EMPA - Protection and Relief Abroad Crisis Support Teams in the Arab Spring

Protection and Relief Abroad Crisis Support Teams in the “Arab Spring“
2014-08-15
Author: Wolfgang Pusztai
On 17 December 2010, around midday, a young grocer, desperate because of frequent harassment by administration and police and a hopeless social
situation, was seen pouring petrol over his body and setting himself on fire in front of the governor’s office in the Central-Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid.
The self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi was the trigger for the events that are known today as “Arab Spring”. After that, the country was gradually
taken in by a wave of strikes, demonstrations and riots, despite all efforts of long-term President Ben Ali to pacify the masses. However, it was too late.
By the time of Bouazizi’s agonising death in a Tunis hospital on 4 January 2011, the revolution was already in full swing.
Immediately before the incident in Sidi Bouzid, the competent Austrian defence attaché (DA) - based in Rome/Italy and also accredited for Greece,
Libya and Tunisia - was staying in Libya in order to update the crisis strategies of the Austrian Embassy, together with other key embassy personnel, in
the event that massive riots broke out. In so doing, the DA thoroughly informed Austrian enterprises based in Tripolitania and the Cyrenaica about the
strategies and supported them in carrying out their own measures.
On these last days of autumn 2010, the situation in North-Africa seemed calm, at least on the surface.
Crisis Strategy of the Austrian Embassy in Tripoli
The crisis strategies of the Austrian Embassies are drawn up in preparation for all kinds of crises and are meant to support crisis management. The
crisis strategy of the Austrian Embassy in Tripoli in the event of riots contains catalogues of measures but also possible causes for outbreak as well as
emergency equipment and supplies and detailed plans in case any evacuations should be necessary. The alarm system comprised various alarm circuits
that spanned the whole country. Secure “close assembly points“, far-away “remote assembly points, and “evacuation points” were explored and
determined in cooperation with the Austrian enterprises on site. The basic documents also contained important data on the country’s infrastructure (e.g.
airports and ports).
Austrian Crisis Support Team
The Austrian Crisis Support System was established in 2004. Its teams are to optimise the embassies’ preparation for crises and to support them as
required. They comprise personnel from the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (Foreign Ministry), having the overall
command, the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports (MoDS) and the Federal Ministry of the Interior. For better protection in crisis-inflicted countries
all members of the Austrian Crisis Support Team are assigned to the respective embassies for the duration of their mission and equipped with
diplomatic passports. Once the mission is completed, the passports are returned to the Foreign Ministry.
Start of the Arab Spring: Revolution in Tunisia
The death of Mohammed Bouazizi has the situation escalate. President Ben Ali, in turn, tries to quell the riots forcefully with the help of police and
National Guard. The latter proving insufficient, he orders the armed forces to intervene. However, from the morning of 12 January 2011 on, when the
Chief of Defence Staff refuses to obey direct orders of the President to crack down on demonstrators, Ben Ali’s escape is only a question of days. When
demonstrators approach the presidential palace in Carthage on the evening of 14 January, he takes a plane to flee the country.
Triggers of the Austrian Crisis Support Team’s First Mission
Upon the president’s escape, police and National Guard dissolve, and the situation gets almost completely out of hand. Thus, senior officials from the
Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defence and Sports, and the Ministry of the Interior decided at one of their regular three-party meetings, which took
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place on 15 January, to propose to political leaders that a Crisis Support Team be sent to Tunisia to support the understaffed Austrian Embassy. This
mission represented the first “live” operation within the Crisis Support Team concept. Mission content: “Support of the Austrian Embassy Tunis during
the period of political change.” The team members immediately got in contact with one another and prepared for deployment under the supervision of
Ambassador Mag. Roland Hauser, head of the Foreign Ministry’s Security Division, who possesses wide experience in matters concerning Africa. Only
few other states were able to react with similar quickness.
The DA arrived as early as on the following day in Tunis and started to investigate the security situation in the relevant regions. This included
observations of how combat actions were developing in and around the presidential palace, where the remaining parts of the presidential guard and
special units of the Army were engaged in heavy fighting. After that, close and remote assembly points (with helicopter landing sites), the evacuation
point as well as evacuation possibilities were investigated or examined, respectively.
Although most of the Crisis Support Team personnel had arrived on 16 January, after coping with some border problems related to the equipment they
were carrying, they were held up at the airport because of the curfew being in force at the time. The team had to spend the night in the baggage claim
area, delaying their arrival at the Embassy until the morning of the next day.
The Crisis Support Team now included personnel from the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of the Interior and the Armed Forces Intelligence Agency as
well as the DA in a double function (member of both embassy and Crisis Support Team).
Crisis Support Team - Activities and Direction
The on-site overall direction rested with the Austrian ambassador, Dr. Johann Fröhlich, who also took charge of political assessment and coverage.
Major tasks of the Crisis Support Team personnel from the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior included supporting Austrians on site,
processing consular cases, networking with other embassies and security authorities as well as supporting Austrians willing to exit the country,
particularly at Tunis Airport. All in all, approximately 120 to 150 Austrians (and employees of Austrian firms) were supported with their departure.
(Major) Tasks of the DA comprised:
- information gathering and -analysis (especially important were contacts to certain locals, other relevant European, North-American, and African
embassies as well as to Austrian expats in the Austrian Embassy’s network);
- in-person investigation of the security situation around the own facilities as well as hotspots (e.g. the area around the presidential palace and the
centre of Tunis);
- situation display;
- analysis and assessment of the further development (with a very high “accuracy of fire”);
- counselling of the Austrian Ambassador;
- contributions to the daily report of the Crisis Support Team as well as writing own in-depth reports.
All these activities together resulted in a 0600-0200 working day throughout the whole operation.
The Crisis Support Team was accommodated in a hotel near the airport, in safe surroundings, away from the main communication routes, and right
between the Austrian Embassy and the residential area of most embassy employees.
Further Development of the Situation
The following days were marked by continuing demonstrations against the interim government, heavy fighting in places between the presidential
guard and the special units of the Army as well as pillages in some areas. Since the police did not dare patrol the streets fearing possible acts of
revenge, special militia units were formed in many residential areas to protect people against looters, who also chased loyalists.
However, the Army was soon able to end the fighting and to stabilise the security situation. Depending on the source, the death toll of this bloody
revolution was estimated at 300 to 600. Approximately 2,000 to 4,000 people were wounded in this country counting 10.8 million inhabitants. By
comparison, the revolution in Egypt claimed 800 to 1,500 fatal victims, however, measured against 84 million inhabitants.
The Crisis Support Team was able to complete its operation, which had been extraordinarily well coordinated. The three ministries had cooperated
professionally, reliably, and without any problems. In internal meetings priorities were set, information, perceptions and estimates exchanged, and the
necessary steps taken. This kind of working together, also marked by a great deal of comradeship, proved essential for mission completion.
Libya Explodes
In view of the events in Tunisia, the Libyan revolutionary leader Muammar al–Gaddafi, who had been in power since 1969, showed increasing
nervousness. First smaller demonstrations in Benghazi entailed threats and promises on his part.
This situation, requiring particularly thorough observation, resulted in the DA keeping very close contact both with various partners in Libya and the
Austrian ambassador, Mag.
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Dorothea Auer. According to an increasing amount of sources a “day of wrath” was to be held on 17 February throughout the country.
The Austrian Embassy in Tripoli is a small embassy consisting of four Austrians and the Foreign Trade Office of the Austrian Chamber of Commerce,
headed at the time by Mag. David Bachmann.
When there were obvious signs of riots breaking out, the DA travelled to Libya once more in order to contribute to a final update of the crisis strategy
and to make preparations for the imminent crisis. This included intensified information gathering on site. Talks with important partners abroad
revealed that no one was expecting a considerable escalation of the situation. Neither did the regime.
However, first signs that riots of a larger scope were looming became visible as early as on 14 and 15 February.
After several further talks with Austrian companies concerning conduct in the event of disturbances, the DA returned to Rome on the afternoon of 16
February, certain that the Austrian Embassy was excellently prepared for the crisis. From there a better operational handling of the situation was
possible for various reasons, in particular to support the necessary decisions in Vienna. The operational picture for the Austrian Embassy and the
Ministry of Defence was ensured in detail from the Rome office, and support on a tactical level was not necessary for the time being.
On the evening of the same day, the first demonstrations and heavy riots took place in Benghazi and Derna. The following were estimated by the DA as
observable criteria for the regime’s incapability of controlling the crisis:
- no end of the riots and fighting within three days (which up to then had normally been the case)- no signs of the regime taking control on the evening
of 19 February;
- spread of the fightings beyond the starting point – from 17 February several towns of the Cyrenaica were affected by disturbances;
- riots spread to other regions of the country – from 18 February, fightings also begin to affect western regions (at first, Misratah and Zintan), from 20
February, they also spread to the Fezzan region (Awbari, to begin with);
- from 19 February, the capital, Tripoli, is swept by riots.
On 19 February, all these criteria were met. Thus, it was evident that the regime would not be able to control the situation very soon. Consequently,
the decision was taken in Vienna in the afternoon to deploy a Crisis Support Team to Tripoli. In addition, the transfer of a C-130K transport aircraft of
the Austrian Armed Forces to Malta was decided in order to reduce reaction times. Upon the DA’s arrival on 21st February, it became clear that the
situation in the city had changed within a few days. On the main roads numerous checkpoints had been established. Some parts of the city were
cluttered with burnt-out car wrecks, many shops barricaded with wooden boards. Several houses showed traces of riots and fighting, and in some
streets battles were taking place. Helicopters were circling above the city. Other helicopters were used for deploying reinforcements to Zawiyah,
farther in the west, where heavy fighting was going on. Parts of 32nd Brigade, led by Gaddafi’s son Khamis, a modern equipped mechanised elite unit,
were deployed to Cyrenaica with strategic transport aircraft, resulting, however, in their being worn down to a great extent.
As an immediate measure the DA himself investigated the hotspots (e.g. Green Square, where demonstrations were dissolved by means of firearms,
and Souk al-Jouma, an emerging rebel stronghold). Information gathering and -exchange contributed to a more detailed operational picture, confirming
the assessment of the expected development.
In the afternoon, Crisis Support Team elements from the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior arrived at the airport and, without any delay,
took up their task of giving support to Austrians on site. The situation at Tripoli Airport, soon to be beleaguered by ten thousands eager to exit the
country, was becoming unbearable. Although, the provision of overflight and landing permits proved difficult, they could be finally obtained owing to
Mag. Bachmann’s perseverance. Thus, despite Austrian Airlines having grounded flights to Tripoli, 62 Austrian and EU-citizens could be flown out of the
country on the evening of 21 February with the C-130K of the Austrian Armed Forces. However, a deployment of the Austrian Crisis Support Team to
the city was not possible for the time being.
In the late afternoon it became clear that, due to the increasingly dangerous situation, the embassy personnel would not be able to return home. So it
was decided that both the embassy personnel and the Crisis Support Team check in at the hotel that had been earmarked for the latter.
During a meeting at the embassy’s room held in accordance with all safety measures (light protection), an ambush was initiated against a motorised
patrol unit of 32nd Brigade directly in front of the hotel. What ensued was a heavy gun fight around, and later, in the hotel, by which several rooms
were affected. Around 2330 hours the situation calmed down again.
After tensions on the road from the airport to the city had eased, the elements of the Conflict Support Team already on site reached the hotel in the
morning of 22 February. The rest of the Team arrived at the airport in the afternoon of the same day.
Conflict Support Team Libya
Structure and Command
The Conflict Support Team comprised eleven personnel and is structured as follows:
- Foreign Ministry personnel (especially to reinforce the consular area);
- Personnel from the Ministry of the Interior (four officers of the “Cobra” Task Force, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Haider, for
ensuring the protection of the embassy building and Austrian Embassy personnel, for carrying out reconnaissance as well as support duties at the
airport);
- Austrian Strategic Intelligence Agency personnel;
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- Joint Forces Command personnel as well as personnel from the MoDS division responsible for Conflict Support Teams (for keeping the situation map,
carrying out support duties at the airport as well as special reconnaissance);
- and the DA (again in a double function as a member of the embassy and head of the MoDS elements of the Conflict Support Team).
The overall command on site rested with the Austrian Ambassador. All crucial decisions were, on the basis of intensive discussion, taken on site by the
highest-ranking representatives of the individual ministries (i.e. Austrian Embassy, DA, and the Task Force commander), partly after direct consultation
with the respective ministerial representatives in the three-party meetings, who are in charge of the Conflict Support Team nationally.
Coordination of “staff work” was ensured by the DA. A joint report was sent daily to the three ministries via the secure communication system of the
MoDS.
Information Gathering and Assessment of the Situation
Information gathering, the crucial factor in decision making, was mainly carried out on site by the DA himself, but also via the ambassador, Strategic
Intelligence Agency personnel as well as Austrian expats and their companies, respectively.
The most important contacts of the DA were:
- various Libyans , important European, North-American as well as a few African and Asian embassies;
- the Italian operational command COI (with the permanent liaison cell of several NATO countries; the DA Italy is also the liaison officer to the COI), and
diverse Italian warships off the coast (including an aircraft carrier);
- military elements of other western states in Libya and at the country’s borders;
- the multinational NEOCC (Non-combatant Evacuation Operations Coordination Center, after its activation in Malta on 24 February);
- a few very high-ranking officers in African neighbouring states.
In crisis scenarios of this kind information exchange only functions on a “give and take basis”. Since time is extremely valuable, only those who have
something to share are contacted. The Austrian Embassy had very much to share: it (the DA, respectively) was permanently contacted, thereby
increasingly turning into a key information point.
Despite the difficult and confusing situation a relatively exact operational picture was available, allowing, after thorough analysis, the anticipatory
assessment of further developments with a very high “accuracy of fire”. Thus, the measures taken by the team were always one step ahead of the
events unfolding.
Conflict Support Team at Work
Meanwhile, fighting had almost spread over the whole country. The flow of refugees – several hundred thousands African and Asian guest workers –
headed for Tunisia and Egypt, blocking the few border crossings.
Early in the evening of 22 February, the increasingly tense security situation around the embassy led to the decision to relocate the Austrian Embassy
to the ambassador’s residence. Despite a careful choice of route the convoy partly got caught in demonstrations in the area of the city limits.
Soon, the ambassador’s elegant residence resembled an army camp. At times, more than a dozen additional people were accommodated there. The
dining room was transformed into a situation- and meeting room. The parlour became a communication centre for keeping in contact with the Austrian
expats, headed by Vice Consul Mag. Wolfgang Gröblacher, and the TV-room was used for meetings of the three most senior ministerial representatives.
The surroundings were, for the most part, observed from the roof terrace of the residence. In addition, huge stocks of pasta, tomato sauce and drinking
water were created, as the (emergency) supplies available at the residence did not suffice for so many people over several days.
With the regime trying to hamper communication among the rebels, mobile networks had stopped functioning. Certain SATCOM networks were also
affected. Only one of the three different systems used by the Conflict Support Team was functioning properly.
At night occasional fightings took place in the vicinity of the residence. Due to the situation at the airport, which by this time had turned into complete
chaos, it was decided on 23 February to evacuate people from Tripolitania and the Cyrenaica by land. However, the C-130K remained in Malta for
possible flights to other parts of the country but also as a backup for the Conflict Support Team itself.
Subsequently, convoys were assembled in all parts of the country, which were directed from Tripoli according to the respective security situation. With
chaos prevailing on the Egyptian border, more serious difficulties were to be expected there. Nevertheless, the Austrian convoy was able to enter the
country without any problems, owing to a high-ranking Egyptian officer, who was a former course comrade of the DA.
In the morning of 24 February, a first convoy, led by two officers of the Task Force and accompanied by two officers from the Austrian Armed Forces,
received a movement order from Tripoli to Tunisia. Command was assigned to the Task Force, due to the officers’ negotiation skills, which might be
necessary under way.
At the same time, the exchange and matching, respectively, of name lists with other countries (later also with the NEOCC) was beginning to prove
successful. In this way, British and Italian aircraft were able to pick up individual Austrians from remote Saharan locations. Others were evacuated from
Misratah and the Cyrenaica by Italian warships.
Although the evacuation of Austrian companies with a bigger number of staff from other than EU countries proved difficult, the Austrian Embassy did
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everything to support them. Finally, none of the companies left any non-Libyan employees eager to exit the country behind. In individual cases big
firms in eastern and southern regions of the country were able to fly staff out with their own aircraft.
Measures Taken by Other Countries
During the following days, numerous teams similar to the Conflict Support Team from other countries arrived in Tripoli, more or less prepared, and the
abovementioned NEOCC began its work.
The United States evacuated most of its citizens by means of a chartered vessel via the port of Tripoli. Germany, France and Italy employed military and
civilian transport aircraft that headed for different airports in the country. Italy also used a few warships for landing operations as well as one destroyer
for picking up their own and EU citizens.
During the evacuations several incidents occurred. For example, on 27 February a Dutch marine helicopter was confiscated, the crew of three arrested,
and only released on 11 March upon the intervention of Greece: the helicopter had been sent from the frigate HNLMS Tromp, off the Libyan coast, to
collect a Dutch and a Swedish citizen near Sirte in the middle of the night, without the Libyan authorities being informed.
Similarly, the military transport aircraft of a western country, which had entered Libyan airspace without permit in order to pick up foreigners from
Tripoli, was captured and only released upon payment of a six-digit ransom. During the whole period of evacuation, this was the only unauthorised
entry of a transport aircraft into Libya.
A British team comprising seven SAS soldiers and an officer from a security service were captured by rebels near Benghazi on 4 March, and only
released on the following day. The team had landed at night and without prior consultation in order to contact the rebel leaders.
Evacuation of the Austrian Embassy
By the evening of 24 February, almost all Austrians eager to leave Tripolitania had been either evacuated or reunited in Tripoli.
The situation was now becoming increasingly tense, even in the vicinity of the ambassador’s residence and on the routes to Tunisia. In the remaining
suburbs of the capital occasional fightings occurred. At Zawiyah, which by this time had been conquered by the rebels, a counter offensive of
government troops was in the offing. Likewise, the Berber town Zuwarah, close to the border, was controlled by the rebels. Here, too, a counter strike
of government troops was imminent.
As the remaining Austrians in the Fezzan region and the Cyrenaica did not necessarily have to be directed or, respectively, supported from Tripoli (the
individual departures and evacuations had already been organised), it was decided to evacuate the personnel of the Austrian Embassy together with the
last Austrians willing to depart.
Thus, the escort team of the first convoy received orders to establish a new “surrogate command post” in Zarzis, Tunisia (with the support of the crisis-
tested team of the Austrian Embassy Tunis). The team took command of the remaining Austrians in the Fezzan region and the Cyrenaica from the
moment the Austrian Embassy was moved, since no viable SATCOM “on the move” was available.
In the evening, the remainder of Austrians willing to depart as well as several other EU citizens at the residence were united at the embassy secretary’s
house in order to ensure a speedy departure on the following day. The DA conducted a detailed check of the security situation on the chosen route.
To be able to leave the city at the most quiet time of the day, the group departed even before sunrise. However, the journey almost came to an end at
a checkpoint of the, by now, notorious 32nd Brigade at a short distance from Tripoli. Not able to produce the required documents (which was only
logical), the convoy was instructed to return to the city. However, owing to the negotiating skills of the convoy leader Lieutenant Colonel Haider and his
local interpreter, they were able to continue their journey after a longer delay. In order to avoid any further problems, the Austrian convoy was even
announced to the army checkpoints ahead.
Yet, more difficulties arose only after a few kilometres. Due to the impending counter offensive of government troops in Zawiyah, the main road was
blocked. By means of GPS navigation the DA skilfully led the convoy past combat zones, sometimes directly passing behind the government's battle
tanks being in fire position.
After having passed all in all 26 checkpoints of government troops and rebels, mostly without any problems, the convoy reached the Tunisian border at
1040 hours.
There, an Austrian’s offence involving his passport led to more difficulties. Whereas Swiss citizen Max Göldi was held prisoner in Libya for almost two
years because of a similar offence, the ambassador’s negotiating skills resulted in the Austrian’s being finally permitted to enter Tunisia.
Briefly afterwards, the message about the Austrians’ successful departure from Libya was sent to Vienna and crowds of journalists beleaguered the
Austrians to get an update on the situation in Libya.
After a short delay, the convoy continued its journey to Zarzis, where the team took the “surrogate command post” set up by the escort team of the first
convoy.
From the next day, the Austrian Armed Forces and Task Force teams carried out reconnaissance and human intelligence activities along the two border
crossings as well as the Saharan border to consolidate the operational picture. After the last, approximately 250 Austrians had been evacuated from the
southern parts of the country by way of international cooperation; the Conflict Support Team’s mission could be ended at the beginning of March. The
surrogate embassy was established in Djerba, in best international and Libyan “company”, and stayed there during the following months.
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Lessons Learnt
The three most important lessons from the two successful Conflict Support Team missions in Tunisia and Libya are:
Thorough preparation is the basis for success.
Information procurement, analysis and a correct assessment of the further development are the prerequisites for correct decisions. These tasks can only
be carried out on the basis of adequate training, a sound knowledge of the country as well a solid information network.
Aptitude of character is especially important for becoming a team member. The Conflict Support Team is not a place for attention seekers, egoists or
narrow-minded people. What is needed are team players with adequate language and negotiating skills as well as cultural awareness.
Conclusion
The DA’s farewell to the war zone did not last for long. After a couple of weeks, he returned to the region.
After Tripoli had fallen into the rebels’ hands at the end of August, once more a Conflict Support Team was deployed to reconnoitre the security
situation and prepare the re-opening of the Austrian Embassy.
Author: Col (GS) Mag. Wolfgang Pusztai, born 1964, enlisted 1983, one-year-volunteer training 1983/84 Infantry/HQ Commandos; after the Theresan
Military Academy (1987), platoon commander and deputy commander of an engineer training company at the Militia Training Regiment 11; from 1990
commander of an infantry training company at the Militia Training Regiment 11; completion of the 14th General Staff Course and award of the academic
degree “Magister”(1993-1997); from 1997 employments in the MoD Regulations Division as G3 and head of operational staff at the Provincial Military
Command Burgenland, at the I. Corps, and the MoD General Staff Division B; from 2003 head and, later, deputy head of the Military Policy Division as
well as deputy head of the MoD Force Development Division. Foreign missions/employments as a Staff Officer J5/9 (CJTF) RHQ AFSOUTH, J2 EU
Command Element/Operation Concordia (FYROM), Chief of Staff/MNTF(N)EUFOR/BiH, National War College/National Defense University, Washington
D.C., USA (2006/07, Master of Science in National Security Strategy, Distinguished Graduate). From the end of 2007, defence attaché in Italy, Greece,
Tunisia and Libya as well as liaison officer to the COI (Italian Operational Command). 2011 Head of the Conflict Support Teams of the MoDS in Tunisia
and Libya. From August 2012 deputy head of the Plans and Policy Division/MoDS. From July 2013 entrusted with heading the Plans and Policy
Division/MoDS.
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