3. INDIA AND AUSTRALIA:
STRENGTHENING
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
THROUGH THE
INDO PACIFIC OCEANS INITIATIVE
Edited By
Dr.Vijay Sakhuja & Anu Maria Francis

4. India and Australia
Strengthening International Cooperation through the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative
Edited by Vijay Sakhuja & Anu Maria Francis
ISBN 978-81-955180-0-5 (Ebook)
First published in 2022
Copyright © Centre for Public Policy Research and Monash University, 2022
Published by the Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR) Elamkulam, Kochi,
Kerala - 682020, India (www.cppr.in) and Monash University, Wellington Road,
Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia (www.monash.edu)
Copy-edited by Haseena Hamsa
Design and Typeset by Aargee Communications, Ernakulam, Kerala, India.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of the
publisher.
The views expressed in the book are the individual opinion(s) of the author(s), who
take individual and joint responsibility for its content. The book does not reflect the
official views of the Centre for Public Policy Research, Monash University or of any
government department, institution or agency. The publishers do not accept any
responsibility for the same in any manner whatsoever.

5. 5
CONTENTS
Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................................7
Contributors..........................................................................................................................................................10
Foreword.................................................................................................................................................................11
Introduction...........................................................................................................................................................13
Section I: ASEAN, Australian and Indian Perspectives on Indo-Pacific
Chapter 1
The Convergent Identity Formation of the Idea of the Indo-Pacific:
ASEAN, Australia and Indian Perspectives - W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar..................................................16
Chapter 2
Understanding ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific - Vo Xuan Vinh..............................................................29
Section 2: Marine Litter and Debris in the Bay of Bengal
Chapter 3
Plastic pollution in the Bay of Bengal: Regulatory Approaches
to the Problem - Gerry Nagtzaam....................................................................................................................43
Chapter 4
Marine litter and Debris in the Bay of Bengal - Salom Gnana Thanga Vincent......................................65
Chapter 5
Marine Litter and its Impact on the
Ecology of Bay of Bengal - Akansha Tiwari...................................................................................................70
Chapter 6
Ocean and Climate as Influencers of Geopolitical Strategic
Importance in the Indian Ocean - Sali Jayne Bache.............................................................................,.......79
Section 3: Smart Ports and Supply Chains in the Indian Ocean
Chapter 7
A ‘Single Window Environment’ for Digital Trade Facilitation: Future of
Australia-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership
- Andrew D Mitchell and Vandana Gyanchandani.........................................................................................87
Chapter 8
Embracing Industrial Revolution 4.0: Smart Ports, Supply
Chain and the Developing Countries - Martin A. Sebastian......................................................................103

6. 6
Chapter 9
Smart Ports and Supply Chains in the Indian Ocean:
India’s Smart Port Case Analysis - R P Pradhan............................................................................................112
Chapter 10
Digitalisation of Port Centric Supply Chains: Issues and Challenges
- Prashant Bhaskar and Peggy Shu-Ling Chen.............................................................................................122
Chapter 11
Oceans as Global Commons: Indo-Pacific Ocean:
Pathways to Prosperity and Corridor of Peace - C. Joshua Thomas........................................................131

7. 7
AADMER : ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response
ABJN : Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction
ACE : Automated Commercial Environment
ACHS : Automated Container Handling System
ACMECS : Ayeyarwady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy
ADB : Asian Development Bank
ADMM-Plus : ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus
AHA centre : ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre
AI-CECA : Australia-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement
AIIPOIP : Australia-India Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative Partnership
AITTDF : Australian International Trade and Transport Industry Development Fund
AMS : ASEAN Member States
AOIP : ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
APEC : Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF : ASEAN Regional Forum
AS : Arabian Sea
ASEAN : Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM : Asia Europe Meeting
ASW : Australian Single Window
ASYCUDA : Automated System for Customs data
AUKUS : Australia United Kingdom United States
B2B : Business to Business
BIMSTEC : Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BOB : Bay of Bengal
BOBLME : Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem
BRI : Belt and Road Initiative
CBP : Customs and Border Protection
CCP : Container Control Programmes
CDRI : Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure
CEO : Chief Executive officer
CEPA : Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements
CERT : Community Emergency Response Team
COP21 : 21st Conference of the Parties
COP26 : 26th Conference of the Parties
CPCB : Central Pollution Control Board
CPPR : Centre for Public Policy Research
CPS : Cyber Physical System
CPTPP : Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
CPV : Communist Party of Vietnam
CSI : Container Security Initiative
CSR : Corporate Social Responsibility
DEPA : Digital Economy Partnership Agreement
DFAT : Department of Foreign Trade
DPD : Direct Port Delivery
DPE : Direct Port Entry
DRRM : Disaster Risk Reduction Management
DWT : Dead Weight Tonnage
ABBREVIATIONS AND
ACRONYMS

8. 8
EAEG : East Asian Economic Group
EAMF : Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum
EAS : East Asia Summit
EDI : Electronic Data Interchange
EEZ : Exclusive Economic Zone
EICC : East Indian Coastal Currents
EPR : Extended Producer Responsibility
EU : European Union
FDA : Food and Drug Administration
FIPIC : Forum for India-Pacific Island Corporation
FOIP : Free and Open Indo-Pacific
G2B : Government to Business
G2G : Government to Government
GCC : Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP : Gross Domestic Product
GESAMP : Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection
GHG : Green House Gas
GoM : Gulf of Mannar
IAPH : International Association of Ports and Harbors
IASS : Institute for advanced Sustainability Studies
ICAO : International Civil Aviation Organization
ICE : Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICS : Integrated Cargo System
ICT : Information and Communication Technology
IFC-IOR : Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre for Indian Ocean Region
IMO : International Maritime Organisation
IO : Indian Ocean
IOC : Indian Ocean Commission
IORA : Indian Ocean Rim Association
IoT : Internet of Things
IPC : Indian Penal Code
IPCC : Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPOI : Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership
ISA : International Solar Alliance
ITDS : International Trade Data System
ITLOS : International tribunal on Law of the Sea
JNPT : Jawaharlal Nehru Port
LULC : Land Use/Land Cover
MBES : Multibeam Ecosounder
MDA : Maritime Domain Awareness
MFAT : Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MGC : Meckong-Ganga Cooperation
MNC : Multinational Corporation
MPAC : Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity
MRAI : Materials Recycling Association of India
NGO : Non-governmental Organization
NII : Non-Intrusive Inspection
NLD : National League for Democracy
NLP : National Single Window Logistics Portal
NSW : National Single Window
NVOCCS : Non-Vessel Owning Common Carrier
OBOR : One Belt One Road
OECD : Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEM : Original Equipment Manufacturing

9. 9
PCS : Port Community System
PDR : Peoples Democratic Republic
PIF : Pacific Islands Forum
POA : Plan of Action
PRO : Producer Responsibility Organization
PSU : Public Sector Undertaking
PUE : Power Usage Effectiveness
QUAD : Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
RC-BNPTT : BIMSTEC Network of Policy Think Tanks
RCEP : Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RIS : Research and Information System
RSW : Regional Single Window
RTA : Regional Trade Agreement
SAF : Society for Assistance to Fisherwomen
SAGAR : Security and Growth for all in the Region
SAR : Safety and Search and Rescue
SASP : South Asian Seas Programme
SCI : Smart Container Initiative
SDG : Sustainable Development Goals
SLOC : Sea Lanes of Communication
SME : Small to Medium Enterprises
SWIF : Single Window Implementation Framework
SWIFT : Single Window Interface for Facilitating Trade
SWS : Single Window System
TEU : Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit
TFA : Trade Facilitation Agreement
TICAD : Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TVET : Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UAE : United Arab Emirates
UHI : Underwater Hyperspectral Imaging
ULIP : Unified Logistics Interface Platform
UN : United Nations
UN/CEFACT : United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business
UNCLOS : United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea
UNCTAD : United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNEA : United Nations Environment Assembly
UNODC : United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC : United Nations Security Council
US : United States
USD : US Dollar
WCO : World Customs Organisation
WEF : World Economic Forum
WICC : West Indian Coastal Currents
WTO : World Trade Organization

10. 10
Dr. W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar, Advisor, Centre for Public Policy Research, Kochi, India.
Dr. Vo Xuan Vinh is the Deputy Director General, Institute for Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS Viet-
nam), Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS), Hanoi.
Dr. Gerry Nagtzaam, Associate Professor, Monash University, Australia.
Dr. Salom Gnana Thanga Vincent, Professor and Head, in the Department of Environmental Sciences,
University of Kerala, India.
Ms. Akansha Tiwari, A wildlife filmmaker and conservationist.
Dr. Sali Jayne Bache, Strategic Advisor at the Climate Works Centre, Australia.
Dr. Andrew D Mitchell, Professor, Faculty of Law, Monash University, Australia.
Ms. Vandana Gyanchandani, PhD Student, Faculty of Law, Monash University, Australia.
Captain Martin A. Sebastian, former Centre Head and Senior Fellow, Centre for Maritime Security and
Diplomacy, Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA), Malaysia.
Dr. R P Pradhan, Associate Professor at the Department of Humanities & Social Sciences, BITS Pilani
KK Birla Goa Campus, Goa, India.
Dr. Prashant Bhaskar, Associate Professor, Maritime & Logistics Management, and Australian Maritime
College, Australia.
Dr Peggy Shu-Ling Chen is Associate Professor and Director, Centre for Maritime & Logistics Manage-
ment, Australian Maritime College, Australia.
Professor C. Joshua Thomas, Distinguished Fellow in International Relations, Centre for Public Policy
Research, Kochi, India.
CONTRIBUTORS

11. 11
The twenty-first century is considered the Asian century and the region of Indo-Pacific forms a
pivot to it. The region is witnessing renewed interest from major industrial powers. It is becoming a
contestation point of various contending powers. In this context, the Indian Pacific Ocean Initiative
is in the right direction, with India, Australia and ASEAN taking the lead to show how a rule-based
international order is in the interest of all.
India, Australia and member states of ASEAN share a strong relationship underpinned by ongoing
cooperation across many areas of mutual interest. This cooperation includes the Framework for
Security Cooperation, regular dialogues involving Ministries responsible for foreign, defence and trade
policy, and a broad range of senior officials meetings, such as the Defence Policy Talks, Maritime
Dialogue and Navy to Navy Staff Talks.
India and Australia have committed to promoting peace, security, stability and prosperity in the Indo-
Pacific region, which is vital for the world. As two key Indo-Pacific countries, India and Australia are
enduringly interested in a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region.
The joint declaration on a shared vision for a maritime corporation between the Republic of India
and the Australian Government states, “Both countries have a shared interest in ensuring freedom
of navigation and overflight in the Indo-Pacific region and maintaining open, safe and efficient sea
lanes for transportation and communication. With shared maritime geography and a deep and long-
standing friendship, India and Australia are natural partners in working together to realise this shared
vision. Both countries also share common concerns regarding the strategic, security and environmental
challenges in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain, including activities and actions in the maritime domain
that are inconsistent with international law, particularly UNCLOS, including terrorism, piracy, drugs
and arms smuggling, irregular migration, people smuggling, trafficking in human beings, poaching of
marine species, narcotics trafficking and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.”
Both countries recognise a shared interest in promoting maritime security and safety that will deepen
navy-to-navy cooperation and strengthen maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific region
through our enhanced exchange of information.
It is in this context that the Australia-India Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership (AIIPOIP)
grant program was launched. Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR) and Monash University have
become the first recipients of the AIIPOIP grant program. Subsequently, CPPR signed a Research
Collaboration Agreement with Monash University, Australia, on Research into Maritime Cooperation
for a Sustainable Future in the Indo-Pacific Region.
With this grant, CPPR organised the conference in collaboration with Monash University, Melbourne,
on “Australia India Indo Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership, Dialogue on Indo-Pacific Oceans
Initiative (IPOI): Strengthening International Cooperation’’ on April 21 and 22, 2022 at Kochi, Kerala.
The conference was attended by 20 scholars from India, ASEAN countries and Australia. The
Conference sessions were based on three thematic areas under the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative:
Maritime Security, Maritime Pollution and Trade, Connectivity and Smart ports. The sessions were
very insightful and thought-provoking. Scholars outlined various opportunities and challenges in the
region. They highlighted the need for the collaboration and participation of the States to strengthen
stability and economic growth in the region. The enlightening sessions brought out 11 research articles
compiled into this compendium.
FOREWORD

12. 12
I am thankful for the support we received from Monash University to organise the conference. The
papers in this compendium speak a lot about the region’s understanding and the importance of
partnerships. I am grateful to the scholars for sharing their insights and experience on the theme.
I congratulate Dr Vijay Sakhuja and Ms Anu Maria Francis for compiling these papers and editing
them to the delight of the readers. I am sure this compendium of scholarly papers would significantly
contribute to the Australia-India Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership (AIIPOIP) literature and
discussions.
Dr D Dhanuraj PhD
Chairman
Centre for Public Policy Research
September 10, 2022

13. 13
The “Australia-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” was announced on 4 June 2020 and
both countries agreed to work together bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally, including through
minilateral arrangements to support regional architecture in line with their shared values and interests.
Furthermore, among the many initiatives under their strategic partnership, the Australia-India Joint
Declaration on a shared vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the Australia-India
Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership (AIIPOIP) has emerged as the flagship programme. It is
supported by the Department of Foreign Trade (DFAT), Government of Australia. The AIIPOIP aligns
with other bilateral arrangements, including Australia-India Maritime and two plus two Dialogues,
and with Australia’s cooperation with The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) under its
Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
An open inclusive, resilient, prosperous, and rules-based maritime order is what the AIIPOIP seeks to
support by helping to shape maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. In pursuit of that, the
AIIPOIP nurtures cooperation under the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership (IPOI) and links with
existing regional mechanisms and arrangements including ASEAN, the Indian Ocean Rim Association
(IORA) and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
This edited volume emerges from the two-day Dialogue (hybrid mode) held at Kochi on 21st
and 22nd
of April 2022. It was hosted by the Centre for Public Policy and Research (CPPR) in partnership with
the Monash University. The Dialogue included three technical and one plenary sessions and scholars
from Australia, India and Southeast Asian countries presented papers which have been included in
this volume under three sections.
Section 1 provides an analysis of the ongoing geopolitical and geostrategic contestation in the Indo-
Pacific region. India and ASEAN are promoting their respective versions of the Indo-Pacific and there
is convergence between Australia, India and the ASEAN to promote peace and stability in the Indo
Pacific region. In this section, Dr. W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar observes that there are currently two
persistent themes in the Indo-Pacific: the constructivist identity creation of new partnerships and the
neorealist pursuit of the power quotient of Great Power competitions. While China’s rise, assertive
claims to power, territorial disputes, and quest for regional hegemony have been quite noticeable,
there has also been a quest for converging ideas and identities of cooperation and convergence in the
Indo-Pacific that strengthens accents of peace, stability, and security through a variety of instrumental
factors of convergence and cooperation. Furthermore, ASEAN, Australia, and India have been in
dialogue and have strengthened the accents of the Indo-Pacific along these lines of convergence.
In fact, there has been a triangular convergence of the three actors strengthening the Indo-Pacific
partnerships as each actor’s security and economic interest is in increasing alignment with each other.
Meanwhile Vo Xuan Vinh observes that nearly two years after the Indo-Pacific concept was revived in
2017, the ASEAN Member States (AMS) officially announced their Outlook on Indo-Pacific. The Outlook
aims at ASEAN’s collective leadership in forging and shaping the vision for closer cooperation in the
Indo-Pacific, continuing to maintain its central role in the evolving regional architecture in Southeast Asia
and its surrounding regions, and continuing being an honest broker within the strategic environment of
competing interests. However, each AMS has different national interests from the others in their relations
INTRODUCTION

14. 14
with countries having stakes in Southeast Asia. For their parts, Quad countries must correctly read AMS
perceptions in order to properly and successfully implement their strategies in the region.
Section 2 of the volume is an exposition on the challenges posed by the growing volume of marine
litter and debris in the Bay of Bengal. Dr. Salom Vincent argues that the plastic garbage in the Bay
of Bengal originates from Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India. At least three important
factors i.e., high coastal population, lack awareness and education and poor waste management
practices can be attributed to the increasing ocean surface litter in the Bay of Bengal. Furthermore,
the impact of changing monsoonal patterns and its effect on transport of marine plastics is a big
challenge in the beaching pattern as well as deposition of marine debris of Bay.
Gerry Nagtzaam informs that the current extent and increasing rates of plastic pollution entering
the Bay of Bengal is an environmental and public health crisis and notes that this can be ascribed to
the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River basin through which tonnes of plastic waste enters the Bay
from Bangladesh. This can be attributed to the absence of regulatory enforcements, which potentially
nullify the environmental benefit of the legal bans or taxes on single-use plastics announced by both
the counties. The author recommends regional transboundary response to the plastic pollution crisis
in the Bay.
Similarly, Akansha Tiwari observes that the magnitude of marine litter in the Bay of Bengal is alarming
and this challenge gets more complex due to the unreliable and tough nature of the sea. It necessitates
technological solutions to efficiently retrieve the marine litter and cleanup the debris. It is argued that
mutual understanding between stakeholders, their trust towards each other, efficient data gathering
and public awareness is essential.
Section 3 deals with smart ports and supply chains in the Indian Ocean. Some sea ports in the Indian
Ocean are advancing to emerge as ‘Smart Ports’ and have begun to use data-driven decision-making
tools to improve operational efficiency.
Martin A. Sebastian points out that the development of the maritime industry has been significantly
influenced by technological innovation, which has played a significant role. Smart ports have raised
the level of competitiveness and is highly intense among the industry’s players. In relation to this,
IR 4.0 demands a crucial reform that would ultimately improve seaport competitiveness and foster
the development of the industry. Also, Smart Ports need to cater for areas such as cargo tracking,
maritime supply chain security, environmental protection, navigating safety, planning, operations,
administration and monitoring.
R P Pradhan observes that technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), Machine
Learning, Big Data, Decision Tree, 5G spectrum, block-chain and virtual realities are now providing
tech-solutions to integrate ships, ports and supply chain towards business efficiency. In fact, “Smart
Port” ideas can be applied to enhance port operations and increase revenue.
Andrew D Mitchell and Vandana Gyanchandani highlight the advantages of a ‘single window system’
for a common digital interface to effectively manage customs-related information, stakeholders,
services and infrastructure for a seamless flow of cross-border trade. The authors point out that it
makes cross-border trade flows smoother. The authors provide an introduction on Australia and
India’s Single Window Systems.

15. 15
Prashant Bhaskar and Peggy Shu-Ling Chen make the point that the supply chains continuously
strive to become more efficient, less wasteful, and environmentally sustainable, which necessitates
ports to remain competitive by becoming smarter and optimise their commercial operations and
administrative processes. Likewise, there will be fundamental changes in the competency and
knowledge requirements of the workforce and maritime institutions, both in the higher education, the
vocational education and training sectors, would have to be continually engaged in monitoring and
renewing their curriculums to suit industry requirements.
Finally, this volume has provided in-depth perspectives on the diverse subjects discussed during
the Dialogue. Many of these are under active consideration of policy makers, high on the agenda of
experts who delve deep into these issues and academics who study and teach.
We thank the Department of Foreign Trade (DFAT), Government of Australia, Centre for Public Policy
and Research (CPPR) and Monash University, Australia for facilitating this Dialogue. It is also our hope
that the volume would trigger implementable policy vectors.
Vijay Sakhuja
Anu Maria Francis

16. 16
Introduction
Security convergence based on Identities and formation of Identities is a vital aspect of growing
regional relations among states and powers. The transforming contexts of the Indo Pacific now witness
two persistent trends of neorealist pursuit of the power quotient of Great Power rivalries as well as the
constructivist identity formation of emerging partnerships. While the rise of China and its assertive
claims in power, territorial disputes and the quest of regional hegemony has been quite pronounced,
there has also been the quest for converging ideas and identities of cooperation and convergence
in the Indo Pacific that builds stronger accents of peace, stability, and security through a variety of
instrumental factors of convergence and cooperation.
The Indo Pacific in the longer haul is demanding that each state and regional actor envisage an
Indo Pacific Outlook that is premised on security, ecology, resources, capacity building and
Resource Sharing, Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM), Science, Technology, maritime
transportation, academic Cooperation and Trade connectivity. These instrumentalities provide for
greater convergence and enduring partnerships among the states and the regional actors.
ASEAN, Australia, and India have been in dialogue and have strengthened the accents of the Indo
Pacific along these lines of convergence. In fact, there has been a triangular convergence of the three
actors strengthening the Indo Pacific partnerships as each actor’s security and economic interest is in
increasing alignment with each other.
The chapter endeavors to (a) analyse the issues of convergence of the three actors of the Indo Pacific
The Convergent Identity
Formation of the Idea of the
Indo-Pacific: Asean, Australia
and Indian Perspectives
W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar
1

17. 17
outlooks and identify the similarities and scope for cooperation; (b) Identify the areas of capacity-
building among the three actors to promote the Indo Pacific convergences; and (c) Examine common
interests among the three actors that would go into reinforce the partnerships.
The Indo Pacific has been referred to and well known as an immense region of conflicting interests,
complete with Great Prominence rivalries, Power Shift discussions involving China’s assertive ascent
to power and frequent threats to replace the United States. Threats from China to the regional
governments and powers have sparked economic and security reactions, and the post-COVID
environment has exacerbated China’s power play in the area. The littoral states and extra-regional
powers have responded by stepping up their deterrent efforts and increasing their capabilities and
resources to counter the assertive Chinese power.
Despite the neorealist prominence of the Indo-Pacific, alternative narratives of constructivist identity
have evolved as the basis of convergences in the region among various governments and entities that
strive to align with one another and adopt similar paradigms.
The quest of establishing stable and peaceful Indo Pacific is a common and convergent concern for
all powers in the region. It is to this objective that states, and powers often work out on parameters
of commonality for cooperation that aid in Capacity Building and mutual benefit among the actors
in the region. The main factors that have sparked these changes in the global economy and more
specifically in the Indo-Pacific region include increased trade, increased economic interdependence,
and the development of new regionalism.
Convergent Identity Formation in the Indo Pacific Region
The construction of a convergent identity in the Indo-Pacific area, which has led to the cooperation of
many states and regional actors for shared goals, is influenced by three key reasons.
The confluence of the seas has been one primary idea that had always evoked free, open, and inclusive
sense of the oceans and seas that has promoted the free transmission of people, goods and ideas
across the oceanic expanses and has promoted a greater convergence of regional interests (Hemmings:
2020).1
The confluence of seas has been very akin to the Indo Pacific oceans as they have brought out
greater convergences between different cultures, civilizations, and states in promoting uninterrupted
commerce and trade and facilitate greater people movement throughout the region.
The evocation of the Rules Based Order has been the second idea that has resulted in the incremental
development of norms and rules that conditions the regional order as well as the maritime order of
the Indo Pacific. Rules Based Order has catalysed the importance of code of conduct as well as the
establishment of operational procedures that are undergirded by International Law and practice so
to promote the smooth operation of maritime transport, maintenance of maritime order and the
promotion of peace and stability in the Indo Pacific region (Byrne: 2020).2
The crafting of Outlooks of the Indo Pacific as a Vision statement of each state actor and regional
actor has gone to a great extent of elucidating the vision and proposed action plan of each actor in
the region. Convergence is a common objective whereby the actors seek alignment and feasibility of
each outlook to be cooperative as well work out various modalities for achieving convergent identities
in the Indo Pacific (Dolven and Vaughn: 2020).3

18. 18
Salience of Convergence of Identities: ASEAN, Australia and India
The Indo Pacific has several state actors as well as regional bloc actors that constitute the universe
of states and powers in the region. Regionalism and its variant of new regionalism has grown and
consolidated in the Indo Pacific region. Foremost among all regional actors has been the ten member
nations’ bloc called ASEAN. The ASEAN since 1967 has grown to be a well-integrated regional actor
that has promoted its norms and values of ASEAN Centrality as well as non-interference in the internal
affairs of other countries.
The ASEAN affirms its importance for ‘constructed values’ and its ‘inherited values’ in the quest of
establishing its own identity. ASEAN has been emphatic about its “One Vision, One Identity, One
Community” in the process to establish an integrated community and explore the three goals of the
ASEAN political-security community, the ASEAN Economic community, and the ASEAN socio-cultural
community by the year 2025 to achieve its purpose and objectives (Maria: 2017).4
ASEAN, Australia, and India have evolved their respective outlooks of the Indo-Pacific that has well
reinforced each actor’s regional maritime interests and has provided the essential means to align
with other Indo Pacific regional actors in aiming to enhance capacity building and synergies with one
another.
The ASEAN outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP) has its salience built on the ‘centrality’ of the regional
organization and its inclusiveness principle. Given the open access of seas in its regional geography,
ASEAN has evolved its own norms and principles that undergird its Indo Pacific outlooks. The main
goal of ASEAN is to develop and maintain an ‘inclusive’ regional architecture that complements its
collective leadership in advancing and defining the long-term vision for greater cooperation in the
Indo-Pacific while maintaining its central position in the new regional order in Southeast Asia and the
surrounding areas. The AOIP aims to enhance ASEAN’s Community building process and strengthen
and give new momentum for existing ASEAN-led mechanisms to better face challenges and seize
opportunities arising from the current and future regional and global environment (ASEAN Outlook:
2021).5
The ASEAN Indo Pacific vision envisages the close integrated and interconnectedness of the region
and emphasizes the ‘centrality’ of ASEAN in the process. ASEAN views the Indo Pacific region as a
premise to cooperation and dialogue rather than rivalries of the region. Given the maritime geography
of Southeast Asia, ASEAN emphasizes the importance of the seas and oceans and the confluence
that could emerge from it. ASEAN emphasizes in its Indo Pacific Outlook, the central importance of
the Rules Based Order, the Free Open and Inclusive nature and scope of the seas and oceans and the
underlying economic cooperation (Hanada: 2019).6
ASEAN envisages regional cooperation with other actors in the region and enhance ASEAN’s
Community Building process by strengthening various ASEAN regional mechanisms such as EAS
(East Asia Summit) the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus
(ADMM-Plus), the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) and others such as the relevant ASEAN
Plus One mechanisms and the nurture and sustaining of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
of the United Nations (Morada: 2017).7
The AIOP envisages the peaceful settlement of disputes, maritime safety, and security, addressing

19. 19
transnational crimes and enhancing cooperation and sustainable management in marine resources. It
aims at the protection of coastal communities, develop Blue Economy objectives, and foster maritime
commerce. ASEAN Outlook also envisages the tackling of marine pollution, sea-level rises and the
protection of marine biodiversity. Augmenting all these would be through academic and technical
cooperation and capacity building (Liliansa:2021).8
ASEAN aims at enhancing regional connectivity by complementing with the existing Master Plan on
ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025. ASEAN aims Connectivity of Southeast Asia to be a seamless and
comprehensive connected and integrated region promoting competitiveness, inclusiveness, and a
greater sense of community (ASEAN Master Plan: 2017).9
The AOIP aims to achieve the SDGs Sustainable Development Goals 2030 with the aim to promote
digital economy. ASEAN Outlook envisions for complementarities and aligning regional development
agenda with the SDGs. It endeavors to sync with the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, the 2030 UN
Agenda for Sustainable Development. It also facilitates promotion of cooperation with the ASEAN
Center for Sustainable Development Studies and Dialogue and other relevant institutions in the region
(Martinus: 2020).10
Australia’s Outlook of the Indo Pacific draws on similar themes of evolving maritime cooperation and
the promotion of institutional complementarities with ASEAN and India. Australia looks at the Indo
Pacific with the objectives of a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region. Australia
shares interest in ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight in the Indo-Pacific region, and the
maintaining of open, safe and efficient sea lanes for transportation and communication (Medcalf:
2019).11
Australia’s Indo Pacific Outlook has been well focused on ASEAN and India since 2013. Though
Australia has been a pillar of the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) and engages with the AUKUS
(Australia, UK, US), it has placed high importance to its ties with ASEAN. Australia envisions ASEAN to
its central place in the entire region with immense geo-political, economic, and diplomatic importance
(Hayes: 2020).12
Australia and India converge on the cooperation on marine ecology and work on a variety of strategic,
security and environmental challenges in the Indo Pacific maritime domain. Australia’s Indo Pacific
Outlook has similar interest on activities and actions in the maritime domain that are contrary with
international law, affecting UNCLOS, that includes terrorism, piracy, drugs, and arms smuggling,
irregular migration, people smuggling, trafficking in human beings, poaching of marine species,
narcotics trafficking and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (Rajagopalan: 2021).13
Australia is concerned about a number of the environmental issues in the Indo-Pacific region, including
marine pollution, climate change, ocean acidification, a lack of potable water, habitat loss from storm
surges, and saline water intrusion. Australia’s Indo Pacific Outlook also features its engagement
with ASEAN emphasizing ASEAN Centrality and Unity and works to strengthen its coordination in
several regional and multilateral fora, such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum,
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the Indian Ocean Naval
Symposium, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, and the International Maritime Organization (Kien:
2020).14

20. 20
The Indo Pacific Outlook highlights Australia’s cooperative role and breadth in important areas such
as maritime ecology with the goal of minimising the impact of marine pollution (particularly plastics);
maritime security; sustainable use of marine resources; capacity building and resource sharing;
disaster risk reduction and management; science, technology, and academic collaboration; and trade,
connectivity, and maritime transport.
India’s Indo Pacific Oceans Initiative forms the basis of India’s Outlook of the Indo Pacific. India since
2018 has always championed the Free, Open, and Inclusive Indo Pacific and has sought to override
regional disputes with cooperative accents. India views the Indo Pacific neither as a strategy nor a
club of members but emphasizes on the inclusive and open nature of all states engaging in the region.
India strongly espouses the centrality and unity of the ASEAN region and has reorganized the Indian
Ministry of External Affairs with a new division of the ‘Indo Pacific’ with a view to integrate the
Indo-Pacific, India-ASEAN relations, East Asia Summit, Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM), Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and Ayeyarwady-Chao Phraya-Mekong
Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS). (Mishra: 2021).15
Given this reorganization, India has launched the IPOI to bridge with AOIP that has several similar
features as the IPOI. The IPOI has seven pillars that are areas of convergence and cooperation that
India envisages as an open, inclusive, non-treaty-based global initiative that aims to promote practical
cooperation. The seven pillars and areas of cooperation and convergence are: Capacity Building and
Resource Sharing; Disaster Risk Reduction and Management; Maritime Ecology; Maritime Resources;
Maritime Security; Science, Technology and Academic Cooperation; and Trade Connectivity and
Maritime Transport (Laskar: 2021).16
Widening the scope of cooperation and identifying elements of convergence has made the IPOI a
robust and dynamic plan of action and engagement of India with ASEAN and Australia since the
respective outlooks of the Indo Pacific espouses similar concerns. The IPOI also makes it clear that it
is not primarily stacked up in terms of addressing traditional security challenges like China’s rise and
hegemony, but more in terms of how regional cooperation could be expanded.
India’s IPOI is well embellished through the institutional framework of EAS, IORA, PIF and in bilateral
and multilateral institutional frameworks that transmits and funnels the objectives of the IPOI into
ASEAN and Australia Outlooks of the Indo Pacific thereby greater congruence is evident.
The salience of the three Indo Pacific Outlooks is premised on the following convergences.
Convergence of Identities envisions for ASEAN, Australia, and India to engage in a larger scope of
crafting identities that are similar and are based on practical aspects of aligning respective vision
of each actor with another. Given the broad consensus of Indo Pacific regional peace, security,
and stability with accents on conserving marine ecology and enhancing trade and commerce on
a sustainable basis, the three partners can craft identities that are converging as well as aligning.
Identities shape the perceptions and the objectives that are to be crafted, hence the ambient vision
of a ‘constructivist’ identities that does not overly rely on the power quotient, but on enduring
convergence and cooperation among states in the region is the basis of long-lasting peace, security,
safety, and stability.

21. 21
Convergences of Objectives envisages the ability to craft objectives of practical action based on
the identities that each state espouses. Outlooks of the Indo Pacific among democratic states have
largely been peaceful and have aimed at achieving stability and prosperity in the region with greater
transmission of goods, services, and people movement in the region. Instruments like Comprehensive
Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPA), the aegis of regional forums like ASEAN and the ARF
and the host of dialogue partnerships provide the widest denominator for evolving convergent
objectives that recognises each other as well as accommodate states in terms of their interests. Joint
Statements between India and ASEAN and India and Australia have greatly aided India in defining its
IPOI objectives and similarly the same elucidation has greatly helped Australia and ASEAN.
Convergences of Cooperation emerge with the regional states with an agreed framework of cooperation
and Vision Statements that provide for practical realization of the outlined objectives. Cooperation
between ASEAN, Australia and India have grown over the years from the earlier phases of security
cooperation to economic cooperation, commerce, and trade to the present contexts of wide scope
cooperation on various sectors of maritime security, maritime trade, and connectivity.
The imperative for cooperation between ASEAN, Australia and India has increased due to the
turbulence of the Indo Pacific order given China’s assertive rise and the triggering of several regional
disputes. The Indo Pacific Outlooks of ASEAN, Australia and India provide for the positive accents
of cooperation amidst the prevailing challenges and issues and they also provide the ballast for long
term cooperation among the states of the Indo Pacific region.
Capacity Building in ASEAN, Australia, and India for Indo Pacific Convergences
The ASEAN-Australia-India Outlooks on the Indo Pacific has provided for converging areas of capacity
building between the players. This could be viewed from the dyadic as well triangular patterns of how
the actors have envisaged capacity building and how they work to realize it between ASEAN-India,
ASEAN-Australia, Australia-India.
ASEAN-India partnerships have been built and nurtured on the convergences of the AOIP and IPOI
in the areas of maritime cooperation, connectivity, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and
economic and other possible areas of cooperation. (ASEAN-India Joint Statement: 2021).17
ASEAN
and India are committed to narrow the development gap through capacity building, provision of
scholarships, training courses and workshops for professionals and proactive stakeholder engagement
and to support the implementation of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration Work Plans. ASEAN and
India are focused on the scope and momentum of the ASEAN-India economic relations with various
measures through enhancing trade facilitation and increasing the utilization of the ASEAN-India Free
Trade Area.
ASEAN and India aim at developing the social infrastructure development by targeting key social
sectors; it is expedited by enhancing support to the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework;
to build and strengthen public health infrastructure; work on enhanced capacities for preparedness
and response to pandemics and public health emergencies; promotion of vaccine and pharmaceutical
research, development, manufacturing and distribution; and promote academic cooperation between
universities and research agencies in the health sector.(ibid)
ASEAN and India are focused on the process of human capital development, including through Technical
and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and possible support for the ASEAN TVET Council

22. 22
from India. ASEAN-India capacity development is evident in the Information and Communications
Technology (ICT) cooperation. This is yet another area of synergy that includes the strengthening
of ICT infrastructures addressing the various supply-chain risks and vulnerabilities of ICT products
and systems, ICT security, capacity building and knowledge sharing in areas such as digital economy,
digital connectivity, e-commerce, FinTech, Artificial Intelligence (AI), big data, cross-border data flows
in compliance with the existing national laws and regulations, and the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
ASEAN India cooperative efforts in capacity building is also reflected in maritime cooperation,
focusing on maritime security, India’s support in counter piracy operations and prevention of armed
robbery against ships, maritime safety and search and rescue (SAR) operations, and information
sharing administered through appropriate mechanisms under the ASEAN-India framework and other
appropriate ASEAN-led mechanisms. The various capacity building measures enhance the Indo Pacific
convergences between ASEAN and India (Bhattacharya: 2020).18
ASEAN-Australia Indo Pacific Outlooks has been focused on the Plan of Action that guides the
implementation of the goals and objectives of the ASEAN-Australia Strategic Partnership for 2020-
2024 (Plan of Action: 2019).19
The Plan of Action POA builds on the robust history of cooperation
and partnership between ASEAN and Australia that been in place since 1974. It was elevated to a
Strategic Partnership in 2014 reaffirming that ASEAN and Australia are partners with vital stakes in the
dynamic Indo Pacific region that is undergoing major changes. Capacity Building measures have been
comprehensive in the post-COVID period.
Australia and ASEAN are working on the implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster
Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) Work Programme for the period 2016-2020 and
beyond, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management’s
ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre (AHA Centre) are the various ongoing initiatives that has
further exploration in other areas of collaboration.
ASEAN and Australia do have a robust partnership and capacity building in Maritime security through
the promotion of maritime security and safety, enhancing the freedom of navigation and overflight,
fostering of unimpeded commerce, the exercise of self-restraint, the non-use of force or the restraint on
the threat to use force, and the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with universally
recognised principles of international law that includes the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the relevant standards and recommended practices of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and instruments and conventions of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) (Prabhakar: 2009).20
ASEAN and Australia are endeavoring strengthening cooperation on the ASEAN Connectivity
agenda, through various plans of implementation and communication. Both parties do have outreach,
monitoring, and evaluation of the Master Plan on ASEAN. Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 and through
other regional fora. The Master Plan also envisages for the ASEAN-Australia Infrastructure Cooperation
programme and the ASEAN-Australia Smart Cities initiative, these are initiatives arising from the
ASEAN-Australia Special Summit to deliver the goals of MPAC 2025 sustainable infrastructure projects
(ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program: 2016).21
ASEAN and Australia are also endeavoring to work on a secure, stable, accessible and peaceful
Information and Communication Technology by which they foster Cooperation on national CERT
(Community Emergency Response Team)-to-CERT cyber response, efforts, and cyber information

23. 23
exchanges. Australia and ASEAN cooperate closely where cyber incidents have direct impact on
them by leveraging on the ARF Points of Contact Directory on Security of and In the Use of ICTs and
established contacts in the CERT community (ASEAN-Australia Digital Trade Standards Cooperation
Initiative: 2018).22
ASEAN and Australia have been working to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on sustainable
development, promoting complementarities between the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and the
UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development through exchange of best practices and capacity
building in areas of poverty eradication, infrastructure and connectivity, sustainable management of
natural resources, sustainable consumption and production and resilience (ASEAN, Australia review
implementation of development cooperation: 2019).23
Australia-India shares a vision for the Indo-Pacific that is free, open, inclusive, resilient rules-based
order in the region. India’s vision of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) has been
able to project its Indo Pacific Oceans Initiative that has several factors of economic development,
maritime ecology, maritime resources, resource sharing, academic cooperation, enhanced commerce
and trade and transportation. Australia and India had signed the AIIPOIP to sync the strategic and
security partnership comprehensively encompassing the various aspects of the respective outlooks of
the Indo Pacific (Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation: 2020).24
Australia and India do have various capacity building initiatives in the South Pacific. India has its own
initiative of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Australia has been engaging the South Pacific through its
‘Pacific Setup’ that has enlarged its outreach in the region. India has been able to reinforce its outreach
with Pacific Island countries. Cooperation and dialogue with these countries is through Forum for
India–Pacific Island Cooperation (FIPIC), which is an extension of India’s Act East Policy. India has
committed US $ 1 million for each of the Pacific Island state of a total of US$12 million grant towards
implementation of high impact developmental project, as also concessional Lines of Credit of US$
150 million (Singh: 2022).25
Australia and India are committed to various partnerships on various
mechanisms on climate change and energy security.
There is the India led International Solar Alliance (ISA) and Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure
(CDRI). Australia supported the cause with 1 million AUD for ISA and 10 million AUD for the CDRI.
Australia and India are leveraging their regional roles for maritime security cooperation and capacity
building in terms of providing security for the smaller states in the Indo Pacific region. Through their
regional leadership roles in IONS and IORA, Australia, and India work to provide peace, prosperity,
and regional security to island nations as well as their own island territories. Australia and India are
engaged in the development of bases in India’s Nicobar Islands and Australia’s Cocos (Keeling) Island
along with Indonesia (Eurasian Times Global Desk: 2020).26
Australia and India have been engaged substantially in operational exchange at naval fleet levels.
Given the advantage of some common equipment platforms between the two navies they benefit
from greater interoperability and enhanced maritime domain awareness. The Australia-India AIIPOIP
has synergies with ASEAN’s Outlook on Indo-Pacific, Australia–ASEAN Plan and India–ASEAN Plan of
Action thus brings greater synergies (Saha & Singh: 2022).27
The matrix of Capacity Building among ASEAN, Australia and India reveals that the common pillars of
digital economy, maritime safety, maritime ecology, ICT, and the pursuit of UN Sustainable Development
Goals are evident. The convergences in the outlooks and objectives of the Indo Pacific among the three

24. 24
states provide for the emerging of common interests by which the triangular relations between the
actors are well established. Building the Outlooks of the Indo Pacific essentially rests on the nature
and scope of mutual capacity building and responses that ASEAN, Australia and India sustain.
Common interests in the Indo Pacific
ASEAN, Australia, and India are thus partners that are operating from the same page of their outlooks
of the Indo Pacific. What are the common interests that converge the three actors? How do these
common interests enable the operationalizing of the respective outlooks of the Indo Pacific?
Five common interests are the converging factors among the ASEAN, Australia, and India that
predominate the focus of the actors and determine the larger agenda of the Indo Pacific that is apart
from the traditional security concerns. These common interests are the common features that are
reflective in the respective Indo Pacific Outlooks.
Maritime security, safety, connectivity and transportation constitute the vital aspect of the Indo Pacific
region. Given the geographic centrality of Southeast Asia, ASEAN enjoys the connectivity with India
and Australia in terms of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and the interconnectedness of the
seas and the oceans.
Cooperation on traditional and nontraditional spheres of maritime security has been increasing among
the three actors. This has resulted in the navies and coastguards exercising with each other as well
as routine Freedom of Navigation Patrols in the region. Besides, the three actors have converged
on a variety of navigational safety measures and have also looked to enhance Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA) of the region through constant exchange of information. Maritime connectivity and
Transportation are a vital factor that has seen growth of the container traffic between the actors and
has been vital in the free flow of maritime trade and commerce across the three actors in the region
(De: 2021).28
Trade and Commerce constitutes the vital lifeline among the three actors. The maritime based trade
and commerce has been smooth and has progressed well. The Comprehensive Economic Partnerships
and the Free Trading Areas have facilitated the three-way trade between ASEAN, Australia, and India
(Tyler: 2021).29
Although India had not joined the RCEP, yet trade volumes between India-ASEAN
and India-Australia have not flagged. ASEAN has been urging India to join the RCEP for the sake
of enhanced regional economic integration and enhanced regional trade partnerships. Trade and
commerce between ASEAN, Australia, and India would serve as an effective offset against any regional
trade issues (Seshadri: 2019).30
Digital Economy and ICT Infrastructure Development emerges as the vital template of the regional
economies with the associated ICT infrastructure development. As the economies transform with
various measures and protocols in cyberspace, the Digital Economy emerges on the platforms of
the transforming ICT infrastructure (Anukoonwattaka, W., P. Romao, P. Bhogal, T. Bentze, and R.S.
Lobo (2021).31
The growing ICT cyberspace and its infrastructure developments would result in the
enhanced regional digital connectivity as well as the permeation of the ICT networks in the various
sectors of the economy that brings about the transformative impact in the actors` economies as well
as the digital economy. The Indo Pacific of the emerging future would thus have digital economies and
the growing cyberspace presence and impact (Ray, Jain, Jayakumar & Reddy: 2021).32

25. 25
Contending Climate Change Risks are real challenges as the Indo Pacific region - especially the Pacific
is known to be the ‘Ring of Fire’ with extreme seismic volatility and the severe weather changes that
have come in the region (Fetzek & McGinn: 2020).33
Sea level rise and the accompanied littoral erosion
has been very much evident in the region. Pollution is yet another source that has its adverse impact
on climate. Marine pollution and air pollution have been persistent threats that have threatened the
region (World Meteorological Organization: 2021).34
The Indo Pacific Outlooks do focus on the task
of contending the climate change challenges and risks. Cooperation on Climate Change is a vital task
that the ASEAN, Australia, and India are prioritizing for mitigating the various risks.
Sustainable Development Goals emerges as the common denominator for the ASEAN, Australia, and
India even as the pace of change warrants it. However, the three actors have varied interpretations of
what constitutes the acceptability of all the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Grunbuhel &
Melati: 2020).35
The norms and values of ASEAN on its inclusiveness and noninterference in internal
affairs may lead to partial acceptance of the SDGs. Australia on its part has its full conformity with the
SDGs as evidenced by the 56 indicators of the SDG programme (Munro: 2021).36
India for its part has
adopted eight goals of the SDGs for attainment of its sustainability (India Voluntary National Review:
2020).37
In the long run, the three actors are working for the total objectives of the UN Sustainable
Development Goals programmes. The three actors thus endeavor for the attainment of the above-
mentioned common interests that align with their respective outlooks of the Indo Pacific.
In summation, the Indo Pacific outlooks of ASEAN, Australia and India reflect the growing sense
of identity-based convergence of their objectives that augur for the greater regional identities and
exclusive characteristics being grafted into the Indo Pacific vision statements. Given the uncertainties
of the great power rivalries in the region, the middle powers of ASEAN as a bloc actor, Australia and
India seem to navigate the convergent path of identities as a basis of working synergies to build their
respective social, economic, ecological and infrastructure development that is non-treaty based as
well non-confrontational aiming towards enhanced regional integration. ASEAN, Australia, and India
also share the common axes of maritime contiguity and have affirmed their interest on the importance
of Free Open and Inclusive Indo Pacific that is the larger interest of peace, security, stability, and the
prosperity of the Indo Pacific.
References:
1. Hemmings, John (2020), Measuring Shinzo Abe’s Impact on the Indo-Pacific, Asia-Pacific. Bulletin No. 536,
Washington DC East-West Center, October, accessed at
ttps://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/measuring-shinzo-abe%E2%80%99s-impact-the-indo-pacific.
2. Byrne, Caitlin (2020) Securing the ‘Rules Based Order’ in the Indo-Pacific: The Significance of the Strategic
Narrative, Security Challenges, Vol. 16, No. 3, Special Issue: The Indo-Pacific: From Concept to Contest
(2020), pp. 10-15.
3. Dolven, Ben & Vaughn, Bruce (2020) Indo-Pacific Strategies of U.S. Allies and Partners: Issues for
Congress, Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, accessed at https://www.everycrsreport.com/
files/20200130_R46217_770a61c4856a9a5aed99d6699f3423b6240ff1c3.pdf
4. Maria, Rebecca Sta. et.al (2017) The ASEAN Economic Community Into 2025 and Beyond, ASEAN@50
Volume 5, ERIA Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia and Department of Foreign Affairs,
Philippines, accessed at

26. 26
https://www.eria.org/ASEAN_50_Vol_5_Complete_Book.pdf
5. ASEAN Outlook of the Indo-Pacific Final, accessed at
https://asean.org/asean2020/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_
FINAL_22062019.pdf
6. Hanada, Ryosuke (2019) ASEAN’s Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-Based Order and Regional Identity in
Sharon Stirling, Mind the Gap: National Views of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, German Marshal Fund of
the United States, accessed at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21474.4?seq=1.
7. Morada, Noel M (2017) ASEAN Community Building—What it Really Means to be a Community (Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung Paper), accessed at
https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=0a6f5873-740e-1681-26c8-
16e6a1cf5b3d&groupId=288143.
8. Liliansa, Dita (2021) ASEAN Conceptualisations of Maritime Security, AMTI Update, Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, December 1, accessed at
https://amti.csis.org/asean-conceptualizations-of-maritime-security/.
9. ASEAN (2017) Masterplan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025, accessed at
https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/47.-December-2017-MPAC2025-2nd-Reprint-.pdf
10. Martinus, Melinda (2020) ASEAN Sustainable Development Goals: Notable, But More Can Be Done,
Singapore: ISEAS Yusuf Ishak Institute, December 11, accessed at
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/media/commentaries/asean-sustainable-development-goals-notable-but-more-
can-be-done/.
11. Medcalf, Rory. “An Australian Vision of the Indo-Pacific and What it Means for Southeast Asia.” Southeast
Asian Affairs, 2019, pp. 53–60, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26939686.
12. Hayes A (2020) The Quad: A perennial element in Australia’s strategic outlook, East Asia Security Symposium
and Conference 2019, accessed at
https:// 13911-the-quad-a-perennial-element-in-australia-s-strategic-outlook.pdf
13. Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai (2021) Australia-India 2+2 Dialogue: Converging Interests, Commentaries, New
Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, September 23, accessed at
https://www.orfonline.org/research/australia-india-22-dialogue-converging-interests/.
14. Kien, Le Trung (2020) The Indo-Pacific Regional Architecture; the Quad, Inclusivity and ASEAN Centrality,
Asialink, accessed at
https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/the-indo-pacific-regional-architecture-the-quad,-inclusivity-and-
asean-centrality.
15. Mishra, Rahul (2021) Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative: Providing Institutional Framework to the Indo-Pacific
Region, AIC Commentary, No:20, August 2021 ASEAN-India Centre, New Delhi: Research Information
Systems in Developing Countries, accessed at
https://aei.um.edu.my/img/files/AIC%20commentary%20No%2020%20August%202021%20final.pdf
16. Laskar, Rezaul H (2021) ‘India, Asean agree to build on Indo-Pacific convergences to ensure free and open
region’ Hindustan Times, October 28, 2021, accessed at
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-asean-agree-to-build-on-indo-pacific-convergences-
to-ensure-free-and-open-region-101635426766533.html.

27. 27
17. ASEAN-India Joint Statement on ‘Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific for Peace,
Stability, and Prosperity in the Region’ 2021.
18. Bhattacharya, Debasish (2020) India-ASEAN Strategic Cooperation: Impacting Security and Stability in the
Indo-Pacific Region, Raisina Dialogues, October 13, 2020 accessed at https://www.orfonline.org/expert-
speak/india-asean-strategic-cooperation-impacting-security-stability-indo-pacific-region/.
19. Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-Australia Strategic Partnership (2020-2024) 01 August 2019,
accessed at
https://asean.org/plan-of-action-to-implement-the-asean-australia-strategic-partnership-2020-2024/.
20. Prabhakar, W. Lawrence S “13. Maritime Security Triangulation of ASEAN-Australia-India: An Indian
Perspective”. ASEAN-India-Australia: Towards Closer Engagement in a New Asia, edited by William T Tow
and Chin Kin Wah, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009, pp. 219-242, accessed at
https://doi.org/10.1355/9789812309648-017.
21. ASEAN-AUSTRALIA DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PROGRAM, accessed at
http://aadcp2.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-TORtender_MPACMTR_161219.pdf
22. ASEAN-Australia Digital Trade Standards Cooperation Initiative, December 2018 accessed at
,https://www.standards.org.au/getmedia/d0942d6e-b58a-4fe4-a17d-aecc52effd50/ASEAN-Australia-
Digital-Trade-Recommendations-Report.pdf.aspx.
23. ASEAN Secretariat (2019) ASEAN, Australia review implementation of development cooperation, https://
asean.org/asean-australia-review-implementation-of-development-cooperation-4/.
24. Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific between the Republic of
India and the Government of Australia 2020, June 4, accessed at
https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/india/joint-declaration-shared-vision-maritime-cooperation-indo-pacific-
between-republic-india-and-government-australia.
25. Singh, R.P. (2022) Australia’s Strategic Imperatives in Indo-Pacific: Opportunities for India IDSA Brief New
Delhi: Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, accessed at
https://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/australias-strategic-imperatives-in-indo-pacific-rpsingh-230222.
26. Eurasian Times Global Desk (2020) ‘India, Australia Could Sign Pact For A Military Base In Andaman’s and
Cocos Islands – Experts’ The Eurasian Times, March 23, 2020, accessed at
https://eurasiantimes.com/india-australia-could-sign-pact-for-a-military-base-in-andamans-and-cocos-
islands-experts/.
27. Saha, Premasha & Singh, Angad (2022) “Securing Two Oceans: Bolstering India-Australia Defence
Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 346, January 2022, New Delhi: Observer
Research Foundation.
28. De, Prabir (2021) Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI): Trade, Connectivity and Maritime Transport Suggested
Action Plans, AIC Working Paper, New Delhi ASEAN-India Centre at RIS, Research Information Systems in
Developing Countries, December, accessed at
https://aic.ris.org.in/sites/aic.ris.org.in/files/Publication/AIC%20Working%20Paper%20No%208%20
December%202021.pdf
29. Tyler, Conley Melissa (2021) Prospects for an Australia-India Trade Deal, East Asia Forum, January 25,
accessed at
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/01/25/prospects-for-an-australia-india-trade-deal/.

28. 28
30. Seshadri, V. S. “RCEP and India: What Next?” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 14, no. 2 (2019): 87–102. https://
www.jstor.org/stable/48636716.
31. Anukoonwattaka, W., P. Romao, P. Bhogal, T. Bentze, and R.S. Lobo (2021), “Digital economy integration
in Asia and the Pacific: insights from DigiSRII 1.0”, ARTNeT Working Paper Series, No. 208, August 2021,
Bangkok, ESCAP, accessed at
https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/AWP%20208%20Witada%20
Pedro%20Preety%20Thomas%20Richard.pdf
32. Ray Trisha, Jain Sangeet, Jayakumar Arjun, Reddy Anurag (2021) The Digital Indo-Pacific: Regional
Connectivity and Resilience, ORF Monograph, New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, February 15,
accessed at
https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-digital-indo-pacific-regional-connectivity-and-resilience/.
33. Fetzek, Shiloh & McGinn, Dennis (2020) Climate Change Is a Security Threat to the Asia-Pacific, The
Diplomat August 10, accessed at
https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/climate-change-is-a-security-threat-to-the-asia-pacific/.
34. World Meteorological Organization (2021), Climate change increases threats in South West Pacific, Press
Release Number: 10112021, November 10, 2021, accessed at
https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/climate-change-increases-threats-south-west-pacific
35. Grunbuhel, Clemens & Melati, Kuntum (2020) ‘SDGs: Is ASEAN Getting it Right’, The ASEAN Post, 15
October, accessed at
https://theaseanpost.com/article/sdgs-asean-getting-it-right.
36. Munro, Virginia (2021) Creating genuine change through SDG implementation, ProBono Australia, accessed at
https://probonoaustralia.com.au/news/2021/08/creating-genuine-change-through-sdg-implementation/.
37. India: Voluntary National Review Report 2020, Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform,
accessed at
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/memberstates/india

29. 29
Introduction
Proposed by Japanese Prime Minister ABE Shinzo in 2007, the Indo-Pacific concept was revived by
U.S. President Trump’s remarks at the APEC CEO Summit held in Vietnam in November 2017. The first
U.S.-Japan-India-Australia Consultations (Quad) began in the Philippines that same month, marking a
significant advance in the Quad. However, about a year before that, in August 2016, Japanese Prime
Minister ABE Shinzo announced his vision for “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” in his keynote address at
the sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) held in Kenya. Japan
has then in 2017, 2018 and 2019 respectively released Diplomatic Bluebooks with the main theme of
Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Other Quad members have also announced their own versions
of Indo-Pacific to affirm their strategy in the region.
The US has gradually shaped its Indo-Pacific strategy through published documents such as Indo-
Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region released
by the Department of Defense in June 2019, Department of State’s A Free and Open Indo-Pacific:
Advancing a Shared Vision (November 4, 2019), United States Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific
(January, 2021), and Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (UN) (February, 2002), among others.
Not as much as Japan and the US have done, Australia and India have both given their perspectives
on the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s most significant documents on the Indo-Pacific are its 2016 Defence
White Paper, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, and 2020 Defence Strategic Update (Matthew Parry:
2022).1
India eventually embraced the concept of a free, open, inclusive Indo-Pacific through Modi’s
speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue (Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India: 2018)2
in 2018.
In terms of mechanism, Indo-Pacific began with the senior official-level meeting in November, 2017 in
Understanding Asean Outlook
on the Indo-Pacific
Vo Xuan Vinh
2

30. 30
the Philippines, which was then upgraded to Foreign Ministers’ Meetings (the first meeting held on 26
September 2019 in New York), and Leader’s Summit of Quad (the first meeting was virtually held on
March 12, 2021). For its part, China, the country has important role in maintaining peace and security in
the Indo-Pacific considered Quad as ‘essentially a tool for containing and besieging China to maintain
US hegemony’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China: 2022).3
ASEAN and its member states-the heart of the Indo-Pacific region, strongly supported by Quad
countries for the former’s unity, centrality and its Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (The White House.:2021).4
‘ASEAN-China relations are among the most dynamic, substantive, and mutually beneficial partnerships
between ASEAN and its dialogue partners’ (Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 2021).5
The
ASEAN-China relationship was upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2021, and since
2009 China surpassed the EU-27 and Japan to become ASEAN’s largest trade in goods partner (The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 2010).6
While all four partners, the US, Japan, India and
Australia combined, accounted for 23.45 per cent of ASEAN’s the total value of trade in goods in
2019, China alone accounted for 17.55 per cent of the grouping’s total trade in the same year (ASEAN
Statistical Yearbook: 2020).7
Although ASEAN faces security challenges, especially the South China Sea issue, its member states,
including allies of the US such as the Philippines and Thailand, have not risked taking sides due to their
close trade relationship with direct neighbor China. ASEAN has strived to maintain its centrality in the
evolving architecture in the Asia-Pacific, now Indo-Pacific through ASEAN-led mechanisms such as
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus
(ADMM-Plus). AOIP released bases on that goal. Therefore, in order to make implications for Australia
and India, the article will clarify perspectives of ASEAN Member States (AMS) on the Indo-Pacific
concept and give a local interpretation of AOIP.
Perspectives of ASEAN Member States on Indo-Pacific Concept
Because each AMS has its national interests in the evolving Indo-Pacific order, especially in their
relationship with major countries that have influence on the region, each AMS has its own perspective
on the Indo-Pacific concept.
Brunei Darussalam
To date, Brunei Darussalam has not made any unilateral official position on the Indo-Pacific. The
country has only expressed its view within the framework of ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms. As a
microstate, Brunei cannot escape the actions of the great powers in the region, particularly the rivalry
between the United States and China (Omar, Abdul Malik: 2018).8
but taking the advantages created
by the rivalry. While heavily relying on American security protection (The US Navy:2018).9
in the
region and depending on international law to sustain and guarantee its sovereignty and independence
(Omar, Abdul Malik: op cit),10
Brunei has been looking for ways to diversify its economy and promote
investments into the country (Gnanasagaran A: 2018).11
Favorable foreign direct investments from
China throughout the years leads Brunei to establish stronger alignment with China, rather than going
against it (Putra, B. A: 2021).12
However, China’s overtly aggressive stance in the South China Sea has
also made the Southeast Asian country cautious because Brunei does not want to be seen as too
friendly to China. At the same time, hurdles between Brunei and the US have also arisen after Brunei
decided to implement phases two and three of the Sharia Penal Code in 2019. As a result, Brunei
engages the strategy of Omni-enmeshment of ASEAN peaceful norms in the region (Ibid).13

31. 31
Laos PDR
Due to its strong influence on Laos PDR in recent years, China was reportedly evaluated as ‘one
of Laos’ closest political allies and trade partners’ (Hutt, David: 2021).14
Implemented Indo-Pacific
strategy, the U.S. has approached Laos PDR (US Embassy in Laos: 2018)15
but so far it seems that there
is no official document from Laos PDR that mentions of Indo-Pacific. Laos’ official stance on the Indo-
Pacific is reflected in ASEAN documents, notably the AOIP.
Taking power in 2015, the NLD-led civilian government in Myanmar was quickly condemned by the
US and the West for its silence on Myanmar military’s actions against Rohingyas. Sanctions have
been posed on key figures of Myanmar military for their role in “ethnic cleansing” against Rohingya
Muslims and ‘widespread human rights abuses’ against other ethnic minority groups (Wong, Edward:
2018).16
As a result, pro-democracy Aung San Suu Kyi has moved closer to China, the country along
with Russia have defended Myanmar by blocking UNSC statement on the situation in Rakhine State
of Myanmar (The Irrawaddy. 2017).17
Pressure on Myanmar after the coup in February 2021 has pushed
Myanmar closer to China. In that context, Myanmar seems to have never officially mentioned the Indo-
Pacific, but only expressed its perspective through the AOIP.
Cambodia
In recent years, Cambodia has been judged as pro-China. Chinese political influence in Cambodia is
strong (Vannarith, Chheang: 2018).18
A survey report released by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Office
Cambodia in May 2021 highlighted that ‘Cambodians point to China as the best foreign partner for
their country across a range of issues’ (Southall, Emily et al.: 2021).19
In the meantime, unlike Brunei,
Cambodia does not choose to be silent in expressing its unilateral views on Indo-Pacific by raising
voice to support Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Prime Minister Hun Sen was the first
ASEAN leader to express full support for Japan’s FOIP during his official visit to Tokyo in August
2017 (Chanborey, Cheunboran.:2021).20
Hun Manet, the eldest son of Prime Minister Hun Sen and the
Commander of Cambodia’s Army said he supported the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific (of Japan)
during his visit to Tokyo in February 2022 (The Japan Times: 2022).21
Facing with challenges posed
by the U.S. criticizes and sanctions, Cambodia has become pro-China but it ‘prioritizes its domestic
agenda and interests, exercises a hedging strategy to mitigate risks, advances multilateralism and
strengthens ASEAN-driven regional architecture’ (Vannarith Chheang:2022).22
That is why Cambodia
has endorsed the AOIP, especially the principles pertaining to ASEAN centrality, openness, inclusivity,
and respect for sovereignty( Chanborey, Cheunboran: op cit, p.22).23
Traditionally pursuing East Asian regionalism with Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s proposal of
East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), and then Prime Minister Abdulla Badawi supported for East Asia
Summit including countries from East Asia (Frost, Frank: 2016).24
Malaysia seems to be wary of a US-
led Indo-Pacific discourse which is anti-China. To mitigate the risks and maximize the opportunities
arising from China’s great power behavior, Malaysia employed a hedging strategy, at the same time
well-balanced relations with the U.S., Japan, and ASEAN (Gerstl, Alfred: 2020).25
That is the reason
why Malaysian leaders and officials have largely been silent on the Indo-Pacific discourse (Kuik,
Cheng-Chwee: 2019).26
After having agreed with ASEAN to develop the AOIP, Malaysia began to refer
to the Indo-Pacific but with a less sensitive term ‘Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions’. The term was
mentioned 13 times in its Defense White Paper 2020 (Ministry of Defence of Malaysia: 2020).27

32. 32
The Philippines
Despite being an ally of the U.S., the Philippines still avoids using the term Indo-Pacific in its official
unilateral documents. Perhaps one of the most important reasons is the Beijing-cozy up policy
under President Duterte. However, in the face of China’s resolute actions in the South China Sea in
recent times, the Duterte administration has begun to make more balanced moves. On one hand, the
Philippines strengthens defense ties with the United States and its regional allies such as Japan, South
Korea, and Australia (Kumar, Yogendra: 2022).28
with commitments to supporting the security, stability
and prosperity of a free and open Indo-Pacific (US Defense Secretary: 2021).29
and strengthening
coordination in realizing free and open Indo-Pacific based on the rule of law, (Vietnam+: 2019).30
on
the other hand, it still wants to strengthen economic ties with China since China is its number one
largest trading partner (accounted for 19.1 per cent of Philippines’ total trade value in 2020, before
Japan-12.5 percent, and the US 11.5 per cent respectively) (Philippine Statistics Authority: 2021).31
At
the same time, the Philippines attached the importance of ASEAN in its foreign policy while jointly
with the US upheld the central role of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific region, recognized ASEAN as being
vital to regional security and prosperity (US Department of States: 2021).32
Thailand
As an ally of the US but facing US criticism, especially the US exclusion its strategic actions in the
Asia-Pacific after the 2014 coup, Thailand has subsequently constructed an alliance with China
(Chachavalpongpun, Pavin: 2020).33
However, in reviving the Indo-Pacific strategy, the US has increased
its engagement with Thai government of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-Ocha. Strong political-economic
and security ties with China and the benefits that come from being an ally of the US have made
Thailand to adopt a balancing strategy in handling its relations with the two superpowers (Ibid).34
Thailand on one hand has strongly supported China’s Belt and Road (BRI), it actively participated in
the US. Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Strategy in the other by reaffirming the importance of the
enduring alliance with the US and discussing their shared commitment to promoting peace, security,
and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond (The American Presidency Project:2017).35
organizing Thailand-Australia Indo-Pacific Strategic Dialogue (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kingdom
of Thailand): 2021).36
or joining 57 other countries from the Indo-Pacific region to discuss a range of
issues at the Indo Pacific Ministerial Forum 2022 (Thai PBS World: 2022).37
However, like many other ASEAN countries, in Thailand’s Indo-Pacific approach, ASEAN plays an
important role. Thai’s 20-Year “5S” Foreign Affairs Masterplan (2018-2037) seeks to step up the
nation’s role in helping to advance stability in the region, and to strengthen ASEAN centrality in
the evolving geopolitical landscape (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kingdom of Thailand): The 20-Year
“5S”).38
In declaring Thailand-Australia Strategic Partnership 2020, two countries reaffirm their strong
commitment to the ASEAN-centered regional architecture (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(Australian Government): 2020).39
Singapore
Singapore is among the most strategic partners of the U.S. in the region but we have rarely heard the
term Indo-Pacific unilaterally announced from this Southeast Asian country’s leader. In the context
of the rapid rise of China, with the view that the US presence in the Asia-Pacific region has fostered
peace and stability which is generally beneficial to the countries in the region, Singapore emphasized
that it is more important for the US to remain anchored in the Asia-Pacific, and play an active role

33. 33
in upholding peace and stability in the region (Yeo, Lay Hwee: 2018).40
For Singapore, acceleration
of ASEAN regional cooperation is the second most important goal of its foreign policy, immediately
following protection of its national security and interests (Grzywacz, Anna: 2019).41
Therefore, when
talking about Indo-Pacific, the Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue
in 2018 placed Indo-Pacific on a par with China’s BRI, and ASEAN centrality ( CAN: 2019).42
The Indonesian leader seems to be the only one in ASEAN who has publicly announced the Indo-
Pacific term. Even before Japan announced their own IP in 2016, in a keynote address to an Indonesia
conference at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on 20 May 2013,
Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa laid out ‘An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-Pacific’
(Natalegawa, Marty: 2013).43
Aiming at being a peace-maker, confidence-builder, problem-solver, and
bridge-builder’, (Agastia, I Gusti Bagus Dharma: 2020).44
and decades of being the de facto leader
of ASEAN, after the Indo-Pacific concept had been revived by US President Donald Trump, in January
2018, Indonesia conveyed a proposal of the concept of Indo Pacific at ASEAN Foreign Ministers
Retreat Meetings, namely Indonesia’s perspective for an ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific: towards
a peaceful, prosperous, and inclusive region. Then, on 9th
August 2018, Foreign Minister Retno formally
presented the Indonesian Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept to the 8th
Ministerial Meeting of the East
Asia Summit (The Free Library. Introducing the Indo-Pacific Concept).45
After rounds of discussions,
ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific, based on Indonesian Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept. Aiming to
offset great power politics (Tham, Jansen: 2018).46
in the region, Indonesia promotes a non-aligned
and ASEAN-centered Indo-Pacific (Hoang, Thi Ha: 2021).47
which could cement Indonesia’s status
as ASEAN’s leader and as a global middle power (Weatherbee, Donald E: 2019).48
On the basis of
Indonesia’s initiative, ASEAN has built ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific.
Sharing borderline with China, the same political system and having close economic relations with
the world’s second largest economy (Trade with China accounted for 24.41 per cent of Vietnam’s
total trade value: 2020),49
although realizing benefits from good relations with Quad members,
Vietnam has been very cautious at least from publicly and directly mentioning of the term Indo-
Pacific. Officially, Vietnam still uses the term “Asia-Pacific region” as reflected in the Political Report
of the recent 13th
National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) (Communist Party of
Vietnam: 2021).50
When the term Indo-Pacific is used in the Vietnam National Defense White Paper
2019, the balance-of-power strategy is clearly reflected when assessing the changes of Asia-Pacific
region, the Defence White Paper of Vietnam 2019 mentions of some new initiatives such as the “Free
and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”, “Belt and Road Initiative”, and “Act East Policy” (Ministry of National
Defence (Socialist Republic of Vietnam): 2019).51
Interestingly, in Vietnam National Defense White
Paper 2019, the term Indo-Pacific is used to refer to Vietnam’s readiness ‘to participate in security
and defence cooperation mechanisms suitable to its capabilities and interests, including security and
defence mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific region as well as those of the European Union and the United
Nations’ (UN). (Ministry of National Defence (Socialist Republic of Vietnam): op cit., p.29).52
However,
for Vietnam, ASEAN centrality in the region is very important. The Political Report of the recent 13th
National Congress of the CPV affirms that Vietnam works to firmly maintain ASEAN centrality in
regional security architecture. (Communist Party of Vietnam: Ibid).53
Before that, the Defence White
Paper of Vietnam 2019 highlights Vietnam’s advocacy of ‘expanding cooperation between ASEAN with
external partners within the ASEAN-led multilateral security mechanisms on the basis of respecting
fundamental principles, standards and norms of ASEAN’ (Ministry of National Defence: Op cit., p.29).54

34. 34
The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: A Local Interpretation
To adapt to the new context, especially after ASEAN member countries agreed to participate in China’s
BRI, discussing and reaching the consensus on Indonesia-proposed Indo-Pacific Concept, ASEAN
announced AOIP in June 2019.
AOIP is based on the principles of strengthening ASEAN Centrality, openness, transparency,
inclusivity, a rules-based framework, good governance, respect for sovereignty, non-intervention,
complementarity with existing cooperation frameworks, equality, mutual respect, mutual trust, mutual
benefit and respect for international law, such as UN Charter, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea, and other relevant UN treaties and conventions, the ASEAN Charter and various ASEAN
treaties and agreements and the East Asia Summit Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations (2011).
The Outlook is also guided by the purposes and principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).
The key elements of the Outlook are:
(a) A perspective of viewing the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, not as contiguous territorial
spaces but as a closely integrated and interconnected region, with ASEAN playing a central and
strategic role;
(b) An Indo-Pacific region of dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry;
(c) An Indo-Pacific region of development and prosperity for all;
(d) The importance of the maritime domain and perspective in the evolving regional architecture.
The Outlook aims at:
(a) Offering an outlook to guide cooperation in the region;
(b) Helping to promote an enabling environment for peace, stability and prosperity in the region in
addressing common challenges, upholding the rules-based regional architecture, and promoting
closer economic cooperation, and thus strengthen confidence and trust;
(c) Enhancing ASEAN’s Community building process and further strengthening the existing ASEAN-
led mechanisms;
(d) Implementing existing and exploring other ASEAN priority areas of cooperation.
The UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030, maritime cooperation, connectivity, and economic
cooperation are some of the areas of cooperation that have been identified in order to realise the key
components of the Outlook. Other possible areas of cooperation are also included.
The Outlook is the ASEAN’s adaptation to the strong competition for influence between the US and
China in Southeast Asia, a geographical centre of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The FOIP
could create a new regional mechanism which could marginalise ASEAN and erode its centrality
(Chanborey, Cheunboran: op cit., p.22).55
Therefore, ASEAN countries worked to come up with a
common position on a geopolitical framework for the Indo-Pacific to ensure that the 10-member
grouping is not marginalized (Nikkei Asia: 2018).56
At the same time, the countries of Southeast Asia
are unwilling to support one side in the rivalry between the US and China.

35. 35
However, the term Indo-Pacific was something sensitive, especially with China. Therefore, as mentioned
above, Foreign Minister Retno formally presented the Indonesian Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept
to the 8th
Ministerial Meeting of the East Asia Summit in August 2018, after Indonesia conveyed the
proposal of Indonesia’s perspective for an ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific to ASEAN Foreign
Ministers Retreat Meeting in January 2018. ASEAN wanted to make clear to China that Indo-Pacific
was merely a geographical term, not a political one. Obviously, ASEAN also sent a signal to the US that
it supported the US Indo-Pacific concept in its own way. From ASEAN perspective, the Indo-Pacific is
a ‘region of dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry’.
A point of primary concern is the central role of ASEAN. In this document, there are two key highlights
of the AOIP associated with ASEAN centrality. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is founded
on the concepts of enhancing ASEAN Centrality, according to the first tenet indicated. And second,
‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific envisages ASEAN Centrality’. ASEAN hopes that AOIP will help
maintain its central role in the evolving regional architecture in Southeast Asia and its surrounding
regions. In the AOIP, ASEAN centrality is placed in ASEAN-led mechanisms, including the East Asia
Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus
(ADMM-Plus), the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), and ASEAN Plus One mechanisms. The
ASEAN-led multilateral system has enabled smaller states to have their own voices in regional affairs,
strengthened ASEAN’s leverage vis-à-vis great powers (CHOI, Ina: 2020).57
In terms of areas of cooperation, bringing maritime cooperation to the forefront, on the one hand, shows
ASEAN’s priority in responding to challenges from marine space, on the other hand it harmonizes the
common interest in this space of the Quad (In the Joint Statement on Quad Cooperation in the Indo-
Pacific: 2022)58
as well as those of China (In the ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea’:2002).59
For AMS, naming international law, freedom of navigation and overflight, and the
settlement of disputes by peaceful means in the Outlook is due to the fact that China has refused
to recognize the PCA’s 2016 rulings regarding the Philippines-China case, conducted more resolute
activities in the South China Sea, such as militarizing the features it occupied by force in the Spratlys
or carrying out many activities in the exclusive economic zones of other claimants in the South China
Sea. This also reflects the fact that ASEAN is more interested in dispute resolution before discussing
joint development with China while the latter wants to have joint exploration with other claimants.
Connectivity is also a strategic element that demonstrates ASEAN’s calculation in taking advantages
of China’s BRI, and the Quad’s FOIP since it locates at the heart of Indo-Pacific region, at least from
geographical perspective, especially since the AOIP identifies that ‘the Declaration on the 6th
East
Asia Summit on ASEAN Connectivity should guide the ASEAN outlook on connectivity in Indo-Pacific
region’.
The contents about SDGs targets and economic cooperation represent the goals of economic
development and improvement of people’s lives, which are the goals of all AMS. It further affirms
ASEAN’s desire to achieve the SDGs as well as enhance the competitiveness of its members’ economies
with external support, especially partners within the framework of ASEAN-led mechanisms.
Implications for Australia and India
The AOIP announcement has had an influence on nations with strategic interests in the area, including
Australia and India, two Quad members and nations that emphasize ASEAN’s crucial role in their
regional strategies. In 2012, Australia released the White Paper titled ‘Australia in the ASEAN Century,

36. 36
(Australian Government: 2012).60
in which ‘members of ASEAN are of special relevance to Australian
interests (Australian Government: Op cit, p.72).61
India for its parts upgraded its Look East Policy
(LEP) to Act East Policy (EAP), which ‘is an important part of India’s Indo-Pacific vision’ and ‘ASEAN
is and always will be the heart of AEP’ (Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India): 2019).62
In that context, a better understanding of AOIP is important for the implementation of Indo-Pacific
strategy of each country. The following are some implications drawn from the AOIP analysis from the
perspectives of every AMS.
First, ASEAN does not want to take sides, including US allies, in the US-China strategic competition.
Instead, they carry out policies of balance of great power. ASEAN and its member countries only want
to take advantage of the economic and investment benefits brought by China’s BRI, and at the same
time they want the Quad countries to be more involved in security to ensure the rules-based order,
especially in the South China Sea to limit China’s unreasonable ambitions in this sea. Therefore, the
constructive engagement, observance and protection of international law carried out by the Quad is
really important to the maintenance of the rules-based order, security, peace and prosperity in the
region.
Second, the introduction of the AOIP once again affirmed ASEAN’s desire to maintain its centrality
in the evolving regional architecture. The history of multilateral integration in the Indo-Pacific region
has shown the importance of ASEAN through ASEAN-led mechanisms such as ARF, EAS, ADMM+,
EAMF. The Quad’s strong support for ASEAN’s unity and centrality and for ASEAN’s Outlook on
the Indo-Pacific, (The White House: 2021)63
and ‘support ASEAN partners to advance the practical
implementation of ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’ (US Mission to ASEAN: 2022).64
demonstrate
the Quad’s support and recognition of ASEAN centrality in the region.
Third, the imbalance of power influence in Southeast Asia, especially in strategic spaces such as the
South China Sea and Mekong subregion, can increase the risk of insecurity in the region. Therefore,
multilateral participation of other nations with interests in the region, including Australia and India,
is crucial. If the South China Sea has experienced efforts of outside countries in establishing a legal-
based order, or at least, this goal is being pursued with actual commitments and actions by the outside
countries, the Mekong sub-region seems to be a new competitive front between countries having
interests in the region. Over the years, Australia and India, among others have engaged in the region,
but the extent of involvement appears to be limited. Sustainable technology-based support with the
long-term vision of each country for the region is extremely important. In the South China Sea issue,
ASEAN has conducted bilateral maritime exercises within the framework of China (2018) and the US
(2019) respectively. Bilateral maritime exercises in the South China Sea between ASEAN and other
dialogue partners such as Australia and India in the framework of EAS also need to be released soon,
demonstrating cooperation efforts between ASEAN countries and its partners in ensuring maritime
space security for all.
Fourth, besides security and connectivity, the economy is also an important area. If Australia is an
important and active leading partner in Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
negotiations, India had withdrawn from this process a year before the RCEP was concluded. India’s
withdrawal from RCEP was explained that ‘the present form of the RCEP Agreement does not fully
reflect the basic spirit and the agreed guiding principles of RCEP’ and ‘it also does not address
satisfactorily India’s outstanding issues and concerns’, including, among others, challenges put India’s
‘domestic industry and agriculture at risk’ (The Economic Times: 2019).65
However, India’s absence in

37. 37
the RCEP, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
means India’s absence from one of the key multilateral economic platforms in the Asia-Pacific. If
India really wants to become a ‘key factor’ in the Indo-Pacific space, as the 6th
largest economy in the
world. However, India’s absence in the RCEP, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) means India’s absence from one of the key multilateral economic
platforms in the Asia-Pacific. If India really wants to become a ‘key factor’ in the Indo-Pacific space,
as the 6th
largest economy in the world (IMF, 2021),66
India should not be absent from the economic
multilateral game in this region. Although India has concluded free trade agreements (FTAs) with
ASEAN, with some AMS, Japan, and South Korea, it is clear that the economic power game in the
Indo-Pacific is much more than that with the new generation FTAs such as CPTPP and RCEP, where
India is completely absent.
Last but not least, ASEAN has also worked closely with its dialogue partners to promote its Indo-
Pacific version (Chanborey, Cheunboran: Op cit., p.22).67
Given the diplomatic and political significance
of the AOIP, a high-level joint statement between ASEAN and its dialogue partners on cooperation
within the framework of the AOIP is very important, affirming the recognitions of ASEAN’s dialogue
partners of ASEAN centrality. The Joint Statement of the 23rd
ASEAN-Japan Summit on Cooperation
on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific was released in November 2020. One year later, ASEAN-India
Joint Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific for Peace, Stability, and
Prosperity in the region was also announced (28 October 2021). It is obvious that ASEAN is waiting
for an edition of the ASEAN-Australia Joint Statement on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the
Indo-Pacific.
Conclusion
AOIP was built at the initiative of Indonesia but is the product of the common strategic calculations
of ASEAN as a bloc, and as those of member countries to adapt to the strategic competition among
powers in the region. As small countries, receiving a lot of economic benefits from China, and security
and economic benefits from the US, AMS have chosen the path of balance of power or hedging
instead of taking sides. In that choice, each AMS has considered the important role of ASEAN in their
foreign policy. To ensure the interests of each member state, maintaining the central role of ASEAN is
paramount, whether this role may be implicitly given by major powers or because of the disagreement
in the distribution of spheres of influence among major powers. It is very important for Australia
and India, the key partners of ASEAN, and members of the Quad to understand the foreign policy
of each AMS, which is partly reflected in the AOIP. Efforts to maintain a rules-based regional order,
ensure freedom of navigation, overflight, unimpeded commerce, and enforce and protect UNCLOS
have been undertaken by Australia and India unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally is essential.
While Australia should have a joint statement on cooperation with AOIP, India should consider deeper
its integration into Indo-Pacific economic life. Substantial engagement with a clear strategic vision of
countries having interests in the region, including Australia and India in the Mekong sub-region, will
make significant contributions to maintaining the balance of power in the region, an important factor
to ensure security and maintain regional peace.