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Stormy Weather
A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007
  q

Raimund Genes, Anthony Arrott, and David Sancho
Trend Micro




VB2008 - Ottawa                 October 2008
Stormy Weather
  A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007



 Storm activity by country of IP source




VB2008 - Ottawa   October 2008   2                 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
Stormy Weather
  A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007



 How does Storm infect computers?
 •       Users open executable email attachments
         (e.g. ‘Full Story.exe’)

         or

 •       Users visit infected websites
         (e.g. ‘click_for_full_story’)


 •       Either way, user click results in becoming a remotely-controlled
         botnet zombie




VB2008 - Ottawa   October 2008   3                 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
Stormy Weather
  A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007



 What does Storm do to make money for its perpetrators?

 •       ‘Botnets for rent’ in underground economy

 •       Rented botnets used:
         –        as spam engines
         –        in denial of service attacks

 •       Sell mined zombie data (e.g. address book contents)




VB2008 - Ottawa      October 2008   4              Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
Stormy Weather
  A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007



 How does Storm protect itself from detection & removal?
 •       Infects host zombies with rootkits

 •       Provides periodic updates of malware code

 •       Botnets configured
         –        decentralized control
         –        rotating activation
         –        enhanced encryption
                           encr ption
         –        frequent code replacement




VB2008 - Ottawa      October 2008   5              Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
Stormy Weather
  A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007



 Storm outbreaks in 2007
         – 17 Jan 07 – “European Storm” Spam
         – 12 Apr 07 – “Worm Alert” Spam
         – 27 Jun 07 – “E-card” (applet.exe)
         – 4 July 07 – “231st B-day”
         – 2 Sep 07 – “Labor Day” (labor.exe)
         – 5 Sep 07 – “Tor Proxy”
                       Tor Proxy
         – 10 Sep 07 – “NFL Tracker”
         – 17 S 07 – “A d G
              Sep    “Arcade Games”
                                  ”

                                                       Adopted from: Porras Saidi & Yagneswaran
                                                                     Porras,


VB2008 - Ottawa   October 2008   6                 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
Stormy Weather
  A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007




                  spam




VB2008 - Ottawa   October 2008   7                 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
Stormy Weather
  A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007




                                                                                       source: Trend Micro


VB2008 - Ottawa   October 2008   8                 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
Stormy Weather
  A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007




                                                             spam volume




VB2008 - Ottawa   October 2008   9                 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
Stormy Weather
  A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007




VB2008 - Ottawa   October 2008   10                Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
Stormy Weather
  A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007




                                                                                       ?

VB2008 - Ottawa   October 2008   11                Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
Thank you




VB2008 - Ottawa   October 2008

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Stormy Weather

  • 1. Stormy Weather A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007 q Raimund Genes, Anthony Arrott, and David Sancho Trend Micro VB2008 - Ottawa October 2008
  • 2. Stormy Weather A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007 Storm activity by country of IP source VB2008 - Ottawa October 2008 2 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
  • 3. Stormy Weather A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007 How does Storm infect computers? • Users open executable email attachments (e.g. ‘Full Story.exe’) or • Users visit infected websites (e.g. ‘click_for_full_story’) • Either way, user click results in becoming a remotely-controlled botnet zombie VB2008 - Ottawa October 2008 3 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
  • 4. Stormy Weather A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007 What does Storm do to make money for its perpetrators? • ‘Botnets for rent’ in underground economy • Rented botnets used: – as spam engines – in denial of service attacks • Sell mined zombie data (e.g. address book contents) VB2008 - Ottawa October 2008 4 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
  • 5. Stormy Weather A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007 How does Storm protect itself from detection & removal? • Infects host zombies with rootkits • Provides periodic updates of malware code • Botnets configured – decentralized control – rotating activation – enhanced encryption encr ption – frequent code replacement VB2008 - Ottawa October 2008 5 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
  • 6. Stormy Weather A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007 Storm outbreaks in 2007 – 17 Jan 07 – “European Storm” Spam – 12 Apr 07 – “Worm Alert” Spam – 27 Jun 07 – “E-card” (applet.exe) – 4 July 07 – “231st B-day” – 2 Sep 07 – “Labor Day” (labor.exe) – 5 Sep 07 – “Tor Proxy” Tor Proxy – 10 Sep 07 – “NFL Tracker” – 17 S 07 – “A d G Sep “Arcade Games” ” Adopted from: Porras Saidi & Yagneswaran Porras, VB2008 - Ottawa October 2008 6 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
  • 7. Stormy Weather A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007 spam VB2008 - Ottawa October 2008 7 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
  • 8. Stormy Weather A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007 source: Trend Micro VB2008 - Ottawa October 2008 8 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
  • 9. Stormy Weather A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007 spam volume VB2008 - Ottawa October 2008 9 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
  • 10. Stormy Weather A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007 VB2008 - Ottawa October 2008 10 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
  • 11. Stormy Weather A quantitative assessment of the Storm web threat in 2007 ? VB2008 - Ottawa October 2008 11 Copyright 2008 - Trend Micro Inc.
  • 12. Thank you VB2008 - Ottawa October 2008