In this on demand webinar, learn how to identify these risks and the steps to keep your enterprise in control over trust. 1. Learn the four certificate and key management threats to your business 2. Hear how criminals are ruining businesses with attacks on certificates 3. Get insights into the five simple steps to prevent your own disaster

1. Four Must Know Certificate
and Key Management
Threats
Prepared for:
Intelligent People
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2. Use of Certificates and Keys in
Enterprise Environments
Certificate Authorities
Server Authentication
Secure Communications
Client-side Server Authentication
Server Authentication
Secure Communications
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3. Certificate and Key Management
Challenges
Certificate Authorities
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4. Downtime Risk
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5. Certificate-based Downtime
Expired Certificate
Application
outage.
Browser error
message.
Application server
certificate expires
Web server
certificate expires
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6. Certificate-based Downtime
Expired Intermediate Root Certificate
Multiple simultaneous
application outages.
Expired
Intermediate Root
Certificates
CA1
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7. Certificate-based Downtime
Trusted Root Certificates Not Updated
Downtime because
new certs from CA2
are not trusted.
Move to
Trusted Root new CA
Certificates
from CA1
CA1 CA2
New Certificates
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from CA2
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8. Certificate-based Causes of Downtime
• Scenarios
– Certificate expires
– Intermediate root certificate expires
– Root certificates not updated
• Causes
1. No inventory certificates to track expiration
2. Correct administrators NOT notified of impending
expiration
3. Administrators notified but don’t not take action
4. Certificates renewed but not installed
5. Certificates installed but applications not restarted
6. No tracking or management of intermediate root
7. No tracking or management of trusted roots
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9. Security Risks
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10. The Threat is Evolving
Stuxnet CA Compromises Adobe
Duqu Flame Buster
Attackers stole private Attackers Attackers exploited
keys from two compromise or dupe MD5 to create a face
Taiwanese companies certificate authorities Microsoft CA
and Adobe to sign to issue fraudulent certificate and then
code. certificates for further sign code.
attacks.
Hackers are increasingly targeting public key infrastructure
for attacks because it is a broadly used security mechanism.
Poor certificate management practices
put you at risk.
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11. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
The Foundation of Digital Certificates
Root
CA
Issuing CA
Certificate
Issuing
CACA
Registration CRL
Authority
CRL
OCSP
Responder
End Entity
Certificate CRL
Distribution
Subject Point
Root
Relying Certificate
Party
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12. Private Key Compromise
Risk
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13. Putting Private Keys at Risk
Same password
used on multiple
keystores.
Private keys and Keystore 2
passwords are not Password = abc123
changed when admins Keystore
leave the organization passwords are not
changed regularly.
Keystore 1
Password = abc123
Server
Server
Performance Monitoring
Customer Experience Monitoring Admins manually
manage private keys,
Security Monitoring making it possible to
copy them.
Private keys are
manually passed to
other groups/admins
for distribution.
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14. CA Compromise Risk
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15. Recent Public Certificate Authority &
Fraudulent Certificate Incidents
Year Incidents
• VeriSign issues Microsoft Corporation code signing certificate to a
2001 non-Microsoft employee.
• Thawte issues certificate for Live.com to non-Microsoft employee
2008 • Comodo issues mozilla.org certificate to Startcom
• Organization forges VeriSign RapidSSL certificates
• Comodo issues nine counterfeit certificates (Google, Yahoo, Live,
etc.) when registration authority is compromised.
• StartSSL CA compromised
2011 • DigiNotar compromised. 531 fraudulent certificates issued. Dutch
government experiences major service outages.
• Boeing CA compromised
2013 • Microsoft CA certificates forged by exploiting MD5 (Flame)
2013 • Buster: DigiCert issues code signing certificate to bogus company
* Electronic Freedom Foundation uncovers many more unpublicized CA
incidents by analyzing CRLs from public CAs
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16. NIST Alert on CA Compromise
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistbul/july-2013_itl-bulletin.pdf
These recent attacks on CAs make it imperative that organizations ensure they
are using secure CAs and are prepared to respond to a CA compromise or
issuance of a fraudulent certificates.
- NIST, July 2013
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17. Using Fraudulent Certificates:
A Two-Phased Attack
Use the
Get fraudulent
fraudulent certificate(s)
certificate(s). for nefarious
purposes.
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18. CA Compromise and
Fraudulent Certificate Scenarios
CA Key Theft: Stolen or
derived copy of CA private
D key is used to issue
fraudulent certificates.
CA System
Compromise:
Malware or other
infiltration used to get
fraudulent certificate
signed by CA
RA Compromise: CA
(without getting copy
Infiltrate RA or steal
of CA private key).
credentials and authorize
fraudulent certificates. B C
Impersonation:
Trick RA into issuing RA
a fraudulent
certificate. A
Subject
Hacker
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19. Man-in-the-Middle
Subject: Alice.com Subject: Alice.com
Issuer: CAx Issuer: CA1
Public Key: Public Key:
Fraudulent
Alice.com Alice.com
Certificate
Certificate
Eve’s
Alice.com
Private Key
Private Key
Eve
Bob is redirected
thru Eve’s server
and presented with
the fraudulent
certificate. Eve can Bob normally connects to
view all encrypted Alice.com directly and
data. verifies the authenticity of
the server using its
certificate
Bob
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20. Impersonation
Subject: Bob
Alice.com
Issuer: CA1
Public Key: Bob authenticates
to Alice.com using
his certificate
Eve authenticates as
Bob’s Bob to Alice.com Subject: Bob
Certificate using the fraudulent Issuer: CAx
Bob certificate
Public Key:
Bob’s
Private Key
Eve Fraudulent
Certificate
Eve’s
Private Key
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21. Forge Digital Signatures
Bob digitally signs
documents
Subject: Bob
authorizing fund
Issuer: CA1 transfers
Alice
Public Key:
Eve is able to forge
Bob’s Bob’s signature
Subject: Bob
using the fraudulent
Certificate certificate Issuer: CAx
Bob Public Key:
Bob’s
Private Key
Eve Fraudulent
Certificate
Eve’s
Private Key
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22. Fallout from a CA Compromise
All Certificates must be Replaced
All certificates from
compromised CA
must be replaced.
Must
move to
new CA
CA1 CA2
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23. Weak Algorithm Risk
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24. Flame and MD5
Attack on Microsoft
1 2 3 4
Microsoft Services Fake Code Information
Impersonated Compromised Signing Stolen
• Focused on • Microsoft • Code was signed • Malware stole
MD5 Certificate Licensing using the fake, small parts of
• Certificate was Services remanufactured files
remanufactured Compromised certificate • Information was
using well‐ • Microsoft • Windows sent to 80
known attack Update Services allowed the different URLs
• Man‐in‐the‐ Compromised malware to • Once analyzed,
middle was • Machines still spread quickly instructed to
setup thought they and run return and get
• Targeted were working interesting files
machines securely with
detected no Microsoft
difference
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25. Are Your Doors Open?
• Nearly 1 in 5 certificates relies on outdated, “hackable” MD5 algorithm
• Not a hypothetical risk
• Security doors are open today
• IDS, IPS, AV, firewalls do not close these doors (appears as authentic)
• Legal and risk management departments are mandating that MD5 certs be
removed
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26. Summary
• Your organization uses certificates broadly
for SSL/TLS today…and use is growing
• Attackers are increasingly targeting
certificates and PKI (non-hypothetical risk)
• Risks include:
– Downtime
– Private key compromise
– CA compromise
– Algorithm breakage
• Lack of certificate and key management
puts your organization at risk
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27. Next Steps
• Attend the second half of this
webinar series:
“5 Must Haves to Prevent Today’s Presentation
Encryption Disasters”
Feb 20, 10am EST, 7am PST, 3pm GMT
• Download NIST’s ITL Bulletin:
“Preparing for and Responding
to CA Compromise” NIST ITL Bulletin
www.venafi.com/NIST
• Questions?
– Paul Turner
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info@venafi.com
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28. ? ? ?
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Discussion
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29. Unpublished Work of Venafi, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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