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Dissecting unlawful Internet
         Activities

       Fyodor Yarochkin
      Armorize Technologies
          @fygrave
АГЕНДА




      Observations

      Case studies

      Sampling goods and services

      Q&A


(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
MEET THE AUTHORS




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Our environment


Honeypots (http, ftp, ssh, smtp, ...)

Sandboxes + proactive internet “browsing”

End points around the globe

Public discussion groups of interest:
scrapping and indexing

    (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Overview




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
What makes the news..
  MALWARE
                                  Black SEO

          Fake AV
                                   Mass Injections
CC abuse



 (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
MAIN ACTORS


                      Profit Oriented
Kiddies                    Crime        APT




   (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Range of players!




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Kiddies: hit our honeypots daily :)




    (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Still live in IRCBOT age




 (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
APT
•   Kiddies are not very interesting.
    Following the APT guys is a bit more
    fun




      APT – advanced persistent threat
      (made lots of noise after Aurora attacks
      But, .. how advanced that is.. really :-))



       (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
APT: attack vectors – often
         plain silly




   (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
APT: in taiwan

•   Targets: academics, post, rail, ..




        (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
APT: main characteristics


•   Attacks are planned and methodological
•   In many instances – the primary aim of an
    action is information gathering (i.e.
    javascript that collects and posts the user
    environment information)
•   Malicious content is well-prepared (digitally
    signed w/ valid certificates etc etc)
        (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
APT      Research from xecure-lab guys




  (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Aptdeezer: apt analysis
platform from xecure-lab




  (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Businessmen are fun to
       study:)
         Traffic                         Online goods
                                  services




 (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
How to steal a million?




  (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Effectiveness


• Old school: steal it from a bank. Make a lot
  of noise and either get caught (or run to
  South America)
• New school: steal a dollar from a million
  people. It is still a million (and no noise).



      (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
So, where is the money?
        DIRECT SOURCES:
 Ads (PPC)                              Banking credentials
    Pharm                         CC cashing
       Pr0nExtortions
“Software”                                   Mobile scam
      INDIRECT SOURCES:
   TRAFF Credentials Online goods
                      & services
       (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
TRAFFIC..




• You need users to start visiting your “milking
  resource” to start with..
      (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
TRAF. COST


• AU - 300-550$

• UK - 220-300$

• IT - 200-350$

• NZ - 200-250$

• ES,DE,FR - 170-250$

• US - 100-150$

• RU, UA, KZ, KG .. 10-40$
(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Case studies~




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Infrastructure compromise: case
study




   (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
UNDER THE HOOD




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Looking into Packet fields




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
TRACKING THE GHOST




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
HYPO: ATTACK SCENARIO




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
RESULTED IN...
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?
alertId=17778




     (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Compromised CAs




•   How about combining this and
    compromised CA?




        (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
WHAT HAD HAPPENED..



     tunnel source <interface>




    tunnel destination <badIP>


       Your taffic is mirrored!!
(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
How were they 0wn3d?




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
AND MORE..




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
LESSON LEARNT




 • The whole city compromised

 • Users infected on the fly. Visiting
   legimate web sites
 • Tricky to investigate

 • Affected parties - complete denial

(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Other varieties ;-)




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Ad ABUSE:
“MALVERTISEMENT”




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Introducing ad. Space
                 hell :)
Source: razorfishmedia.com




               (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Ad network dynamic
                bidding
•   Ad network dynamic bidding system is asking for
    abuse :-)
    •   Decentralized, small players feed data to
        bigger guys (doubleclick), verification is mostly
        manual, real-time content tampering is easy,
        automated target selection, number of
        mechanisms that prevent click fraud (and
        makes automated analysis hard!!!)
•


           (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
MALVERT. Mechanics


iframe

    redirect

               iframe

                        redirect




                                           iframe
          (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies    Iframe to TDS
Malvertisement (cont)




 (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Malvert: agencies get
              0wned
•   Pulpomedia incident:




          (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Extortions going
        international




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Also spanish version

Credit: http://xylibox.blogspot.com/




     (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Common characteristics


     Registration Service Provided By: Bizcn.com
     Website: http://www.cnobin.com                   person:
                                                       person:        Ionut Tripa
                                                                       Ionut Tripa
                                                 remarks:
                                                  remarks:       SC GoldenIdeas SRL
                                                                  SC GoldenIdeas SRL
     Whois Server: whois.bizcn.com
                                               address:
                                                address:      Str. Drumul Sarii, nr. 57C
                                                               Str. Drumul Sarii, nr. 57C
                                                  address:
                                                   address:      Sector 6, Bucuresti
                                                                  Sector 6, Bucuresti
     Domain name: bundespol.net                     phone:
                                                     phone:         +0744885334
                                                                     +0744885334
                                           abuse-mailbox: goldenideas.ionut@yahoo.com
                                            abuse-mailbox: goldenideas.ionut@yahoo.com
• Hosting and domain registration
     Registrant Contact:
      Whois Privacy Protection Service
                                                      nic-hdl:
                                                       nic-hdl:
                                                    source:
                                                     source:
                                                                     IT1737-RIPE
                                                                      IT1737-RIPE
                                                                    RIPE # Filtered
                                                                     RIPE # Filtered
      Whois Agent gmvjcxkxhs@whoisservices.cn     mnt-by:
                                                   mnt-by:       GOLDENIDEAS-MNT
                                                                  GOLDENIDEAS-MNT
      +86.05922577888 fax: +86.05922577111
      No. 61 Wanghai Road, Xiamen Software Park
      xiamen fujian 361008
      cn




     (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
WAS ON THE NEWS




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
COMMON PATTERNS




Exploits                         Social tricks


(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
“Social engineering”




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Well-operated :)


• Spreads through advertisements (social
  engineering and exploits)
• Reboots machine until license is purchased
  (80USD)
• Provides support hotline (hosted in India)
• Uses legimate payment gateways (possible
  to do refunds)
      (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Another attack:
          infrastructure




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Infrastructure

Speedtest.net


                          Ads.ookla.com



                      http://35ksegugsfkfue.cx.cc
       (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
TDS systems: TRAFF
marketplace




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
COMMON TDS




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
TDS + verification srv




 (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
SEO:Another option

• Black SEO:




      (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
SEO USE and abuse :)

                                 <*bad* word (rus)




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
SEO SERVICES




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Goods and services :
    Sampling :)




 (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Digital currencies

•   Modern day hawalla




     (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Amusing portals




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
PASSPORT COPIES




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
.. OR A SET




                                 For money of any state of dirtiness
                                 Pack includes
                                 1. Online bank account access
                                 2.ATM card (1000/6000USD
                                    per month withdrawal limit)
                                 3. online access passwords
                                 4. Passport copy of “poor john”
                                 5. SIM card




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
MALWARE Q/A AND HOSTING




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Abuse-resistant hosting




  (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
CLOUD-cracking




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
AND CAPTCHA




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
MOBILE
So far - easy to spot with
  static analysis tools
     (android, j2me)




       (c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Press the button “stop” as soon as
                                 possible!




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
LEARNING POSSIBILITIES :)




(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies
Questions




                                    l

(c) 2011 Armorize Technologies

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