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Traffic Analysis:
Network Flow Watermarking
Amir Houmansadr
CS660: Advanced Information Assurance
Spring 2015
1
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Previously
• Two popular forms of anonymous
communications
– Onion Routing (Tor)
– Mix Networks
• They aim to be low-latency to be used for
interactive application, e.g., web browsing,
IM, VoIP, etc.
Gives birth to attacks
2
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Attacks on anonymity systems
• Traffic analysis attacks
• Intersection attacks
• Fingerprinting attacks
• DoS attacks
• …
3
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Who Wants to Attack Tor?
• Who has the ability to attack Tor?
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
4
• How NSA tries to break Tor
– Tor stinks
5
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Why do they want to break Tor
(or, what do they say?)
6
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
7
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
8
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
9
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
10
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
11
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
12
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
13
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Discussion
• Should privacy-enhancing technologies (e.g.,
Tor) have backdoors for the law-enforcement?
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
14
Traffic Analysis
• Definition: inferring sensitive information
from communication patterns, instead of
traffic contents, no matter if encrypted
• Related fields
– Traffic shaping
– Data mining
15
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Use cases of traffic analysis
• Inferring encrypted data (SSH, VoIP)
• Inferring events
• Linking network flows in low-latency
networking applications
• …
16
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Outline
• Traffic analysis in low-latency scenarios
• Passive traffic analysis
• Active traffic analysis: watermarks
17
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
18
Compromising anonymity
Anonymous network
A
B
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Stepping stone attack
19
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Passive Traffic analysis
• Analyzing network flow patterns by only
Observing traffic:
– Packet counts
– Packet timings
– Packet sizes
– Flow rate
– …
20
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Some literature
 Stepping stone detection
– Character frequencies [Staniford-Chen et al., S&P’95]
– ON/OFF behavior of interactive connections [Zhang et al., SEC’00]
– Correlating inter-packet delays [Wang et al., ESORICS’02]
– Flow-sketches [Coskun et al., ACSAC’09]
 Compromising anonymity
– Analysis of onion routing [Syverson et al., PET’00]
– Freedom and PipeNet [Back et al., IH’01]
– Mix-based systems: [Raymond et al., PET’00], [Danezis et al., PET’04]
21
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Passive Traffic analysis
• Based on inter-packet delays of network flows
[Wang et al., ESORICS’02]
– Min/Max Sum Ratio (MMS)
– Statistical Correlation (STAT)
– Normalized Dot Product (NDP)
22
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Passive Traffic analysis
• ON/OFF behavior of interactive connections
[Zhang et al., SEC’00]
• Based on flow sketches [Coskun et al.,
ACSAC’09]
23
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Issues of passive traffic analysis
• Intrinsic correlation of flows
– High false error rates
– Need long flows for detection
24
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Compromising anonymity
25
Anonymity network
B
A
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Issues of passive traffic analysis
• Intrinsic correlation of flows
– High false error rates
– Need long flows for detection
• Massive computation and communication
– Not scalable: O(n) communication, O(n2) computation
26
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Compromising anonymity
27
Anonymity network
B
A
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Flow watermarks:
Active traffic analysis
28
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Flow watermarking
• Traffic analysis by perturbing network traffic
– Packet timings
– Packet counts
– Packet sizes
– Flow rate
– …
29
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Compromising anonymity
30
Anonymity network
B
A
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Stepping stone detection
31
Enterprise network
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
32
Active Traffic Analysis
Improve detection efficiency (lower false
errors, fewer packets)
O(1) communication and O(n) computation,
instead of O(n) and O(n2)
Faster detection
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Compromising anonymity
33
Anonymity network
B
A
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Watermark features
Detection efficiency
Invisibility
Robustness
Resource efficiency
34
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
35
Inter-Packet Delay vs. Interval-Based
Watermarking
• Interval-Based Watermarking
– Robustness to packet modifications
• IBW[Infocom’07], ICBW[S&P’07], DSSS[S&P’07]
CLEAR LOAD
• Inter-Packet Delay (IPD) watermarking
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
RAINBOW: Robust And Invisible
Non-Blind Watermark
NDSS 2009
With Negar Kiyavash and Nikita Borisov
36
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
37
RAINBOW Scheme
• Insert spread spectrum watermark within Inter-Packet
Delay (IPD) information
– At the watermarker: IPDW= IPD + WM
– At the detector: IPDR - IPD = WM + Jitter
• IPD Database
– Last n packets, removed after connection ends
– Low memory resources for moderate-size enterprises
Watermarker Receiver
Detector
Sender
IPD Database
IPD IPDW
IPD
IPDR
IPD
WM
• Non-Blind watermarking: provide invisibility
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
38
Detection Analysis
• Using the last n samples of IPD
– Y= IPDR - IPD = WM + Jitter
– Normalized correlation
– Detection threshold η
• System parameters:
– a: watermark amplitude
– b: standard deviation of jitter
– represents the SNR
– n: watermark length
• Detection analysis: Hypothesis testing
)
2
)
(
exp(
5
.
0
)
2
exp(
5
.
0 n
FN
n
FP 

 




b
a


Subtraction
IPDR
IPD
Normalized
Correlation
Decision
IPD Database
Watermark
Detector
Y
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
39
System Design
• Cross-Over Error Rate
(COER) versus system
parameters
• Increasing
– Lower error, more visible
• Increasing n
– lower error, slower
detection
• a can be traded for n
• a should be adjusted to
jitter

CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
40
Evaluation
• Devise a selective correlation to compensate for
packet-level modifications
– Sliding window
• Invisibility analyzed using
– Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
– Entropy-based tools of [Gianvecchio, CCS07]
• Performance summary
– Fast detection
– Detection time ≈ 3 min of SSH traffic (400 packets)
– False errors of order 10-6
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Other applications
• Linking flows in low-latency applications
– Stepping stone detection
– Compromising anonymous networks
– Long path attack
– IRC-based botnet detection
– VoIP de-anonymization
– …
41
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
IRC-based botnets
43
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst
Acknowledgement
• Some of the slides, content, or pictures are borrowed from
the following resources, and some pictures are obtained
through Google search without being referenced below:
• Tor stinks
44
CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance -
UMassAmherst

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21-TrafAnal.pptx

  • 1. Traffic Analysis: Network Flow Watermarking Amir Houmansadr CS660: Advanced Information Assurance Spring 2015 1 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 2. Previously • Two popular forms of anonymous communications – Onion Routing (Tor) – Mix Networks • They aim to be low-latency to be used for interactive application, e.g., web browsing, IM, VoIP, etc. Gives birth to attacks 2 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 3. Attacks on anonymity systems • Traffic analysis attacks • Intersection attacks • Fingerprinting attacks • DoS attacks • … 3 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 4. Who Wants to Attack Tor? • Who has the ability to attack Tor? CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst 4
  • 5. • How NSA tries to break Tor – Tor stinks 5 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 6. Why do they want to break Tor (or, what do they say?) 6 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 7. 7 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 8. 8 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 9. 9 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 10. 10 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 11. 11 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 12. 12 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 13. 13 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 14. Discussion • Should privacy-enhancing technologies (e.g., Tor) have backdoors for the law-enforcement? CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst 14
  • 15. Traffic Analysis • Definition: inferring sensitive information from communication patterns, instead of traffic contents, no matter if encrypted • Related fields – Traffic shaping – Data mining 15 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 16. Use cases of traffic analysis • Inferring encrypted data (SSH, VoIP) • Inferring events • Linking network flows in low-latency networking applications • … 16 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 17. Outline • Traffic analysis in low-latency scenarios • Passive traffic analysis • Active traffic analysis: watermarks 17 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 18. 18 Compromising anonymity Anonymous network A B CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 19. Stepping stone attack 19 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 20. Passive Traffic analysis • Analyzing network flow patterns by only Observing traffic: – Packet counts – Packet timings – Packet sizes – Flow rate – … 20 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 21. Some literature  Stepping stone detection – Character frequencies [Staniford-Chen et al., S&P’95] – ON/OFF behavior of interactive connections [Zhang et al., SEC’00] – Correlating inter-packet delays [Wang et al., ESORICS’02] – Flow-sketches [Coskun et al., ACSAC’09]  Compromising anonymity – Analysis of onion routing [Syverson et al., PET’00] – Freedom and PipeNet [Back et al., IH’01] – Mix-based systems: [Raymond et al., PET’00], [Danezis et al., PET’04] 21 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 22. Passive Traffic analysis • Based on inter-packet delays of network flows [Wang et al., ESORICS’02] – Min/Max Sum Ratio (MMS) – Statistical Correlation (STAT) – Normalized Dot Product (NDP) 22 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 23. Passive Traffic analysis • ON/OFF behavior of interactive connections [Zhang et al., SEC’00] • Based on flow sketches [Coskun et al., ACSAC’09] 23 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 24. Issues of passive traffic analysis • Intrinsic correlation of flows – High false error rates – Need long flows for detection 24 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 25. Compromising anonymity 25 Anonymity network B A CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 26. Issues of passive traffic analysis • Intrinsic correlation of flows – High false error rates – Need long flows for detection • Massive computation and communication – Not scalable: O(n) communication, O(n2) computation 26 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 27. Compromising anonymity 27 Anonymity network B A CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 28. Flow watermarks: Active traffic analysis 28 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 29. Flow watermarking • Traffic analysis by perturbing network traffic – Packet timings – Packet counts – Packet sizes – Flow rate – … 29 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 30. Compromising anonymity 30 Anonymity network B A CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 31. Stepping stone detection 31 Enterprise network CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 32. 32 Active Traffic Analysis Improve detection efficiency (lower false errors, fewer packets) O(1) communication and O(n) computation, instead of O(n) and O(n2) Faster detection CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 33. Compromising anonymity 33 Anonymity network B A CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 34. Watermark features Detection efficiency Invisibility Robustness Resource efficiency 34 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 35. 35 Inter-Packet Delay vs. Interval-Based Watermarking • Interval-Based Watermarking – Robustness to packet modifications • IBW[Infocom’07], ICBW[S&P’07], DSSS[S&P’07] CLEAR LOAD • Inter-Packet Delay (IPD) watermarking CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 36. RAINBOW: Robust And Invisible Non-Blind Watermark NDSS 2009 With Negar Kiyavash and Nikita Borisov 36 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 37. 37 RAINBOW Scheme • Insert spread spectrum watermark within Inter-Packet Delay (IPD) information – At the watermarker: IPDW= IPD + WM – At the detector: IPDR - IPD = WM + Jitter • IPD Database – Last n packets, removed after connection ends – Low memory resources for moderate-size enterprises Watermarker Receiver Detector Sender IPD Database IPD IPDW IPD IPDR IPD WM • Non-Blind watermarking: provide invisibility CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 38. 38 Detection Analysis • Using the last n samples of IPD – Y= IPDR - IPD = WM + Jitter – Normalized correlation – Detection threshold η • System parameters: – a: watermark amplitude – b: standard deviation of jitter – represents the SNR – n: watermark length • Detection analysis: Hypothesis testing ) 2 ) ( exp( 5 . 0 ) 2 exp( 5 . 0 n FN n FP         b a   Subtraction IPDR IPD Normalized Correlation Decision IPD Database Watermark Detector Y CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 39. 39 System Design • Cross-Over Error Rate (COER) versus system parameters • Increasing – Lower error, more visible • Increasing n – lower error, slower detection • a can be traded for n • a should be adjusted to jitter  CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 40. 40 Evaluation • Devise a selective correlation to compensate for packet-level modifications – Sliding window • Invisibility analyzed using – Kolmogorov-Smirnov test – Entropy-based tools of [Gianvecchio, CCS07] • Performance summary – Fast detection – Detection time ≈ 3 min of SSH traffic (400 packets) – False errors of order 10-6 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 41. Other applications • Linking flows in low-latency applications – Stepping stone detection – Compromising anonymous networks – Long path attack – IRC-based botnet detection – VoIP de-anonymization – … 41 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 42. IRC-based botnets 43 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst
  • 43. Acknowledgement • Some of the slides, content, or pictures are borrowed from the following resources, and some pictures are obtained through Google search without being referenced below: • Tor stinks 44 CS660 - Advanced Information Assurance - UMassAmherst