3. 2002 election performance was poor
Critical decision to be made on party strategy
1.Market development to appeal beyond existing base
2.Seek greater market penetration
4. Reasoning:
1.Potential of existing policies had not been exhausted
2.Better vote management through formal pact with
FG would maximise support
5. Direct contrast to 2002 strategy which adopted a more
independent line and viewed formal alliances as
problematic
2002 voters assessment was that there was no choice
but Fianna Fáil
6. Fine Gael - Labour Alliance
2004 vote transfer pact with FG
Mullingar Accord extended the relationship in 2005
Clear electable alternative to Fianna Fáil emerged
8. Candidate Selection
More centralised candidate selection in the Labour
Party’s Organisational Subcommittee (OSC)
Recommend the number of candidates for selection
at a convention
Chairperson and Party Leader could also add
candidates to the ticket once election called
(Dublin South: Alex White / Aidan Culhane)
9. Committee led by Dick Spring in 2005 to devise a
candidate strategy
Recommended one-candidate tickets
seven constituencies where two candidates were run
Candidate in every constituency for the first time since
1969
Sitting TDs were unchallenged
10.
11. Labour Candidates in terms of Political Experience
20
15
10
5
0
TD Senator Councillor Electoral Experience New
12. Communication Objectives
Steps taken by the new
alliance to outline:
Shared Vision
Shared Goals
Shared
Responsibilities
Economy Health Education
Crime Tax Housing
13. Communication Objectives
Media Coverage
80%
9% 8%
Steps taken by the new 14% 14%
60%
alliance to outline:
9% 7%
Shared Vision 40% 8% 12%
26% 23%
Shared Goals
20%
Shared
11% 12%
Responsibilities
0%
Enda Kenny Pat Rabbitte
Economy Health Education
Crime Tax Housing
14. Particular effort made to win backing of party members
80% support at convention
Vehicle for achieving more of its objectives
Labour contained more senior political figures with
ministerial experience - important asset for
competence
Characterised the strategy as ensuring a framework for
a centre-left government to replace the centre right
one.
16. The 5 Commitments
1.More Beds in Clean Hospitals.
2.Pre-School education for all our
children.
3.More Gardai on the beat in
neighbourhoods.
4.Abolish the means test for
carers.
5.Enable more people to begin to
buy a house.
18. Campaign Characteristics
1. No substantial revision of policies
2. Conservative candidate selection
3. Focus on communicating an elective alternative to
government
4. Convincing public this is the right choice
Lees Marshment: political marketing by a Sales
Orientated Party
19. Sales Oriented Parties
Attempt to persuade voters by using market
communication
Focus is on selling, using hard persuasive techniques
that may mask weaknesses or problem areas
Try to make voters want it, and what it offers, rather
than change its behaviour to suit what voters want
Research for advertisement and message generation,
but not product (candidate or policy) design
21. Candidates Avg. Vote % elected
Fianna Fáil 106 8,100 73%
Fine Gael 91 6,203 56%
Labour 50 4,184 40%
Green Party 44 2,204 14%
Sinn Féin 41 3,498 10%
P. Democrats 30 1,880 7%
Others 108 1,268 5%
Totals 470 4,395 35%
22. Change since
% vote
2002
Fianna Fáil 41.6% 0.1%
Fine Gael 27.3% 4.8%
Labour 10.1% 0.6%
Green Party 4.7% 0.8%
Sinn Féin 6.9% 0.4%
Prog. Democrats 2.7% 1.2%
Others 6.7% 4.3%
23. Change since
Seats
2002
Fianna Fáil 77 4
Fine Gael 51 20
Labour 20 0
Green Party 6 0
Sinn Féin 4 1
Prog. Democrats 2 6
Others 5 8
165
24. Vote Share Seats
30+ years in the 9 - 12 per cent band
Party has found its level? or is it stuck in a rut?
25. Vote Share Seats
33
19.5% 20 20
16 16 17
15 15 15
11.6% 12
9.9% 9.4% 9.5% 10.4% 10.8% 10.1%
9.1%
6.5%
1977 1981 1982 (Feb) 1982 (Nov) 1987 1989 1992 1997 2002 2007
30+ years in the 9 - 12 per cent band
Party has found its level? or is it stuck in a rut?
26. Plus ça change
Eamon Gilmore
emphasised continuity of
philosophy, improved
organisation and better
presentation of Labour’s
existing values and
policies rather than a more
fundamental reassessment
Poor 2002 performance, Labour had a critical decision to make whether to attempt an aggressive strategy of market development by appealing beyond its existing base to challenge either the market leader (FF) or Fine Gael, Labours main rival for the role of challenger.
They opted for the more conservative strategy of seeking greater market penetration.
The party strategists calculated that the potential of its existing policies had not been exhausted and judged that better vote management through a formal pact with Fine Gael would maximise support.
This was in direct contrast to the strategy used in 2002 where Labour had adopted a more independent position and viewed formal alliances as problematic. Labour strategists felt that the new approach responded to the voters assessment in 2002 that in practice there was no choice but Fianna Fáil.
Before the 2004 local elections, Pat Rabbitte had approved a vote transfer pact with Fine Gael and this was extended in the ‘Mullingar Accord’ agreed by the party’s leadership in 2005. The strategy was formulated to emphasise a clear electable alternative to Fianna Fáil. In this regard it was largely successful.
The Labour Party adopted a more centralised candidate selection process in the Labour Party’s Organisational Subcommittee (OSC). The OSC would recommend the number of candidates for selection at a convention. In addition the OSC Chairperson and Party Leader could also add candidates to the ticket once the election was called. This occurred in Dublin South where Aidan Culhane won the selection at convention, but Alex White was nonetheless added to the ticket.
Working with the OSC, Labour established a committee led by Dick Spring in 2005 to devise a candidate strategy. The committee recommended one-candidate tickets in most cases with exceptions in seven constituencies where two candidates were run in each. Notably this was the first time that Labour ran candidates in every constituency since 1969. Had been attempted in 2002 but was not successful due to lack of suitable candidates. None of the sitting Labour TD’s were challenged.
This conservative approach to candidate selection evidenced by not challenging any of the sitting TD’s is further reflected in the breakdown of the political experience of the Labour Party candidates. Only 5 out of the 50 candidates were new to the process. 40 of the candidates were either sitting TD’s, Senators or local Councillors.
This conservative approach to candidate selection evidenced by not challenging any of the sitting TD’s is further reflected in the breakdown of the political experience of the Labour Party candidates. Only 5 out of the 50 candidates were new to the process. 40 of the candidates were either sitting TD’s, Senators or local Councillors.
This conservative approach to candidate selection evidenced by not challenging any of the sitting TD’s is further reflected in the breakdown of the political experience of the Labour Party candidates. Only 5 out of the 50 candidates were new to the process. 40 of the candidates were either sitting TD’s, Senators or local Councillors.
This conservative approach to candidate selection evidenced by not challenging any of the sitting TD’s is further reflected in the breakdown of the political experience of the Labour Party candidates. Only 5 out of the 50 candidates were new to the process. 40 of the candidates were either sitting TD’s, Senators or local Councillors.
This conservative approach to candidate selection evidenced by not challenging any of the sitting TD’s is further reflected in the breakdown of the political experience of the Labour Party candidates. Only 5 out of the 50 candidates were new to the process. 40 of the candidates were either sitting TD’s, Senators or local Councillors.
This conservative approach to candidate selection evidenced by not challenging any of the sitting TD’s is further reflected in the breakdown of the political experience of the Labour Party candidates. Only 5 out of the 50 candidates were new to the process. 40 of the candidates were either sitting TD’s, Senators or local Councillors.
Steps taken to outline a shared vision as well as clear goals and responsibilities for the new alliance. In a subsequent review of the media coverage of the election campaign it emerged that Fine Gael Leader Enda Kenny, and the Labour Party Leader Pat Rabbitte were almost identical in terms of time and effort invested in each topic. This shows that both parties were consistently on message in communicating the vision, goals and responsibilities of the campaign.
Steps taken to outline a shared vision as well as clear goals and responsibilities for the new alliance. In a subsequent review of the media coverage of the election campaign it emerged that Fine Gael Leader Enda Kenny, and the Labour Party Leader Pat Rabbitte were almost identical in terms of time and effort invested in each topic. This shows that both parties were consistently on message in communicating the vision, goals and responsibilities of the campaign.
Steps taken to outline a shared vision as well as clear goals and responsibilities for the new alliance. In a subsequent review of the media coverage of the election campaign it emerged that Fine Gael Leader Enda Kenny, and the Labour Party Leader Pat Rabbitte were almost identical in terms of time and effort invested in each topic. This shows that both parties were consistently on message in communicating the vision, goals and responsibilities of the campaign.
Steps taken to outline a shared vision as well as clear goals and responsibilities for the new alliance. In a subsequent review of the media coverage of the election campaign it emerged that Fine Gael Leader Enda Kenny, and the Labour Party Leader Pat Rabbitte were almost identical in terms of time and effort invested in each topic. This shows that both parties were consistently on message in communicating the vision, goals and responsibilities of the campaign.
Steps taken to outline a shared vision as well as clear goals and responsibilities for the new alliance. In a subsequent review of the media coverage of the election campaign it emerged that Fine Gael Leader Enda Kenny, and the Labour Party Leader Pat Rabbitte were almost identical in terms of time and effort invested in each topic. This shows that both parties were consistently on message in communicating the vision, goals and responsibilities of the campaign.
Steps taken to outline a shared vision as well as clear goals and responsibilities for the new alliance. In a subsequent review of the media coverage of the election campaign it emerged that Fine Gael Leader Enda Kenny, and the Labour Party Leader Pat Rabbitte were almost identical in terms of time and effort invested in each topic. This shows that both parties were consistently on message in communicating the vision, goals and responsibilities of the campaign.
Steps taken to outline a shared vision as well as clear goals and responsibilities for the new alliance. In a subsequent review of the media coverage of the election campaign it emerged that Fine Gael Leader Enda Kenny, and the Labour Party Leader Pat Rabbitte were almost identical in terms of time and effort invested in each topic. This shows that both parties were consistently on message in communicating the vision, goals and responsibilities of the campaign.
Particular effort made to win the backing of party members and to build a plan for realistic and proportionate gains and risk-sharing. Labour presented the strategy as a vehicle for achieving more of its objectives, as it was the author of more of the policies in the agreed programme and its ranks contained more senior political figures with ministerial experience - an important asset when competence was being stressed. For its traditional supporters it characterised the strategy as ensuring a framework for a centre-left government to replace the centre-right one in place.
Messaging was consistent, clear, and concise. Focus was on the qualities and experience of the Labour party and their candidates more so than particular policies. Labour was presented as a key player in a change of government (centre left v. centre right)
Policy light although it is still clear and concise messaging.
Campaign Characteristics
No substantial revision of policies, relied instead on existing policies.
Conservative candidate selection, although more far reaching than previously.
Focus on communicating an elective alternative to government.
Convincing public this is the right choice.
Applying the Lees Marshment theory of political marketing to this leads us to conclude that the political campaign best describes that of a Sales Oriented Party.
According to Lees Marshment the characteristics of a political marketing campaign run by a Sales Oriented Party include:
Attempt to persuade voters by using market communication.
Focus on selling, using hard persuasive techniques that may mask weakness or problem areas. (Such as the incompatibility of conflicting FG / Lab policies)
Try to make the voters want it, and what it offers, rather than change its behaviour to suit what the voters want. (Didn’t change, but tried to make voters opt for an alternative government to FF)
Research for advertisement and message generation, but not product (candidate or policy) design. (Conservative candidate selection, no substantive policy reform).
Unfortunately for Labour, the strategy of teaming with Fine Gael appeared to benefit Fine Gael more so that Labour.
Over the ten elections during the period 1977-2007, Labour’s vote fell outside the 9-12 per cent band (and its seats outside the band of 15 - 21, only twice. In 1987 it plunged to 6% of the vote, reducing seats to 12, and in 1992 it raised the vote share to 19 per cent and won 33 seats.
The remarkable stability suggests a party that has found its level within the party system, or, some would say, is stuck in a rut.
Over the ten elections during the period 1977-2007, Labour’s vote fell outside the 9-12 per cent band (and its seats outside the band of 15 - 21, only twice. In 1987 it plunged to 6% of the vote, reducing seats to 12, and in 1992 it raised the vote share to 19 per cent and won 33 seats.
The remarkable stability suggests a party that has found its level within the party system, or, some would say, is stuck in a rut.
Over the ten elections during the period 1977-2007, Labour’s vote fell outside the 9-12 per cent band (and its seats outside the band of 15 - 21, only twice. In 1987 it plunged to 6% of the vote, reducing seats to 12, and in 1992 it raised the vote share to 19 per cent and won 33 seats.
The remarkable stability suggests a party that has found its level within the party system, or, some would say, is stuck in a rut.
Upon taking over as leader in the late summer of 2007, Eamon Gilmore emphasised continuity of philosophy, improved organisation, and better presentation of Labour’s existing values and policies rather than a more fundamental reassessment.
Labours performance in 2007 was neither bad enough to prompt a root and branch self examination, nor good enough to lift it into the top division.