Here I describe my previous work analyzing lobster fishery in the Caribbean as a social-ecological systems. Main findings show that dynamic failures lead the system to undesirable states: less and shorter lobsters, less profits and less fishermen. These failures typically fall within subsystems interactions: e.g. losses of lobster reproductive potential, perception of non-resource exhaustion, a poverty trap of fishing effort, and a socially based reinforcing feedback for legitimate norms breaking.

1. Misperception of Feedbacks:
Another Source of Vulnerability
in Social-Ecological Systems
Juan Carlos Rocha
PhD student
Stockholm Resilience Centre
Saturday, March 12, 2011

2. Misperception of
feedbacks
“the tendency that decision makers often
are insensitive to nonlinearities that alter
the strength of feedback loops,
undervalue the importance of delays, and
misperceive the workings of stock and
flow relationships” (Moxnes 1998;
Sterman 2000)
Saturday, March 12, 2011

3. Case study: Lobster fishery in
Providence Island, Colombia
Saturday, March 12, 2011

4. Why Providence is
interesting: the logic of failure
They have made number of
efforts to reach sustainable
fishing.
Atypically uncooperative.
Towards an undesirable regime
where fishery is unsustainable:
less and shorter lobsters, less
profits and less fishermen;
therefore erosion on the
system’s knowledge.
Saturday, March 12, 2011

5. The role of misperception of
feedbacks for natural resource
management
1. Are misperception of
feedbacks undermining
dynamic failures?
2. Are misperceptions of
feedbacks triggering
uncooperative
behavior?
3. What can we do to
tackle misperceptions?
Saturday, March 12, 2011

6. Methods
Data:
Fishing records
Socio- Interviews
Economic
Inequity Experimental
economics - games
-
+
Lobster
Reputation B
Respectability
Literature review
+ fishery
-
SES
Equity
Cultural Biologic
Saturday, March 12, 2011

7. Biological sub-system
• Cohort model
• Reproduction type r =
Each lobster mom can
produce up to 600.000
eggs per period.
• Confers fast recovery
to disturbance - Noise
and 2 yrs delay
• Metapopulation
dynamics matter -
Spatial misperception -
Conflict with “others”.
Lobster population and K Metapopulation dynamics
Saturday, March 12, 2011

8. Socio-Economic: Fishing
Elder adults Adults
• Elder adults and young
lobster decrease in
fishing scenarios while
young and middle age
adults increase
• No giant lobsters
Young Young adults anymore
• Perception of non-
resource exhaustion
• Higher effort than in the
No-fishing - Fishing
past
Saturday, March 12, 2011

9. Socio-Economic: Fishing
Poverty trap of fishing effort.
• Fishers manage more
Birth potential
money but also spend
+
Effort - R and fish more than
+
before.
Lobster
+ population
B
Fishing -
effectiveness B
• Increase in effort and
+ technology use
+
Lobster fished
+ Price
• Price is fixed by the
+
Technology usage + State
(engines & petro) R Gains
+ +
• Weaken balancing
+ B + Demand feedbacks - Information
Operation cost
-
Profitability delay.
Saturday, March 12, 2011

10. Socio-Economic: Fishing
Lobster fished in Tons
Lobster fished in Tons
Lobster population Eggs produced
Base line Lobster numbers or
Maximum effort with noise biomass is not sensitive
Maximum effort without noise enough; egg production is
Twice maximum effort a good resilience surrogate.
How the decisions of fishers in the experimental game can tell us how
the resource will be affected under different institutional settings
Saturday, March 12, 2011

11. Cultural: Institutions and rule breaking
• Institutional
arrangements not only
The effect of institutions on the lobster population
2000000
improve cooperation
Social optima & Low allowance levels.
1500000
Communication, Low monitoring and
• Without rules and norms
Eggs produced
Focalized monitoring
1000000
the system is way too
Base line
close to collapse points.
500000
0
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
• Why are they atypically
Effort in the game uncooperative?
How the decisions of fishers in the experimental game can tell us how
the resource will be affected under different institutional settings
Saturday, March 12, 2011

12. Cultural: Institutions and rule breaking
• Crab antics: a metaphor of
social order.
• Conflict with “others”: role
of external agents =
authorities and industrial
- + fishermen
Reputation R Equity Respectability
R
- +
• Legitimate rule breaking
Wilson 1973
• Erosion of traditional
ecological knowledge and
beliefs system
• The role of drug smuggling
Saturday, March 12, 2011

13. 1. Are misperception of feedbacks
undermining dynamic failures?
Fishermen: Authorities:
Scientists:
Weaken balancing
2yr delay How much
feedbacks and create
information delays metapopulation
Spatial misperception matters?
Rules breaking
Non resource exhaustion Lobster biomass is not
institutions
sensitive enough; eggs
Poverty trap of fishing Erosion of TEK and belief production is a good
effort system resilience surrogate.
Saturday, March 12, 2011

14. 2. Are misperceptions of feedbacks
triggering uncooperative behavior?
Role and power of external
agents
Time gap between rule
implementation and
desired results (2 years)
Industrial fishermen only
fish outside the barrier reef
- Metapopulation dynamics
With todays technology,
artisanal fishermen have
the power to collapse the
lobster stock.
Saturday, March 12, 2011

15. 3. What can we do?
Three tipping points:
Perception of equality among fishermen is driving them
towards social equilibria highly uncooperative.
As fishermen social prestige is low, the social memory
loss remains high with strong implications for innovation
and adaptation.
Monitoring programs based on biomass are not sensitive
enough to resilience losses, inducing on one hand
misperceptions by delayed information, while on the other
closing the window of opportunity for preventive action.
Saturday, March 12, 2011

16. Fishermen
F&FCoop
Thanks! INCODER
Daniel Castillo
Pablo Ramos
Jorge Maldonado
Questions??
e-mail: juan.rocha@stockholmresilience.su.se Juan Camilo
Twitter: @juanrocha Cardenas
Blog: www.criticaltrasitions.worldpress.com
Saturday, March 12, 2011