAP) -  Upstream for US Gov Enterprise Linux baselines -  STIG: DoD RHEL6 baseline, produced by DISA FSO -  C2S: Intelligence Community “Commercial Cloud” for JWICS -  CSCF: NRO’s Centralized Super Computing Facility (CNSSI 1253 controls) -  CS2: NSA RHEL6 baseline -  US Navy JBoss EAP -  Shipping natively in Enterprise Linux
SCAP Deployment: CSCF •  Established September 1985 to provide HPC resources for use by the classified NRT and scientific computing communities •  DS&T was facilitator with SMUG committee of user groups •  WF took over with consolidation of WF to current management •  CSCF is currently located in ADF-E •  Applications support – code optimization, code parallelization, conversion, algorithm development/modification •  O&M support – OS configuration, help desk, backups, disaster recovery, etc
SCAP Deployment: CSCF •  CSCF followed the ICD 503 Six steps with standard controls and Cross Domain System (CDS) controls (CDS is approximately equal to MLS) •  Controls were straight forward •  Testing was very problematic •  Testers unfamiliar with Linux, much less MLS. •  Test Output Formatting •  CSCF moving to SCAP with Red Hat using the xml and html outputs to standardize on with Red Hat support
PORTABLE WORKLOADS
Data  Sources  
Data  Sources   JBoss  Data  Virtualiza0on     Format  consistency   1234567890   123-­‐456-­‐7890   (123)-­‐456-­‐7890   123/456/7890   123,456,7890   [123]-­‐456-­‐7890  
Report  1   Report  2   Report  3   Report  4  Data  Consumers   Data  Sources   JBoss  Data  Virtualiza0on     Format  consistency   1234567890   123-­‐456-­‐7890   (123)-­‐456-­‐7890   123/456/7890   123,456,7890   [123]-­‐456-­‐7890  
Data     Sources   Hadoop   NoSQL   Cloud  Apps   Data  Warehouse     &  Databases   Mainframe   XML,  CSV   &  Excel  Files   Enterprise   Apps   Siloed  &    Complex  
Connect   Compose   Consume   Na0ve  Data  Connec0vity   Standard  based  Data  Provisioning   JDBC,  ODBC,  SOAP,  REST,  OData   JBoss  Data   VirtualizaNon   Data     Sources   Design  Tools   Dashboard   OpNmizaNon   Caching   Security   Metadata   Hadoop   NoSQL   Cloud  Apps   Data  Warehouse     &  Databases   Mainframe   XML,  CSV   &  Excel  Files   Enterprise   Apps   Siloed  &    Complex   Virtualize   Transform   Federate  Unified  Virtual  Database  /  Common  Data  Model   Data  Transforma0ons  
Connect   Compose   Consume   BI  Reports  &   Analy0cs   Mobile  Applica0ons   SOA  Applica0ons  &   Portals     ESB,   ETL   Na0ve  Data  Connec0vity   Standard  based  Data  Provisioning   JDBC,  ODBC,  SOAP,  REST,  OData   JBoss  Data   VirtualizaNon  Data     Consumers   Data     Sources   Design  Tools   Dashboard   OpNmizaNon   Caching   Security   Metadata   Hadoop   NoSQL   Cloud  Apps   Data  Warehouse     &  Databases   Mainframe   XML,  CSV   &  Excel  Files   Enterprise   Apps   Siloed  &    Complex   Virtualize   Transform   Federate   Easy,   Real-­‐Cme     InformaCon   Unified  Virtual  Database  /  Common  Data  Model   Data  Transforma0ons  
Shawn  Wells   Director,  Innova0on  Programs   Red  Hat  Public  Sector   shawn@redhat.com  ||  443-­‐534-­‐0130  

Recommandé

How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsHow MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsSergey Soldatov
 
AI & ML in Cyber Security - Why Algorithms are Dangerous
AI & ML in Cyber Security - Why Algorithms are DangerousAI & ML in Cyber Security - Why Algorithms are Dangerous
AI & ML in Cyber Security - Why Algorithms are DangerousRaffael Marty
 
Splunk for Security
Splunk for SecuritySplunk for Security
Splunk for SecurityGabrielle Knowles
 
Cyber Security Threat Modeling
Cyber Security Threat ModelingCyber Security Threat Modeling
Cyber Security Threat ModelingDr. Anish Cheriyan (PhD)
 
The Finest Penetration Testing Framework for Software-Defined Networks
The Finest Penetration Testing Framework for Software-Defined NetworksThe Finest Penetration Testing Framework for Software-Defined Networks
The Finest Penetration Testing Framework for Software-Defined NetworksPriyanka Aash
 
conf2015_TLaGatta_CHarris_Splunk_BusinessAnalytics_DeliveringHighLevelAnalytics
conf2015_TLaGatta_CHarris_Splunk_BusinessAnalytics_DeliveringHighLevelAnalyticsconf2015_TLaGatta_CHarris_Splunk_BusinessAnalytics_DeliveringHighLevelAnalytics
conf2015_TLaGatta_CHarris_Splunk_BusinessAnalytics_DeliveringHighLevelAnalyticsTom LaGatta
 
Lessons Learned From Heartbleed, Struts, and The Neglected 90%
Lessons Learned From Heartbleed, Struts, and The Neglected 90%Lessons Learned From Heartbleed, Struts, and The Neglected 90%
Lessons Learned From Heartbleed, Struts, and The Neglected 90%Sonatype
 
Tools Of The Hardware Hacking Trade Final
Tools Of The Hardware Hacking Trade FinalTools Of The Hardware Hacking Trade Final
Tools Of The Hardware Hacking Trade FinalPriyanka Aash
 

Recommandé

How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsHow MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsSergey Soldatov
 
AI & ML in Cyber Security - Why Algorithms are Dangerous
AI & ML in Cyber Security - Why Algorithms are DangerousAI & ML in Cyber Security - Why Algorithms are Dangerous
AI & ML in Cyber Security - Why Algorithms are DangerousRaffael Marty
 
Splunk for Security
Splunk for SecuritySplunk for Security
Splunk for SecurityGabrielle Knowles
 
Cyber Security Threat Modeling
Cyber Security Threat ModelingCyber Security Threat Modeling
Cyber Security Threat ModelingDr. Anish Cheriyan (PhD)
 
The Finest Penetration Testing Framework for Software-Defined Networks
The Finest Penetration Testing Framework for Software-Defined NetworksThe Finest Penetration Testing Framework for Software-Defined Networks
The Finest Penetration Testing Framework for Software-Defined NetworksPriyanka Aash
 
conf2015_TLaGatta_CHarris_Splunk_BusinessAnalytics_DeliveringHighLevelAnalytics
conf2015_TLaGatta_CHarris_Splunk_BusinessAnalytics_DeliveringHighLevelAnalyticsconf2015_TLaGatta_CHarris_Splunk_BusinessAnalytics_DeliveringHighLevelAnalytics
conf2015_TLaGatta_CHarris_Splunk_BusinessAnalytics_DeliveringHighLevelAnalyticsTom LaGatta
 
Lessons Learned From Heartbleed, Struts, and The Neglected 90%
Lessons Learned From Heartbleed, Struts, and The Neglected 90%Lessons Learned From Heartbleed, Struts, and The Neglected 90%
Lessons Learned From Heartbleed, Struts, and The Neglected 90%Sonatype
 
Tools Of The Hardware Hacking Trade Final
Tools Of The Hardware Hacking Trade FinalTools Of The Hardware Hacking Trade Final
Tools Of The Hardware Hacking Trade FinalPriyanka Aash
 
Connected Cars: What Could Possibly Go Wrong
Connected Cars: What Could Possibly Go WrongConnected Cars: What Could Possibly Go Wrong
Connected Cars: What Could Possibly Go WrongOnBoard Security, Inc. - a Qualcomm Company
 
Scaling Systems Securely: Challenges and Risks
Scaling Systems Securely: Challenges and RisksScaling Systems Securely: Challenges and Risks
Scaling Systems Securely: Challenges and RisksOnBoard Security, Inc. - a Qualcomm Company
 
Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology Selection
Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology SelectionIndustrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology Selection
Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology SelectionDragos, Inc.
 
Detecting Hacks: Anomaly Detection on Networking Data
Detecting Hacks: Anomaly Detection on Networking DataDetecting Hacks: Anomaly Detection on Networking Data
Detecting Hacks: Anomaly Detection on Networking DataJames Sirota
 
SPO2-T11_Automated-Prevention-of-Ransomware-with-Machine-Learning-and-GPOs
SPO2-T11_Automated-Prevention-of-Ransomware-with-Machine-Learning-and-GPOsSPO2-T11_Automated-Prevention-of-Ransomware-with-Machine-Learning-and-GPOs
SPO2-T11_Automated-Prevention-of-Ransomware-with-Machine-Learning-and-GPOsRod Soto
 
Applied machine learning defeating modern malicious documents
Applied machine learning defeating modern malicious documentsApplied machine learning defeating modern malicious documents
Applied machine learning defeating modern malicious documentsPriyanka Aash
 
Dreaming of IoCs Adding Time Context to Threat Intelligence
Dreaming of IoCs Adding Time Context to Threat IntelligenceDreaming of IoCs Adding Time Context to Threat Intelligence
Dreaming of IoCs Adding Time Context to Threat IntelligencePriyanka Aash
 
Car cybersecurity: What do automakers really think?
Car cybersecurity: What do automakers really think?Car cybersecurity: What do automakers really think?
Car cybersecurity: What do automakers really think?OnBoard Security, Inc. - a Qualcomm Company
 
Advances in cloud scale machine learning for cyber-defense
Advances in cloud scale machine learning for cyber-defenseAdvances in cloud scale machine learning for cyber-defense
Advances in cloud scale machine learning for cyber-defensePriyanka Aash
 
Securing Electric Utility Infrastructure
Securing Electric Utility InfrastructureSecuring Electric Utility Infrastructure
Securing Electric Utility InfrastructureDragos, Inc.
 
Quantum Safety in Certified Cryptographic Modules
Quantum Safety in Certified Cryptographic ModulesQuantum Safety in Certified Cryptographic Modules
Quantum Safety in Certified Cryptographic ModulesOnBoard Security, Inc. - a Qualcomm Company
 
Misbehavior Handling Throughout the V2V System Lifecycle
Misbehavior Handling Throughout the V2V System LifecycleMisbehavior Handling Throughout the V2V System Lifecycle
Misbehavior Handling Throughout the V2V System LifecycleOnBoard Security, Inc. - a Qualcomm Company
 
Application Assessment Techniques
Application Assessment TechniquesApplication Assessment Techniques
Application Assessment TechniquesDenim Group
 
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017FRSecure
 
Highly dependable automotive software
Highly dependable automotive softwareHighly dependable automotive software
Highly dependable automotive softwareAlan Tatourian
 
SDN Analytics & Security
SDN Analytics & Security SDN Analytics & Security
SDN Analytics & Security Scott Raynovich
 
Slide Deck Class Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program
Slide Deck Class Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor ProgramSlide Deck Class Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program
Slide Deck Class Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor ProgramFRSecure
 
Using Assessment Tools on ICS (English)
Using Assessment Tools on ICS (English)Using Assessment Tools on ICS (English)
Using Assessment Tools on ICS (English)Digital Bond
 
Functional Safety and Security process alignment
Functional Safety and Security process alignmentFunctional Safety and Security process alignment
Functional Safety and Security process alignmentAlan Tatourian
 
S4xJapan Closing Keynote
S4xJapan Closing KeynoteS4xJapan Closing Keynote
S4xJapan Closing KeynoteDigital Bond
 
University_of_pune
University_of_puneUniversity_of_pune
University_of_puneSaurabh Kulkarni
 
Tamil nadu open university chengai study back
Tamil nadu open university chengai study backTamil nadu open university chengai study back
Tamil nadu open university chengai study backmodernjobsinslide
 

Contenu connexe

Tendances

Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology Selection
Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology SelectionIndustrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology Selection
Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology SelectionDragos, Inc.
 
Detecting Hacks: Anomaly Detection on Networking Data
Detecting Hacks: Anomaly Detection on Networking DataDetecting Hacks: Anomaly Detection on Networking Data
Detecting Hacks: Anomaly Detection on Networking DataJames Sirota
 
SPO2-T11_Automated-Prevention-of-Ransomware-with-Machine-Learning-and-GPOs
SPO2-T11_Automated-Prevention-of-Ransomware-with-Machine-Learning-and-GPOsSPO2-T11_Automated-Prevention-of-Ransomware-with-Machine-Learning-and-GPOs
SPO2-T11_Automated-Prevention-of-Ransomware-with-Machine-Learning-and-GPOsRod Soto
 
Applied machine learning defeating modern malicious documents
Applied machine learning defeating modern malicious documentsApplied machine learning defeating modern malicious documents
Applied machine learning defeating modern malicious documentsPriyanka Aash
 
Dreaming of IoCs Adding Time Context to Threat Intelligence
Dreaming of IoCs Adding Time Context to Threat IntelligenceDreaming of IoCs Adding Time Context to Threat Intelligence
Dreaming of IoCs Adding Time Context to Threat IntelligencePriyanka Aash
 
Advances in cloud scale machine learning for cyber-defense
Advances in cloud scale machine learning for cyber-defenseAdvances in cloud scale machine learning for cyber-defense
Advances in cloud scale machine learning for cyber-defensePriyanka Aash
 
Securing Electric Utility Infrastructure
Securing Electric Utility InfrastructureSecuring Electric Utility Infrastructure
Securing Electric Utility InfrastructureDragos, Inc.
 
Application Assessment Techniques
Application Assessment TechniquesApplication Assessment Techniques
Application Assessment TechniquesDenim Group
 
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017FRSecure
 
Highly dependable automotive software
Highly dependable automotive softwareHighly dependable automotive software
Highly dependable automotive softwareAlan Tatourian
 
SDN Analytics & Security
SDN Analytics & Security SDN Analytics & Security
SDN Analytics & Security Scott Raynovich
 
Slide Deck Class Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program
Slide Deck Class Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor ProgramSlide Deck Class Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program
Slide Deck Class Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor ProgramFRSecure
 
Using Assessment Tools on ICS (English)
Using Assessment Tools on ICS (English)Using Assessment Tools on ICS (English)
Using Assessment Tools on ICS (English)Digital Bond
 
Functional Safety and Security process alignment
Functional Safety and Security process alignmentFunctional Safety and Security process alignment
Functional Safety and Security process alignmentAlan Tatourian
 
S4xJapan Closing Keynote
S4xJapan Closing KeynoteS4xJapan Closing Keynote
S4xJapan Closing KeynoteDigital Bond
 

Tendances (20)

Connected Cars: What Could Possibly Go Wrong
Connected Cars: What Could Possibly Go WrongConnected Cars: What Could Possibly Go Wrong
Connected Cars: What Could Possibly Go Wrong
 
Scaling Systems Securely: Challenges and Risks
Scaling Systems Securely: Challenges and RisksScaling Systems Securely: Challenges and Risks
Scaling Systems Securely: Challenges and Risks
 
Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology Selection
Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology SelectionIndustrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology Selection
Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology Selection
 
Detecting Hacks: Anomaly Detection on Networking Data
Detecting Hacks: Anomaly Detection on Networking DataDetecting Hacks: Anomaly Detection on Networking Data
Detecting Hacks: Anomaly Detection on Networking Data
 
SPO2-T11_Automated-Prevention-of-Ransomware-with-Machine-Learning-and-GPOs
SPO2-T11_Automated-Prevention-of-Ransomware-with-Machine-Learning-and-GPOsSPO2-T11_Automated-Prevention-of-Ransomware-with-Machine-Learning-and-GPOs
SPO2-T11_Automated-Prevention-of-Ransomware-with-Machine-Learning-and-GPOs
 
Applied machine learning defeating modern malicious documents
Applied machine learning defeating modern malicious documentsApplied machine learning defeating modern malicious documents
Applied machine learning defeating modern malicious documents
 
Dreaming of IoCs Adding Time Context to Threat Intelligence
Dreaming of IoCs Adding Time Context to Threat IntelligenceDreaming of IoCs Adding Time Context to Threat Intelligence
Dreaming of IoCs Adding Time Context to Threat Intelligence
 
Car cybersecurity: What do automakers really think?
Car cybersecurity: What do automakers really think?Car cybersecurity: What do automakers really think?
Car cybersecurity: What do automakers really think?
 
Advances in cloud scale machine learning for cyber-defense
Advances in cloud scale machine learning for cyber-defenseAdvances in cloud scale machine learning for cyber-defense
Advances in cloud scale machine learning for cyber-defense
 
Securing Electric Utility Infrastructure
Securing Electric Utility InfrastructureSecuring Electric Utility Infrastructure
Securing Electric Utility Infrastructure
 
Quantum Safety in Certified Cryptographic Modules
Quantum Safety in Certified Cryptographic ModulesQuantum Safety in Certified Cryptographic Modules
Quantum Safety in Certified Cryptographic Modules
 
Misbehavior Handling Throughout the V2V System Lifecycle
Misbehavior Handling Throughout the V2V System LifecycleMisbehavior Handling Throughout the V2V System Lifecycle
Misbehavior Handling Throughout the V2V System Lifecycle
 
Application Assessment Techniques
Application Assessment TechniquesApplication Assessment Techniques
Application Assessment Techniques
 
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017
 
Highly dependable automotive software
Highly dependable automotive softwareHighly dependable automotive software
Highly dependable automotive software
 
SDN Analytics & Security
SDN Analytics & Security SDN Analytics & Security
SDN Analytics & Security
 
Slide Deck Class Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program
Slide Deck Class Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor ProgramSlide Deck Class Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program
Slide Deck Class Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program
 
Using Assessment Tools on ICS (English)
Using Assessment Tools on ICS (English)Using Assessment Tools on ICS (English)
Using Assessment Tools on ICS (English)
 
Functional Safety and Security process alignment
Functional Safety and Security process alignmentFunctional Safety and Security process alignment
Functional Safety and Security process alignment
 
S4xJapan Closing Keynote
S4xJapan Closing KeynoteS4xJapan Closing Keynote
S4xJapan Closing Keynote
 

En vedette

Tamil nadu open university chengai study back
Tamil nadu open university chengai study backTamil nadu open university chengai study back
Tamil nadu open university chengai study backmodernjobsinslide
 
ASM's IIBR - Institute Of International Business & Research, Pune
ASM's IIBR - Institute Of International Business & Research, PuneASM's IIBR - Institute Of International Business & Research, Pune
ASM's IIBR - Institute Of International Business & Research, PuneASM Group of Institutes
 
The FrontAhead International Education Expo - January 18th - 19th 2014 in as...
The FrontAhead International Education Expo - January 18th - 19th 2014 in as...The FrontAhead International Education Expo - January 18th - 19th 2014 in as...
The FrontAhead International Education Expo - January 18th - 19th 2014 in as...Rajiv Dabhadkar
 
Ich will agil testen! was muss ich können iqnite 2014 - verison 2.0
Ich will agil testen! was muss ich können iqnite 2014 - verison 2.0Ich will agil testen! was muss ich können iqnite 2014 - verison 2.0
Ich will agil testen! was muss ich können iqnite 2014 - verison 2.0Michael Fischlein
 
University of Pune - Project report
University of Pune - Project reportUniversity of Pune - Project report
University of Pune - Project reportRishiraj Randive
 
National Housing Board prof. ajay shukla university of pune_nashik
National Housing Board prof. ajay shukla university of pune_nashikNational Housing Board prof. ajay shukla university of pune_nashik
National Housing Board prof. ajay shukla university of pune_nashikProf. Ajay H Shukla
 
Solid State Drives - Seminar for Computer Engineering Semester 6 - VIT,Univer...
Solid State Drives - Seminar for Computer Engineering Semester 6 - VIT,Univer...Solid State Drives - Seminar for Computer Engineering Semester 6 - VIT,Univer...
Solid State Drives - Seminar for Computer Engineering Semester 6 - VIT,Univer...ravipbhat
 
University Of Pune Result 2014
University Of Pune Result 2014University Of Pune Result 2014
University Of Pune Result 2014Daily Pudhari
 
Mktstratergyofmcdonald 111231011641-phpapp02
Mktstratergyofmcdonald 111231011641-phpapp02Mktstratergyofmcdonald 111231011641-phpapp02
Mktstratergyofmcdonald 111231011641-phpapp02vinod singh
 
Marketing of Cadbury
Marketing of Cadbury Marketing of Cadbury
Marketing of Cadbury anshulramnani
 
Hard Disk Drive versus Solid State Drive
Hard Disk Drive versus Solid State DriveHard Disk Drive versus Solid State Drive
Hard Disk Drive versus Solid State DriveDac Khue Nguyen
 
Principles of Interior design
Principles of Interior designPrinciples of Interior design
Principles of Interior designRohan Choudhary
 
What are The Elements of Interior Design
What are The Elements of Interior Design What are The Elements of Interior Design
What are The Elements of Interior Design emmymartin
 
How to shutdown and power up of the netapp cluster mode storage system
How to shutdown and power up of the netapp cluster mode storage systemHow to shutdown and power up of the netapp cluster mode storage system
How to shutdown and power up of the netapp cluster mode storage systemSaroj Sahu
 

En vedette (20)

University_of_pune
University_of_puneUniversity_of_pune
University_of_pune
 
Tamil nadu open university chengai study back
Tamil nadu open university chengai study backTamil nadu open university chengai study back
Tamil nadu open university chengai study back
 
University of madras notice
University of madras noticeUniversity of madras notice
University of madras notice
 
ASM's IIBR - Institute Of International Business & Research, Pune
ASM's IIBR - Institute Of International Business & Research, PuneASM's IIBR - Institute Of International Business & Research, Pune
ASM's IIBR - Institute Of International Business & Research, Pune
 
The FrontAhead International Education Expo - January 18th - 19th 2014 in as...
The FrontAhead International Education Expo - January 18th - 19th 2014 in as...The FrontAhead International Education Expo - January 18th - 19th 2014 in as...
The FrontAhead International Education Expo - January 18th - 19th 2014 in as...
 
Ich will agil testen! was muss ich können iqnite 2014 - verison 2.0
Ich will agil testen! was muss ich können iqnite 2014 - verison 2.0Ich will agil testen! was muss ich können iqnite 2014 - verison 2.0
Ich will agil testen! was muss ich können iqnite 2014 - verison 2.0
 
University of Pune - Project report
University of Pune - Project reportUniversity of Pune - Project report
University of Pune - Project report
 
National Housing Board prof. ajay shukla university of pune_nashik
National Housing Board prof. ajay shukla university of pune_nashikNational Housing Board prof. ajay shukla university of pune_nashik
National Housing Board prof. ajay shukla university of pune_nashik
 
Solid State Drives - Seminar for Computer Engineering Semester 6 - VIT,Univer...
Solid State Drives - Seminar for Computer Engineering Semester 6 - VIT,Univer...Solid State Drives - Seminar for Computer Engineering Semester 6 - VIT,Univer...
Solid State Drives - Seminar for Computer Engineering Semester 6 - VIT,Univer...
 
University Of Pune Result 2014
University Of Pune Result 2014University Of Pune Result 2014
University Of Pune Result 2014
 
The micoscope
The micoscopeThe micoscope
The micoscope
 
Mktstratergyofmcdonald 111231011641-phpapp02
Mktstratergyofmcdonald 111231011641-phpapp02Mktstratergyofmcdonald 111231011641-phpapp02
Mktstratergyofmcdonald 111231011641-phpapp02
 
Marketing of Cadbury
Marketing of Cadbury Marketing of Cadbury
Marketing of Cadbury
 
Hard Disk Drive versus Solid State Drive
Hard Disk Drive versus Solid State DriveHard Disk Drive versus Solid State Drive
Hard Disk Drive versus Solid State Drive
 
Principles of Interior design
Principles of Interior designPrinciples of Interior design
Principles of Interior design
 
What are The Elements of Interior Design
What are The Elements of Interior Design What are The Elements of Interior Design
What are The Elements of Interior Design
 
City Profile of Chennai
City Profile of ChennaiCity Profile of Chennai
City Profile of Chennai
 
University of Madras Campus Photos in details
University of Madras Campus Photos in detailsUniversity of Madras Campus Photos in details
University of Madras Campus Photos in details
 
How to shutdown and power up of the netapp cluster mode storage system
How to shutdown and power up of the netapp cluster mode storage systemHow to shutdown and power up of the netapp cluster mode storage system
How to shutdown and power up of the netapp cluster mode storage system
 
Detailed understanding of the Chennai Master Plan
Detailed understanding of the Chennai Master PlanDetailed understanding of the Chennai Master Plan
Detailed understanding of the Chennai Master Plan
 

Similaire à 2014-12-16 defense news - shutdown the hackers

Solnet dev secops meetup
Solnet dev secops meetupSolnet dev secops meetup
Solnet dev secops meetuppbink
 
Monitoring ICS Communications
Monitoring ICS CommunicationsMonitoring ICS Communications
Monitoring ICS CommunicationsDigital Bond
 
Detect Threats Faster
Detect Threats FasterDetect Threats Faster
Detect Threats FasterForce 3
 
Operationalizing Security Intelligence
Operationalizing Security IntelligenceOperationalizing Security Intelligence
Operationalizing Security IntelligenceSplunk
 
Making Runtime Data Useful for Incident Diagnosis: An Experience Report
Making Runtime Data Useful for Incident Diagnosis: An Experience ReportMaking Runtime Data Useful for Incident Diagnosis: An Experience Report
Making Runtime Data Useful for Incident Diagnosis: An Experience ReportQAware GmbH
 
Oliver Schuermann - Integrated Software in Networking - the Mystery of SDN
Oliver Schuermann - Integrated Software in Networking - the Mystery of SDNOliver Schuermann - Integrated Software in Networking - the Mystery of SDN
Oliver Schuermann - Integrated Software in Networking - the Mystery of SDNcentralohioissa
 
Scalar Security Roadshow April 2015
Scalar Security Roadshow April 2015Scalar Security Roadshow April 2015
Scalar Security Roadshow April 2015Scalar Decisions
 
[CONFidence 2016] Gaweł Mikołajczyk - Making sense out of the Security Operat...
[CONFidence 2016] Gaweł Mikołajczyk - Making sense out of the Security Operat...[CONFidence 2016] Gaweł Mikołajczyk - Making sense out of the Security Operat...
[CONFidence 2016] Gaweł Mikołajczyk - Making sense out of the Security Operat...PROIDEA
 
SplunkSummit 2015 - Splunk User Behavioral Analytics
SplunkSummit 2015 - Splunk User Behavioral AnalyticsSplunkSummit 2015 - Splunk User Behavioral Analytics
SplunkSummit 2015 - Splunk User Behavioral AnalyticsSplunk
 
Hacker Halted 2014 - Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Los...
Hacker Halted 2014 - Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Los...Hacker Halted 2014 - Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Los...
Hacker Halted 2014 - Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Los...EC-Council
 
Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Losing Control (Hacker H...
Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Losing Control (Hacker H...Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Losing Control (Hacker H...
Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Losing Control (Hacker H...David Etue
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security Featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security Featuring User Behavior Analytics Splunk for Enterprise Security Featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security Featuring User Behavior Analytics Splunk
 
How To Handle Breach Disclosures? Bug Bounty, Coordinated Vulnerability Discl...
How To Handle Breach Disclosures? Bug Bounty, Coordinated Vulnerability Discl...How To Handle Breach Disclosures? Bug Bounty, Coordinated Vulnerability Discl...
How To Handle Breach Disclosures? Bug Bounty, Coordinated Vulnerability Discl...Priyanka Aash
 
Gov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior Analytics
Gov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior AnalyticsGov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior Analytics
Gov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior AnalyticsSplunk
 
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)Shah Sheikh
 
Cyber Security 101 - Back to Basics (HP Secure Print Event 2018)
Cyber Security 101 - Back to Basics (HP Secure Print Event 2018)Cyber Security 101 - Back to Basics (HP Secure Print Event 2018)
Cyber Security 101 - Back to Basics (HP Secure Print Event 2018)Shah Sheikh
 
Security Analytics & Security Intelligence-as-a-Service
Security Analytics & Security Intelligence-as-a-ServiceSecurity Analytics & Security Intelligence-as-a-Service
Security Analytics & Security Intelligence-as-a-ServiceMarco Casassa Mont
 
CLASS 2018 - Palestra de Edgard Capdevielle (Presidente e CEO – Nozomi)
CLASS 2018 - Palestra de Edgard Capdevielle (Presidente e CEO – Nozomi)CLASS 2018 - Palestra de Edgard Capdevielle (Presidente e CEO – Nozomi)
CLASS 2018 - Palestra de Edgard Capdevielle (Presidente e CEO – Nozomi)TI Safe
 
IT Network Asset Discovery & Inventory
IT Network Asset Discovery & InventoryIT Network Asset Discovery & Inventory
IT Network Asset Discovery & Inventoryikirmer
 

Similaire à 2014-12-16 defense news - shutdown the hackers (20)

Solnet dev secops meetup
Solnet dev secops meetupSolnet dev secops meetup
Solnet dev secops meetup
 
Monitoring ICS Communications
Monitoring ICS CommunicationsMonitoring ICS Communications
Monitoring ICS Communications
 
Detect Threats Faster
Detect Threats FasterDetect Threats Faster
Detect Threats Faster
 
Operationalizing Security Intelligence
Operationalizing Security IntelligenceOperationalizing Security Intelligence
Operationalizing Security Intelligence
 
Making Runtime Data Useful for Incident Diagnosis: An Experience Report
Making Runtime Data Useful for Incident Diagnosis: An Experience ReportMaking Runtime Data Useful for Incident Diagnosis: An Experience Report
Making Runtime Data Useful for Incident Diagnosis: An Experience Report
 
Oliver Schuermann - Integrated Software in Networking - the Mystery of SDN
Oliver Schuermann - Integrated Software in Networking - the Mystery of SDNOliver Schuermann - Integrated Software in Networking - the Mystery of SDN
Oliver Schuermann - Integrated Software in Networking - the Mystery of SDN
 
Scalar Security Roadshow April 2015
Scalar Security Roadshow April 2015Scalar Security Roadshow April 2015
Scalar Security Roadshow April 2015
 
[CONFidence 2016] Gaweł Mikołajczyk - Making sense out of the Security Operat...
[CONFidence 2016] Gaweł Mikołajczyk - Making sense out of the Security Operat...[CONFidence 2016] Gaweł Mikołajczyk - Making sense out of the Security Operat...
[CONFidence 2016] Gaweł Mikołajczyk - Making sense out of the Security Operat...
 
IoT and M2M Safety and Security
IoT and M2M Safety and Security IoT and M2M Safety and Security
IoT and M2M Safety and Security
 
SplunkSummit 2015 - Splunk User Behavioral Analytics
SplunkSummit 2015 - Splunk User Behavioral AnalyticsSplunkSummit 2015 - Splunk User Behavioral Analytics
SplunkSummit 2015 - Splunk User Behavioral Analytics
 
Hacker Halted 2014 - Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Los...
Hacker Halted 2014 - Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Los...Hacker Halted 2014 - Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Los...
Hacker Halted 2014 - Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Los...
 
Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Losing Control (Hacker H...
Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Losing Control (Hacker H...Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Losing Control (Hacker H...
Control Quotient: Adaptive Strategies For Gracefully Losing Control (Hacker H...
 
Splunk for Enterprise Security Featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security Featuring User Behavior Analytics Splunk for Enterprise Security Featuring User Behavior Analytics
Splunk for Enterprise Security Featuring User Behavior Analytics
 
How To Handle Breach Disclosures? Bug Bounty, Coordinated Vulnerability Discl...
How To Handle Breach Disclosures? Bug Bounty, Coordinated Vulnerability Discl...How To Handle Breach Disclosures? Bug Bounty, Coordinated Vulnerability Discl...
How To Handle Breach Disclosures? Bug Bounty, Coordinated Vulnerability Discl...
 
Gov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior Analytics
Gov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior AnalyticsGov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior Analytics
Gov & Education Day 2015 - User Behavior Analytics
 
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)
 
Cyber Security 101 - Back to Basics (HP Secure Print Event 2018)
Cyber Security 101 - Back to Basics (HP Secure Print Event 2018)Cyber Security 101 - Back to Basics (HP Secure Print Event 2018)
Cyber Security 101 - Back to Basics (HP Secure Print Event 2018)
 
Security Analytics & Security Intelligence-as-a-Service
Security Analytics & Security Intelligence-as-a-ServiceSecurity Analytics & Security Intelligence-as-a-Service
Security Analytics & Security Intelligence-as-a-Service
 
CLASS 2018 - Palestra de Edgard Capdevielle (Presidente e CEO – Nozomi)
CLASS 2018 - Palestra de Edgard Capdevielle (Presidente e CEO – Nozomi)CLASS 2018 - Palestra de Edgard Capdevielle (Presidente e CEO – Nozomi)
CLASS 2018 - Palestra de Edgard Capdevielle (Presidente e CEO – Nozomi)
 
IT Network Asset Discovery & Inventory
IT Network Asset Discovery & InventoryIT Network Asset Discovery & Inventory
IT Network Asset Discovery & Inventory
 

Plus de Shawn Wells

2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms
2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms
2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO PlatformsShawn Wells
 
2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security
2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security
2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital SecurityShawn Wells
 
2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...
2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...
2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...Shawn Wells
 
2017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f02
2017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f022017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f02
2017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f02Shawn Wells
 
2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...
2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...
2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...Shawn Wells
 
2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook
2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook
2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop CoursebookShawn Wells
 
2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation
2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation
2016-08-29 AFITC Security AutomationShawn Wells
 
2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...
2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...
2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...Shawn Wells
 
2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update
2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update
2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security UpdateShawn Wells
 
2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain
2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain
2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross DomainShawn Wells
 
2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark
2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark
2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the DarkShawn Wells
 
2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy
2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy
2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made EasyShawn Wells
 
2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator
2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator
2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to CollaboratorShawn Wells
 
2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks
2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks
2015-01-27 ssa opening remarksShawn Wells
 
2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap
2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap
2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scapShawn Wells
 
2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook
2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook
2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbookShawn Wells
 
2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing
2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing
2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT ManufacturingShawn Wells
 
2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement
2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement
2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcementShawn Wells
 
2014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 2014
2014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 20142014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 2014
2014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 2014Shawn Wells
 
2014 04-03 xyratex event
2014 04-03 xyratex event2014 04-03 xyratex event
2014 04-03 xyratex eventShawn Wells
 

Plus de Shawn Wells (20)

2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms
2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms
2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms
 
2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security
2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security
2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security
 
2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...
2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...
2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...
 
2017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f02
2017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f022017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f02
2017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f02
 
2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...
2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...
2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...
 
2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook
2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook
2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook
 
2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation
2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation
2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation
 
2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...
2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...
2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...
 
2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update
2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update
2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update
 
2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain
2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain
2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain
 
2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark
2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark
2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark
 
2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy
2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy
2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy
 
2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator
2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator
2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator
 
2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks
2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks
2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks
 
2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap
2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap
2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap
 
2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook
2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook
2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook
 
2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing
2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing
2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing
 
2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement
2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement
2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement
 
2014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 2014
2014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 20142014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 2014
2014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 2014
 
2014 04-03 xyratex event
2014 04-03 xyratex event2014 04-03 xyratex event
2014 04-03 xyratex event
 

Dernier

Optimizing AI for immediate response in Smart CCTV
Optimizing AI for immediate response in Smart CCTVOptimizing AI for immediate response in Smart CCTV
Optimizing AI for immediate response in Smart CCTVshikhaohhpro
 
Learn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdf
Learn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdfLearn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdf
Learn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdfkalichargn70th171
 
Project Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanation
Project Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanationProject Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanation
Project Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanationkaushalgiri8080
 
Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...
Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...
Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...soniya singh
 
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...OnePlan Solutions
 
Der Spagat zwischen BIAS und FAIRNESS (2024)
Der Spagat zwischen BIAS und FAIRNESS (2024)Der Spagat zwischen BIAS und FAIRNESS (2024)
Der Spagat zwischen BIAS und FAIRNESS (2024)OPEN KNOWLEDGE GmbH
 
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdfwhy an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdfjoe51371421
 
Hand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptx
Hand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptxHand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptx
Hand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptxbodapatigopi8531
 
DNT_Corporate presentation know about us
DNT_Corporate presentation know about usDNT_Corporate presentation know about us
DNT_Corporate presentation know about usDynamic Netsoft
 
Salesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
Salesforce Certified Field Service ConsultantSalesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
Salesforce Certified Field Service ConsultantAxelRicardoTrocheRiq
 
A Secure and Reliable Document Management System is Essential.docx
A Secure and Reliable Document Management System is Essential.docxA Secure and Reliable Document Management System is Essential.docx
A Secure and Reliable Document Management System is Essential.docxComplianceQuest1
 
CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online ☂️
CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online ☂️CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online ☂️
CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online ☂️anilsa9823
 
Unveiling the Tech Salsa of LAMs with Janus in Real-Time Applications
Unveiling the Tech Salsa of LAMs with Janus in Real-Time ApplicationsUnveiling the Tech Salsa of LAMs with Janus in Real-Time Applications
Unveiling the Tech Salsa of LAMs with Janus in Real-Time ApplicationsAlberto González Trastoy
 
TECUNIQUE: Success Stories: IT Service provider
TECUNIQUE: Success Stories: IT Service providerTECUNIQUE: Success Stories: IT Service provider
TECUNIQUE: Success Stories: IT Service providermohitmore19
 
What is Binary Language? Computer Number Systems
What is Binary Language? Computer Number SystemsWhat is Binary Language? Computer Number Systems
What is Binary Language? Computer Number SystemsJheuzeDellosa
 
(Genuine) Escort Service Lucknow | Starting ₹,5K To @25k with A/C 🧑🏽‍❤️‍🧑🏻 89...
(Genuine) Escort Service Lucknow | Starting ₹,5K To @25k with A/C 🧑🏽‍❤️‍🧑🏻 89...(Genuine) Escort Service Lucknow | Starting ₹,5K To @25k with A/C 🧑🏽‍❤️‍🧑🏻 89...
(Genuine) Escort Service Lucknow | Starting ₹,5K To @25k with A/C 🧑🏽‍❤️‍🧑🏻 89...gurkirankumar98700
 
Right Money Management App For Your Financial Goals
Right Money Management App For Your Financial GoalsRight Money Management App For Your Financial Goals
Right Money Management App For Your Financial GoalsJhone kinadey
 
Active Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdf
Active Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdfActive Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdf
Active Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdfCionsystems
 

Dernier (20)

Optimizing AI for immediate response in Smart CCTV
Optimizing AI for immediate response in Smart CCTVOptimizing AI for immediate response in Smart CCTV
Optimizing AI for immediate response in Smart CCTV
 
Learn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdf
Learn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdfLearn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdf
Learn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdf
 
Project Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanation
Project Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanationProject Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanation
Project Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanation
 
Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...
Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...
Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...
 
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
 
Der Spagat zwischen BIAS und FAIRNESS (2024)
Der Spagat zwischen BIAS und FAIRNESS (2024)Der Spagat zwischen BIAS und FAIRNESS (2024)
Der Spagat zwischen BIAS und FAIRNESS (2024)
 
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdfwhy an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
 
Vip Call Girls Noida ➡️ Delhi ➡️ 9999965857 No Advance 24HRS Live
Vip Call Girls Noida ➡️ Delhi ➡️ 9999965857 No Advance 24HRS LiveVip Call Girls Noida ➡️ Delhi ➡️ 9999965857 No Advance 24HRS Live
Vip Call Girls Noida ➡️ Delhi ➡️ 9999965857 No Advance 24HRS Live
 
Hand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptx
Hand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptxHand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptx
Hand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptx
 
DNT_Corporate presentation know about us
DNT_Corporate presentation know about usDNT_Corporate presentation know about us
DNT_Corporate presentation know about us
 
Salesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
Salesforce Certified Field Service ConsultantSalesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
Salesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
 
Exploring iOS App Development: Simplifying the Process
Exploring iOS App Development: Simplifying the ProcessExploring iOS App Development: Simplifying the Process
Exploring iOS App Development: Simplifying the Process
 
A Secure and Reliable Document Management System is Essential.docx
A Secure and Reliable Document Management System is Essential.docxA Secure and Reliable Document Management System is Essential.docx
A Secure and Reliable Document Management System is Essential.docx
 
CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online ☂️
CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online ☂️CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online ☂️
CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online ☂️
 
Unveiling the Tech Salsa of LAMs with Janus in Real-Time Applications
Unveiling the Tech Salsa of LAMs with Janus in Real-Time ApplicationsUnveiling the Tech Salsa of LAMs with Janus in Real-Time Applications
Unveiling the Tech Salsa of LAMs with Janus in Real-Time Applications
 
TECUNIQUE: Success Stories: IT Service provider
TECUNIQUE: Success Stories: IT Service providerTECUNIQUE: Success Stories: IT Service provider
TECUNIQUE: Success Stories: IT Service provider
 
What is Binary Language? Computer Number Systems
What is Binary Language? Computer Number SystemsWhat is Binary Language? Computer Number Systems
What is Binary Language? Computer Number Systems
 
(Genuine) Escort Service Lucknow | Starting ₹,5K To @25k with A/C 🧑🏽‍❤️‍🧑🏻 89...
(Genuine) Escort Service Lucknow | Starting ₹,5K To @25k with A/C 🧑🏽‍❤️‍🧑🏻 89...(Genuine) Escort Service Lucknow | Starting ₹,5K To @25k with A/C 🧑🏽‍❤️‍🧑🏻 89...
(Genuine) Escort Service Lucknow | Starting ₹,5K To @25k with A/C 🧑🏽‍❤️‍🧑🏻 89...
 
Right Money Management App For Your Financial Goals
Right Money Management App For Your Financial GoalsRight Money Management App For Your Financial Goals
Right Money Management App For Your Financial Goals
 
Active Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdf
Active Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdfActive Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdf
Active Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdf
 

2014-12-16 defense news - shutdown the hackers

  • 1. Shut  Down  the  Hackers     Presented  with          
  • 2. 50 MINUTES, 3 GOALS (+10MIN Q&A) 1.  Discuss existing & emerging technologies for continuous monitoring - Vulnerability Management - Configuration Management 2.  Share DoD Centralized Super Computing Facility story 3.  Data standardization technologies
  • 3. Reliance  on   Technology  over   Time  
  • 4. Reliance  on   Technology  over   Time   2  units  of  0me   Trivial  consequences   ……  IT  as  helpdesk   ……  IT  as  ancillary  cost  
  • 5. Reliance  on   Technology  over   Time   2  units  of  0me   2  units  of  0me   Severe  consequences  a6er  IT  failure   ……  “IT  Guy”  now  “Chief  Architect”   ……  Rise  of  the  CISO   ……  IT  performance  metrics  to  O5/O6+  
  • 6. Ever-Increasing Capability & Complexity FUNCTIONALITY & COMPLEXITY OPERATIONAL RISK Biplane: 0 LOC
  • 7. Ever-Increasing Capability & Complexity FUNCTIONALITY & COMPLEXITY OPERATIONAL RISK Biplane: 0 LOC Lunar Module: 2K LOC
  • 8. Ever-Increasing Capability & Complexity FUNCTIONALITY & COMPLEXITY OPERATIONAL RISK Biplane: 0 LOC Lunar Module: 2K LOC F-35: 9.9M LOC
  • 9.
  • 11.
  • 12. h2p://www.state.gov/documents/organiza0on/ 225886.pdf   “In  April  2013,  AQI’s  leader  Abu  Bakr  al-­‐Baghdadi   declared  the  group  was  opera0ng  in  Syria  and   changed  its  public  name  to  the  Islamic  State  of  Iraq   and  the  Levant(ISIL).”   “On  April  30,  the  U.S.  State  Department  noted  that  private   dona0ons  from  Persian  Gulf  countries  were  "a  major  source  of   funding  for  Sunni  terrorist  groups,  par0cularly...in  Syria,"  calling   the  problem  one  of  the  most  important  counterterrorism  issues   during  the  previous  calendar  year.  Groups  such  as  al-­‐Qaeda's   Syrian  affiliate,  Jabhat  al-­‐Nusra,  and  the  Islamic  State  of  Iraq  and   al-­‐Sham  (ISIS),  previously  known  as  al-­‐Qaeda  in  Iraq,  are  believed   to  be  frequent  recipients  of  some  of  the  hundreds  of  millions  of   dollars  that  wealthy  ci0zens  and  others  in  the  Gulf  peninsula  have   been  dona0ng  during  the  Syrian  conflict.”  
  • 13. 2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey What percent of Electronic Crime events are known or suspected to have been caused by . . . Insider,  28%   Outsider,  72%   Source: 2014 US State of Cybercrime Survey, CSO Magazine (sponsored by Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Price Waterhouse Cooper, April 2014)
  • 14. 2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey Which Electronic Crimes were more costly or damaging to your organization, those perpetrated by . . . Source: 2014 US State of Cybercrime Survey, CSO Magazine (sponsored by Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Price Waterhouse Cooper, April 2014) Insider,  46%   Outsider,  54%  
  • 15. 2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey Source: 2014 US State of Cybercrime Survey, CSO Magazine (sponsored by Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Price Waterhouse Cooper, April 2014) 75%   10%   12%   3%   How  Intrusions  Are  Handled   Internally  (without  legal   ac0on  or  law  enforcement)   Internally  (with  legal  ac0on)   Externally  (no0fying  law   enforcement)   Externally  (filing  a  civil   ac0on)  
  • 16. 2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey Source: 2014 US State of Cybercrime Survey, CSO Magazine (sponsored by Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Price Waterhouse Cooper, April 2014) 75%   10%   12%   3%   How  Intrusions  Are  Handled   Internally   (without  legal   ac0on  or  law   enforcement)   Internally  (with   legal  ac0on)   Top  5  Reasons  Cyber  Crimes   were  not  referred  for  legal  acNon   Damage  level  insufficient  to  warrant   prosecu0on   34%   Lack  of  evidence/not  enough   informa0on  to  prosecute   36%   Could  not  iden0fy  the  individuals   responsible   37%   Nega0ve  publicity   12%   Don’t  know   21%   è  
  • 17.
  • 22. Case  Study:   U.S.  Department  of  Defense   Centralized  Super  Compu0ng  Facility  
  • 23. “Innova0on  Programs”  –  Review  of  ongoing  work  with   NSA’s  Informa0on  Assurance  Directorate  and  NIST  
  • 24.
  • 25. h2p://www.gao.gov/assets/120/110329.pdf   “80%  of  a2acks  leverage   known  vulnerabili0es   and  configura0on   management  sekng   weaknesses”  
  • 26. UNIFIED SYSTEMS -  LOWERING RISK -  Correcting “tunnel vision” -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
  • 27. UNIFIED SYSTEMS -  LOWERING RISK -  Correcting “tunnel vision” -  Using math and statistics to accelerate corrective action -  -  -  -  -  - 
  • 28. UNIFIED SYSTEMS -  LOWERING RISK -  Correcting “tunnel vision” -  Using math and statistics to accelerate corrective action -  Daily risk calculations/priorities -  -  -  -  - 
  • 29. UNIFIED SYSTEMS -  LOWERING RISK -  Correcting “tunnel vision” -  Using math and statistics to accelerate corrective action -  Daily risk calculations/priorities -  Automated business processes (patch distribution, corrective actions, etc) -  … WHILE NOT CHANGING -  Structure of departments or agencies -  Decentralized technology management -  Structure of security program
  • 30. UNIFIED SYSTEMS -  LOWERING RISK -  Correcting “tunnel vision” -  Using math and statistics to accelerate corrective action -  Daily risk calculations/priorities -  Automated business processes (patch distribution, corrective actions, etc) -  … WHILE NOT CHANGING -  Structure of departments or agencies -  Decentralized technology management -  Structure of security program OBSTACLE:    CxO’s  accountable      for  IT  security          BUT        Directly  supervise  only  a      small  %  of  systems  in  use  
  • 31.
  • 32. An SCAP Primer -  Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)
  • 33. An SCAP Primer -  Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) -  Defines standardized formats -  Standardized inputs (e.g. a compliance baseline, status query) -  Standardized outputs (machine readable results) -  NIST 800-117: Guide to Adopting and Using the Security Content Automation Protocol -  NIST 800-126: The Technical Specification for the Security Content Automation Protocol -  NIST IR 7511: Requirements for vendors to attain NIST Validation
  • 34. An SCAP Primer -  Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) -  Defines standardized formats -  Standardized inputs (e.g. a compliance baseline, status query) -  Standardized outputs (machine readable results) -  Provides the DoD enterprise with liberty with regard to product choices -  Avoids vendor lock-in, enables interoperability -  Provides common technical position to vendors, integrators, mission partners -  Federal procurement language requires SCAP support in some cases (e.g. new Common Criteria language)
  • 38. SCAP Security Guide -  ~1.66M lines of code from 80 developers across DoD, IC, Civilian, industry, academia -  NIST Validated tooling (OpenSCAP) -  Upstream for US Gov Enterprise Linux baselines -  STIG: DoD RHEL6 baseline, produced by DISA FSO -  C2S: Intelligence Community “Commercial Cloud” for JWICS -  CSCF: NRO’s Centralized Super Computing Facility (CNSSI 1253 controls) -  CS2: NSA RHEL6 baseline -  US Navy JBoss EAP -  Shipping natively in Enterprise Linux
  • 39.
  • 40.
  • 41.
  • 42.
  • 43.
  • 44.
  • 45.
  • 46.
  • 47.
  • 48.
  • 49.
  • 50. SCAP Deployment: CSCF •  Established September 1985 to provide HPC resources for use by the classified NRT and scientific computing communities •  DS&T was facilitator with SMUG committee of user groups •  WF took over with consolidation of WF to current management •  CSCF is currently located in ADF-E •  Applications support – code optimization, code parallelization, conversion, algorithm development/modification •  O&M support – OS configuration, help desk, backups, disaster recovery, etc
  • 51. SCAP Deployment: CSCF •  CSCF followed the ICD 503 Six steps with standard controls and Cross Domain System (CDS) controls (CDS is approximately equal to MLS) •  Controls were straight forward •  Testing was very problematic •  Testers unfamiliar with Linux, much less MLS. •  Test Output Formatting •  CSCF moving to SCAP with Red Hat using the xml and html outputs to standardize on with Red Hat support
  • 52.
  • 53.
  • 54.
  • 55.
  • 56.
  • 59. Data  Sources   JBoss  Data  Virtualiza0on     Format  consistency   1234567890   123-­‐456-­‐7890   (123)-­‐456-­‐7890   123/456/7890   123,456,7890   [123]-­‐456-­‐7890  
  • 60. Report  1   Report  2   Report  3   Report  4  Data  Consumers   Data  Sources   JBoss  Data  Virtualiza0on     Format  consistency   1234567890   123-­‐456-­‐7890   (123)-­‐456-­‐7890   123/456/7890   123,456,7890   [123]-­‐456-­‐7890  
  • 61. Data     Sources   Hadoop   NoSQL   Cloud  Apps   Data  Warehouse     &  Databases   Mainframe   XML,  CSV   &  Excel  Files   Enterprise   Apps   Siloed  &    Complex  
  • 62. Connect   Compose   Consume   Na0ve  Data  Connec0vity   Standard  based  Data  Provisioning   JDBC,  ODBC,  SOAP,  REST,  OData   JBoss  Data   VirtualizaNon   Data     Sources   Design  Tools   Dashboard   OpNmizaNon   Caching   Security   Metadata   Hadoop   NoSQL   Cloud  Apps   Data  Warehouse     &  Databases   Mainframe   XML,  CSV   &  Excel  Files   Enterprise   Apps   Siloed  &    Complex   Virtualize   Transform   Federate  Unified  Virtual  Database  /  Common  Data  Model   Data  Transforma0ons  
  • 63. Connect   Compose   Consume   BI  Reports  &   Analy0cs   Mobile  Applica0ons   SOA  Applica0ons  &   Portals     ESB,   ETL   Na0ve  Data  Connec0vity   Standard  based  Data  Provisioning   JDBC,  ODBC,  SOAP,  REST,  OData   JBoss  Data   VirtualizaNon  Data     Consumers   Data     Sources   Design  Tools   Dashboard   OpNmizaNon   Caching   Security   Metadata   Hadoop   NoSQL   Cloud  Apps   Data  Warehouse     &  Databases   Mainframe   XML,  CSV   &  Excel  Files   Enterprise   Apps   Siloed  &    Complex   Virtualize   Transform   Federate   Easy,   Real-­‐Cme     InformaCon   Unified  Virtual  Database  /  Common  Data  Model   Data  Transforma0ons  
  • 64.
  • 65.
  • 66. Shawn  Wells   Director,  Innova0on  Programs   Red  Hat  Public  Sector   shawn@redhat.com  ||  443-­‐534-­‐0130