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Passive vs Active
Measurements in the DNS
Geoff Huston, Joao Damas
APNIC
This is work-in-progress
• So its not clear what the conclusions might be
• But we have noticed a set of not-well-explained behaviours in the
DNS, and we are wondering if the observational behaviour has an
influence on the observed DNS behaviour
Some anomalies
• In previous studies associated with the KSK roll we noticed that the
profile of resolvers and their query volumes seen at root servers had
a very different profile to the resolvers who ask authoritative servers
for “terminal” DNS names
• We see repeat queries at servers that are inconsistent with our
perceptions of how caching by recursive resolver systems should
mitigate queries
Some questions we’d like to ask
• If we actively “plant” a sequence of DNS resolution queries into the
edge, and record the queries we see at the authoritative name server
for the DNS name being queried, then what can this tell us about the
general behaviour of the DNS?
• What proportion of queries are the result of stub resolution questions
and what proportion are the result of the DNS talking to itself (such
as self-triggered cache refresh)
• Why are there query “storms”?
An active observation platform
We might understand the effect better if we controlled the cause
i.e. generate queries in a known context and look at their effect within in the
DNS resolution environment
From the Inside looking Out
Instrument a DNS client
• Use the client to generate various DNS
queries
• Measure the absolute outcomes and the
variance
This needs the ability to either coopt or
manufacture a collection of willing clients
From the Inside looking Out
RIPE Atlas
• Many thousands of end points installed in end user
networks
• Programmable DNS queries
• Report back
From the Outside looking In
Set up authoritative server(s)
• Enroll end users to send queries to it
• Measure the outcomes from the perspective of the
server, not the end client
In the Middle looking both ways
• Instrument recursive resolvers and observe both stub behaviours and
authoritative server behaviours for queries
• There are obvious privacy issues that lurk very close to the surface
here
How to measure using millions of end
devices?
APNIC Lab’s approach
• we originally wanted to measure IPv6 deployment as seen by end
users
• We wanted to say something about ALL users
• So we were looking at a way to sample end users in a random but
statistically significant fashion across the entire network
• We stumbled across the advertising networks...
What can be scripted in an Ad
Not much:
• http.FetchImg()
i.e. attempt to retrieve a URL
But that’s enough!
• It’s EXACTLY what users do!
• A URL consists of a DNS question and an HTML question
• What if we point both the DNS and the HTML to servers we run?
• As long as each Ad execution uses unique names we can push the user
query back to our servers
DNS Label Encoding
Think of a URL name as a microcoded instruction set directed to
programmable DNS and HTTP servers …
http://06s-u69c5b052-c13-a4c5-s1579128735-icb0a3c4c-0.ap.dotnxdomain.net/1x1.png
IPv6 access only
Valid DNSSEC signature available
User is located in Country 13 (Australia)
Label Creation Time is 16 January 2020 9:52am
User’s IPv4 address is 203.10.60.76
Immediate response
User is located in AS1221 (Telstra)
uuid to map multiple queries to a single experiment
DNS Label Encoding
Think of a URL name as a microcoded instruction set directed to
programmable DNS and HTTP servers …
http://06s-u69c5b052-c13-a4c5-s1579128735-icb0a3c4c-0.ap.dotnxdomain.net/1x1.png
IPv6 access only
Valid DNSSEC signature available
User is located in Country 13 (Australia)
Label Creation Time is 16 January 2020 9:52am
User’s IPv4 address is 203.10.60.76
Immediate response
User is located in AS1221 (Telstra)
uuid to map multiple queries to a single experiment
Experiment Profile
Daily Ad Impression Count Daily DNS Query Count
DNS Amplification
This compares the daily DNS query
count against the daily new label
“injection” count
DNS Zombies per day
• These are single use DNS
labels
• So let’s look at the queries
where the time is more than
30 seconds older than the
label creation time
• Some days have a high avg
peak rate – some don’t –
why?
• The zombie rate on non-
peaking days is (slowly) falling
– why?
One ‘Intense’ Zombie Day
One ‘Other’ Zombie Day
Some Questions
• Some of the Zombie activity might be based on high speed query log
replay
• How prevalent is this behaviour across the entire DNS query landscape?
• How would this impact on passive query observations
• What contributes to the background query profile?
• Why does the background have such a long tail?
Further Studies?
• Correlate select query data from recursor(s) with query data from
authoritatives
• Look for query teleportation (geo shift from original to zombie)
• How much DNS stalking is going on?
• Would changing the response code for zombie queries change the
zombie query behaviour?
• How much of the query data is based on end user queries and how
much on synthetic queries and DNS thrashing?

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DINR 2021 Virtual Workshop: Passive vs Active Measurements in the DNS

  • 1. Passive vs Active Measurements in the DNS Geoff Huston, Joao Damas APNIC
  • 2. This is work-in-progress • So its not clear what the conclusions might be • But we have noticed a set of not-well-explained behaviours in the DNS, and we are wondering if the observational behaviour has an influence on the observed DNS behaviour
  • 3. Some anomalies • In previous studies associated with the KSK roll we noticed that the profile of resolvers and their query volumes seen at root servers had a very different profile to the resolvers who ask authoritative servers for “terminal” DNS names • We see repeat queries at servers that are inconsistent with our perceptions of how caching by recursive resolver systems should mitigate queries
  • 4. Some questions we’d like to ask • If we actively “plant” a sequence of DNS resolution queries into the edge, and record the queries we see at the authoritative name server for the DNS name being queried, then what can this tell us about the general behaviour of the DNS? • What proportion of queries are the result of stub resolution questions and what proportion are the result of the DNS talking to itself (such as self-triggered cache refresh) • Why are there query “storms”?
  • 5. An active observation platform We might understand the effect better if we controlled the cause i.e. generate queries in a known context and look at their effect within in the DNS resolution environment
  • 6. From the Inside looking Out Instrument a DNS client • Use the client to generate various DNS queries • Measure the absolute outcomes and the variance This needs the ability to either coopt or manufacture a collection of willing clients
  • 7. From the Inside looking Out RIPE Atlas • Many thousands of end points installed in end user networks • Programmable DNS queries • Report back
  • 8. From the Outside looking In Set up authoritative server(s) • Enroll end users to send queries to it • Measure the outcomes from the perspective of the server, not the end client
  • 9. In the Middle looking both ways • Instrument recursive resolvers and observe both stub behaviours and authoritative server behaviours for queries • There are obvious privacy issues that lurk very close to the surface here
  • 10. How to measure using millions of end devices? APNIC Lab’s approach • we originally wanted to measure IPv6 deployment as seen by end users • We wanted to say something about ALL users • So we were looking at a way to sample end users in a random but statistically significant fashion across the entire network • We stumbled across the advertising networks...
  • 11. What can be scripted in an Ad Not much: • http.FetchImg() i.e. attempt to retrieve a URL But that’s enough! • It’s EXACTLY what users do! • A URL consists of a DNS question and an HTML question • What if we point both the DNS and the HTML to servers we run? • As long as each Ad execution uses unique names we can push the user query back to our servers
  • 12. DNS Label Encoding Think of a URL name as a microcoded instruction set directed to programmable DNS and HTTP servers … http://06s-u69c5b052-c13-a4c5-s1579128735-icb0a3c4c-0.ap.dotnxdomain.net/1x1.png IPv6 access only Valid DNSSEC signature available User is located in Country 13 (Australia) Label Creation Time is 16 January 2020 9:52am User’s IPv4 address is 203.10.60.76 Immediate response User is located in AS1221 (Telstra) uuid to map multiple queries to a single experiment
  • 13. DNS Label Encoding Think of a URL name as a microcoded instruction set directed to programmable DNS and HTTP servers … http://06s-u69c5b052-c13-a4c5-s1579128735-icb0a3c4c-0.ap.dotnxdomain.net/1x1.png IPv6 access only Valid DNSSEC signature available User is located in Country 13 (Australia) Label Creation Time is 16 January 2020 9:52am User’s IPv4 address is 203.10.60.76 Immediate response User is located in AS1221 (Telstra) uuid to map multiple queries to a single experiment
  • 14. Experiment Profile Daily Ad Impression Count Daily DNS Query Count
  • 15. DNS Amplification This compares the daily DNS query count against the daily new label “injection” count
  • 16. DNS Zombies per day • These are single use DNS labels • So let’s look at the queries where the time is more than 30 seconds older than the label creation time • Some days have a high avg peak rate – some don’t – why? • The zombie rate on non- peaking days is (slowly) falling – why?
  • 19. Some Questions • Some of the Zombie activity might be based on high speed query log replay • How prevalent is this behaviour across the entire DNS query landscape? • How would this impact on passive query observations • What contributes to the background query profile? • Why does the background have such a long tail?
  • 20. Further Studies? • Correlate select query data from recursor(s) with query data from authoritatives • Look for query teleportation (geo shift from original to zombie) • How much DNS stalking is going on? • Would changing the response code for zombie queries change the zombie query behaviour? • How much of the query data is based on end user queries and how much on synthetic queries and DNS thrashing?