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From LOW to PWNED
  Chris Gates
  Carnal0wnage
  Lares Consulting
meterpreter> getuid

• Chris Gates (CG)
   –   Twitter carnal0wnage
   –   Blog carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com
   –   Job Partner/Principal Security Consultant at Lares
   –   Affiliations  Attack Research, Metasploit, wXf
• Work

• Previous Talks
   –   Dirty Secrets of Pentesting
   –   Attacker Capability Driven Pentests
   –   Attacking Oracle (via web)
   –   wXf Web eXploitation Framework
   –   Open Source Information Gathering
   –   Attacking Oracle (via TNS)
   –   Client-Side Attacks
What The Hell Are You Talking About

• We have an overreliance on Vulnerability
  Scanners and commercial Pentest Frameworks
  (Core Impact, Canvas, Metasploit Pro).

• So much that if the “tool” says it isn’t exploitable
  many consultants don’t even try.

• Clients can fail to remediate the vulnerabilities in
  the “low” and “medium” areas of the
  vulnerability scan or pentest report.
   – Reasons? Time, lack of prioritization, trained/conditioned not to
     care about lows  we have a winner!
What The Hell Are You Talking About

• Organizations should focus on the vulns that a
  million people can compromise on their network
  and not the random 0day that might exist out
  there.

• Fix the low hanging fruit (this isn’t new) don’t rely
  on some scanner to find all the 0wnable stuff for
  you…it can’t and won’t.

• How many IDS/IPS signatures exist for the stuff
  that is “low” and “medium”?
Bottom Line

• Don’t rely on vulnerability scanners to prioritize your
  “order of remediation” for you VA/Pentests. Stop
  letting tools tell you what’s important.

• Pentesters need to investigate LOW and MEDIUM
  vulns as thoroughly as the do HIGH vulnerabilities.

• Clients need to investigate/fix LOW and MEDIUM
  vulns as thoroughly as they do HIGH vulnerabilities.

• Keep a human in the mix 
Your passwords suck
Your passwords suck

• One of these passwords almost always works…

  password[1]          Passw0rd[1]

  Password[1]          $Company[1-10]

  Password123          $Company123

  welcome1             changeme123

  welcome123           p@ssw0rd[1]

  Username123          p@ssw0rd123

  $Season$Year         Welcome$YEAR
Exposed Services

• Remembering that your passwords suck…
• VNC with no password =


• VNC with a password of “password” =



• Same thing goes for SSH, Telnet, FTP, etc
• Oh yeah and databases (MSSQL, MySQL, Oracle)
  with access to the world
Exposed Services  Admin Interfaces

• Admin Interfaces listening on random ports can be gold.
• Finding them amongst all the crap can be challenging.
• Random interfaces typically get a:



• Possible Methodology
   –   Nmap your range
   –   Import into metasploit
   –   Use the db_ searches to pull out all hosts you want
   –   Some ruby to make them into a piece of html
   –   Use linky to open everything
Exposed Services  Admin Interfaces
Exposed Services  Admin Interfaces




• msf > services -o /tmp/demo.csv
Exposed Services  Admin Interfaces

• Ruby
Exposed Services  Admin Interfaces
Exposed Services  Admin Interfaces
Exposed Services  Admin Interfaces
Exposed Services  Admin Interfaces
Exposed Services  Admin Interfaces




      Default creds…weblogic/weblogic
Exposed Services  Admin Interfaces




      Deploy .war files 
ColdFusion

• Whhhhaaaat? ColdFusion?
• Originally released in 1995 by Allaire
   – Motivation: make it easier to connect simple HTML pages to a
     database
• Along the way became full Java
• Latest version is ColdFusion 9 released in 2009
   – Most recent features focus on integration with other
     technologies, e.g. Flash, Flex, AIR, Exchange, MS Office, etc.
   – Frequent to see CF 7 – 9
• Open Source CFML avalable as well
   – BlueDragon, Railo, Mura CMS
ColdFusion
ColdFusion
ColdFusion

• XSS abundant
• SQL Injection *common*
• Info disclosure via verbose error messages abundant

• More to this talk…because each patch must be applied
  individually I almost always find a CF box vulnerable to
  either:
   – Locale traversal CVE: 2010-2861
       • coldfusion_locale_traversal.rb
   – Adobe XML External Entity Injection: CVE-2009-3960
       • adobe_xml_inject.rb
ColdFusion

• Locale traversal




• Full walkthru here:
• http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/coldfusion-directory-traversal-
  faq-cve-2010-2861/
ColdFusion

• Adobe XML External Entity Injection




http://www.security-assessment.com/files/advisories/2010-
02-22_Multiple_Adobe_Products-
XML_External_Entity_and_XML_Injection.pdf
ColdFusion

• Adobe XML External Entity Injection




http://www.security-assessment.com/files/advisories/2010-
02-22_Multiple_Adobe_Products-
XML_External_Entity_and_XML_Injection.pdf
ColdFusion
Jboss/Tomcat server-status

• We know unauth’d deploy is the bomb, but sometimes
  sever status reveals fun things

• ?full=true

• Lists of applications
• Recent URL’s accessed
   – With sessionids 
• Find hidden services/apps
• Enabled servlets
Jboss/Tomcat server-status
Jboss/Tomcat server-status
Jboss/Tomcat server-status (find pwned stuff)
Jboss/Tomcat server-status (find pwned stuff)
Jboss/Tomcat server-status (find pwned stuff)
Jboss/Tomcat server-status
Browsable Directories

• “Index of” can be your friend same with “web mirroring”
Browsable Directories
Browsable Directories
Browsable Directories
Browsable Directories
Browsable Directories
Browsable Directories




                         Database Backup
                         Site Backup – with
                        DecryptMe function 
Browsable Directories
Browsable Directories
SharePoint
SharePoint

• Misconfigured SharePoint can be *really* useful
   – User/Domain Enumeration
   – Access to useful files


• Auth’d access to SharePoint almost always is *really*
  useful
   – That’s really another talk…but its mint
   – Go ask Nickerson
SharePoint Finding Stuff
SharePoint Finding Stuff
• Stach and Liu’s SharePoint Diggity tools
   – http://www.stachliu.com/resources/tools/sharepoint-hacking-
     diggity-project/
• Roll your own
   – http://code.google.com/p/fuzzdb/source/browse/trunk/Discovery
     /PredictableRes/Sharepoint.fuzz.txt
SharePoint (Open Access)
SharePoint (User Enumeration)
SharePoint (User Enumeration)
SharePoint (User Enumeration)
• Can (ab)use web services calls to get account info (requires auth)
SharePoint (User Enumeration)
• Can (ab)use web services calls to get account information
  (requires auth)

POST /_vti_bin/usergroup.asmx HTTP/1.1
Host: 1.2.3.4
Content-Type: application/soap+xml; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 367

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<soap12:Envelope
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:soap12="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope">
  <soap12:Body>
    <GetAllUserCollectionFromWeb
xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/director
y/" />
  </soap12:Body>
</soap12:Envelope>
Your passwords suck
SharePoint
HTTP PUT/WebDAV/SEARCH
HTTP PUT/WebDAV/SEARCH

• Normally when you get a WebDAV enabled its not
  writable.
• IIS5 is awesome (not) because WebDAV is enabled by
  default but web root is not writable.
• So the “game” is finding the writable directory (if one
  exists).
   – Dirbusting and ruby FTW
• Its usually NOT the web root.
HTTP PUT/WebDAV/SEARCH
HTTP PUT/WebDAV/SEARCH

• HTTP PUT/SEARCH usually get hidden in


• Web scanners are better about alerting on PUT as an
  available method, but don’t test for it
   – Writable HTTP PUT is rare (least for me)


• HTTP SEARCH can be fun. When enabled, will give you a
  listing of every file in the webroot.


• REF: http://www.room362.com/blog/2011/8/26/iis-
  search-verb-directory-listing.html
HTTP PUT/WebDAV/SEARCH
HTTP PUT/WebDAV/SEARCH
Apple Filing Protocol

• The Apple Filing Protocol (AFP) is a network protocol that
  offers file services for Mac OS X and original Mac OS. In
  Mac OS X, AFP is one of several file services supported
  including Server Message Block (SMB), Network File
  System (NFS), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), and WebDAV.
   – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_Filing_Protocol
Apple Filing Protocol
Apple Filing Protocol

• What can I do with it?
   – Read access to files/folders
   – Write access (sometimes)
• Discovery?
   – Nmap scripts
       •   afp-showmount
       •   afp-serverinfo
       •   afp-ls
       •   afp-brute
       •   afp-path-vuln (directory traversal exploit)
Apple Filing Protocol

• Nmap
Apple Filing Protocol
• Nmap
Apple Filing Protocol
• Connect with OS X
Apple Filing Protocol
• Connect with OS X
Apple Filing Protocol
• Connect with Linux
   – Afpfs-ng 32 bit only (?)
Apple Filing Protocol
• Connect with Linux
Apple Filing Protocol
• Connect with Linux
Apple Filing Protocol
• Connect with Linux
Apple Filing Protocol
Trace.axd

• Trace.axd is an Http Handler for .Net that can be used to
  view the trace details for an application. This file resides in
  the application’s root directory. A request to this file
  through a browser displays the trace log of the last n
  requests in time-order, where n is an integer determined
  by the value set by requestLimit=”[n]” in the application’s
  configuration file.
   – http://www.ucertify.com/article/what-is-traceaxd.html
• It is a separate file to store tracing messages. If you have
  pageOutput set to true, your webpage will acquire a large
  table at the bottom. That will list lots of information—the
  trace information. trace.axd allows you to see traces on a
  separate page, which is always named trace.axd.
   – http://www.dotnetperls.com/trace
Trace.axd
Trace.axd
Trace.axd

• What can I do with it?
   – Read ALL variables and data from HTTP requests
   – POST requests rock! 
• Discovery?
   – Metasploit
   – Vuln Scanners
Trace.axd

• Metasploit
Trace.axd

• Examples
Trace.axd

• Examples
Trace.axd

• Examples
Trace.axd
Citrix
Citrix
Citrix
Citrix
Citrix

• What can I do with it?
   – Access to published applications
   – Escape from those published applications 
• Discovery?
   – Metasploit
   – Nmap TCP: 80,443,1494 (ICA)
           – UDP: 1604
   – Vuln Scanners
Citrix

• Nmap
Citrix (Published Applications)
• Nmap
Your passwords suck
Citrix (Published Applications)

• Nmap
Citrix (Published Applications)

• Nmap
Citrix (ICA)
Citrix (ICA)
Citrix (ICA)
Citrix (ICA)
Citrix (Published Applications--Escape)
Citrix (Published Applications --Escape)
Citrix (Published Applications --Escape)

• Ikat is awesome…
   – http://ikat.ha.cked.net
Citrix
Recap

• Don’t rely on vulnerability scanners to prioritize your
  “order of remediation” for you VA/Pentests. Stop
  letting tools tell you what’s important.

• Pentesters need to investigate LOW and MEDIUM
  vulns as thoroughly as the do HIGH vulnerabilities.

• Clients need to investigate/fix LOW and MEDIUM
  vulns as thoroughly as they do HIGH vulnerabilities.

• Keep a human in the mix 
Questions?




Chris Gates
@carnal0wnage
cgates [] laresconsulting [] com

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