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SC 103
Domino on the Web - Yes, It's
(Probably) Hackable
Darren Duke
About Me
• Ex co-host of This Week In Lotus podcast
• Current (?) co-co-host of WTF Tech podcast
• Sometime blogger https://blog.darrenduke.net
• Twitter snark fountain @darrenduke
• This maybe the best slide in the deck. Feel free
to leave right now…
Agenda
• What we will cover
– Then eternal battle of admin vs developer
– The simple things
– The less simple things
– The harder things
– The much harder things
Be Careful
• When you have a web server you are a target
– Do the simple things first
– Change one thing at time and test
• You will break something
• No, really you will
• No. For real. You will break something.
• I broke my blog search
• I broke iNotes clipboard pasting
The Eternal Battle
• Web server security, whose responsibility?
– Is it the application developer?
– Is it the web server administrator?
– Yes
• Developer
– Tell
• What is *your* required minimum security
• Administrator
– Ask
• What is the maximum level of security I can use?
• If no answer, start high and move down
Sanitize Input
• Developers, you must sanitize the input
uploaded by your web applications
– Input fields need to be cleaned on form
submission
• Ex, on submit check for an remove <script> tags in the
input
• This reduces the risk of a compromised server
– Try to hack your own applications
• The Domino HTTP stack
– Not the most up-to-date HTTP stack available
• I’m being nice
– Missing many modern features
• HTTP/2, SNI
• Yes, I’m sure Domino 10 will address this along with
world peace
– Complicated HTTP header use
– Sometimes TLS/SSL gets caught with pants down
• Poodle
• ROBOT
• So yes, you can do most of this in Domino
• I would use a reverse proxy
– Apache
– Nginx
• I use both
– Blog behind Nginx (on Prominic)
– iNotes, Traveler behind Apache (on-prem)
• Proxies can also HA and LB
– Try that in native Domino!
The Simple Things…..
The Simple Things
• More Secure Internet Passwords
The Simple Things
• More Secure EXISTING Internet Passwords
The Simple Things
• Make your Domino LTPA cookie more secure
– Require SSL
• Mitigate man-in-the-middle-attacks
– Restrict Use
• Prevent script access to cookie
• Mitigate XSS
The Simple Things
• Notes.ini Settings
– HSTS
• https://blog.darrenduke.net/darren/ddbz.nsf/dx/domino-
adds-hsts-to-its-security-arsenal.htm
– X-Frame Header Options
• http://www-
01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21568598
• 9.0.1 FP6+ HTTPAdditionalRespHeader=X-Frame-Options:
SAMEORIGIN
– DominoValidateFramesetSRC=1
• Frame content must be from the same database
• https://www-
10.lotus.com/ldd/dominowiki.nsf/dx/DominoValidateFrames
etSRC
The Simple Things
• Other Notes.ini Settings
– SSL_DISABLE_RENEGOTIATE=1
– HTTPEnableConnectorHeaders=0
– SSL_RESUMABLE_SESSIONS=0
– SSL_DISABLE_TLS_10=1
The Simple Things
• Upgrade to latest Fix Pack
– FP10 fixes ROBOT
– Each FP will deprecate weak/vulnerable ciphers
The Less Simple Things
I’ll show mine, if you show yours
• HTTP Headers are your friend
• Prevents browser from doing stupid things
– Headers can be disabled in the browser!!!
– Implement with care
• For example line 5 breaks Domino blog
– Here is my starting header config for Apache
1. Header edit Set-Cookie ^(.*)$ $1;HttpOnly;Secure
2. Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000;
includeSubDomains"
3. Header always append X-Frame-Options SAMEORIGIN
4. Header always set X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block"
5. Header always set X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
6. Header always set Server NotTelling
7. Header always set Referrer-Policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin
The Less Simple Things
• NginX Version
1. set_cookie_flag HttpOnly secure;
2. add_header Strict-Transport-Security 'max-age=63072000;
includeSubDomains; preload';
3. add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN";
4. add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block";
5. add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff";
6. server_tokens off;
7. add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin";
• Note 1, line 1 requires module support in NginX.
• Note 2, line 6 only removes version and OS, it still says “nginx”. There are other ways but they
seem it and miss as you may have to compile module support into NginX.
more_clear_headers Server;
more_clear_headers Server;
The Less Simple Things
• You could put all those headers in Domino
– But you have to add each one at a time
– For each internet site
• Oh, yeah, you need to be using Internet Sites
• It may work with global, not tried it, YMMV
– You end up with a *lot* of web rule documents
• Much, much easier in a reverse proxy
The Harder Things
The Harder Things
• There are more advanced headers
– Access-Control-Allow-Methods
– Access-Control-Allow-Headers
– Content-Security-Policy
– Access-Control-Allow-Origin
– Think of these as X-XSS-Protection on
steroids
The Harder Things
• The blog NginX headers
add_header Access-Control-Allow-Methods 'GET, POST, OPTIONS,HEAD';
add_header Access-Control-Allow-Headers 'DNT,X-CustomHeader,Keep-
Alive,User-Agent,X-Requested-With,If-Modified-Since,Cache-
Control,Content-Type';
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src
'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'
https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self'
https://www.slideshare.net https://public.slidesharecdn.com
https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' https://www.gravatar.com
https://i.creativecommons.org https://licensebuttons.net; frame-src
https://www.slideshare.net";
add_header Access-Control-Allow-Origin
"https://public.slidesharecdn.com,https://www.slideshare.net";
The Harder Things
• Content-Security-Policy
–default-src
–script-src
–font-src
–img-src
–frame-src
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self'
'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src
'self' https://www.slideshare.net
https://public.slidesharecdn.com https://fonts.gstatic.com;
img-src 'self' https://www.gravatar.com
https://i.creativecommons.org https://licensebuttons.net;
frame-src https://www.slideshare.net";
The Harder Things
• Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only
– Allows testing of policy BEFORE implementing
• Clean up all the errors BEFORE turning on
– Shows content errors in browser development
tools console
The Much Harder Things
The Much Harder Things
• ModSecurity
– Available for Apache and NginX
– Add-in module to prevent OWASP-known hacking
attempts
• OWASP - Open Web Application Security Project
– Use rules to allow or disallow certain URL patterns
and actions
• Known vulnerabilities get blocked/reported
– Use with caution
• You probably want to “report” before turning it on fully
• SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly
ModSecurity
--d5cdc63e-H--
Message: Warning. Operator EQ matched 0 at REQUEST_HEADERS. [file
"/usr/share/modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf"] [line
"612"] [id "920280"] [rev "2"] [msg "Request Missing a Host Header"] [severity
"WARNING"] [ver "OWASP_CRS/3.0.0"] [maturity "9"] [accuracy "9"] [tag
"application-multi"] [tag "language-multi"] [tag "platform-multi"] [tag "attack-
protocol"] [tag "OWASP_CRS/PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/MISSING_HEADER_HOST"] [tag
"WASCTC/WASC-21"] [tag "OWASP_TOP_10/A7"] [tag "PCI/6.5.10"]
Apache-Error: [file "apache2_util.c"] [line 273] [level 3] [client 192.168.0.195]
ModSecurity: Warning. Operator EQ matched 0 at REQUEST_HEADERS. [file
"/usr/share/modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf"] [line
"612"] [id "920280"] [rev "2"] [msg "Request Missing a Host Header"] [severity
"WARNING"] [ver "OWASP_CRS/3.0.0"] [maturity "9"] [accuracy "9"] [tag
"application-multi"] [tag "language-multi"] [tag "platform-multi"] [tag "attack-
protocol"] [tag "OWASP_CRS/PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/MISSING_HEADER_HOST"] [tag
"WASCTC/WASC-21"] [tag "OWASP_TOP_10/A7"] [tag "PCI/6.5.10"] [hostname
"localhost.localdomain"] [uri "/"] [unique_id "W1RiorhE-6pWl72XxvlgcAAAABg"]
Stopwatch: 1532256930612640 6576 (- - -)
Stopwatch2: 1532256930612640 6576; combined=5424, p1=635, p2=1014, p3=96, p4=3552,
p5=126, sr=86, sw=1, l=0, gc=0
Response-Body-Transformed: Dechunked
Producer: ModSecurity for Apache/2.9.2 (http://www.modsecurity.org/);
OWASP_CRS/3.0.2.
Server: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)
Engine-Mode: "DETECTION_ONLY"
--d5cdc63e-Z--
ModSecurity
• OWASP_TOP_10/A7
– Google it for a more in-depth description
• [tag
"OWASP_CRS/PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/MISSING_HEADER_HOST"]
– Find out what the violation is
ModSecurity
• Most often than not, you will just end up
disabling the rule that hit because it’s not
applicable or a risk to your application/server
• In our example it is rule[id "920280"]
• Rules can be disabled per URI, web server or
for all servers
• Depending on your ModSec version exceptions
will be different, so Google it
Tools
Tools
• Warning
– Don’t scan a site you don’t have approval to scan
• Scanning without explicit approval could be crime in
your (or the servers) jurisdiction
– Don’t scan a site during busy times
• You could become the source of your own DDoS attack
• Fun times!
Tools
• Qualys
– Most of you will have used the free version
• Paid options to proactively scan your servers
– Scans external web sites for free and provides
detailed insight into SSL, ciphers, etc.
Qualys
Tools
• SecurityHeaders.com
– Will scan a given site and return security related
header information
– Provides warnings and recommendations for the
different headers
SecurityHeaders.com
Tools
• ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy)
– The official OWASP scanning tool
– Provides tons of information
– Free
Tools
• PenTest-Tools.com
– Like Qualys, except for penetration tests
– Online, no software to install
– Free version provides limited but useful
functionality
– Really cheap for the paid version (relatively)
ZAP
Pentest-tools.com
Takeways
• Know what the access the application needs
• Implement the highest possible security whilst
maintaining functionality
• Scan often
Q&A
• That was a lot
• Question Time!

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CollabSphere SC 103 : Domino on the Web : Yes, It's (Probably) Hackable

  • 1. SC 103 Domino on the Web - Yes, It's (Probably) Hackable Darren Duke
  • 2. About Me • Ex co-host of This Week In Lotus podcast • Current (?) co-co-host of WTF Tech podcast • Sometime blogger https://blog.darrenduke.net • Twitter snark fountain @darrenduke • This maybe the best slide in the deck. Feel free to leave right now…
  • 3. Agenda • What we will cover – Then eternal battle of admin vs developer – The simple things – The less simple things – The harder things – The much harder things
  • 4. Be Careful • When you have a web server you are a target – Do the simple things first – Change one thing at time and test • You will break something • No, really you will • No. For real. You will break something. • I broke my blog search • I broke iNotes clipboard pasting
  • 5. The Eternal Battle • Web server security, whose responsibility? – Is it the application developer? – Is it the web server administrator? – Yes • Developer – Tell • What is *your* required minimum security • Administrator – Ask • What is the maximum level of security I can use? • If no answer, start high and move down
  • 6. Sanitize Input • Developers, you must sanitize the input uploaded by your web applications – Input fields need to be cleaned on form submission • Ex, on submit check for an remove <script> tags in the input • This reduces the risk of a compromised server – Try to hack your own applications
  • 7. • The Domino HTTP stack – Not the most up-to-date HTTP stack available • I’m being nice – Missing many modern features • HTTP/2, SNI • Yes, I’m sure Domino 10 will address this along with world peace – Complicated HTTP header use – Sometimes TLS/SSL gets caught with pants down • Poodle • ROBOT
  • 8. • So yes, you can do most of this in Domino • I would use a reverse proxy – Apache – Nginx • I use both – Blog behind Nginx (on Prominic) – iNotes, Traveler behind Apache (on-prem) • Proxies can also HA and LB – Try that in native Domino!
  • 10. The Simple Things • More Secure Internet Passwords
  • 11. The Simple Things • More Secure EXISTING Internet Passwords
  • 12. The Simple Things • Make your Domino LTPA cookie more secure – Require SSL • Mitigate man-in-the-middle-attacks – Restrict Use • Prevent script access to cookie • Mitigate XSS
  • 13. The Simple Things • Notes.ini Settings – HSTS • https://blog.darrenduke.net/darren/ddbz.nsf/dx/domino- adds-hsts-to-its-security-arsenal.htm – X-Frame Header Options • http://www- 01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21568598 • 9.0.1 FP6+ HTTPAdditionalRespHeader=X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN – DominoValidateFramesetSRC=1 • Frame content must be from the same database • https://www- 10.lotus.com/ldd/dominowiki.nsf/dx/DominoValidateFrames etSRC
  • 14. The Simple Things • Other Notes.ini Settings – SSL_DISABLE_RENEGOTIATE=1 – HTTPEnableConnectorHeaders=0 – SSL_RESUMABLE_SESSIONS=0 – SSL_DISABLE_TLS_10=1
  • 15. The Simple Things • Upgrade to latest Fix Pack – FP10 fixes ROBOT – Each FP will deprecate weak/vulnerable ciphers
  • 16. The Less Simple Things
  • 17. I’ll show mine, if you show yours • HTTP Headers are your friend • Prevents browser from doing stupid things – Headers can be disabled in the browser!!! – Implement with care • For example line 5 breaks Domino blog – Here is my starting header config for Apache 1. Header edit Set-Cookie ^(.*)$ $1;HttpOnly;Secure 2. Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" 3. Header always append X-Frame-Options SAMEORIGIN 4. Header always set X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block" 5. Header always set X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 6. Header always set Server NotTelling 7. Header always set Referrer-Policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin
  • 18. The Less Simple Things • NginX Version 1. set_cookie_flag HttpOnly secure; 2. add_header Strict-Transport-Security 'max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload'; 3. add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"; 4. add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block"; 5. add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"; 6. server_tokens off; 7. add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"; • Note 1, line 1 requires module support in NginX. • Note 2, line 6 only removes version and OS, it still says “nginx”. There are other ways but they seem it and miss as you may have to compile module support into NginX. more_clear_headers Server; more_clear_headers Server;
  • 19. The Less Simple Things • You could put all those headers in Domino – But you have to add each one at a time – For each internet site • Oh, yeah, you need to be using Internet Sites • It may work with global, not tried it, YMMV – You end up with a *lot* of web rule documents • Much, much easier in a reverse proxy
  • 21. The Harder Things • There are more advanced headers – Access-Control-Allow-Methods – Access-Control-Allow-Headers – Content-Security-Policy – Access-Control-Allow-Origin – Think of these as X-XSS-Protection on steroids
  • 22. The Harder Things • The blog NginX headers add_header Access-Control-Allow-Methods 'GET, POST, OPTIONS,HEAD'; add_header Access-Control-Allow-Headers 'DNT,X-CustomHeader,Keep- Alive,User-Agent,X-Requested-With,If-Modified-Since,Cache- Control,Content-Type'; add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://www.slideshare.net https://public.slidesharecdn.com https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' https://www.gravatar.com https://i.creativecommons.org https://licensebuttons.net; frame-src https://www.slideshare.net"; add_header Access-Control-Allow-Origin "https://public.slidesharecdn.com,https://www.slideshare.net";
  • 23. The Harder Things • Content-Security-Policy –default-src –script-src –font-src –img-src –frame-src add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://www.slideshare.net https://public.slidesharecdn.com https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' https://www.gravatar.com https://i.creativecommons.org https://licensebuttons.net; frame-src https://www.slideshare.net";
  • 24. The Harder Things • Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only – Allows testing of policy BEFORE implementing • Clean up all the errors BEFORE turning on – Shows content errors in browser development tools console
  • 25. The Much Harder Things
  • 26. The Much Harder Things • ModSecurity – Available for Apache and NginX – Add-in module to prevent OWASP-known hacking attempts • OWASP - Open Web Application Security Project – Use rules to allow or disallow certain URL patterns and actions • Known vulnerabilities get blocked/reported – Use with caution • You probably want to “report” before turning it on fully • SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly
  • 27. ModSecurity --d5cdc63e-H-- Message: Warning. Operator EQ matched 0 at REQUEST_HEADERS. [file "/usr/share/modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf"] [line "612"] [id "920280"] [rev "2"] [msg "Request Missing a Host Header"] [severity "WARNING"] [ver "OWASP_CRS/3.0.0"] [maturity "9"] [accuracy "9"] [tag "application-multi"] [tag "language-multi"] [tag "platform-multi"] [tag "attack- protocol"] [tag "OWASP_CRS/PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/MISSING_HEADER_HOST"] [tag "WASCTC/WASC-21"] [tag "OWASP_TOP_10/A7"] [tag "PCI/6.5.10"] Apache-Error: [file "apache2_util.c"] [line 273] [level 3] [client 192.168.0.195] ModSecurity: Warning. Operator EQ matched 0 at REQUEST_HEADERS. [file "/usr/share/modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf"] [line "612"] [id "920280"] [rev "2"] [msg "Request Missing a Host Header"] [severity "WARNING"] [ver "OWASP_CRS/3.0.0"] [maturity "9"] [accuracy "9"] [tag "application-multi"] [tag "language-multi"] [tag "platform-multi"] [tag "attack- protocol"] [tag "OWASP_CRS/PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/MISSING_HEADER_HOST"] [tag "WASCTC/WASC-21"] [tag "OWASP_TOP_10/A7"] [tag "PCI/6.5.10"] [hostname "localhost.localdomain"] [uri "/"] [unique_id "W1RiorhE-6pWl72XxvlgcAAAABg"] Stopwatch: 1532256930612640 6576 (- - -) Stopwatch2: 1532256930612640 6576; combined=5424, p1=635, p2=1014, p3=96, p4=3552, p5=126, sr=86, sw=1, l=0, gc=0 Response-Body-Transformed: Dechunked Producer: ModSecurity for Apache/2.9.2 (http://www.modsecurity.org/); OWASP_CRS/3.0.2. Server: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu) Engine-Mode: "DETECTION_ONLY" --d5cdc63e-Z--
  • 28. ModSecurity • OWASP_TOP_10/A7 – Google it for a more in-depth description • [tag "OWASP_CRS/PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/MISSING_HEADER_HOST"] – Find out what the violation is
  • 29. ModSecurity • Most often than not, you will just end up disabling the rule that hit because it’s not applicable or a risk to your application/server • In our example it is rule[id "920280"] • Rules can be disabled per URI, web server or for all servers • Depending on your ModSec version exceptions will be different, so Google it
  • 30. Tools
  • 31. Tools • Warning – Don’t scan a site you don’t have approval to scan • Scanning without explicit approval could be crime in your (or the servers) jurisdiction – Don’t scan a site during busy times • You could become the source of your own DDoS attack • Fun times!
  • 32. Tools • Qualys – Most of you will have used the free version • Paid options to proactively scan your servers – Scans external web sites for free and provides detailed insight into SSL, ciphers, etc.
  • 34. Tools • SecurityHeaders.com – Will scan a given site and return security related header information – Provides warnings and recommendations for the different headers
  • 36. Tools • ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy) – The official OWASP scanning tool – Provides tons of information – Free
  • 37. Tools • PenTest-Tools.com – Like Qualys, except for penetration tests – Online, no software to install – Free version provides limited but useful functionality – Really cheap for the paid version (relatively)
  • 38. ZAP
  • 40. Takeways • Know what the access the application needs • Implement the highest possible security whilst maintaining functionality • Scan often
  • 41. Q&A • That was a lot • Question Time!