Mr. Friend is acrime analystwith the SantaCruz, Califo.docx

1. Mr. Friend is a crime analyst with the Santa Cruz, California, Police Department. Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime By Zach Friend, M.P.P. 4/9/2013 Nationwide law enforcement agencies face the problem of doing more with less. Departments slash budgets and implement furloughs, while management struggles to meet the public safety needs of the community. The Santa Cruz, California, Police Department handles the same issues with increasing property crimes and service calls and diminishing staff. Unable to hire more officers, the department searched for a nontraditional solution. In late 2010 researchers published a paper that the department believed might hold the answer. They proposed that it was possible to predict certain crimes, much like scientists forecast earthquake aftershocks. An “aftercrime” often follows an initial crime. The time and location of previous criminal activity helps to determine future offenses. These researchers developed an

2. algorithm (mathematical procedure) that calculates future crime locations.1 Equalizing Resources The Santa Cruz Police Department has 94 sworn officers and serves a population of 60,000. A university, amusement park, and beach push the seasonal population to 150,000. Department personnel contacted a Santa Clara University professor to apply the algorithm, hoping that leveraging technology would improve their efforts. The police chief indicated that the department could not hire more officers. He felt that the program could allocate dwindling resources more efficiently. Santa Cruz police envisioned deploying officers by shift to the most targeted locations in the city. The predictive policing model helped to alert officers to targeted locations in real time, a significant improvement over traditional tactics. Making it Work The algorithm is a culmination of anthropological and criminological behavior research. It uses complex mathematics to estimate crime and predict future hot spots. Researchers based these studies on In Depth Featured Articles - IAFIS Identifies Suspect from 1978 Murder Case

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4. - School Violence - Psychopathy About LEB - History - Author Guidelines (pdf) - Editorial Staff - Editorial Release Form (pdf) Patch Call Known locally as the “Gateway to the Summit,” which references the city’s proximity to the Bechtel Family National Scout Reserve. More The patch of the Miamisburg, Ohio, Police Department prominently displays the city seal surrounded by an outline of the state. More LEB Updates Subscribe to receive monthly updates listing articles featured on this website. Details Home • Stats & Services • Reports and Publications • LEB • 2013 • April • Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime FBI — Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement- bulletin/... 1 of 4 6/3/2013 3:38 PM

5. information that officers inherently know. For example, when people are victims, the chance that they or their neighbors will be victimized again increases. Offenders criminalize familiar areas. There are detectable patterns associated with the times and locations of their crimes. Using an earthquake aftershock algorithm, the system employs verified crime data to predict future offenses in 500-square-foot locations. The program uses historical information combined with current data to determine patterns. The system needs between 1,200 and 2,000 data points, including burglaries, batteries, assaults, or other crimes, for the most accuracy. Santa Cruz, averaging between 400 and 600 burglaries per year, used 5 years of data. Throughout the experiment the Santa Cruz Police Department focused on burglaries— vehicular, residential, and commercial—and motor vehicle thefts.2 The system works on gang violence, batteries, aggravated assaults, drug crimes, and bike thefts. It functions on all property crimes and violent crimes that have enough data points and are not crimes of passion, such as domestic violence. Homicides generally do not provide enough data points to produce accurate predictions. Using the Data To add an extra layer of security, employees transfer the data on designated crime types from the

6. records management system (RMS) to the secure Web-based system. The algorithm requires the date, time, type, and location of a crime. This is public data, which adds another level of security in case someone intercepts the information. No one submits, collects, or uses personal data. The system processes the information through the algorithm and combines it with historical crime data to make predictions. Staff members log in, just like they do on an e-mail account, and the system generates hot spot maps. For Santa Cruz police, there are 15 hot spot maps per shift. Distributed through roll calls, these maps indicate 500-square-foot locations. Officers pass through these areas when they are not obligated to address other calls. No one dispatches or requires them to patrol the sites; they do it as part of their routine extra checks. Some agencies using the program designate predictive policing units to run patrols, while others use unmarked cars to traverse hotspots. The Santa Cruz Police Department decided not to mandate the patrols. Personnel thought it would eliminate the feeling of an administrative directive and empower officers to be as proactive as their call levels allowed. When police enter and clear the hot spot locations, they notify dispatch with a designated clearing code. This enables dispatch personnel to collect data on the frequency of the officers’ presence in the hot spots. FBI — Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement- bulletin/...

7. 2 of 4 6/3/2013 3:38 PM Evaluating the Process During the first 6 months of the program, the department made over 2 dozen arrests within the hot spot locations. However, the true measure of the program’s success is not apprehensions, but the reduction of crime. Santa Cruz police officers indicated an initial 11 percent reduction in burglaries and a 4 percent decrease in motor vehicle thefts. As time progresses, the reductions increase. Over a 6-month period, burglaries declined 19 percent. The system requires 6 months of data to assess whether the method actually is reducing the crime rate. Because the Santa Cruz police did not introduce any additional variables—no additional officers were hired, shift lengths continued, patrol structure remained the same—the department attributed the crime reduction to the model. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) tested the method under a controlled experiment. The project scientifically proved the model’s effectiveness. The city has a larger population and more complex patrol needs than Santa Cruz. Researchers established the experiment in the Foothill Division with a population of 300,000 people. They compared the predictive policing system with LAPD’s best practices. Similar to the Santa Cruz test, the department distributed maps

8. to officers at the beginning of roll call. On some days analysts produced the maps using traditional LAPD hot spot methods. On other days, they used the algorithm. No one told the officers where the maps came from. Graphically they looked the same. The algorithm provided twice the accuracy that LAPD’s current practices produced. While property crime was up .4 percent throughout Los Angeles, Foothill’s declined by 12 percent. Foothill benefitted from the largest crime reduction of any division during the experiment. People found it hard to understand that an algorithm performed similar to a crime analyst. Eventually, even the most skeptical individuals realized that the method worked. The LAPD expanded the program to other divisions serving a total population of over 1.5 million people. Each one that implemented the predictive policing software achieved crime reduction. The department recognized that the predictive policing system is a large improvement over previously used approaches. When looking at a map from 1 week, the assumption is that the next week will be the same. The computer eliminates the bias that people have. Gaining Support As with any new program, questions and concerns arise. People resist change. The Santa Cruz Police Department worked with officers to develop maps and solicit feedback before implementation of the program. The department emphasized that the program does not replace officer intuition but

9. supplements it. The Santa Cruz Police Department found that veteran officers usually identify 8 or 9 of the 15 hot spot locations. Newer officers discover 1 or 2 of the areas. This validates skilled police officers’ intuition, provides additional targeted locations, and imparts tactical information for new officers. The maps reinforce existing knowledge and inform about targeting locations. They standardize information across shifts and experience levels. The algorithm combines historic and daily crime information, produces real-time predictions of areas to patrol, and normalizes information among shifts. It eliminates the concern about adequate information sharing. Officers obtaining the daily hot spot maps receive any information they missed due to vacation, illness, or regular days off. The program shares information graphically. It does not replace the value of senior officers teaching younger ones or the need for roll calls to discuss crime trends. It cannot replace police officers’ knowledge and skills and does not remove the officer from the equation. It puts law enforcement in the right time and place to prevent crime. Conclusion FBI — Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement- bulletin/... 3 of 4 6/3/2013 3:38 PM

10. Accessibility | eRulemaking | Freedom of Information Act | Legal Notices | Legal Policies and Disclaimers | Links | Privacy Policy | USA.gov | White House FBI.gov is an official site of the U.S. government, U.S. Department of Justice Close Additional departments in the states of California, Washington, South Carolina, Arizona, Tennessee, and Illinois have implemented the program. In November 2011 Time Magazine named predictive policing one of 50 best inventions for 2011.3 The Santa Cruz police chief acknowledged the recognition, but said the accolades are less important than the crime reduction. According to the chief, “Innovation is the key to modern policing, and we’re proud to be leveraging technology in a way that keeps our community safer.”4 Endnotes 1 Dr. George Mohler, Santa Clara University, California, and Dr. P. Jeffrey Brantingham, University of California at Los Angeles, California, developed the algorithm (mathematical model) for predictive policing. 2 George Mohler, P. Jeffrey Brantingham, and Zach Friend conducted the research in Santa Cruz, California.

11. 3 Lev Grossman, Cleo Brock-Abraham, Nick Carbone, Eric Dodds, Jeffrey Kluger, Alice Park, Nate Rawlings, Claire Suddath, Feifei Sun, Mark Thompson, Bryan Walsh, and Kayla Webley, “The 50 Best Inventions of 2011,” Time Magazine, November 28, 2011. www.time.com/time/magazine/article /0,9171,2099708-13,00.html (accessed September 27, 2012). 4 Santa Cruz Police Chief Kevin Vogel. FBI — Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement- bulletin/... 4 of 4 6/3/2013 3:38 PM Copyright of FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin is the property of Superintendent of Documents and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. Science and Justice 54 (2014) 494–501 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Science and Justice

12. journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/scijus Expanding forensic science through forensic intelligence Olivier Ribaux a,⁎, Benjamin Talbot Wright b a Ecole des Sciences Criminelles, School of Forensic Science, University of Lausanne, Switzerland b Centre for Forensic Science, University of Technology, Sydney, Australia ⁎ Corresponding author at: University of Lausanne, E Batochime, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. E-mail address: [email protected] (O. Ribaux). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2014.05.001 1355-0306/© 2014 Forensic Science Society. Published by a b s t r a c t a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 29 January 2014 Received in revised form 14 April 2014 Accepted 6 May 2014 Keywords: Forensic intelligence Policing Crime analysis Research and Development (‘R&D’) in forensic science currently focuses on innovative technologies improving the efficiency of existing forensic processes, from the detection of marks and traces at the scene, to their presentation in Court. R&D approached from this perspective provides no response to doubts raised by recent criminological studies, which question the effective contribution of forensic science to crime reduction, and to policing in general.

13. Traces (i.e. forensic case data), as remnants of criminal activity are collected and used in various forms of crime monitoring and investigation. The aforementioned doubts therefore need to be addressed by expressing how information is conveyed by traces in these processes. Modelling from this standpoint expands the scope of forensic science and provides new R&D opportunities. Twelve propositions for R&D are stated in order to pave the way. © 2014 Forensic Science Society. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction The influential report produced under the auspices of the US Nation- al Academies of Sciences in 2009, is an almost mandatory starting point for debating Research and Development (‘R&D’) in forensic science [39]. Its focus on the development of specialised technologies and its valida- tion provides for what are all inarguably challenges for forensic science laboratories which serve the Justice System [9,38,46,56]. Some commentators have however pointed to many anomalies with the current paradigm taken for granted by the Report. At least, it is acknowledged that forensic science does not limit itself to the application of a patchwork of technologies deployed in the laboratory [21,23,30,32, 47,58]. A school of thought goes further to suggest a change of attitude to respond to the emerging crisis epitomised by the tragic

14. closure of some of the more established traditional laboratories. A discipline should be (re-)built around the study of the ‘trace’, the remnant of a unique criminal activity that occurred in the past. The information it conveys is not only restricted to serve the Court process but should also support the study of many types of crime activities, following a variety of objectives [35,36,52,53]. This paper aims at structuring this debate by stating twelve inter- connected propositions, at different levels of generality, to be tested by research. They should be considered as a preliminary construct open to evolution. cole des Sciences Criminelles, Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserv 1.1. Is this expansion necessary? Proposition 1. Expanding R&D in forensic science beyond its delineation in the report is a necessity for providing a discipline with a sufficient ambi- tion to justify its existence, ensure its own coherency and favour its sustain- able development. The need to consider the contribution of forensic science beyond the laboratory is already occasionally postulated by scholars [30],

15. but the scientific literature on this issue remains rare [52]. There are many pos- sibilities to specify territories to be explored [37]. They have overlapping shapes. We propose one possible configuration that helps to pinpoint risks and opportunities for forensic science to engage in these areas. 1.2. What should this expansion cover? The most evident step for such an expansion consists of adopting a global view that goes from the crime scene to the presentation of evidence in Court. In this context, the traditional laboratory is situated as one possible structure responsible for performing specialised operations. Proposition 2. Research in forensic science covers the study of its contribution along the whole chain of the justice process, from the crime scene, to the presentation of forensic information in Court. This elementary expansion for forensic science is not a given. There are many inhibitors that dissuade researchers to embark on such a ven- ture. Some commentators even deny, or strictly limit, an expanded role for forensic science along this chain: ed.

16. http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1016/j.scijus.2014. 05.001&domain=pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2014.05.001 mailto:[email protected] http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2014.05.001 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/13550306 495O. Ribaux, B. Talbot Wright / Science and Justice 54 (2014) 494–501 ‘Expanding the forensic scientists’ domain to the ‘activity level’ destroys the line between their expertise in their specific forensic discipline and a more general (and dangerous) claim to general investigative expertise ([46: 70]). This confined view is mainly justified by the need to keep scientific independence, mitigating contextual bias and avoiding encroachment upon each other competencies. Such statements are particularly stimulating for research. They immediately lead to directly address the question of the application of forensic science. Would it truly deserve existence, by merely bringing small/simple pieces of evidence before the justice system (source level involvement only)? And in doing so endangering the fairness of the judicial process at such an increased cost? The extremity of this confinement should be more carefully studied,

17. because it is not immediately apparent when adjoined with Polanyi's statement: ‘Even the most strictly mechanized procedure leaves something to personal skill in the exercise of which an individual bias may enter’ ([41]: 19). And combined with Rosenthal affirmation: ‘It costs something to reduce errors, and it costs more and more to get rid of each error as there are fewer of them left’ [49]. Reconstructing specific events that occurred in the past is subject to many forms of uncertainty. Whatever the level of sophistication of procedures and models for making decisions, forensic failures will continue to occur unavoidably. Each high profile case will invariably put a little more pressure on the system with the effect of progressively confining scientific laboratories in the landscape of the justice system. This reduction in the scope of laboratories may open space for more fragile information and biased forms of reasoning to prosper in crime investigation. This could not be more evident than in the collection of human information (interview) that is guided by forensic results, in

18. the complete absence of forensic advice. An alternative response to the collapse of some independent laboratories is to rebuild forensic capacity within police organisations. It may be another natural evolution of systems searching to fill gaps created. Is this movement already a reality? Research could empirically test this hypothesis. The reality of this confinement is often tempered by the employment of a case manager in the laboratory. This still understudied function focuses on mitigating risks of biases produced by observer effects. It proceeds by separating the management of the case from the evalua- tion of observations, and by filtering contextual information about the case through sequential unmasking procedures [56]. However, this defensive function provides little indication on how forensic science and crime investigation should logically be articulated to favour the resolution of investigative problems. This needs to be studied also. Whatever the viewpoint, forensic science cannot operate in isola- tion. Indeed, lack of research dedicated to expressing this articulation allows space for pervasive misunderstandings and tensions

19. between organisations and individuals to prosper. It is also true that no guarantee can be made for forensic case data to be safely and transparently exploited to its full potential in the variety of processes it serves. The study of the whole chain brings into focus two of its important components: (a) the contribution of forensic science to crime investigation and (b) crime scene investigation itself. 1.2.1. Studying how forensic science may integrate with crime investigation The proposition to adopt a global view that starts at the scene and ends in Court forces the study of different forms of articulation of forensic science within crime investigation, and their respective consequences on the whole process. This is an area of many controversies. They occur in a judicial context that is itself poorly formalised [25], and which is the target of many crit- icisms. In particular, in his 1984 seminal paper, Egger [14] pinpointed the incapacity of police systems to connect dots, leading to disastrous failures in serial murder investigations. He denounced the fragmentation of crime investigation as it causes linkage blindness.

20. This is where the fragmentation of forensic science, confined in spe- cialities and silos, certainly does not address these systemic weaknesses coined by Egger. Research may examine how the fluidity of the treatment of scientific information is inhibited by traditional organisational settings of forensic laboratories. Thus, the following statement challenges the usual pathway designed for forensic science. Proposition 3. Crime investigation is holistic, and forensic science is a significant contributor to it. In shaping police organisations during the last decade, the focus has been on how crime analysts, investigators, forensic scientists and other contributors differ through their speciality, while they actually participate collectively to the same process of crime investigation. Digital traces have added new dimensions to the picture. They are used almost systematically and are central to most of today's investigations. A promising avenue for research would be to consider what the actors (i.e. the various contributors to the investigations bringing their own knowledge and expertise) share, and what kind of collaboration must be stimulated to favour and regulate problem solving. Indeed, the term

21. investigation contains at its root vestige, which means in French the remnant of an activity, the mark, the ‘trace’ [10]; exactly what forensic science studies according to Margot [36]. Adopting this view allows the definition of stable concepts and frameworks. A research programme could thus examine, as its object, a system composed of different kinds of investigators (e.g. police investigator, forensic investigator, criminal intelligence analysts) trying to solve problems through a collective approach, by bringing their specific knowledge and skills in treating specific types of information. A lot of empirical studies could be launched around this system, its functioning, its adaptation to the investigation of specific cases, its transparency and its effectiveness. This kind of research will inevitably address the question of organising forensic science with respect to the fragmentation of the investigative process. Various forms of bias and their consequences have been intensively discussed in forensic literature. This catalysed the debate of marginalising the forensic scientist from the investigation. However, the consequences of this fragmentation and de-contextualisation have been

22. far less considered. This opens an important consideration that is directly related with a more holistic view of the investigation. Proposition 4. The fragmentation of processes in systems and the distancing of scientists from other figures of the investigation might contribute to a variety of failures, not addressed by laboratory quality management. Thus, contextualisation and de-contextualisation must be studied in mirror, depending on needs and expectations of the criminal justice process. There are already many documented illustrations where such failures have occurred. One significant example is the Byford's report on the Yorkshire Ripper inquiry in 1981 [6]. So called ‘Byford scientists’ have since the mid 90s deployed good practices in the role of forensic investigators, contributing concretely to the resolution of many serious crimes [1,57]. It is their responsibility to generate a productive collaboration with the other ‘actors’ (i.e. a contributing figure), of the investigation. Similar models have since been developed in many laboratories. These scientists have a global view on forensic case data available in the context of a case. They provide advice on how to treat it by defining

23. sequences of operations, as well as evaluating and integrating results with other parts of the investigation. Priorities are defined for optimising information gained and, at the same time, avoiding costly and superfluous 496 O. Ribaux, B. Talbot Wright / Science and Justice 54 (2014) 494–501 operations. However, the nature of the contribution of this generalist, even if it is well admitted in the field, is very rarely debated in the scientific literature [1,54,55]. Consequently, the realisation of this task remains largely tacit and therefore needs to be formalised in order to ensure transparency (see proposition five). We experience this same modelling gap at the scene. 1.2.2. Studying forensic science at the crime scene Empirical research has detected many unexplained discrepancies when measuring performance at the crime scene. They have been recur- rently made evident not only across jurisdictions and operational units, but also when making comparisons within the same units [2]. Such results are compounded by the disparity of views about the character of crime scene examination as shown by a survey conducted in Scotland

24. [33]. As it turns out, a significant number of respondents, among them forensic scientists from the laboratory and crime scene examiners themselves, still consider it as substantially ‘mechanical’ (can be carried out by applying a set of predefined learned procedures that allow little space for inductive thinking). Such unexplained disparities should raise many more questions for research. Standard operating procedures for crime scene examination and lab-on-a-chip technologies are on the way to implementation before intensive research is performed to understand the underlying logic of the treatment. We risk putting the cart before the horse. A set of studies should deserve more attention in this context. For instance, Kelty and Julian [24] have identified seven qualities that char- acterise high performance crime scene examiners selected by peers: knowledge, life experience, professionalism, approach to life, cognitive abilities, communication and stress management. These dimensions overlap with the recurrent themes identified in the literature reviewed by Ludwig and Fraser [32] on what factors seem to influence forensic science effectiveness (and weaknesses) in dealing with high volume

25. crime. The results are signs that crime scene examination is not mechanical in character. It rather belongs to an imaginative type of activity. They encourage associations of ideas, favour the use of a solid scientific background to regulate reasoning, and allow the deployment of abilities Fig. 1. The reconstruction process. A criminal activity perturbs the physical environment (a) developed (d). The consequences are eventually tested, refuted, discriminated and evaluated t to intensively communicate and exchange information. Such signs indicate the types of frameworks to be elaborated or how to recruit people. But research must go far further in deciphering the underlying logic operating at the scene and in crime investigation. 1.2.3. The study of an investigative and crime scene logic Let us use a very simplified model in order to sketch the modelling challenge (Fig. 1). Forensic science deals with activities that are unique, and that generate material (or digital) exchanges, according to Locard's principle. After a certain time (Δt), crime scene investigators attend the scene and collect specimens. Crime reconstruction consists of developing hypotheses about

26. the activity, objects and individuals. A series of cycles aim at discriminating and refuting hypotheses, as well as develop new hypotheses. Beliefs change as a function of newly available information. The active development of hypotheses about what occurred in the specific situation is at the core of the process. Crime scene investigators intensively apply this ‘abductive’ logic at the scene [11]. At the other extremity of the judicial process, the Court, the expert evaluates information from the perspective of the remaining hypotheses of the defence and of the prosecutor. At this stage, a more deductive style of reasoning takes place for the forensic scientist, in a stabilised cycle (probabilities of observations knowing the proposition of the prosecutor, and respec- tively of the defence). There is still much to be understood beyond this very simplified model. Taking part in the expression of an investigative logic is suggested as a priority for forensic science. Proposition 5. Research in forensic science needs an epistemological component for elaborating upon the foundations of an investigative logic exploiting information conveyed by traces (forensic case data). This very limited overview shows that the quality of crime

27. scene examination and forensic investigation is mainly determined by the ability to draw relevant hypotheses from observations in the specific circumstances of the case, and to regulate their management. Moreover, the potential contribution of forensic science in crime investigation is of a . Relevant specimen is recognised, collected and measured (b). Alternative hypothesis is hrough experiments. 497O. Ribaux, B. Talbot Wright / Science and Justice 54 (2014) 494–501 broad variety, when viewed with such a clinical perspective [58]. It is felt to be significant, but this is still not demonstrated by research. An epistemological exploration can lead for instance to suggest links between works such as Peirce semiotic [13], the evidential paradigm of the historian Carlo Ginzburg [16], the method of historical science that searches for explanations to past singular events on the basis of currently observable marks [7,8], the scientific investigation of crime defined by Kind [25], the use of probabilities in the investigation suggested by Jackson et al. [22], and case-based reasoning when successful solutions

28. to previous problems are used to deal with a new similar situation [26]. Probably many other approaches can be integrated where traces are recognised as signs providing information on what occurred in the past. 1.3. Questioning the effectiveness of forensic science This background causes other concerns about how to appropriately integrate innovative and flourishing technologies. The laboratory- centric view of forensic science causes deviation from this fundamental question. It focuses mainly on technologies rather than on the value of information conveyed by forensic case data. Peter Deforest wrote in 1999: ‘Has the field advanced?’ On the face of it there would seem to be no question that the field of criminalistics has advanced. But has it? While we have forged ahead technologically, in my view we have backslid with respect to our core activity — that of applying science and scientific reasoning to criminal and civil investigations ([12: 197]). Technologies are aimed at supporting the resolution of problems. But the specific problem under scrutiny, as well as the global

29. impact of forensic science on solving and reducing crime often remains relegat- ed behind the prescriptive application of procedures and technologies. The rapid evolution of technologies may provide an explanation of this deviation. DNA came about 80 years after the implementation of fingerprints. But the quantity of electronic data has since exploded, at a time scale that is equivalent to about half a professional career. ‘Big data’ has become an effective issue in less than one generation of students [51]. Efforts to assimilate these changes are tremendous. The Policing debate Fig. 2. Order of magnitude of the DNA evi market is stimulated to push new technologies at a rate that exceeds our own ability to integrate them. Lab-on-a-chip and big data technologies are at the door, but the current paradigm provides no solution for avoiding a further destabilisation of the discipline. A solid vision elaborated through a strong focus on fundamental research has become indispensable in our rapidly evolving system. Another exciting avenue for research exists here. Proposition 6. Refocusing forensic science on problem solving

30. will provide a more central position to the discipline in crime investigation, as well as greater stability and sustainability. By focusing on means rather than ends and distancing from other actors, current forensic systems forget to consider their global effectiveness in policing [53]. Indeed, when it is measured, an embarrassing evidence funnel is made visible, i.e. there is a huge gap between what is collected at the scene and what is effectively used at the end of the judicial process. This gap is made always more explicit through the so called end-to-end studies on the use of DNA profiles (Fig. 2). They show that the chance for a trace, generated by the activity of the offender, to be eventually presented at Court, remains very low, no matter how extensively technology is deployed. Information is lost at various decision points throughout the case handling process. Registering the case and attending the scene, processing the crime scene and choosing if a specimen must be sent to the laboratory are examples of choices to be made. Many factors influence the extraction of the profile, the comparison of the profile with the content of databases, the interpretation of matches, the integration of

31. results into the investigation, the use of this evidence in reporting, and eventually the use of the piece of evidence at Court. Regardless, when seen as a whole, the process provides a questioning picture for the effectiveness of forensic science. Such evaluations however are unfair. These indicators do not grasp the broad variety of useful information brought to the investigation by forensic science. The UK Parliamentary Select Committee ‘Forensic Science on Trial’ acknowledged this in 2005: ‘The main contribution that forensic science makes to the criminal justice system is the generation of intelligence to assist investigations’ ([20]: 8). Justice / Forensic debate dence funnel for high volume crime. image of Fig.�2 498 O. Ribaux, B. Talbot Wright / Science and Justice 54 (2014) 494–501 There are unfortunately still very few empirical bases to ground this assertion. Beyond investigation, forensic science is understood according

32. to the lines debated in the scientific literature. Development centres on serving the Court process, yet it is evaluated on how it supports crime control or crime reduction strategies in policing (see Fig. 2). There is a tension here that needs urgently to be made visible by research, because this misunderstanding may have dramatic consequences in deciding the future of forensic science [2,5,48,57]. 1.4. Forensic science in policing There is again a lack of models and almost no scientific debate to express the potential of forensic science in policing. Proposition 7. Forensic science can and should contribute to, and actively engage in policing. Going into policing is another controversial possible expansion for forensic science. As Inman and Rudin state, forensic science is required to strictly stay focussed on the court's need: ‘The scientific analysis is only performed at the behest of someone seeking to introduce the evidence into a court of law’ ([21:15]). In this context, can forensic science enter into the policing debate, which is a discipline that has acquired some autonomy from the justice system?

33. This is also a delicate question, but let's have a quick and simplified look at a contemporary policing debate in order to better identify risks and opportunities. It may actually be that the broad use of separate forensic identification techniques in a court-oriented strategy is already contributing to overwhelm actors of the system. The order of magnitude of the number of matches obtained through biometric systems has changed. Estimations already indicate that the treatment of all the matches obtained at a national and international level through auto- matic data exchanges becomes intractable. At the same time, the real effect of this traditional intensive case-by-case identification method is controversial in terms of crime reduction [44]. But what are the alternatives? Mostly they focus much more on the study of repetitive crimes. They started to emerge in the 1970s along many different lines. Goldstein has initiated one of the most important streams [17]. He defined ‘problem oriented policing’ (POP), which aims at providing a proactive component to the organisation. The process concentrates efforts on Scanning repetitive and persistent criminal or security problems encountered by the police in their daily

34. operations (S). Their Analysis (A) encourages then inferring the causes of the problem identified. Elaboration of possible Responses for mitigating the problem, choosing and implementing what is expected to be the more efficient solutions are the next steps of the approach (R). The systematic Assessment and adaptation of the chosen dispositive finalises the process (A). The focus is on mitigating the problem by preferring preven- tive approaches, not necessarily by arresting or identifying individuals. This method has become very popular in policing and known under the acronym SARA. Does forensic science really have something to do with problem oriented policing? There are actually many examples of such implications. One such experience in Boston is particularly interesting and was the object of scientific papers written by Braga [3,4], a distinguished special- ist in problem oriented policing. It was eventually recognised that the systematic comparisons of bullets collected at crime scenes ‘helped guide violence prevention efforts by establishing patterns in particular areas and among specific individuals’. Of importance is to notice that this programme was not led by the police, but by other

35. institutions that had to deal with the problem. Policing does not mean that the police are the only actors, or even that they must lead such projects or to what degree they participate in the application of the method. What is common in these modern strategies, beyond problem solving policing, is the focus on repetitive crimes under all their forms. Even if different streams in policing exist, they tend to be regrouped under the umbrella of ‘intelligence-led policing’. This opens the door to potential fears prompted by the misinterpre- tation of the term ‘intelligence’. Thus, has forensic science to compro- mise with intelligence by developing a forensic intelligence branch? Maybe the term itself ‘forensic intelligence’ which is occasionally regarded an oxymoron, is not an appropriate one. The term seeks only to express that forensic case data has the potential to contribute in a structured way to the detection and strategic approach towards repetitive crime, the support of preventative policing models, and the disrup- tion of criminal enterprises in crime reduction. The first generation of intelligence-led policing systems was much more based on the results of research in criminology, that

36. clearly showed that a few minority of offenders were responsible for a high proportion of crimes reported [42]. Targeting and neutralising these so-called prolific offenders would hopefully significantly reduce crime. Obviously, the problem was how to target prolific offenders. Traditional police solutions can be intrusive, and predicting recidivism is far from obvious. How forensic science can support this process in a more neutral way is thus a critical question to be evaluated within this framework. This way of considering forensic science in policing changes the metrics, and even the econometrics, for evaluating its efficiency. In this framework, assessing the following proposition takes an evident importance. Proposition 8. The adoption of intelligence-led policing changes how to consider the effectiveness of forensic science. Intelligence-led crime scene processing and crime scene linking become central. Let us take one example to obtain an understanding of the dimension of the challenge. 1.5. Forensic science and intelligence-led policing: an example

37. A crime scene investigator attends scenes of residential burglaries into the same … RESEARCH ARTICLE Rethinking the Compstat process to enhance problem-solving responses: insights from a randomized field experiment Brenda J. Bonda* and Anthony A. Bragab aSawyer Business School, Suffolk University, Boston, MA 02108, USA; bSchool of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark, NJ 07102, USA Compstat is an important administrative innovation in policing that provides a much-needed mechanism for holding mid-level managers accountable for controlling crime rates. Research evidence suggests that Compstat is more likely to generate reactive crime control responses rather than more creative problem-solving responses. A randomized field experiment in Lowell, Massachusetts found that ‘problem-solving meetings’ produced more innovative responses to crime problems and generated stronger crime control gains when compared to the Compstat process. Analysis of qualitative data collected to monitor the implementation of the experiment revealed that important differences in meeting dynamics were associated with observed differences and suggests promising avenues to improve Compstat

38. processes. Keywords: Compstat; problem-solving; police management; crime control Introduction Compstat has been hailed as one of the most prominent police innovations of the past 20 years (see, e.g. McDonald, 2002; Silverman, 1999). While it has many features, Compstat can be generally viewed as a combined technical and managerial system that embeds the technical system for the collection and distribution of police performance data in a broader managerial system designed to focus the organization on specific objectives, usually involving crime reduction, by holding a subset of managers accountable for using organizational resources appropriately in pursuit of these objectives (Moore, 2003; Moore & Braga, 2003). Since the approach was first implemented by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) in 1994 (Bratton, 1998), Compstat has been adopted by various police organizations, where police executives attempt to improve their performance by embracing data-based decision-making, enhanced problem-solving, and management accountability (Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, & Willis, 2003). Despite the extensive diffusion of Compstat across police agencies in the USA and other countries, the crime control benefits of Compstat remain

39. unclear.1 In fact, the extant research evidence suggests that Compstat is more likely to generate reactive crime control responses, such as flooding a problem area with patrol officers (putting ‘cops on the dots’), rather than more creative problem-solving responses designed to address the conditions that cause crime problems to recur (Dabney, 2010; Weisburd et al., 2003). This is a concerning limitation of the Compstat process intended to harness problem-solving decisions to data analysis results. Indeed, there is a growing body of *Corresponding author. Email: [email protected] © 2013 Taylor & Francis Police Practice and Research, 2015 Vol. 16, No. 1, 22–35, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.832250 mailto:[email protected] http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.832250 rigorous research evidence that suggests problem-oriented policing programs generate stronger crime control gains when compared to traditional police crime control strategies (Weisburd, Telep, Hinkle, & Eck, 2010). To some observers, the control element of this reform, most clearly manifested in Compstat meeting dynamics, reinforces the bureau- cratic paramilitary model of traditional police departments; this, in turn, leads to less creative responses to crime problems (Weisburd et al., 2003).

40. In this paper, we reflect upon the outcomes of a randomized field experiment in Lowell, Massachusetts that found ‘problem-solving meetings’ designed to ensure adequate treatment dosage in treatment crime hot spots resulted in far more problem- solving responses and greater crime control gains when compared to the crime-reduction responses implemented at control hot spots naturally generated by a citywide Compstat process (Braga & Bond, 2008). Using qualitative data collection and analysis methods, we compare meeting dynamics to understand why the problem- solving meetings yielded more innovative and effective crime-reduction interventions relative to Compstat meetings. The results of our analyses suggest that the inputs and processes of the problem-solving meetings accounted for the observed differences in strategies and outcomes. By integrating these dynamics into Compstat meetings, these managerial systems could be used to good effect in moving police departments towards more robust community problem-solving activities. Compstat and problem-solving Herman Goldstein (1979) argued that the crime control failures of the standard model of policing could be explained by the fact that police departments were poorly organized to do something about crime. Compstat sought to overcome this organizational problem by empowering the command structure to do something about

41. crime problems (Bratton, 1998; Weisburd et al., 2003). As originated by the NYPD, Compstat operates as a strategic control system implemented to collect and disseminate information on crime problems and track responses used to control them (McDonald, 2002; Silverman, 1999). These elements are most visibly displayed in Compstat meetings during which precinct commanders appear before the department’s top brass to report on crime problems in their precincts and what they are doing about them (Bratton, 1998; Silverman, 1999; Weisburd, Mastrofski, Willis, & Greenspan, 2006). A recent Police Foundation study of the implementation of Compstat by US police departments defined Compstat as a ‘strategic problem-solving’ model that seeks to focus police organizations on specific crime problems and to empower police organizations to identify and solve those problems (Weisburd et al., 2003). When compared to common conceptions of problem-oriented policing programs that tend to focus on line-level practice (Eck & Spelman, 1987; Goldstein, 1990), Compstat focuses on the ways in which police agencies can be organized as problem-solving institutions rather than on the specific problem-solving strategies that police use to address crime problems (Weisburd et al., 2006). The Police Foundation identified six key elements of Compstat that form a comprehensive approach for mobilizing police agencies to identify, analyze, and solve public safety problems: mission clarification; internal

42. accountability; geographic organization of command; organizational flexibility; data-driven problem identification and assessment; and innovative problem-solving (Weisburd et al., 2003). In practice, however, these core elements do not seem to translate into enhanced problem-solving responses in Compstat agencies. A Police Foundation survey found that Compstat police agencies were not any more likely to implement innovative Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 23 problem-solving responses than non-Compstat police agencies (Weisburd et al., 2003). The on-site observations documented a preponderance of traditional responses, such as saturation patrol and increasing arrests in problem areas. The Police Foundation research team also conducted deeper ethnographic assessments of three ‘model’ police departments – including the Lowell Police Department (LPD) – that closely followed the NYPD Compstat model (Willis, Mastrofski, Weisburd, & Greenspan, 2004). Compstat police agencies tended to place the greatest emphasis on mission clarification and internal accountability elements. Unfortunately, the reinforcement of the traditional hierarchical command structure interfered with the decision-making authority of mid-level managers and diminished creative problem-solving efforts.

43. The LPD and Compstat Lowell, Massachusetts is a small city of some 105,000 residents located about 30 miles northeast of Boston and has a geographic expanse of 14.5 square miles. After his appointment in 1995, Superintendent Edward F. Davis adopted Compstat as a central component of his departmental reforms and closely followed the model developed by the NYPD; as such, this makes Lowell an ideal research site as the LPD engaged a model that was widely replicated in police agencies across the USA and many other nations. As described by Willis et al. (2004), the LPD’s Compstat goals included, ‘elicit- ing collective input on crime patterns and problem-solving strategies, encouraging information sharing on crime locations, victims, and suspects, and facilitating the deployment of department resources’ (p. 474). LPD Compstat meetings were held on a bi-weekly basis, led by Superintendent Davis or one of the two Deputy Superintendents, and typically included 25–30 attendees.2 The captains who led the LPD’s three policing sectors were the focal point of the Compstat meetings and other mid-level managers would also be queried as crime problems intersected with their locus of responsibility. Citywide and sector-level crime trends and hot spot maps were closely reviewed; the presentation of the data was accompanied by questioning by Davis and the Deputy Superintendents on the nature of concerning crime trends and

44. concentrations and the captains’ strategies to address recurring crime problems. Willis et al. (2004) found that the LPD’s Compstat fostered a clear sense of mission and accountability relative to crime control. However, they also reported that the process did not realign decision-making toward street supervisors, nor did it provide sector captains with greater flexibility in using organizational resources. Although the use of crime data and analyses for problem and hot spot identification were a centerpiece of the Compstat process, the captains rarely referenced data beyond personal perceptions and police reports to understand the conditions that cultivate crime patterns and hot spots. Further, the Willis et al. (2004) study revealed that captains habitually relied on traditional crime control tactics rather than engage in more creative and innovative strategies to deal with crime hot spots. While the LPD’s Compstat was established, in part, to encourage information sharing and innovative problem-solving, Willis et al. (2004) suggested that Lowell fell short of achieving these goals because the meeting reinforced traditional, hierarchical command and control constitutions that impeded the reforms and innovation that they had hoped to achieve. The current study This research analyzes process data collected during the implementation of a randomized controlled trial to test the impact of problem-

45. oriented policing on crime and 24 B.J. Bond and A.A. Braga disorder hot spots in Lowell (Braga & Bond, 2008). Using computerized mapping technology, 34 crime and disorder hot spots were identified and subsequently matched into 17 like pairs; one member of each pair was randomly allocated to treatment and control conditions. The intervention period lasted for one year (1 September 2005 through 31 August 2006). Superintendent Davis assigned ultimate responsibility for the implementation of the problem-oriented policing intervention at the treatment places to the captains that managed the LPD three policing sectors. The problem- oriented policing intervention was managed through monthly ‘problem-solving meetings’ designed to ensure adequate treatment dosage in treatment crime hot spots. The control hot spot areas experienced the routine amount and kinds of police strategies that such areas in Lowell would experience without focused intervention – arbitrary patrol interventions, routine follow-up investigations by detectives, and ad hoc community problem- solving attention. Policing actions at the control hot spots were managed through the LPD’s bi-weekly Compstat meetings. These meetings were attended by the research team to document possible contamination issues – whether the control hot spots

46. were receiving concentrated police actions that were similar to the interventions implemented at the treatment hot spots. While control hot spots were not acknowledged as such, these locations were routine subjects of Compstat meetings as persistent problem places that required ongoing police attention. When control hot spots were addressed, the research team took careful notes on the discussion that followed. It is worth noting here that treatment hot spots would occasionally be mentioned during the Compstat process. Analytical framework and data collection The randomized controlled trial design facilitated a structured comparison between the problem-solving meetings that guided the implementation of the problem-oriented policing intervention at the treatment hot spots and the Compstat meetings that governed problem-solving attention in the comparison hot spots. Qualitative data collected to monitor treatment and control conditions were analyzed to understand the key characteristics and dynamics of the two sets of management accountability meetings. The analytical framework draws on group/team3 effectiveness research to examine whether meeting characteristics and dynamics had an influence on the observed differences. The Inputs-Process-Outcome (IPO) framework is applied to the LPD meetings to explore the connection among the inputs into group work, group process behaviors to develop

47. strategies and tactics to address crime and disorder, and their impact on working group outcomes (Campion, Medsker & Higgs, 1993; Gladstein, 1984). The application of the IPO framework to this research is appropriate for two reasons. First, since the LPD was the site for both sets of meetings, organizational factors were constant. Variations in organizational culture, hierarchy, policies, and procedures can have strong impacts on group dynamics. Second, the Compstat and the treatment problem-solving meetings had very similar crime-reduction and accountability objectives. Qualitative data were collected using two basic techniques: (1) overt participant observation; and (2) intensive interviewing of LPD commanders, managers, and officers. As described by Lofland and Lofland (1984), participant observation is the process in which a researcher gains a close and intimate familiarity with a given group of individuals and their practices through an intensive involvement with people in their natural environment, usually over an extended period of time. In this study, the LPD was overtly observed by the research team in two sets of crime control meetings and field settings as researchers monitoring the implementation of an experiment. Intensive Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 25 interviewing, also described by Lofland and Lofland (1984) as

48. ‘unstructured interviewing,’ involves recurring guided conversations to discover the subject’s experience of a particular topic or situation. Over the course of the experiment, N = 14 monthly problem- solving meetings and N = 22 bi-monthly Compstat meetings were observed.4 In both meetings, the number of participants and their level and nature of participation, patterns of participation, participant roles within the agency, and the content of conversations involving strategies to address hot spot locations were carefully documented. The research team also interviewed key LPD staff at scheduled meetings and through informal conversations.5 Qualitative data on the genesis and implementation of crime control strategies were also collected during N = 52 weekly ride-alongs to monitor progress at treatment hot spots and N = 12 monthly researcher site observations to document actions taken at control hot spots.6 We sought to improve reliability of the qualitative data by cross-checking and probing study participants’ responses to the interview questions. Interview and meeting observation data were recorded in the form of handwritten notes, transcribed, and analyzed by the authors. In the analysis, we selected statements that illustrated themes consistently found throughout the data. The quotes used were not atypical, with the exception of a few

49. issues that we indicate a small number of respondents mentioned. We were also careful throughout the data analysis to ensure that the emerging themes correctly reflected respondents’ descriptions. Thus, the research team utilized grounded theory methods to identify recurrent topics in addition to less common but salient issues (Strauss, 1987). Results Meeting inputs While the problem-solving meetings were based on the LPD’s Compstat process, there were some obvious differences. The problem-solving meetings were held on a monthly rather than bi-weekly basis. Compstat centered on the identification of crime patterns and hot spots across the city and within sectors, while problem- solving meetings focused on 17 persistent crime and disorder hot spots. The problem-solving meetings were also smaller, with a mean of 13 participants that included Davis, then-Deputy Superintendent Kenneth Lavallee, the three sector captains and selected officers from their commands, the Community Liaison, the Director of Research and Development, and a civilian analyst from the Crime Analysis Unit. Compstat meetings averaged 27 participants; the additional meeting members included other members of the LPD command staff and external agency representatives (such as probation officers, prosecutors, and others).

50. It is also important to note here that the Compstat meetings were held in a large room with the LPD command staff seated around a U-shaped table facing a screen with projected computerized crime statistics for presentation purposes. Lowering ranking officers, civilian staff, and members of outside agencies were seated around the table. Superintendent Davis or one of the Deputy Superintendents led the meeting as a formal question-and-answer session for particular sector captains with occasional input from other high-ranking LPD officers on specific issues. In contrast, the problem-solving meetings were held in a smaller room with all participants (regardless of rank, civilian/ sworn status, or external observer status) sat around a single rectangular table. While Superintendent Davis or Deputy Superintendent Lavallee led the meetings, the format was much less formal and there was an expectation that everyone around the table needed to participate in the discussion. 26 B.J. Bond and A.A. Braga At each problem-solving meeting, the crime analyst presented simple trend analyses of citizen calls for service and crime incidents in each of the treatment hot spots to determine whether crime and disorder problems were being positively impacted. If the data revealed that calls for service were decreasing, Superintendent Davis praised the

51. captains and their officers and asked them to explain why they believed their actions were producing the desired effects, and what else could be done to keep calls for service decreasing. If the analysis revealed that the number of citizen calls for service had remained the same or increased, Superintendent Davis peppered the captains with questions about their plans for dealing with recurring problems in the hot spot areas. The problem-solving meetings also served as a venue for the command staff, captains, officers, and other LPD staff to explore and share ideas on plausibly effective prevention strategies for persistent problems in the treatment places. While the performance measurement accountability principles were borrowed from Compstat, the activities at the problem-solving meetings represented an ongoing scanning, analysis, response, and assessment process (see Eck & Spelman, 1987). The routine measurement and review of strategies in the treatment places served as an important mechanism to ensure that there was a strong treatment dosage for the experiment. The problem-solving meetings were designed to ensure that the captains and their officers were implementing the problem-oriented policing program and adhering to the requirements of the experimental research design. These meetings were explicitly focused on implementing the approach by addressing local community concerns as measured by trends in citizen calls for service in the treatment hot spot areas, holding police managers

52. accountable for dealing with identified problems, and serving as a venue to enhance the creativity of implemented responses through open discussion and idea sharing. Research on group work suggests that inputs such as group size, group composition, and task design influence the outcomes of working groups (Campion et al., 1993; Stewart, 2006). Our analysis documented that the Compstat meetings were larger and group composition was slightly more varied than the problem- solving meetings. Our analyses of the qualitative data also suggested neither group size nor composition seem to exert noteworthy independent effects on the meetings. The smaller size of the problem-solving meetings may have made it easier to conduct intimate conversations of particular problems. However, as will be discussed further below, the meeting processes were much more influential in explaining variations in outcomes between the Compstat and problem-solving meetings. Task design represents what the group is attempting to accomplish (Hackman & Oldham, 1980). In the Compstat meetings, Superintendent Davis tended to guide conversations towards clusters of crime incidents within a particular sector, specifically including the 17 comparison hot spots. In this way, the task designs of the two meetings were broadly similar as both meetings were intended to produce the same outcomes – increased problem-solving responses and reduced crime at

53. specific problem places. However, the geography of targeted crime problems were clearly more variable in the Compstat meetings as discussions, at times, ranged from specific addresses to neighbor- hoods. Another important difference was the explicit identification of specific problems within each targeted treatment hot spot in the problem-solving meetings. On average, the sector captains identified four problems per treatment hot spot that seemed to generate recurring crimes. These problems became a ‘caseload’ of work: underlying conditions associated with these problems were dissected, appropriate responses were discussed, and response performance was measured repeatedly over the course of the experiment. Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 27 Meeting process Meeting process elements include a variety of group dynamics, including communication and cooperation behaviors, constructive feedback systems, collaborative planning practices, the level of interdependence and trust among participants, and the functional diversity and roles participants represent in the organization and group (Williams & Allen, 2008). Analysis of our qualitative data from the Compstat and problem-solving meetings suggested that the two working groups had the greatest

54. differences in three key areas: communication and information sharing, collaborative planning, and the appreciation of the roles and skill sets of a broader range of group members in achieving group goals. Communication and information sharing Communication and information sharing are recognized as influencing group effectiveness (Woolley, Gerbasi, Chabris, Kosslyn, & Hackman, 2008). Woolley et al. (2008) asserts that it is more than just information sharing that matters, but rather the revealing, organizing, and pooling of information that matters most to outcomes. The LPD Compstat meetings almost always involved one-to-one communication between the lead executive officer and the sector captains in a mechanical and, often, superficial manner. Similar to the observations made by Willis et al. (2004), communication exchanges were usually perfunctory, involving quick reviews of identified problems and brief reports on responses by the sector captains. While we did not observe any instances where sector captains were publicly humiliated, the communications by the lead executive officer were highly authoritarian in nature and occasionally dismissive when the sector captains provided answers that were believed to be uninformed or incorrect. Unless the Superintendent prompted another meeting member to

55. contribute, the captain of the reporting sector was the only person discussing problems at these varying high-crime places. Moreover, these discussions often did not lead to conversations on appropriate problem-solving responses that were linked to underlying conditions and dynamics. Over the course of the study, we documented N = 170 distinct discussions of spatial crime problems at Compstat meetings. Only 25.8% (N = 44) of these discussions were followed by a problem-oriented conversation about the varied ways LPD officers could impact these persistent spatial crime problems. Unfortunately, the resulting responses usually included a preponderance of traditional enforcement actions. Many instances were noted where deficient problem-solving was driven by a lack of engagement of low-ranking officers and civilian staff. For instance, in Compstat meeting 1, the Superintendent asked the North Sector captain to report on his plans for addressing community concerns over an assault hot spot in the downtown area. The captain responded by simply stating that he was ‘redeploying officers to address community concerns and complaints.’ The community liaison was not asked to report on community concerns and substance of the LPD’s response to the problem. In fact, across the observed Compstat Meetings, this important LPD staff member was rarely asked to comment on any police-community communication issues.

56. In Compstat meeting 19, the Superintendent requested the East Sector captain to explain some concerning increases in sector-wide property and violent crime trends by reflecting on the content of the underlying crime incident reports. The captain responded by stating, ‘Chief, I don’t know how these statistics are generated, and I’m not sure I 28 B.J. Bond and A.A. Braga ever will.’ The crime analyst who was managing the presentation of crime statistics for the Compstat meetings was not asked to provide any insights on the underlying crime incident reports. Rather than engage in what could have been a valuable conversation about the data, the conversation moved to the next topic. After each of these Compstat meetings, we asked the community liaison and crime analyst why they did not offer any insights. Both expressed concerns that it would be detrimental to their careers if they offered information that contradicted their superiors. This parallels previous research findings that most Compstat participants do not contribute information to avoid the perception of questioning authority (Weisburd et al., 2006; Willis et al., 2004). Problem-solving meetings fostered a more participatory and democratic problem- solving approach, without minimizing the accountability of captains. The communica-

57. tion tone of the lead executive officer was less formal, more engaging, and inclusive. Captains were encouraged to discuss crime problems and their problem-solving ideas, without a fear of being embarrassed if an idea was incomplete or failed. All meeting members were expected to contribute and share information. In problem-solving meeting 5, the crime analyst began the conversation on treatment hot spots in the West Sec- tor by observing, ‘Three hot spot areas seem to be driving the numbers, so maybe we should focus on those areas.’ The West Sector captain and two patrol officers then followed this observation by identifying the underlying problems that might be driving the increases and the entire group contributed to the search for potential responses. In problem-solving meeting 5, Superintendent Davis suggested, ‘Let’s look at the hot spots with crime reductions so we can try to understand why other hot spots are not showing the same decreases.’ Instead of offering the same perfunctory replies used in Compstat meetings, the sector captains engaged in a thoughtful discourse on the observed differences. Other participants, such as the community liaison, enriched the discussion by contributing information based on what they knew from their work in the hot spots. Problem-solving meeting members were encouraged to participate with the intent of offering feedback in order to improve upon, rather than simply criticize, ideas. In organizational research, this is known as ‘voice behavior’ (LePine &

58. Dyne, 1998 and this manner of risk-taking communication has been found to influence group outcomes positively (Edmondson, 1999). For instance, in problem-solving meeting 3, Deputy Superin- tendent Lavallee asked participating officers if their strategies at their various treatment hot spots included serving warrants. The East Sector lieutenant responded by stating ‘we are focusing on car break problems in this hot spot because that is our biggest problem, and while warrant checks are important, they are not of greatest concern to the police or the community at the moment.’ Deputy Lavallee accepted this explanation without questioning the lieutenant’s judgment, suggesting a dynamic in support of open and honest communication without fear of reprimand. Risk- taking communication was rarely observed at Compstat Meetings. Captains … THE NUMBERS DILEMMA: THE CHIMERA OF MODERN POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS JAMES F. GILSINAN* INTRODUCTION In the lexicon of dyadic American folk sayings, "motherhood and apple pie" is. being joined by "transparency and accotmtability." Similarly, like "motherhood and apple pie," one takes on the iconic nature of

59. the saying at considerable risk. After all, who could be against transparency and accountability? Management gum Stephen R. Covey argues that, "[ajccountability breeds response-ability."^ This formulation neatly captures, the assumed relationship between accountability and performance. There is also an assumed relationship between transparency and a robust democratic system.̂ Joumalist Peter Finn notes, a "basic tenet of a healthy democracy is open dialogue and transparency." Finally, accountability and transparency are seen as reinforcing each other." Being held accountable assvunes that one's actions are available for review and critique.' Indeed, the Dodd- Fratik Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, passed in the wake of the recent financial meltdown, attempts to regulate the disclosure requirements of fmancial firms on the asstimption that such mandated transparency will result in better performance on the part of banks and other financial institutions.^ Police departments in the United States and elsewhere have been quick to jump on the transparency and accountability bandwagon.^ The increasing use * E. Desmond Lee Professor in Collaborative Regional Education, Department of Public Policy Studies, Saint Louis University.

60. 1. STEPHEN R. COVEY, PRINCIPLE-CENTERED LEADERSHIP 49 (1990). 2. Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 924 (1999). 3. Peter Fenn, POLITICO: THE ARENA (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.politico.com/arena/ perm/Peter_Fenn_l 49A409A-FDA2-41EA-ACA1- 41133DF86F66.html. 4. Joshua N. Auerbach, Police Accountability in Kenya, 3 AFR. HUM. RTS. L. J. 275, 282 (2003). 5. Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. R. 29, 29 (2005). . 6. Cody Vitello, The Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 & What it Means for Joe & Jane Consumer, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 99, 101 (2010). 7. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. .1107, 1163 (2000). 93 94 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX11:93 of accessible, web-based, real time crime data, using geographic information

61. system (GIS) technology to display neighborhood crime pattems, represents the move toward transparency on the part of major city police departments.^ Similarly, the rapid adoption of COMPSTAT-like programs in mid to large size departments speaks to a willingness to be held accountable for crime occurrences and their control.' Unfortunately, there are a multitude of reasons why systems designed to increase transparency and accountability will not work and, in fact, may make the very goals sought by programs of organizational reform less likely to be achieved. In this Article, I argue that there are five obstacles facing police reformers seeking to increase transparency and accountability in law enforcement organizations.' Moreover, these obstacles are nearly insurmountable." The phrase "nearly insurmountable" means that while change can and will occur, the changes will, at best, be at the margins of the organization— and, at worst, such changes may make situations in need of correction more problematic.'^ This pessimistic assessment is due to the nature of the numbers themselves; the nature of organizations, particularly those that do not produce an objective product; the culture of policing; the institutional environment in which the police operate; and the larger cultures' failure to distinguish among the

62. concepts of data, information, and knowledge.'^ I. THE SIREN SONG OF COUNTING AND NUMBERS When presented with a table of numbers that purport to objectively measure or describe a phenomenon, in keeping with the dictates of accountability or transparency, or both, the reader is often lulled into a state of process amnesia. Numbers are always the end product of a series of decisions, many of which are subjective and somewhat arbitrary.''' There are at least six decision points that affect the "objective" nature of the numbers being reported.'^ The first is obviously the decision to count one thing rather than another.'^ 8. W. at 1175. 9. John R. Firman, Deconstructing COMPSTAT to Clarify its Intent, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 457, 458 (2003). 10. See m/ra Parts I-V. 11. See Gary W. Sykes, The Functional Nature of Police Reform: The 'Myth' of Controlling the Police, 2 JUST. Q. 51, 53 (1985). 12. Id 13. See infra nott 111. 14. Craig D. Uchida, Carol Bridgeforth & Charles F. Wellford, Law Enforcement Statistics:

63. The State of the Art, 5 AM. J. POLICE 23, 29 (1986). 15. Id 16. Id 2012] THE NUMBERS DILEMMA 95 The simple act of deciding to count or not count something confers or denies a certain importance to an object or outcome. A number of criminal justice examples illustrate the point. Until the early 1970s, domestic assault did not "coiinf as a serious offense.'̂ On the other hand, homosexual activity between consenting adults did "count" as a crime. In fact, why do we bother to count crime at all? Those familiar with the history and the development of the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) know the reason certain kinds of crime were counted was motivated by a political goal: shielding top police officials from the periodic crime cmsades of the tabloid press." The sensationalism of crime reporting, and the consequent threat to the job stability of a police chief, literally could be count-ered by the "objectivity" of numbers.^" Of course, since its beginning, the UCR has been plagued by a second subjective decision point prior to arriving at a number: What counts as an instance of a phenomenon?^'

64. The specifically political nature of this decision point is noted by Deborah Stone who points out that counting requires classification, which in tum requires judgments about inclusion and exclusion—who or what is in or out.̂ ^ Again, the history of the UCR nicely illustrates this dilemma. Crime categories have been known to expand or contract depending on the circumstances at hand. Thus, a mtinicipality heavily dependent on tourism may employ very narrow definitions of what constitutes a criminal act, thereby keeping crime rates low. At budget time, a crime wave, based on expanding the category of what coimts as a crime, may be helpful in obtaining additional resources. The third decision point that illustrates the subjective nature of a number is the choice of a procedure for counting to one. '̂' This may seem straightforward—one thing is one thing. But alas, one thing may be made up of multiple parts; thus, the question becomes whether to count the parts separately or as a unit. The UCR solves this dilemma by introducing a time dimension in 17. Faith E. Lutze & Megan L. Symons, The Evolution of Domestic Violence Policy Through Masculine Institutions: From Discipline to Protection to Collaborative Empowerment, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 319,322 (2003).

65. 18. Bennett Wolff, Expanding the Right of Sexual Privacy, 27 LOY. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1981). 19. Michael D. Maltz, Crime Statistics: A Historical Perspective, 23 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 32, 33 (1977). 20. /¿a t33-34. 21. Id 22. DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 146 (3d ed. 2002). 23. Crime Reporting in the Age of Technology, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. (Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C), 2000, at 12. 24. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 96 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI1:93 deciding how to count to one.̂ ^ For example, if a car is vandalized as part of a series of auto vandalisms that all occurred within the same, designated time period, then that incident is counted as one occurrence of vandalism, even if twenty cars were involved.̂ * The above example introduces the fourth challenge to numeric objectivity—the inability to understand what a number means

66. unless the context in which the number was produced is also provided.^' Put another way, this is the siren song of numbers. Numbers appear to be objective and not tainted by context. Moreover, with too much contextual description, the elegant efficiency of numeric description is lost. This is a particular problem in attempting to use numbers either to provide transparency or to improve performance through accountability.^' There is a well-known aphorism that attests to the need for context: The Govemment are very keen on amassing statistics—they collect them, add them, raise them to the nth power, take the cube root and prepare wonderful diagrams. But you must never forget that every one of those figures comes in the first instance from chowly dar (village watchman), who just puts down what he damn pleases. This nineteenth century British waming continues to be of relevance in assessing modem, twenty-first century police intelligence units charged with analyzing data for the constmction of actionable law enforcement interventions.^ ' In a recent study of British police intelligence analysis units, one analyst is quoted as saying, "the quota of information that we work on is as good as the officer puts on there. If you look at the standards of

67. the [officers'] reports, they're absolutely appalling. You know, and they've got the house number wrong, they've got the beat wrong."''̂ The respondent goes on to note that these mistakes result in the identification of false hot spots—^places of peak crime occurrences. The important point of this, however, is that the analysts make the best of the data they are given and report a de-contextualized version of an event (a series of numbers). As the authors note, those numbers fail to convey either the fluid nature of a criminal occurrence, and, thus, some 25. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK 12 (2004). 26. Id 27. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 28. 5eeUchida, Bridgeforth & Wellford, .yt/pra note 14, at 25. 29. See Martin Innes et al., 'The Appliance of Science?' The Theory and Practice of Crime Intelligence Analysis, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 50-52 (2005). 30. JosiAH STAMP, SOME ECONOMIC FACTORS OF MODERN LIFE 258-59 (1929). 31. Innes et al., supra note 29, at 50-52. 32. Id 33. Id

68. 2012] THE NUMBERS DILEMMA . 97 of its underlying causes, or the interpretive work of the analyzer who fills in gaps in the data so that it becomes "sensical."^'' The inability to convey context exacerbates a fifth characteristic of numbers, the objectification of evaluative criteria—i.e., disguising judgment as measurement.̂ ^ Deborah Stone gives a wonderful example of this process: "Paul Samuelson's best-selling (economic) textbook declared in its 1970 edition that ftill-employment was about 3.5 percent tmemployment; by the time of its 1985 edition, the natural rate of tmemployment had grown to around 6 percent."^* Of course, today, the Obama administration would celebrate a 7 percent tmemployment rate. The tendency of numbers to disguise a judgment as a measurement makes it difficult to hold the entities reporting the numbers accountable and to ensure organizational transparency.'" Finally, as noted previously, the act of counting something confers a status on, or suggests the importance of, the thing counted.''̂ Therefore, both the counter and the coimted react to the process of numbering.^' Organizationally,

69. this refers to producing good numbers whether the entity is a police agency employing COMPSTAT or a school system participating in high stakes testing. The number becomes a goal in and of itself—separate from what the number represents. This unfortunately became the experience of the NYPD over the course of implementing COMPSTAT."" In a study by John Etemo and Eli Silverman, field commanders quickly leamed that they needed to look good (i.e. have good numbers) when presenting at COMPSTAT meetings if they wanted to avoid public humiliation.'" This resulted first in commanders spending inordinate amounts of time constmcting data charts, rather than actually implementing the crime control sfrategies that the analysis might have suggested.''̂ Secondly, there was a strong temptation to manipulate the numbers.''̂ Thus, to tmly understand what a number means, it is necessary to know about the organization that produces the number. It is to this issue that we now tum. 34. Id 35. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 36. STONE, supra note 22, at 169. 37. Id at 176-77. 38. Id at 178. 39. Wat 187. 40. See John A. Etemo & Eli B. Silverman, The New York City

70. Police Department's Compstat: Dream or Nightmare?, 8 INT'L J. OF POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 218, 219-26 (2006). 41. /¿at223. 42. Id at 228. 43. Id at 227. 98 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX11:93 II. ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS AND THE PROBLEM OF REFORM Daniel Kahneman, in a popular sutnmary of current brain research, suggests that there are, at least metaphorically, two systems that control thitiking.'*'* System one is intuitive, quick thinking, and bases conclusions on mental frames developed through past experience.'" These fVames or beliefs are the templates used to explain the world as someone encounters it.'*̂ System two is slower and engages in deliberative assessments of information.'*' However, system two responses require effort, and according to Kahneman, system two often lacks the requisite effort."^ Therefore, if system one presents an explanation that seems to make sense and accords with past experience, system two will accept the conclusions of system one without ftirther analysis

71. and cntique. This observation is parallel to an observation made by Herbert Simon about organizational decision-making. Decision-making in organizations does not involve analyzing all of the information available, but, instead, is represented by a process of "satisficing."" The decision-maker uses mies of thumb, that is, how this current situation is like a previous situation and what the appropriate response was in that previous situation.'^ The use of analogous situations to make decisions mirror what has been discovered by brain research—neither as individuals nor as members of organizations do we optimize our decision-making, picking the best of all possible altematives. Instead, we satisfice, picking the altemative that best seems to fit, without expending a great deal of energy to review—in a systematic way—all other possible choices.'^ Of course, this approach, both individually and organizationally, has some advantages.''* It conserves energy and allows for efficient decision-making." In most cases, such decision-making processes or standard operating 44. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FASTAND SLOW 20 (2011).

72. 45. Id at 105. 46. / ¿a t 21-22. 47. /¿a t49 . 48. / ¿ a t31 . 49. Id. at 24. 50. KEVIN B. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER W. LARIMER, THE PUBLIC POLICY THEORY PRIMER 54 (2009). 51. Id 52. Id at 52. 53. Id at 52-53. 54. See id. at 53. 55. / ¿ a t 54. 2012] THE NUMBERS DILEMMA 99 procedures result in the individual or the organization moving forward to accomplish the task at hand.̂ ^ The disadvantage of this course of action is that often individuals and organizations do not engage in an analytical process that would prevent major problems.̂ ^ Higher order analytical routines are most often employed after the CO fact—what went wrong and why? Post-mortems sometimes result in changed ways of behaving, but these soon become standard operating procedures and

73. satisficing once again becomes the preferred mode of decision- making.^' This suggests that changing the core activity of an organization and its routines of decision-making is very, very difficult. This may be particularly tme in the public sector, where assessing performance is hindered by the lack of a concrete product or outcome.* '̂ Performance criteria are instead infiuenced by political considerations, budgets, and the public In this kind of decision environment, it makes sense to ask whether any particular decision is based on technical or institutional criteria. A decision based on technical criteria responds to a change in the outside environment. '̂' A new product or service is required to keep the organization competitive.^" Therefore, stmctures are designed or redesigned to efficiently and effectively meet this demand.̂ ^ The organization that successfully navigates its environment's technical demands is rewarded with more resources.*^ Failure to do so jeopardizes resources.̂ ^ When an organization employs technical decision processes, it is engaging in a more sophisticated and analytical routine than simply satisficing.*^ A decision based on institutional criteria is much closer to the satisficing model or the system one brain model.*' The criteria for judging

74. the success of 56. KEVIN B. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER W. LARIMER, THE PUBLIC POLICY THEORY PRIMER 54 (2009). 57. See id. at 53; K. A. Arehibald, Three Views of the Expert's Role in Policymaking: Systems Analysis, Incrementalism, and the Clinical Approach, 1 POL'Y SCI. 73, 76, 82 (1970). 58. See Archibald, supra note 57, at 76. 59. Id 60. / ¿ a t 8 2 . 61. SMITH & LARIMER, supra note 50, at 114-15. 62. See id. 63. See Sidney G. Winter, The Satisficing Principle in Capability Learning, 21 STRATEGIC MGMT. J., 981,982(2000). 64. See id. 65. See id. 66. See id. at 983; James Willis et al.. Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 41 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 147, 150(2007). 67. See Winter, supra note 63, at 982. 68. W. at 983. 69. See Willis et al.,5«pra note 66, at 151.

75. 100 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI1:93 the organization involve neither efficiency nor effectiveness.'" The criteria instead involve judging the legitimacy of the organization based on cultural beliefs about how an organization should look and act.'' Perceived legitimacy rather than efficacy is what counts.'^ Organizations operating in this kind of decision climate gain recognition and resoiu-ces by: conforming to cultural beliefs and expectations about what it is they are supposed to do; and by becoming isomorphic with other institutions in their environment that have been rewarded for particular behaviors." Research describing the adoption of COMPSTAT suggests that the adoption has been spurred primarily by institutional considerations.''' The rapid deployment of COMPSTAT mirrors an almost fadlike acceptance of the process rather than a careñil and analytical investigation of how the process might adopt to a particular local situation or what pros and cons such adoption might entail.'^ Change spurred by the dynamic of institutional isomorphism is likely to be superficial. Core technologies and procedures are unlikely to be impacted."

76. This certainly seems to be the case with COMPSTAT.'̂ In a study of three police departments that had adopted COMPSTAT, James Willis and his colleagues concluded that COMPSTAT simply raised reactive policing strategies to new levels. Police would respond quickly to a spike in crime, producing what the authors called a "whack-a- mole" effect."" Contrary to the assumptions of careful plarming and the development of long term strategies, COMPSTAT simply encouraged business as usual, only even more so. Further, while commanders felt responsible for crime in their districts, there was very little communication to beat officers conceming COMPSTAT trends—with the result that officers' daily routines were not impacted by the analysis derived from the gathered data. '̂ 70. Id 71. Id. 72. Matthew J. Giblin, Structural Elaboration and Institutional Isomorphism: The Case of Crime Analysis Units, 29 POLICING: INT'L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 643, 645 (2006). 73. Id 74. Willis et al., supra note 66, at 161. 75. Eterno & Silverman, supra note 40, at 219. 76. Matthew J. Giblin & George W. Burruss, Developing a Measurement Model of

77. Institutional Processes in Policing, 32 POLICING: INT'L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT., 351, 355 (2009). 77. See id 78. See Willis et al. supra note 66, at 152, 174-75. 79. / ¿a t 174. 80. / ¿a t 175. 81. / ¿a t 164-65. 2012] THE NUMBERS DILEMMA 101 Other studies have suggested that COMPSTAT also increased the gulf between the command culture and the street cop culture.̂ ^ For example, in New York, commanders took credit for dips in the crime rate, while passing blame to subordinates if the crime rate spiked in an area.̂ ^ The concept of work culture is an important element in trying to understand why organizational change in general, and change toward more accountability and transparency, in particular, is difficult to achieve. '̂' In public sector agencies, the organizational dynamics just described, together with the cultural dynamics of such organizations, make the likelihood of fundamental change even more remote.̂ ^ We ttim to the role of cultural dynamics next.

78. III. THE CULTURES OF MODERN DAY POLICING Our understanding of the cultural complexity of the modem police agency has come a long way from the studies of the 1970s, which concentrated primarily on the culture of the street officer.̂ * By the end of the decade, it was clear that police organizations had at least two distinct culttires: a street cop culture and a management culttire.̂ ^ Today, it is recognized that there are multiple cultures within police agencies consisting not only of beat officers and higher ranked managers—but civilian cultures which span a fairly large professional hierarchy from clerical support staff, through 911 call-takers and dispatchers, to highly trained and credentialed personnel in such vmits as research and development, human resource management, and forensics.̂ ^ Although not studied quite as intensively as the police subcultures, these other subcultures are beginning to receive more attention.^' In a study this Author conducted on police call-takers, it was evident their work culture was influenced by the stress and strains of being sfreet level bureaucrats with too 82. Eterno & Silverman, supra note 40, at 222-23. 83. W. at 224. 84. Linda Smircich, Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q.

79. 339,346(1983). 85. Peter J. Robertson & Sonal J. Senevir, Outcomes of Planned Organizational Change in the Public Sector: A Meta-Analytic Comparison to the Private Sector, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 547, 548(1995). 86. See JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 57 (4th ed. 2011). 87. ELIZABETH REUSS-IANNI, TWO CULTURES OF POLICING: STREET COPS AND MANAGEMENT COPS 1 (1983). 88. David A. Sklansky, Not Your Father's Police Department: Making Sense of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1209-10, 1229-30 (2006). 89. See, e.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN & MEGAN A. ALDERDEN, NAT'L. INST. OF JUSTICE, JOB SATISFACTION AMONG CIVILIANS IN POLICING l (2011), available at http://www.nationalpolice research.org/job-satisfaction-among-civilia/. 102 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX1I:93 few resources to meet increasing demands.'" Many of the

80. sfrategies they adopted were attempts to gain greater confrol over their work situation while still trying to meet the demands for service emanating from 911 calls." Chief among the sfrategies they employed was attempting to fit a caller's demand into a pre-existing definition of a situation that permitted the dispatch of a car.'^ Call-takers would often prompt callers as to how to appropriately frame their request.'^ A key conclusion of this study was that police agencies do not respond directly to a situation, but instead respond to an organizationally projected frame that takes ambiguous information and forms it into an understandable pattem to which the agency can then respond in a routine fashion.'" A similar conclusion was reached in a study conducted by this Author and a colleague focused on a police research and development (R&D) unit.'^ The source of the ambiguous information for this unit was demands for data that would help other organizational units within the department make a decision about a problematic situation.'* Interestingly, the problem- solving sequence for the R&D tmit did not start with an analysis of the problem they were supposed to research, but with an analysis of the political situation and the agenda of the person making the request." Once there was consensus on the

81. real agenda and on a solution that would meet both political and practical realities, "research" OR was conducted to support this solution. Often, the research consisted of calling other police R&D units to see what they suggested in similar circumstances." This closed system of information processing allowed the organization to do what it would normally do anyway. "Research" simply reinforced standard operating procedures. More recent research on police research units reinforces these initial observations.'"^ Martin Itmes and his colleagues adopt the term "bricolage" to describe the tasks performed by crime analysts in two British police 90. See James F. Gilsinan, They is Clowning Tough: 911 and the Social Construction of Reality, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 332 (1989). 91. See id 92. Id at 332-33. 93. See id. at 340. 94. Id at 341. 95. See generally James F. Gilsinan & J.R. Valentine, Bending Granite: Attempts to Change the Management Perspective of American Criminologists and Police Reformers, 15 J. POLICE

82. SCI. & ADMIN. 196(1987). 96. SeeW. at 197-98. 97. Wat 198-99. 98. See/'rf. atl99. 99. W. at 197. 100. / ¿ a t 202, 203. 101. James F. Gilsinan & J.R. Valentine, iwpra note'95, at 203. (1987). 102. Innes et al., supra note 29, at 54-55. 2012] THE NUMBERS DILEMMA 103 agencies.'"^ Crime analysts work with what they are given and take messy, contingent, and incomplete data to constmct an objective, scientific product.'°'* They put together the bric-a-brac of what they receive from field reports and constmct a coherent pattem of events."" The gaps in data are filled in by what everybody knows to be "tme" about how criminals operate.'"^ The resulting product is a reproduction of the world that allows the department to enact its environment, i.e. project an image of a situation that allows for the carrying out of standard operating procedures."" While units that can contribute to transparency and accountability do not operate in ways that can easily achieve either characteristic,

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