SlideShare une entreprise Scribd logo
1  sur  12
Information Supplement:
Protecting Telephone-based
Payment Card Data
Standard: PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)
Version: 2.0
Date: March 2011
The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the
PCI Data Security Standard.
2
Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data
Table of Contents
Executive Summary 3
Clarification of the PCI DSS Guidelines for Voice Recordings 4
Recap: The PCI SSC FAQ 4
PCI DSS Requirements for Stored Cardholder Data 4
Decision Process for Voice Recordings 6
Hints and Tips for Call Centers 8
About the PCI Security Standards Council 12
The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the
PCI Data Security Standard.
3
Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data
Executive Summary
The following information and guidance is intended to provide payment security advice
for merchants and service providers who accept and/or process payment card data
over the telephone. This information highlights the key areas organizations with call-
center operations need to address in order to process payment cards securely, and
how best to protect their business and their customers from the risks of data
compromise and fraud.
The intent of this document is to provide supplemental guidance, and the information
provided here does not replace or supersede PCI DSS requirements. The PCI
Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) is not responsible for enforcing compliance or
determining whether a particular implementation is compliant. Merchants and service
providers should work with their acquirers or payment card brands, as applicable, to
understand their compliance validation and reporting responsibilities.
Why Telephone Card Payment Security is Important
In face-to-face and e-commerce environments, risk-mitigating technologies
have helped significantly reduce fraud rates, resulting in a shift of card fraud
towards the Mail Order / Telephone Order (MOTO) space.
Additionally, a number of regulatory bodies are requiring some companies to
record and store telephone conversations in a range of situations. The
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), however,
stipulates that the three-digit or four-digit card verification code or value
printed on the card (CVV2, CVC2, CID, or CAV2) cannot be retained after
authorization, and full primary account numbers (PANs) cannot be kept
without further protection measures.
As such, there is a risk that organizations taking customer payment card
details over the telephone may be recording the full cardholder details to
comply with various regulatory bodies, thereby causing them to be in
contravention of PCI DSS requirements and potentially exposing cardholder
data to unnecessary risk.
Note that PCI DSS does not supersede local or regional laws, government
regulations, or other legislative requirements.
The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the
PCI Data Security Standard.
4
Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data
Clarification of the PCI DSS Guidelines for Voice Recordings
The impact of PCI DSS has been far-reaching, and its goal to minimize payment card
data loss (malicious or otherwise) from merchant and service provider environments is
becoming a reality.
For all merchants and service providers, this requires appropriate measures to protect
any systems that store, process and/or transmit cardholder data. This impacts call-
recording management and storage, and control of the agent/caller interface within the
physical call-center space. The PCI SSC produced this Information Supplement to
clarify the PCI DSS requirements on voice recordings, to provide some best practices,
and to promote consistency among merchants, service providers and the assessor
community.
Recap: The PCI SSC FAQ
PCI SSC FAQ 5362 – Are audio/voice recordings containing cardholder data
and/or sensitive authentication data included in the scope of PCI DSS?
This response is intended to provide clarification for call centers that record cardholder
data in audio recordings, and applies only to the storage of card validation codes and
values (referred to as CAV2, CVC2, CVV2 or CID codes by the payment brands).
It is a violation of PCI DSS Requirement 3.2 to store any sensitive authentication data,
including card validation codes and values, after authorization even if encrypted.
It is therefore prohibited to use any form of digital audio recording (using formats such
as WAV, MP3, etc.) for storing CAV2, CVC2, CVV2 or CID codes after authorization if
that data can be queried; recognizing that multiple tools exist that potentially could
query a variety of digital recordings.
Where technology exists to prevent recording of these data elements, such technology
should be enabled.
If these recordings cannot be data-mined, storage of CAV2, CVC2, CVV2 or CID
codes after authorization may be permissible as long as appropriate validation has
been performed. This includes the physical and logical protections defined in PCI DSS
that must still be applied to these call-recording formats.
This requirement does not supersede local or regional laws that may govern the
retention of audio recordings.
PCI DSS Requirements for Stored Cardholder Data
In general, no cardholder data should ever be stored unless it is necessary to meet
the needs of the business. Sensitive data on the chip or magnetic stripe must never be
stored after authorization. If an organization stores the primary account number
(PAN), it is crucial to render it unreadable (see PCI DSS Requirement 3.4).
Organizations also must comply with Requirements 3.1 through 3.6 of the PCI DSS
with respect to protection of stored data.
It is important to understand the various elements that are classified as cardholder
data, and especially what constitutes sensitive authentication data.
The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the
PCI Data Security Standard.
5
Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data
The following table gives a summary of the PCI DSS guidelines for cardholder data
elements:
Data Element
Storage
Permitted
Render Stored Account
Data Unreadable per
Requirement 3.4
AccountData
Cardholder
Data
Primary Account
Number (PAN)
Yes Yes
Cardholder Name Yes No
Service Code Yes No
Expiration Date Yes No
Sensitive
Authentication
Data*
Full Magnetic Stripe
Data† No
Cannot store per
Requirement 3.2
CAV2/CVC2/CVV2/
CID
No
Cannot store per
Requirement 3.2
PIN/PIN Block No
Cannot store per
Requirement 3.2
What this means: Essentially, sensitive authentication data must not be retained after
authorization (Requirement 3.2); and for telephone operations, “sensitive
authentication data” means the CAV2/CVC2/CVV2/CID and/or PIN values that may be
taken during a telephone call.
*
Sensitive authentication data must not be stored after authorization (even if encrypted).
†
Full track data from the magnetic stripe, equivalent data on the chip, or elsewhere.
Where to Start
The following page shows the process a merchant should follow when assessing
the risk for their call center operations and aims to further clarify the FAQ above.
The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the
PCI Data Security Standard.
6
Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data
Decision Process for Voice Recordings
The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the
PCI Data Security Standard.
7
Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data
* Flowchart Notes: Are controls in place to ensure Sensitive
Authentication Data cannot be queried?
Sensitive Authentication Data must be secured in a manner consistent with PCI DSS and
must not be able to be queried. Data that is queriable may be retrieved through use of a
search tool or by issuing a system instruction/task or a set of instructions/tasks. Examples of
instructions/tasks that could result in data being retrieved include but are not limited to –
 Defined searches based on character sets or data format
 Database query functions
 Decryption mechanisms
 Sniffer tools
 Data mining functions
 Data analysis tools
 Built-in utilities for sorting, collating or retrieving data
Note: Encrypting sensitive authentication data is not by itself sufficient to render the data
non-queriable.
For data to be considered “non-queriable” it must not be feasible for general users of the
system or malicious users that gain access to the system to retrieve or access the data.
Access to the types of functions listed above must be extremely limited, explicitly authorized,
documented, and actively monitored. Additionally, controls must be in place to prevent
unauthorized access to these functions.
Other methods that may help to render SAD non-queriable include but are not limited to:
a. Removing call recordings from the call recording solution
b. Taking the call recordings offline
c. Vaulting the call recordings
d. Enforcing dual access controls to the vaulted call recordings
e. Allowing only single call recordings to be retrieved from vaults
Before considering this option, every possible effort must first be made to eliminate sensitive
authentication data. There must be a documented, legitimate reason why sensitive
authentication data cannot be eliminated (for example, a legislative or regulatory obligation),
and a comprehensive risk assessment performed at least annually. The detailed justification
and risk assessment results must be made available to the acquiring bank and/or payment
card brand as applicable.
This option is a last resort only, and the desired outcome is always the elimination of all
sensitive authentication data after authorization. If technologies are available to fulfil PCI
DSS requirements without contravening government laws and regulations, these
technologies should be used.
The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the
PCI Data Security Standard.
8
Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data
Hints and Tips for Call Centers
Call centers will need to ensure that an appropriate retention policy is
implemented and maintained.
This is part of PCI DSS Requirements 3.1 and 3.2 and includes:
 Ensuring that payment card data is stored only when absolutely necessary,
and that a disposal procedure is in place.
 Limiting the amount of time that card information is kept on the quality
assurance (QA)/recording server and customer relationship management
(CRM) solution databases (both voice and screen recordings); it may be
necessary for corporate governance, legal and QA departments to work out a
compromise between what is needed to adhere to the PCI DSS and
regulatory compliance requirements. However, note that PCI DSS does not
supersede local or regional laws, government regulations, or other legislative
requirements.
 Never allowing for the card validation code (referred to as CAV2, CVC2,
CVV2, or CID) to be stored in a digital audio or video format (e.g., WAV, MP3,
MPG, etc.). If the QA/recording solution cannot block the audio or video from
being stored, the code must be deleted from the recording after it is stored. If
a call-center manager feels that there may be difficulty with achieving this,
they must discuss this with their acquiring bank.
Call centers will need to ensure that the PAN is masked when displayed (no
more than the first six and last four digits should be displayed).
This is part of PCI DSS Requirement 3.3 and includes:
 Allowing access to the full PAN only on a need-to-know basis.
 Segmenting call-center operations so that the minimum required number of
agents have access to payment card data; for example, payment card
information can be entered by a sales agent, but a customer service
representative may have access only to the masked PAN.
 Considering solutions where the agent does not have to enter card information
into the system.
 If the above is not possible, requiring agents to enter payment card
information as it is given to them and then mask the information once they
verify its accuracy. This may mean sourcing agent desktop applications that
can mask card information once it has been entered and verified.
Call centers will need to ensure that PAN data is rendered unreadable (for
example, encrypted using strong cryptography) when stored.
This is part of PCI DSS Requirement 3.4 and includes ensuring PANs stored within
the QA/recording and CRM solutions are encrypted using strong cryptography, or are
otherwise rendered unreadable.
The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the
PCI Data Security Standard.
9
Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data
Call centers will need to ensure that transmission of cardholder data across
public networks is encrypted.
This is part of PCI DSS Requirement 4 and includes:
 Using strong encryption protocols such as Secure Socket Layer and Transport
Layer Security (SSL/TLS), Secure Shell (SSH), or Internet Protocol Security
(IPsec) to secure transmission of any cardholder data over public networks,
including:
- Both wired and wireless networks used by at-home/remote agents and
supervisors. For example, via a Virtual Private Network (VPN) with
SSL/TLS. Please note that Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol is
no longer permissible as a security control for wireless networks.
- Any public network segments used to carry or send screen or voice
recordings.
- Voice or data streams over Voice over IP (VoIP) telephone systems,
whenever sent over an open or public network. Note that only those
consumer or enterprise VoIP systems that provide strong cryptography
should be used.
 Requiring agents to use analog telephone lines when a VoIP telephone
system does not provide strong cryptography,
 Ensuring that payment card information is never sent over an unencrypted,
end-user messaging medium such as chat, SMS (Simple Messaging
System)/text or e-mail, or other non-encrypted communication channels.
 As a best practice, ensuring that stored recordings are not played back over a
speakerphone if payment card information is included.
Call centers will need to ensure that proper user authentication is implemented
for staff, agents, and administrators.
This is part of PCI DSS Requirements 7 and 8 and includes:
 Restricting access to QA/recording and CRM data containing payment card
data based on the user’s log-in account and corporate role; for example,
providing screen recording play-back interfaces where the payment card
information is displayed only to managers and compliance officers during legal
discovery, and having it blacked out (masked) for all other supervisors and QA
specialists
 Segmenting call-center operations so that the minimum required number of
agents have access to payment card data; for example, payment card
information can be entered by a sales agent, but a customer service
representative may have access only to the masked PAN.
 Ensuring at-home/remote agents and supervisors use a two-factor
authentication process.
 Ensuring that agents and supervisors do not share user IDs and passwords.
The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the
PCI Data Security Standard.
10
Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data
Call centers will need to ensure that they adhere to an information security
policy.
This includes:
 Developing daily operational security procedures that are consistent with all
PCI DSS requirements and clearly defining the responsibilities of all
personnel.
 Developing usage policies for critical technologies to define proper use of
these technologies for all personnel.
 Assigning an individual or team specific security responsibilities.
 Implementing a formal security awareness program so that all personnel are
conscious of the importance of payment card security, and to make sure that
all personnel are properly trained and knowledgeable about all security
policies and procedures.
 Annually reviewing all security policies and procedures with all in-house and
at-home/remote agents. As a best practice, require agents to acknowledge the
security requirements as part of their daily sign-in process
 Screening of potential employees prior to hiring. In addition, as a best
practice, monitoring of both at-home/remote agents and in-house agents.
These practices help minimize the risk of attacks from internal sources. In any
instance, call-center managers should ensure that controls are implemented
to monitor policy compliance for on-site, remote and at-home users.
 Ensuring that at-home/remote agents are prohibited from unauthorized
copying, moving, and storing of cardholder data onto local hard drives and
removable electronic media when accessing cardholder data via remote-
access technologies.
Call centers will need to ensure that any media used to record the information
must be clearly labeled, inventoried and rendered unreadable following PCI DSS
requirements.
 Pay particular attention to sensitive authentication data: Storage is not
permitted.
 Physical and logical access to the media as well as logical access to the
product used to record the calls should be restricted.
 All interaction with the recordings should be logged.
 Storage and backup/archiving of the recording solution must not become a
backdoor to the solution.
 A destruction policy should be put in place such that recordings are not kept
any longer than necessary.
 It is advisable to find a call-recording product allowing you to track logical and
physical access to media containing data. It should also provide encryption
features, strong authentication and detailed reporting and logging.
The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the
PCI Data Security Standard.
11
Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data
Finally, call centers will need to ensure that all PCI DSS requirements are
implemented.
This includes:
 Strong authentication controls for all personnel with access to call recordings.
 Ensuring there are no direct connections between systems storing audio
recordings and the Internet.
 Ensuring that systems are maintained to secure configuration standards and
are regularly tested for vulnerabilities.
 Ensuring that at-home/remote agent and supervisor PCs have personal
firewalls installed and operational.
 Ensure that at-home/remote agents and supervisor PCs have the latest
version of the corporate virus protection software and definition files
 Ensure that at-home/remote agent and supervisor PCs have the latest
approved security patches installed.
 Requiring agents and supervisors to use only company-approved systems.
What to Ask Your Call-Center Provider
How does the call-center system help my company comply with the PCI
DSS requirements, and how does it automatically remove sensitive credit
card information from recorded calls?
If you take credit card details over the phone, ask your supplier to prove that they
are “PCI DSS compliant” and to explain how they remove sensitive authentication
data from their recordings, automatically (with no manual intervention by your
staff).
How will the call-center system comply with any future changes in legal
regulations or codes of practice?
It is important that any call-recording system purchased now can adapt to future
changes in the law, regulations and industry best practices. Organizations need
to ensure that their recording system is as future-proof as it can be. Suppliers
must be able to prove that regardless of any constraints or changes the
government or other regulatory body may require for call recording solutions, their
system is flexible enough to adapt.
The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the
PCI Data Security Standard.
12
Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data
About the PCI Security Standards Council
The mission of the PCI Security Standards Council is to enhance payment account
security by driving education and awareness of the PCI Data Security Standard and
other standards that increase payment data security.
The PCI Security Standards Council was formed by the major payment card brands
American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard
Worldwide, and Visa Inc. to provide a transparent forum in which all stakeholders can
provide input into the ongoing development, enhancement, and dissemination of the
PCI Data Security Standard (DSS), PIN Transaction Security (PTS) Requirements,
and the Payment Application Data Security Standard (PA-DSS). Merchants, banks,
processors, and point-of-sale vendors are encouraged to join as Participating
Organizations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This Information Supplement contains material from a resource developed by PCI
SSC Board of Advisor member Barclaycard. The Council thanks Barclaycard for
making this content available to share with the wider PCI community.

Contenu connexe

En vedette

Destination Southwest Nova Association Business Plan 2013 2014 (3)
Destination Southwest Nova Association Business Plan 2013 2014 (3)Destination Southwest Nova Association Business Plan 2013 2014 (3)
Destination Southwest Nova Association Business Plan 2013 2014 (3)destswn
 
День ADV на Russian Digital Week: Масштабирование решений - проекты, которые ...
День ADV на Russian Digital Week: Масштабирование решений - проекты, которые ...День ADV на Russian Digital Week: Масштабирование решений - проекты, которые ...
День ADV на Russian Digital Week: Масштабирование решений - проекты, которые ...ADV/web-engineering
 
Youth & Employment at Balearic Islands (SOIB)
Youth & Employment at Balearic Islands (SOIB) Youth & Employment at Balearic Islands (SOIB)
Youth & Employment at Balearic Islands (SOIB) Francisco Caparros Alcaraz
 
Hydram: A Solution to Livelihood Enhancement - Centre for Rural Technology, N...
Hydram: A Solution to Livelihood Enhancement - Centre for Rural Technology, N...Hydram: A Solution to Livelihood Enhancement - Centre for Rural Technology, N...
Hydram: A Solution to Livelihood Enhancement - Centre for Rural Technology, N...Fatin62c
 
Startups and Smalltak - Presented at Smalltalks2014 Córdoba, Argentina
Startups and Smalltak - Presented at Smalltalks2014 Córdoba, ArgentinaStartups and Smalltak - Presented at Smalltalks2014 Córdoba, Argentina
Startups and Smalltak - Presented at Smalltalks2014 Córdoba, Argentinasebastian sastre
 
Dirty tricks van het onderhandelen - Jos Burgers
Dirty tricks van het onderhandelen - Jos BurgersDirty tricks van het onderhandelen - Jos Burgers
Dirty tricks van het onderhandelen - Jos BurgersHans Janssen
 
HOW TO TRACK SOMEONES VIBER CONVERSATIONS
HOW TO TRACK SOMEONES VIBER CONVERSATIONS HOW TO TRACK SOMEONES VIBER CONVERSATIONS
HOW TO TRACK SOMEONES VIBER CONVERSATIONS Elizabeth_Martin
 

En vedette (10)

Destination Southwest Nova Association Business Plan 2013 2014 (3)
Destination Southwest Nova Association Business Plan 2013 2014 (3)Destination Southwest Nova Association Business Plan 2013 2014 (3)
Destination Southwest Nova Association Business Plan 2013 2014 (3)
 
День ADV на Russian Digital Week: Масштабирование решений - проекты, которые ...
День ADV на Russian Digital Week: Масштабирование решений - проекты, которые ...День ADV на Russian Digital Week: Масштабирование решений - проекты, которые ...
День ADV на Russian Digital Week: Масштабирование решений - проекты, которые ...
 
Youth & Employment at Balearic Islands (SOIB)
Youth & Employment at Balearic Islands (SOIB) Youth & Employment at Balearic Islands (SOIB)
Youth & Employment at Balearic Islands (SOIB)
 
Film title
Film titleFilm title
Film title
 
Hydram: A Solution to Livelihood Enhancement - Centre for Rural Technology, N...
Hydram: A Solution to Livelihood Enhancement - Centre for Rural Technology, N...Hydram: A Solution to Livelihood Enhancement - Centre for Rural Technology, N...
Hydram: A Solution to Livelihood Enhancement - Centre for Rural Technology, N...
 
Irene Bernier
Irene BernierIrene Bernier
Irene Bernier
 
Startups and Smalltak - Presented at Smalltalks2014 Córdoba, Argentina
Startups and Smalltak - Presented at Smalltalks2014 Córdoba, ArgentinaStartups and Smalltak - Presented at Smalltalks2014 Córdoba, Argentina
Startups and Smalltak - Presented at Smalltalks2014 Córdoba, Argentina
 
Dirty tricks van het onderhandelen - Jos Burgers
Dirty tricks van het onderhandelen - Jos BurgersDirty tricks van het onderhandelen - Jos Burgers
Dirty tricks van het onderhandelen - Jos Burgers
 
HOW TO TRACK SOMEONES VIBER CONVERSATIONS
HOW TO TRACK SOMEONES VIBER CONVERSATIONS HOW TO TRACK SOMEONES VIBER CONVERSATIONS
HOW TO TRACK SOMEONES VIBER CONVERSATIONS
 
Untitled Presentation
Untitled PresentationUntitled Presentation
Untitled Presentation
 

Similaire à Protecting Telephone based Payment Card Data

Online_Transactions_PCI
Online_Transactions_PCIOnline_Transactions_PCI
Online_Transactions_PCIKelly Lam
 
Quick Reference Guide to the PCI Data Security Standard
Quick Reference Guide to the PCI Data Security StandardQuick Reference Guide to the PCI Data Security Standard
Quick Reference Guide to the PCI Data Security Standard- Mark - Fullbright
 
PCI Compliance (for developers)
PCI Compliance (for developers)PCI Compliance (for developers)
PCI Compliance (for developers)Maksim Djackov
 
PCI Certification and remediation services
PCI Certification and remediation servicesPCI Certification and remediation services
PCI Certification and remediation servicesTariq Juneja
 
6 ways reduce pci dss audit scope tokenizing cardholder data
6 ways reduce pci dss audit scope tokenizing cardholder data6 ways reduce pci dss audit scope tokenizing cardholder data
6 ways reduce pci dss audit scope tokenizing cardholder dataRichard Thompson
 
Hpe secure data-payments-pci-dss-control-applicability-assessment
Hpe secure data-payments-pci-dss-control-applicability-assessmentHpe secure data-payments-pci-dss-control-applicability-assessment
Hpe secure data-payments-pci-dss-control-applicability-assessmentat MicroFocus Italy ❖✔
 
1. PCI Compliance Overview
1. PCI Compliance Overview1. PCI Compliance Overview
1. PCI Compliance Overviewokrantz
 
Introduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) Certification
Introduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) CertificationIntroduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) Certification
Introduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) CertificationKimberly Simon MBA
 
Cisp Payment Application Best Practices
Cisp Payment Application Best PracticesCisp Payment Application Best Practices
Cisp Payment Application Best Practicesguestcc519e
 
ECMTA 2009 PCI Compliance and the Ecommerce Merchant
ECMTA 2009 PCI Compliance and the Ecommerce MerchantECMTA 2009 PCI Compliance and the Ecommerce Merchant
ECMTA 2009 PCI Compliance and the Ecommerce MerchantMelanie Beam
 
eCommerce Summit Atlanta Mountain Media
eCommerce Summit Atlanta Mountain MediaeCommerce Summit Atlanta Mountain Media
eCommerce Summit Atlanta Mountain MediaeCommerce Merchants
 
Introduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) Certification
Introduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) CertificationIntroduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) Certification
Introduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) CertificationControlCase
 
PCI Compliance Report
PCI Compliance ReportPCI Compliance Report
PCI Compliance ReportHolly Vega
 
Tripwire pci basics_wp
Tripwire pci basics_wpTripwire pci basics_wp
Tripwire pci basics_wpEdward Lam
 
PCI DSS Slidecast
PCI DSS SlidecastPCI DSS Slidecast
PCI DSS SlidecastRobertXia
 
Visa Compliance Mark National Certification
Visa Compliance Mark National CertificationVisa Compliance Mark National Certification
Visa Compliance Mark National CertificationMark Pollard
 

Similaire à Protecting Telephone based Payment Card Data (20)

Online_Transactions_PCI
Online_Transactions_PCIOnline_Transactions_PCI
Online_Transactions_PCI
 
Quick Reference Guide to the PCI Data Security Standard
Quick Reference Guide to the PCI Data Security StandardQuick Reference Guide to the PCI Data Security Standard
Quick Reference Guide to the PCI Data Security Standard
 
PCI Compliance (for developers)
PCI Compliance (for developers)PCI Compliance (for developers)
PCI Compliance (for developers)
 
Pci ssc quick reference guide
Pci ssc quick reference guidePci ssc quick reference guide
Pci ssc quick reference guide
 
Pcidss qr gv3_1
Pcidss qr gv3_1Pcidss qr gv3_1
Pcidss qr gv3_1
 
PCI Certification and remediation services
PCI Certification and remediation servicesPCI Certification and remediation services
PCI Certification and remediation services
 
6 ways reduce pci dss audit scope tokenizing cardholder data
6 ways reduce pci dss audit scope tokenizing cardholder data6 ways reduce pci dss audit scope tokenizing cardholder data
6 ways reduce pci dss audit scope tokenizing cardholder data
 
PCI DSS for Pentesting
PCI DSS for PentestingPCI DSS for Pentesting
PCI DSS for Pentesting
 
Hpe secure data-payments-pci-dss-control-applicability-assessment
Hpe secure data-payments-pci-dss-control-applicability-assessmentHpe secure data-payments-pci-dss-control-applicability-assessment
Hpe secure data-payments-pci-dss-control-applicability-assessment
 
PCI DSS for Penetration Testing
PCI DSS for Penetration TestingPCI DSS for Penetration Testing
PCI DSS for Penetration Testing
 
1. PCI Compliance Overview
1. PCI Compliance Overview1. PCI Compliance Overview
1. PCI Compliance Overview
 
Introduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) Certification
Introduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) CertificationIntroduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) Certification
Introduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) Certification
 
Cisp Payment Application Best Practices
Cisp Payment Application Best PracticesCisp Payment Application Best Practices
Cisp Payment Application Best Practices
 
ECMTA 2009 PCI Compliance and the Ecommerce Merchant
ECMTA 2009 PCI Compliance and the Ecommerce MerchantECMTA 2009 PCI Compliance and the Ecommerce Merchant
ECMTA 2009 PCI Compliance and the Ecommerce Merchant
 
eCommerce Summit Atlanta Mountain Media
eCommerce Summit Atlanta Mountain MediaeCommerce Summit Atlanta Mountain Media
eCommerce Summit Atlanta Mountain Media
 
Introduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) Certification
Introduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) CertificationIntroduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) Certification
Introduction to Token Service Provider (TSP) Certification
 
PCI Compliance Report
PCI Compliance ReportPCI Compliance Report
PCI Compliance Report
 
Tripwire pci basics_wp
Tripwire pci basics_wpTripwire pci basics_wp
Tripwire pci basics_wp
 
PCI DSS Slidecast
PCI DSS SlidecastPCI DSS Slidecast
PCI DSS Slidecast
 
Visa Compliance Mark National Certification
Visa Compliance Mark National CertificationVisa Compliance Mark National Certification
Visa Compliance Mark National Certification
 

Dernier

Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Mark Simos
 
Vector Databases 101 - An introduction to the world of Vector Databases
Vector Databases 101 - An introduction to the world of Vector DatabasesVector Databases 101 - An introduction to the world of Vector Databases
Vector Databases 101 - An introduction to the world of Vector DatabasesZilliz
 
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machineInstall Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machinePadma Pradeep
 
Leverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage Cost
Leverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage CostLeverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage Cost
Leverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage CostZilliz
 
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering TipsVertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering TipsMiki Katsuragi
 
Gen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdf
Gen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdfGen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdf
Gen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdfAddepto
 
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxSAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxNavinnSomaal
 
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024Lorenzo Miniero
 
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek SchlawackFwdays
 
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfSearch Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfRankYa
 
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time ClashPowerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clashcharlottematthew16
 
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 PresentationMy Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 PresentationRidwan Fadjar
 
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxArtificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxhariprasad279825
 
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!Manik S Magar
 
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!Commit University
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsMark Billinghurst
 
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry InnovationBeyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry InnovationSafe Software
 

Dernier (20)

Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
 
Vector Databases 101 - An introduction to the world of Vector Databases
Vector Databases 101 - An introduction to the world of Vector DatabasesVector Databases 101 - An introduction to the world of Vector Databases
Vector Databases 101 - An introduction to the world of Vector Databases
 
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machineInstall Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machine
 
Leverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage Cost
Leverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage CostLeverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage Cost
Leverage Zilliz Serverless - Up to 50X Saving for Your Vector Storage Cost
 
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering TipsVertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
 
Gen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdf
Gen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdfGen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdf
Gen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdf
 
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxSAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
 
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
 
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
 
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
 
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfSearch Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
 
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time ClashPowerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
Powerpoint exploring the locations used in television show Time Clash
 
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 PresentationMy Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
 
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxArtificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
 
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
 
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
Nell’iperspazio con Rocket: il Framework Web di Rust!
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
 
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptxE-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
 
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry InnovationBeyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
 

Protecting Telephone based Payment Card Data

  • 1. Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data Standard: PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) Version: 2.0 Date: March 2011
  • 2. The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the PCI Data Security Standard. 2 Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data Table of Contents Executive Summary 3 Clarification of the PCI DSS Guidelines for Voice Recordings 4 Recap: The PCI SSC FAQ 4 PCI DSS Requirements for Stored Cardholder Data 4 Decision Process for Voice Recordings 6 Hints and Tips for Call Centers 8 About the PCI Security Standards Council 12
  • 3. The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the PCI Data Security Standard. 3 Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data Executive Summary The following information and guidance is intended to provide payment security advice for merchants and service providers who accept and/or process payment card data over the telephone. This information highlights the key areas organizations with call- center operations need to address in order to process payment cards securely, and how best to protect their business and their customers from the risks of data compromise and fraud. The intent of this document is to provide supplemental guidance, and the information provided here does not replace or supersede PCI DSS requirements. The PCI Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) is not responsible for enforcing compliance or determining whether a particular implementation is compliant. Merchants and service providers should work with their acquirers or payment card brands, as applicable, to understand their compliance validation and reporting responsibilities. Why Telephone Card Payment Security is Important In face-to-face and e-commerce environments, risk-mitigating technologies have helped significantly reduce fraud rates, resulting in a shift of card fraud towards the Mail Order / Telephone Order (MOTO) space. Additionally, a number of regulatory bodies are requiring some companies to record and store telephone conversations in a range of situations. The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), however, stipulates that the three-digit or four-digit card verification code or value printed on the card (CVV2, CVC2, CID, or CAV2) cannot be retained after authorization, and full primary account numbers (PANs) cannot be kept without further protection measures. As such, there is a risk that organizations taking customer payment card details over the telephone may be recording the full cardholder details to comply with various regulatory bodies, thereby causing them to be in contravention of PCI DSS requirements and potentially exposing cardholder data to unnecessary risk. Note that PCI DSS does not supersede local or regional laws, government regulations, or other legislative requirements.
  • 4. The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the PCI Data Security Standard. 4 Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data Clarification of the PCI DSS Guidelines for Voice Recordings The impact of PCI DSS has been far-reaching, and its goal to minimize payment card data loss (malicious or otherwise) from merchant and service provider environments is becoming a reality. For all merchants and service providers, this requires appropriate measures to protect any systems that store, process and/or transmit cardholder data. This impacts call- recording management and storage, and control of the agent/caller interface within the physical call-center space. The PCI SSC produced this Information Supplement to clarify the PCI DSS requirements on voice recordings, to provide some best practices, and to promote consistency among merchants, service providers and the assessor community. Recap: The PCI SSC FAQ PCI SSC FAQ 5362 – Are audio/voice recordings containing cardholder data and/or sensitive authentication data included in the scope of PCI DSS? This response is intended to provide clarification for call centers that record cardholder data in audio recordings, and applies only to the storage of card validation codes and values (referred to as CAV2, CVC2, CVV2 or CID codes by the payment brands). It is a violation of PCI DSS Requirement 3.2 to store any sensitive authentication data, including card validation codes and values, after authorization even if encrypted. It is therefore prohibited to use any form of digital audio recording (using formats such as WAV, MP3, etc.) for storing CAV2, CVC2, CVV2 or CID codes after authorization if that data can be queried; recognizing that multiple tools exist that potentially could query a variety of digital recordings. Where technology exists to prevent recording of these data elements, such technology should be enabled. If these recordings cannot be data-mined, storage of CAV2, CVC2, CVV2 or CID codes after authorization may be permissible as long as appropriate validation has been performed. This includes the physical and logical protections defined in PCI DSS that must still be applied to these call-recording formats. This requirement does not supersede local or regional laws that may govern the retention of audio recordings. PCI DSS Requirements for Stored Cardholder Data In general, no cardholder data should ever be stored unless it is necessary to meet the needs of the business. Sensitive data on the chip or magnetic stripe must never be stored after authorization. If an organization stores the primary account number (PAN), it is crucial to render it unreadable (see PCI DSS Requirement 3.4). Organizations also must comply with Requirements 3.1 through 3.6 of the PCI DSS with respect to protection of stored data. It is important to understand the various elements that are classified as cardholder data, and especially what constitutes sensitive authentication data.
  • 5. The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the PCI Data Security Standard. 5 Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data The following table gives a summary of the PCI DSS guidelines for cardholder data elements: Data Element Storage Permitted Render Stored Account Data Unreadable per Requirement 3.4 AccountData Cardholder Data Primary Account Number (PAN) Yes Yes Cardholder Name Yes No Service Code Yes No Expiration Date Yes No Sensitive Authentication Data* Full Magnetic Stripe Data† No Cannot store per Requirement 3.2 CAV2/CVC2/CVV2/ CID No Cannot store per Requirement 3.2 PIN/PIN Block No Cannot store per Requirement 3.2 What this means: Essentially, sensitive authentication data must not be retained after authorization (Requirement 3.2); and for telephone operations, “sensitive authentication data” means the CAV2/CVC2/CVV2/CID and/or PIN values that may be taken during a telephone call. * Sensitive authentication data must not be stored after authorization (even if encrypted). † Full track data from the magnetic stripe, equivalent data on the chip, or elsewhere. Where to Start The following page shows the process a merchant should follow when assessing the risk for their call center operations and aims to further clarify the FAQ above.
  • 6. The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the PCI Data Security Standard. 6 Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data Decision Process for Voice Recordings
  • 7. The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the PCI Data Security Standard. 7 Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data * Flowchart Notes: Are controls in place to ensure Sensitive Authentication Data cannot be queried? Sensitive Authentication Data must be secured in a manner consistent with PCI DSS and must not be able to be queried. Data that is queriable may be retrieved through use of a search tool or by issuing a system instruction/task or a set of instructions/tasks. Examples of instructions/tasks that could result in data being retrieved include but are not limited to –  Defined searches based on character sets or data format  Database query functions  Decryption mechanisms  Sniffer tools  Data mining functions  Data analysis tools  Built-in utilities for sorting, collating or retrieving data Note: Encrypting sensitive authentication data is not by itself sufficient to render the data non-queriable. For data to be considered “non-queriable” it must not be feasible for general users of the system or malicious users that gain access to the system to retrieve or access the data. Access to the types of functions listed above must be extremely limited, explicitly authorized, documented, and actively monitored. Additionally, controls must be in place to prevent unauthorized access to these functions. Other methods that may help to render SAD non-queriable include but are not limited to: a. Removing call recordings from the call recording solution b. Taking the call recordings offline c. Vaulting the call recordings d. Enforcing dual access controls to the vaulted call recordings e. Allowing only single call recordings to be retrieved from vaults Before considering this option, every possible effort must first be made to eliminate sensitive authentication data. There must be a documented, legitimate reason why sensitive authentication data cannot be eliminated (for example, a legislative or regulatory obligation), and a comprehensive risk assessment performed at least annually. The detailed justification and risk assessment results must be made available to the acquiring bank and/or payment card brand as applicable. This option is a last resort only, and the desired outcome is always the elimination of all sensitive authentication data after authorization. If technologies are available to fulfil PCI DSS requirements without contravening government laws and regulations, these technologies should be used.
  • 8. The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the PCI Data Security Standard. 8 Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data Hints and Tips for Call Centers Call centers will need to ensure that an appropriate retention policy is implemented and maintained. This is part of PCI DSS Requirements 3.1 and 3.2 and includes:  Ensuring that payment card data is stored only when absolutely necessary, and that a disposal procedure is in place.  Limiting the amount of time that card information is kept on the quality assurance (QA)/recording server and customer relationship management (CRM) solution databases (both voice and screen recordings); it may be necessary for corporate governance, legal and QA departments to work out a compromise between what is needed to adhere to the PCI DSS and regulatory compliance requirements. However, note that PCI DSS does not supersede local or regional laws, government regulations, or other legislative requirements.  Never allowing for the card validation code (referred to as CAV2, CVC2, CVV2, or CID) to be stored in a digital audio or video format (e.g., WAV, MP3, MPG, etc.). If the QA/recording solution cannot block the audio or video from being stored, the code must be deleted from the recording after it is stored. If a call-center manager feels that there may be difficulty with achieving this, they must discuss this with their acquiring bank. Call centers will need to ensure that the PAN is masked when displayed (no more than the first six and last four digits should be displayed). This is part of PCI DSS Requirement 3.3 and includes:  Allowing access to the full PAN only on a need-to-know basis.  Segmenting call-center operations so that the minimum required number of agents have access to payment card data; for example, payment card information can be entered by a sales agent, but a customer service representative may have access only to the masked PAN.  Considering solutions where the agent does not have to enter card information into the system.  If the above is not possible, requiring agents to enter payment card information as it is given to them and then mask the information once they verify its accuracy. This may mean sourcing agent desktop applications that can mask card information once it has been entered and verified. Call centers will need to ensure that PAN data is rendered unreadable (for example, encrypted using strong cryptography) when stored. This is part of PCI DSS Requirement 3.4 and includes ensuring PANs stored within the QA/recording and CRM solutions are encrypted using strong cryptography, or are otherwise rendered unreadable.
  • 9. The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the PCI Data Security Standard. 9 Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data Call centers will need to ensure that transmission of cardholder data across public networks is encrypted. This is part of PCI DSS Requirement 4 and includes:  Using strong encryption protocols such as Secure Socket Layer and Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS), Secure Shell (SSH), or Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) to secure transmission of any cardholder data over public networks, including: - Both wired and wireless networks used by at-home/remote agents and supervisors. For example, via a Virtual Private Network (VPN) with SSL/TLS. Please note that Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol is no longer permissible as a security control for wireless networks. - Any public network segments used to carry or send screen or voice recordings. - Voice or data streams over Voice over IP (VoIP) telephone systems, whenever sent over an open or public network. Note that only those consumer or enterprise VoIP systems that provide strong cryptography should be used.  Requiring agents to use analog telephone lines when a VoIP telephone system does not provide strong cryptography,  Ensuring that payment card information is never sent over an unencrypted, end-user messaging medium such as chat, SMS (Simple Messaging System)/text or e-mail, or other non-encrypted communication channels.  As a best practice, ensuring that stored recordings are not played back over a speakerphone if payment card information is included. Call centers will need to ensure that proper user authentication is implemented for staff, agents, and administrators. This is part of PCI DSS Requirements 7 and 8 and includes:  Restricting access to QA/recording and CRM data containing payment card data based on the user’s log-in account and corporate role; for example, providing screen recording play-back interfaces where the payment card information is displayed only to managers and compliance officers during legal discovery, and having it blacked out (masked) for all other supervisors and QA specialists  Segmenting call-center operations so that the minimum required number of agents have access to payment card data; for example, payment card information can be entered by a sales agent, but a customer service representative may have access only to the masked PAN.  Ensuring at-home/remote agents and supervisors use a two-factor authentication process.  Ensuring that agents and supervisors do not share user IDs and passwords.
  • 10. The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the PCI Data Security Standard. 10 Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data Call centers will need to ensure that they adhere to an information security policy. This includes:  Developing daily operational security procedures that are consistent with all PCI DSS requirements and clearly defining the responsibilities of all personnel.  Developing usage policies for critical technologies to define proper use of these technologies for all personnel.  Assigning an individual or team specific security responsibilities.  Implementing a formal security awareness program so that all personnel are conscious of the importance of payment card security, and to make sure that all personnel are properly trained and knowledgeable about all security policies and procedures.  Annually reviewing all security policies and procedures with all in-house and at-home/remote agents. As a best practice, require agents to acknowledge the security requirements as part of their daily sign-in process  Screening of potential employees prior to hiring. In addition, as a best practice, monitoring of both at-home/remote agents and in-house agents. These practices help minimize the risk of attacks from internal sources. In any instance, call-center managers should ensure that controls are implemented to monitor policy compliance for on-site, remote and at-home users.  Ensuring that at-home/remote agents are prohibited from unauthorized copying, moving, and storing of cardholder data onto local hard drives and removable electronic media when accessing cardholder data via remote- access technologies. Call centers will need to ensure that any media used to record the information must be clearly labeled, inventoried and rendered unreadable following PCI DSS requirements.  Pay particular attention to sensitive authentication data: Storage is not permitted.  Physical and logical access to the media as well as logical access to the product used to record the calls should be restricted.  All interaction with the recordings should be logged.  Storage and backup/archiving of the recording solution must not become a backdoor to the solution.  A destruction policy should be put in place such that recordings are not kept any longer than necessary.  It is advisable to find a call-recording product allowing you to track logical and physical access to media containing data. It should also provide encryption features, strong authentication and detailed reporting and logging.
  • 11. The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the PCI Data Security Standard. 11 Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data Finally, call centers will need to ensure that all PCI DSS requirements are implemented. This includes:  Strong authentication controls for all personnel with access to call recordings.  Ensuring there are no direct connections between systems storing audio recordings and the Internet.  Ensuring that systems are maintained to secure configuration standards and are regularly tested for vulnerabilities.  Ensuring that at-home/remote agent and supervisor PCs have personal firewalls installed and operational.  Ensure that at-home/remote agents and supervisor PCs have the latest version of the corporate virus protection software and definition files  Ensure that at-home/remote agent and supervisor PCs have the latest approved security patches installed.  Requiring agents and supervisors to use only company-approved systems. What to Ask Your Call-Center Provider How does the call-center system help my company comply with the PCI DSS requirements, and how does it automatically remove sensitive credit card information from recorded calls? If you take credit card details over the phone, ask your supplier to prove that they are “PCI DSS compliant” and to explain how they remove sensitive authentication data from their recordings, automatically (with no manual intervention by your staff). How will the call-center system comply with any future changes in legal regulations or codes of practice? It is important that any call-recording system purchased now can adapt to future changes in the law, regulations and industry best practices. Organizations need to ensure that their recording system is as future-proof as it can be. Suppliers must be able to prove that regardless of any constraints or changes the government or other regulatory body may require for call recording solutions, their system is flexible enough to adapt.
  • 12. The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede requirements in the PCI Data Security Standard. 12 Information Supplement: Protecting Telephone-based Payment Card Data About the PCI Security Standards Council The mission of the PCI Security Standards Council is to enhance payment account security by driving education and awareness of the PCI Data Security Standard and other standards that increase payment data security. The PCI Security Standards Council was formed by the major payment card brands American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard Worldwide, and Visa Inc. to provide a transparent forum in which all stakeholders can provide input into the ongoing development, enhancement, and dissemination of the PCI Data Security Standard (DSS), PIN Transaction Security (PTS) Requirements, and the Payment Application Data Security Standard (PA-DSS). Merchants, banks, processors, and point-of-sale vendors are encouraged to join as Participating Organizations. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This Information Supplement contains material from a resource developed by PCI SSC Board of Advisor member Barclaycard. The Council thanks Barclaycard for making this content available to share with the wider PCI community.