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HOSPITAL OUTBREAK OF MIDDLE EAST
RESPIRATORY SYNDROME
CORONAVIRUS
JOSE SOCRATES “DEE” M. EVARDONE
YEAR LEVEL I
IM DEPARTMENT, CDUH
HOSPITAL OUTBREAK OF
MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY
SYNDROME
CORONAVIRUS
AUGUST 1, 2013 VOL. 369 NO. 5
PAGES 407-416
ABDULLAH ASSIRI, M.D., ALLISON MCGEER, M.D., TRISH M.
PERL, M.D., ET AL
JOSE SOCRATES “DEE” M. EVARDONE
YEAR LEVEL I
IM DEPARTMENT, CDUH
Study Overview
A novel coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is causing severe disease in
the Middle East.
In this report on a hospital outbreak of MERS-CoV infection, 23
confirmed cases and evidence of person-to-person
transmission were identified.
The median incubation period was 5.2 days.
Objectives:
To be able to review about Coronaviruses, Basic Epidemiology
To be able to understand about MERS Cov
 1) Virology
 2) Epidemiology
 3) Case definitions
 4) Clinical manifestations
 5) Diagnosis
 6) Treatment
 7) Prevention
 8) Outcomes
 9) Travel Recommendations
Methods
• Setting:
• The governorate of Al-Hasa, eastern Saudi Arabia
• Serves a mixed urban and rural population of 1.1 million persons.
• 1) Hospital A is a 150-bed general hospital in the largest urban area (Al-
Hufuf). The dialysis unit, which cares for 43 patients in two shifts per day,
is an open unit with 16 beds spaced 1.3 to 1.5 m apart. The intensive
care unit (ICU) contains two open 6-bed bays.
• 2)Hospitals B and C are also general hospitals in Al-Hufuf. Hospital D is a
regional referral hospital located 160 km from Al-Hufuf.
METHODS:
• The governorate of Al-Hasa, eastern Saudi Arabia
• Serves a mixed urban and rural population of 1.1 million persons.
• Hospital A is a 150-bed general hospital in the largest urban area (Al-
Hufuf).
• The dialysis unit: 43 patients, 2 shifts/day, open unit with 16 beds
spaced 1.3 to 1.5 m apart.
• The ICU contains two open 6-bed bays.
• Hospitals B and Hospital C are general hospitals in Al-Hufuf.
• Hospital D is a regional referral hospital located 160 km from Al-Hufuf.
METHODS:
Definitions:
Confirmed case of MERS-CoV infection:
1) laboratory evidence of MERS-CoV
2) either fever and at least one respiratory symptom or two respiratory symptoms
without another identifiable cause.
Probable case of MERS-CoV infection:
1) if he or she was a household, family, or health care contact of a person with a
confirmed case
2) if pneumonia developed without another confirmed cause
3) either laboratory testing for MERS-CoV was not performed or a single test was negative
and no other specimens were available for testing.
METHODS:
Definitions:
The date of onset:
• febrile patients: the first day of fever that persisted for more than 48 hours
• afebrile patients: the first day of new cough or shortness of breath.
Exposed patients:
had any face-to-face contact with a symptomatic patient who had a confirmed or
probable case,
1) Was in the same hospital room or ward as a symptomatic case patient >1hr
2) Moved into a bed vacated by a symptomatic case patient
3) Was being cared for by a health care worker who was also caring for a
symptomatic case patient, or
4) Was sharing hospital equipment with a symptomatic case patient.
METHODS:
• Laboratory Surveillance:
• September 2012, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health requested that all patients
with pneumonia requiring admission to the ICU be tested for MERS-CoV.
• Throat-swab (Eurotubo, Deltalab),
• sputum,
• tracheal-aspirate, or
• bronchoalveolar- lavage
placed in viral transport medium (Vircell), stored at 28°C, and transported within 72
hours to the Ministry of Health regional reference laboratory in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, where they were subjected to real-time reverse-transcriptase–polymerase-
chain-reaction (RT-PCR) assays totest for MERS-CoV.20
• For all patients, the results of RT-PCR tests were confirmed by measuring cycle-
threshold values for viral load.
METHODS:
Identification of Clusters, Collection of Case Data, and Assessment of
Exposure
• Hospital A initiated active surveillance for pneumonia on April 20, 2013, and conducted a
retrospective review of in-hospital deaths and cases of pneumonia from March 1 through
April 19.
• They also reviewed the medical charts of patients with confirmed MERS-CoV infection to
identify symptoms, laboratory findings, and clinical course. The Ministry of Health
interviewed household contacts of patients with confirmed MERS-CoV infection and
followed them for 14 days after exposure.
METHODS:
Identification of Clusters, Collection of Case Data, and Assessment of
Exposure
• Mapped confirmed and probable MERSCoV cases in time and in space within health care
facilities.
• For each case, we identified potential exposures, with the assumption that face-to-face
contact or time spent in the same area conferred a greater risk than shared caregivers,
which in turn conferred a greater risk than shared equipment.
• No assumptions were made about incubation periods.
• Three of the authors reviewed potential exposures independently; when more than one
potential exposure was possible,
• the most likely source of exposure was identified by consensus among those authors and
an additional author.
• The corresponding author vouches for the accuracy and completeness of the data.
METHODS:
Sequencing and Phylogenetic Analysis:
• Full-genome sequences were obtained from specimens from four patients
(Patients I, J, K, and V)
METHODS:
• Statistical Analysis:
• They calculated empirical cumulative density functions of the incubation period and serial
intervals by computing the cumulative fraction of all observations that fell below each observed
value in the respective data sets.
• They estimated the incubation period by identifying the earliest and latest time of possible
exposure and the time of symptom onset for each case.
• Treating these times as interval-censored estimates of the incubation period for each person, we
fit a log-normal distribution to these data using maximum-likelihood techniques.
• We then examined the robustness of our estimates with multiple definitions of onset and with
the exclusion of particular cases.
METHODS:
Statistical Analysis:
They estimated the serial interval by identifying the times of symptom onset in the
patient and in the person who transmitted the infection (infected–infector pairs) and
then fitting a lognormal distribution to these interval-censored
They estimated the medians and 5th and 95th percentiles of the incubation period
and the serial interval using the quantiles of the lognormal distribution fit to each
data
Results
RESULTS:
• Description of the Outbreak
April 1 and May 23, 2013,
a total of 23 confirmed cases of human infection with MERSCoV were
identified in the
eastern province of Saudi Arabia
RESULTS:
A: Illness in Patients at Hospital A
1) Community Introductions
2) Hemodialysis Unit
3) ICU
4) Medical Ward
B: Illness in Staff Members at Hospital A
C: Illness in Family Members
D: Illness with Onset in Other health care facilities
RESULTS:
RESULTS:
Demographic and Clinical Features
RESULTS:
Demographic and Clinical Features
• median time from the onset of symptoms to ICU admission = 5 days
(range, 1 to 10)
• median time to the need for mechanical ventilation = 7 days
(range, 3 to 11)
• median time to death = 11 days (range, 5 to 27)
RESULTS:
Transmission, Incubation Period, and Serial Interval
One patient transmitted the infection to seven persons, one patient transmitted the infection
to three persons, and four patients transmitted the infection to two persons each.
The incubation period of confirmed cases was 5.2 days (95% confidence interval [CI], 1.9 to
14.7); distributions that were fit to our observed data indicated that 95% of infected patients
would have an onset of symptoms by day 12.4 (95% CI of 95th percentile, 7.3 to 17.5),
whereas 5% would have an onset of symptoms by day 2.2 (95% CI of 5th percentile, 1.2 to
3.1).
We estimated that the serial interval was 7.6 days (95% CI, 2.5 to 23.1) (Fig. 3). The
distributions that were fit to our observed data indicate that the serial interval was less than
19.4 days in
95% of cases (95% CI of 95th percentile, 11.7 to 27.0) and less than 3.0 days in 5% of cases
(95%
CI of 5th percentile, 1.8 to 4.2).
RESULTS:
Sequencing and Phylogenetic Analysis
Phylogenetic analysis of the four MERS-CoV genomes
showed that the viruses form a monophyletic clade with a
bootstrap support of 100%
Discussion
LABORATORY-CONFIRMED
MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS INFECTION, APRIL–
MAY 2013.Characteristics Patients with confirmed cases (n=23)
Male sex — no. (%) 17 (74)
Age — yr
Median 56
Range 24–94
Age ≥50 yr — no. (%) 17 (74)
Age ≥65 yr — no. (%) 6 (26)
Obesity — no./total no. (%)* 5/21 (24)
Underlying Illness — no. (%)
End-stage renal disease 12 (52)
Diabetes mellitus 17 (74)
Cardiac disease 9 (39)
Lung disease, including asthma 10 (43)
Immunosuppressive condition other than renal disease 0
Symptoms before presentation — no. (%)
Fever 20 (87)
Cough 20 (87)
Shortness of breath 11 (48)
Gastrointestinal symptoms
Any 8 (35)
Vomiting 4 (17)
Diarrhea 5 (22)
LABORATORY-CONFIRMED
MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS INFECTION, APRIL–
MAY 2013.
0
39%
43%
52%
74%
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Immunosuppressive condition other than renal disease
Cardiac disease
Lung disease, including asthma
End Stage Renal Disease
Diabetes mellitus
Underlying Illness
Underlying Illness
LABORATORY-CONFIRMED
MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS INFECTION, APRIL–
MAY 2013.Characteristics Patients with confirmed cases (n=23)
Male sex — no. (%) 17 (74)
Age — yr
Median 56
Range 24–94
Age ≥50 yr — no. (%) 17 (74)
Age ≥65 yr — no. (%) 6 (26)
Obesity — no./total no. (%)* 5/21 (24)
Underlying Illness — no. (%)
End-stage renal disease 12 (52)
Diabetes mellitus 17 (74)
Cardiac disease 9 (39)
Lung disease, including asthma 10 (43)
Immunosuppressive condition other than renal disease 0
Symptoms before presentation — no. (%)
Fever 20 (87)
Cough 20 (87)
Shortness of breath 11 (48)
Gastrointestinal symptoms
Any 8 (35)
Vomiting 4 (17)
Diarrhea 5 (22)
TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS AND SYMPTOMS OF PATIENTS WITH
LABORATORY-CONFIRMED
MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS INFECTION, APRIL–
MAY 2013.
17%
22%
35%
48%
87%
87%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
GI {Vomiting} (4)
GI {Diarrhea} (5)
GI {Any} (8)
Shortness of breath (11)
Fever (20)
Cough (20)
Symptoms before presentation
GI {Vomiting} (4) GI {Diarrhea} (5) GI {Any} (8) Shortness of breath (11) Fever (20) Cough (20)
TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS AND SYMPTOMS OF PATIENTS WITH
LABORATORY-CONFIRMED
MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS INFECTION, APRIL–
MAY 2013. (CONT..)Characteristics Patients with confirmed cases (n=23)
Laboratory testing at presentation — no./total no. (%)
Abnormal white-cell count† 5/23 (22)
Abnormal platelet count‡ 5/23 (22)
Elevated aspartate aminotransferase 3/13 (23)
Oxygen saturation <95% while breathing ambient air 7/23 (30)
Chest radiographic findings at presentation — no. (%)
Normal 3 (13)
Increased bronchovascular markings 4 (17)
Unilateral infiltrate 10 (43)
Bilateral infiltrates 5 (22)
Diffuse reticulonodular pattern 1 (4)
Clinical course — no. (%)
Admitted to hospital 22 (96)
Admitted to intensive care unit 18 (78)
Received mechanical ventilation 18 (78)
Outcome as of June 12, 2013 — no. (%)
Recovered 6 (26)
Remained in hospital§ 2 (9)
Died 15 (65)
DISCUSSION:
• Acute viral respiratory tract infections cause considerable morbidity and mortality and pose a risk of
outbreaks in health care settings.
• We describe a cluster of MERS-CoV infections and report health care–associated human-to-human
transmission of MERS-CoV. The 65% case fatality rate in this outbreak is of concern.
DISCUSSION:
DISCUSSION:
DISCUSSION:
Conclusions
Conclusions
• Person-to-person transmission of MERS-CoV can
occur in health care settings and may be associated
with considerable morbidity.
• Surveillance and infection-control measures are
critical to a global public health response.
EPIDEMIOLOGY
Occurrence of infectious diseases:
Sporadic - refers to a disease that occurs infrequently and
irregularly
Endemic - refers to the constant presence and/or usual prevalence
of a disease or infectious agent in a population within a geographic
area
Hyperendemic - refers to persistent, high levels of disease
occurrence.
Epidemic - refers to an increase, often sudden, in the number of
cases of a disease above what is normally expected in that population
in that area.
Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health Practice, 3rd Edition
EPIDEMIOLOGY
Occurrence of infectious diseases:
Outbreak- definition of epidemic, but is often used for a more
limited geographic area
Cluster - an aggregation of cases grouped in place and time that
are suspected to be greater than the number expected, even though
the expected number may not be known
Pandemic - an epidemic that has spread over several countries or
continents, usually affecting a large number of people.
Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health Practice, 3rd Edition
EPIDEMIOLOGY
Outbreaks
Definition
• Two or more people who experience a similar illness or
confirmed infection, and are linked by a common factor, or
• When the observed number of cases unaccountably
exceeds the expected number for a given place and time.
The terms epidemic and outbreak are used interchangeably.
Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health Practice, 3rd Edition
EPIDEMIOLOGY
Surveillance
the continuing scrutiny of all aspects of the occurrence and spread
of a disease that are pertinent to effective control.
It involves a systematic collection, collation and analysis of data
and the prompt dissemination of the resulting information to
those who need to know so that action can result
Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health Practice, 3rd Edition
CORONAVIRUS
CORONAVIRUS
VIROLOGY
Coronaviruses are members of the Nidovirus family, viruses that
replicate using a nested set of mRNAs (“nido-” for “nest”).
The human coronaviruses are classified in two genera:
1) alpha coronaviruses (HCoV-229E and HCoV-NL63) and
2) beta coronaviruses (HCoV-HKU1, HCoV-OC43),
a) Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus [MERS-CoV], and
b) Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus [SARS-CoV]).
CORONAVIRUS
• Viral composition —
• medium-sized, enveloped, positive-stranded RNA viruses
• name derives from their characteristic crown-like appearance in electron
micrographs
• These viruses have the largest known viral RNA genomes, with a length of
27 to 32 kb.
• The host-derived membrane is studded with glycoprotein spikes and
surrounds the genome, which is encased in a nucleocapsid that is helical in
its relaxed form but assumes a roughly spherical shape in the virus particle
Phylogenetic relationships among members of the subfamily Coronavirinae and taxonomic position of
MERS-CoV.
de Groot R J et al. J. Virol. 2013;87:7790-7792
CORONAVIRUS VIRAL COMPOSITION
• —
CORONAVIRUSWhat is coronavirus?
NOVEL HUMAN CORONAVIRUSES
1) Human coronavirus 229E
2) Human coronavirus OC43
3) SARS-CoV (2003)
4) Human Coronavirus NL63 (HCoV-NL63, New Haven coronavirus) (2003)
5) Human coronavirus HKU1 (2005)
6) Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), previously known as
Novel coronavirus 2012 and HCoV-EMC(2012)
CORONAVIRUS
What is MERS?
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
(MERS)
-a viral respiratory illness
-caused by a coronavirus called “Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus” (MERS-
CoV).
MERS-COV
• Q: What are the symptoms of MERS?
• severe acute respiratory illness with symptoms of fever,
cough, and shortness of breath.
• About half of them died.
• Some people were reported as having a mild respiratory
illness.
MERS-COV
Genetic analysis—sufficient heterogeneity to support multiple separate
animal-to-human transfers
Cotten M, Watson SJ, Kellam P, et al. Transmission and
evolution of the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
in Saudi Arabia: a descriptive genomic study. Lancet 2013;
382:1993.
Saudi Arabia
United
Kingdom
France
Italy
Tunisia
Jordan
Qatar
United Arab
Emirates
Oman
Malaysia
United
States
MERS-COV
1) “Index
Patient”
June 2012
KSA
2) Sept 2012,
Qatar
3) Infected with no
Epidemiologic link
4) Oct & Nov 2012
4 Men in 1 Family, Riyadh
2 died
5) Jordan
2 confirmed cases
6) January 2013, U.K.
7) Feb 2013, Px’s son
8) Family member
9) March 2013, Abu
Dhabi, UAE
10) April 2013
23 confirmed cases
11 probable cases
11) May 2013, France
2 diagnosed
12) May 2013, Tunisia
3 cases
13) May 2013, Italy
3 cases
MERS-COV
Possible sources and modes of transmission:
1) Bats
2) Camels
3) Human-to-Human
MERS-COV
• Possible sources and modes of transmission:
BATS
• Bat Coronavirus RNA sequence closely related to MERS-CoV sequences
• Might be a reservoir of MERS-CoV
• unlikely that they are the immediate source
MERS-COV
• Possible sources and modes of transmission:
CAMELS
MERS-COV
Possible sources and modes of transmission:
CAMELS
• Intermediate Hosts
• viruses were quite similar and shared several unusual single nucleotide
polymorphism
• Attempts to isolate viruses were unsuccessful
• Serologic studies have also suggested that camels are an important source of
MERS-CoV
• Using stored serum samples from 1992 to 2010, antibodies to MERS-CoV were detected
as early as 1992
• 651 serum samples from dromedary camels (151 from 2003; 500 from 2013), 632
samples (97 percent) had antibodies against MERS-CoV, including all of the samples
collected in 2003, prior to the outbreak in humans
MERS-COV
What is the significance of the recent finding of MERS-CoV in a
camel?
The critical questions are :
• What is the route by which humans are infected?
• In what way are they exposed?
Most patients who have tested positive for MERS-CoV
• had neither a human source of infection
• nor direct exposure to animals, including camels
It is still unclear whether camels, even if infected with MERS-CoV, play a role
in transmission to humans.
MERS-COV
• Possible sources and modes of transmission:
• Human-to-human transmission
MERS-COV
• Possible sources and modes of transmission:
• Human-to-human transmission
REVISED INTERIM CASE DEFINITION FOR REPORTING TO WHO AS
OF 3 JULY 2013
CASE DEFINITIONS
Confirmed case: A person with laboratory confirmation of infection with MERS-CoV
Probable case:
 A person with an acute respiratory infection (with or without fever) with clinical, radiographic,
or histopathologic evidence of pulmonary parenchymal disease
 No possibility of laboratory confirmation for MERS-CoV because either the patient or samples are
not available for testing and
 Close contact with a laboratory-confirmed case.
REVISED INTERIM CASE DEFINITION FOR REPORTING TO WHO
(AS OF 3 JULY 2013)
PROBABLE CASE
CLINICAL LABORATORY EPIDEMIOLOGICAL
acute febrile respiratory
illness with clinical,
radiological, or
histopathological evidence of
pulmonary parenchymal
disease
MERS-CoV is unavailable or
negative on a single
inadequate specimen
direct epidemiologic-link with
a confirmed MERS-CoV case
acute febrile respiratory
illness with clinical,
radiological, or
histopathological evidence of
pulmonary parenchymal
disease
inconclusive MERS-CoV
laboratory test
direct epidemiologic-link with
a confirmed MERS-CoV case
acute febrile respiratory
illness of any severity
inconclusive MERS-CoV
laboratory test
resident of or traveler to
Middle Eastern countries
where MERS-CoV virus is
believed to be circulating in
the 14 days before onset of
illness
CLINICAL MANIFESTATIONS
• Incubation period - 5.2 days (1.9-14.7 days)
• Clinical features :
• 1) severely ill with pneumonia and acute respiratory distress syndrome
• 2) some have had acute kidney injury
CORONAVIRUS
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
100%
98%
87%
83%
72%
32%
26%
21% 21%
17%
17%
CLINICAL PICTURE
MERS-COV
LABORATORY ABNORMALITIES — AMONG 47 CASES OF MERS-COV INFECTION
IN SAUDI ARABIA
11%
11%
14%
15%
34%
36%
49%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Elevated ALT
Lymphocytosis
Leukopenia
Elevated AST
Lymphopenia
Thrombocytopenia
Elevated LDH
.
MERS-COV
Diagnosis
1) Polymerase chain reaction and sequencing
-real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT-
PCR) testing
2) Serology
MERS-COV
DIAGNOSIS
rRT-PCR - real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase
chain reaction
Lower respiratory tract specimens
Serum samples
MERS-COV
DIAGNOSIS
rRT-PCR
Recommendations by WHO and CDC:
1) Lower respiratory tract specimens
2) Combined nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swab
specimen
3) Acute and convalescent
4) blood, urine, and stool (uncertain)
5) Continued sampling and testing by rRT-PCR is encouraged
6) Nucleic acid sequencing in certain cases
MERS-COV
DIAGNOSIS
rRT-PCR
• false-negative results
• specimen was of poor quality,
• collected late or very early in the illness,
• not handled and shipped appropriately, and
• technical problems with the test.
• Three rRT-PCR assays for routine detection of MERS-CoV
have been developed
MERS-COV
DIAGNOSIS
SEROLOGY
• Detection of MERS-CoV Antibodies:
• immunofluorescence assays
• protein microarray assay
• 2-stage approach by CDC
• Screening: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)
• Confirmation: indirect immunofluorescence test or
microneutralization test
MERS-COV
Treatment
NO antiviral agents are recommended for the treatment of MERS-CoV
infection.
1) combination therapy with
a)Interferon (IFN)-alpha-2b and
b) Ribavirin appears promising
None of the patients responded to therapy and all died of their illness.
2) Convalescent plasma,
3) Monoclonal antibodies, and
4) Inhibition of the main viral protease
MERS-COV
OUTCOMES
April 26, 2014
261
36%
(93)
Laboratory
Confirmed
Died
Overestimate
14
19
(74%)
Routine
Surveillance
5
24
(21%)
Secondary Cases
AGE(47 patients)
39% (<50 yo)
48% (<60 yo)
75% (>60 yo)
MERS-COV
TRAVEL RECOMMENDATIONS
The Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia recommended that in 2013, the following individuals postpone
their plans to travel to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, for Hajj and/or Umrah due to the outbreak of MERS-CoV
●Elderly individuals (>65 years of age)
●Individuals with chronic diseases (eg, heart disease, kidney disease, respiratory
disease, diabetes)
●Individuals with immunodeficiency (congenital or acquired)
●Patients with malignancy
●Patients with a terminal illness
●Pregnant women
●Children (<12 years of age)
THANK
YOU

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Hospital outbreak of middle east respiratory syndrome

  • 1. HOSPITAL OUTBREAK OF MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS JOSE SOCRATES “DEE” M. EVARDONE YEAR LEVEL I IM DEPARTMENT, CDUH
  • 2. HOSPITAL OUTBREAK OF MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS AUGUST 1, 2013 VOL. 369 NO. 5 PAGES 407-416 ABDULLAH ASSIRI, M.D., ALLISON MCGEER, M.D., TRISH M. PERL, M.D., ET AL JOSE SOCRATES “DEE” M. EVARDONE YEAR LEVEL I IM DEPARTMENT, CDUH
  • 3. Study Overview A novel coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is causing severe disease in the Middle East. In this report on a hospital outbreak of MERS-CoV infection, 23 confirmed cases and evidence of person-to-person transmission were identified. The median incubation period was 5.2 days.
  • 4. Objectives: To be able to review about Coronaviruses, Basic Epidemiology To be able to understand about MERS Cov  1) Virology  2) Epidemiology  3) Case definitions  4) Clinical manifestations  5) Diagnosis  6) Treatment  7) Prevention  8) Outcomes  9) Travel Recommendations
  • 6. • Setting: • The governorate of Al-Hasa, eastern Saudi Arabia • Serves a mixed urban and rural population of 1.1 million persons. • 1) Hospital A is a 150-bed general hospital in the largest urban area (Al- Hufuf). The dialysis unit, which cares for 43 patients in two shifts per day, is an open unit with 16 beds spaced 1.3 to 1.5 m apart. The intensive care unit (ICU) contains two open 6-bed bays. • 2)Hospitals B and C are also general hospitals in Al-Hufuf. Hospital D is a regional referral hospital located 160 km from Al-Hufuf. METHODS: • The governorate of Al-Hasa, eastern Saudi Arabia • Serves a mixed urban and rural population of 1.1 million persons. • Hospital A is a 150-bed general hospital in the largest urban area (Al- Hufuf). • The dialysis unit: 43 patients, 2 shifts/day, open unit with 16 beds spaced 1.3 to 1.5 m apart. • The ICU contains two open 6-bed bays. • Hospitals B and Hospital C are general hospitals in Al-Hufuf. • Hospital D is a regional referral hospital located 160 km from Al-Hufuf.
  • 7. METHODS: Definitions: Confirmed case of MERS-CoV infection: 1) laboratory evidence of MERS-CoV 2) either fever and at least one respiratory symptom or two respiratory symptoms without another identifiable cause. Probable case of MERS-CoV infection: 1) if he or she was a household, family, or health care contact of a person with a confirmed case 2) if pneumonia developed without another confirmed cause 3) either laboratory testing for MERS-CoV was not performed or a single test was negative and no other specimens were available for testing.
  • 8. METHODS: Definitions: The date of onset: • febrile patients: the first day of fever that persisted for more than 48 hours • afebrile patients: the first day of new cough or shortness of breath. Exposed patients: had any face-to-face contact with a symptomatic patient who had a confirmed or probable case, 1) Was in the same hospital room or ward as a symptomatic case patient >1hr 2) Moved into a bed vacated by a symptomatic case patient 3) Was being cared for by a health care worker who was also caring for a symptomatic case patient, or 4) Was sharing hospital equipment with a symptomatic case patient.
  • 9. METHODS: • Laboratory Surveillance: • September 2012, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health requested that all patients with pneumonia requiring admission to the ICU be tested for MERS-CoV. • Throat-swab (Eurotubo, Deltalab), • sputum, • tracheal-aspirate, or • bronchoalveolar- lavage placed in viral transport medium (Vircell), stored at 28°C, and transported within 72 hours to the Ministry of Health regional reference laboratory in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where they were subjected to real-time reverse-transcriptase–polymerase- chain-reaction (RT-PCR) assays totest for MERS-CoV.20 • For all patients, the results of RT-PCR tests were confirmed by measuring cycle- threshold values for viral load.
  • 10. METHODS: Identification of Clusters, Collection of Case Data, and Assessment of Exposure • Hospital A initiated active surveillance for pneumonia on April 20, 2013, and conducted a retrospective review of in-hospital deaths and cases of pneumonia from March 1 through April 19. • They also reviewed the medical charts of patients with confirmed MERS-CoV infection to identify symptoms, laboratory findings, and clinical course. The Ministry of Health interviewed household contacts of patients with confirmed MERS-CoV infection and followed them for 14 days after exposure.
  • 11. METHODS: Identification of Clusters, Collection of Case Data, and Assessment of Exposure • Mapped confirmed and probable MERSCoV cases in time and in space within health care facilities. • For each case, we identified potential exposures, with the assumption that face-to-face contact or time spent in the same area conferred a greater risk than shared caregivers, which in turn conferred a greater risk than shared equipment. • No assumptions were made about incubation periods. • Three of the authors reviewed potential exposures independently; when more than one potential exposure was possible, • the most likely source of exposure was identified by consensus among those authors and an additional author. • The corresponding author vouches for the accuracy and completeness of the data.
  • 12. METHODS: Sequencing and Phylogenetic Analysis: • Full-genome sequences were obtained from specimens from four patients (Patients I, J, K, and V)
  • 13. METHODS: • Statistical Analysis: • They calculated empirical cumulative density functions of the incubation period and serial intervals by computing the cumulative fraction of all observations that fell below each observed value in the respective data sets. • They estimated the incubation period by identifying the earliest and latest time of possible exposure and the time of symptom onset for each case. • Treating these times as interval-censored estimates of the incubation period for each person, we fit a log-normal distribution to these data using maximum-likelihood techniques. • We then examined the robustness of our estimates with multiple definitions of onset and with the exclusion of particular cases.
  • 14. METHODS: Statistical Analysis: They estimated the serial interval by identifying the times of symptom onset in the patient and in the person who transmitted the infection (infected–infector pairs) and then fitting a lognormal distribution to these interval-censored They estimated the medians and 5th and 95th percentiles of the incubation period and the serial interval using the quantiles of the lognormal distribution fit to each data
  • 16. RESULTS: • Description of the Outbreak April 1 and May 23, 2013, a total of 23 confirmed cases of human infection with MERSCoV were identified in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia
  • 17. RESULTS: A: Illness in Patients at Hospital A 1) Community Introductions 2) Hemodialysis Unit 3) ICU 4) Medical Ward B: Illness in Staff Members at Hospital A C: Illness in Family Members D: Illness with Onset in Other health care facilities
  • 19.
  • 21. RESULTS: Demographic and Clinical Features • median time from the onset of symptoms to ICU admission = 5 days (range, 1 to 10) • median time to the need for mechanical ventilation = 7 days (range, 3 to 11) • median time to death = 11 days (range, 5 to 27)
  • 22. RESULTS: Transmission, Incubation Period, and Serial Interval One patient transmitted the infection to seven persons, one patient transmitted the infection to three persons, and four patients transmitted the infection to two persons each. The incubation period of confirmed cases was 5.2 days (95% confidence interval [CI], 1.9 to 14.7); distributions that were fit to our observed data indicated that 95% of infected patients would have an onset of symptoms by day 12.4 (95% CI of 95th percentile, 7.3 to 17.5), whereas 5% would have an onset of symptoms by day 2.2 (95% CI of 5th percentile, 1.2 to 3.1). We estimated that the serial interval was 7.6 days (95% CI, 2.5 to 23.1) (Fig. 3). The distributions that were fit to our observed data indicate that the serial interval was less than 19.4 days in 95% of cases (95% CI of 95th percentile, 11.7 to 27.0) and less than 3.0 days in 5% of cases (95% CI of 5th percentile, 1.8 to 4.2).
  • 23. RESULTS: Sequencing and Phylogenetic Analysis Phylogenetic analysis of the four MERS-CoV genomes showed that the viruses form a monophyletic clade with a bootstrap support of 100%
  • 25. LABORATORY-CONFIRMED MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS INFECTION, APRIL– MAY 2013.Characteristics Patients with confirmed cases (n=23) Male sex — no. (%) 17 (74) Age — yr Median 56 Range 24–94 Age ≥50 yr — no. (%) 17 (74) Age ≥65 yr — no. (%) 6 (26) Obesity — no./total no. (%)* 5/21 (24) Underlying Illness — no. (%) End-stage renal disease 12 (52) Diabetes mellitus 17 (74) Cardiac disease 9 (39) Lung disease, including asthma 10 (43) Immunosuppressive condition other than renal disease 0 Symptoms before presentation — no. (%) Fever 20 (87) Cough 20 (87) Shortness of breath 11 (48) Gastrointestinal symptoms Any 8 (35) Vomiting 4 (17) Diarrhea 5 (22)
  • 26. LABORATORY-CONFIRMED MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS INFECTION, APRIL– MAY 2013. 0 39% 43% 52% 74% 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 Immunosuppressive condition other than renal disease Cardiac disease Lung disease, including asthma End Stage Renal Disease Diabetes mellitus Underlying Illness Underlying Illness
  • 27. LABORATORY-CONFIRMED MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS INFECTION, APRIL– MAY 2013.Characteristics Patients with confirmed cases (n=23) Male sex — no. (%) 17 (74) Age — yr Median 56 Range 24–94 Age ≥50 yr — no. (%) 17 (74) Age ≥65 yr — no. (%) 6 (26) Obesity — no./total no. (%)* 5/21 (24) Underlying Illness — no. (%) End-stage renal disease 12 (52) Diabetes mellitus 17 (74) Cardiac disease 9 (39) Lung disease, including asthma 10 (43) Immunosuppressive condition other than renal disease 0 Symptoms before presentation — no. (%) Fever 20 (87) Cough 20 (87) Shortness of breath 11 (48) Gastrointestinal symptoms Any 8 (35) Vomiting 4 (17) Diarrhea 5 (22)
  • 28. TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS AND SYMPTOMS OF PATIENTS WITH LABORATORY-CONFIRMED MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS INFECTION, APRIL– MAY 2013. 17% 22% 35% 48% 87% 87% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% GI {Vomiting} (4) GI {Diarrhea} (5) GI {Any} (8) Shortness of breath (11) Fever (20) Cough (20) Symptoms before presentation GI {Vomiting} (4) GI {Diarrhea} (5) GI {Any} (8) Shortness of breath (11) Fever (20) Cough (20)
  • 29. TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS AND SYMPTOMS OF PATIENTS WITH LABORATORY-CONFIRMED MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS INFECTION, APRIL– MAY 2013. (CONT..)Characteristics Patients with confirmed cases (n=23) Laboratory testing at presentation — no./total no. (%) Abnormal white-cell count† 5/23 (22) Abnormal platelet count‡ 5/23 (22) Elevated aspartate aminotransferase 3/13 (23) Oxygen saturation <95% while breathing ambient air 7/23 (30) Chest radiographic findings at presentation — no. (%) Normal 3 (13) Increased bronchovascular markings 4 (17) Unilateral infiltrate 10 (43) Bilateral infiltrates 5 (22) Diffuse reticulonodular pattern 1 (4) Clinical course — no. (%) Admitted to hospital 22 (96) Admitted to intensive care unit 18 (78) Received mechanical ventilation 18 (78) Outcome as of June 12, 2013 — no. (%) Recovered 6 (26) Remained in hospital§ 2 (9) Died 15 (65)
  • 30. DISCUSSION: • Acute viral respiratory tract infections cause considerable morbidity and mortality and pose a risk of outbreaks in health care settings. • We describe a cluster of MERS-CoV infections and report health care–associated human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV. The 65% case fatality rate in this outbreak is of concern.
  • 35. Conclusions • Person-to-person transmission of MERS-CoV can occur in health care settings and may be associated with considerable morbidity. • Surveillance and infection-control measures are critical to a global public health response.
  • 36. EPIDEMIOLOGY Occurrence of infectious diseases: Sporadic - refers to a disease that occurs infrequently and irregularly Endemic - refers to the constant presence and/or usual prevalence of a disease or infectious agent in a population within a geographic area Hyperendemic - refers to persistent, high levels of disease occurrence. Epidemic - refers to an increase, often sudden, in the number of cases of a disease above what is normally expected in that population in that area. Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health Practice, 3rd Edition
  • 37. EPIDEMIOLOGY Occurrence of infectious diseases: Outbreak- definition of epidemic, but is often used for a more limited geographic area Cluster - an aggregation of cases grouped in place and time that are suspected to be greater than the number expected, even though the expected number may not be known Pandemic - an epidemic that has spread over several countries or continents, usually affecting a large number of people. Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health Practice, 3rd Edition
  • 38. EPIDEMIOLOGY Outbreaks Definition • Two or more people who experience a similar illness or confirmed infection, and are linked by a common factor, or • When the observed number of cases unaccountably exceeds the expected number for a given place and time. The terms epidemic and outbreak are used interchangeably. Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health Practice, 3rd Edition
  • 39. EPIDEMIOLOGY Surveillance the continuing scrutiny of all aspects of the occurrence and spread of a disease that are pertinent to effective control. It involves a systematic collection, collation and analysis of data and the prompt dissemination of the resulting information to those who need to know so that action can result Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health Practice, 3rd Edition
  • 41. CORONAVIRUS VIROLOGY Coronaviruses are members of the Nidovirus family, viruses that replicate using a nested set of mRNAs (“nido-” for “nest”). The human coronaviruses are classified in two genera: 1) alpha coronaviruses (HCoV-229E and HCoV-NL63) and 2) beta coronaviruses (HCoV-HKU1, HCoV-OC43), a) Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus [MERS-CoV], and b) Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus [SARS-CoV]).
  • 42. CORONAVIRUS • Viral composition — • medium-sized, enveloped, positive-stranded RNA viruses • name derives from their characteristic crown-like appearance in electron micrographs • These viruses have the largest known viral RNA genomes, with a length of 27 to 32 kb. • The host-derived membrane is studded with glycoprotein spikes and surrounds the genome, which is encased in a nucleocapsid that is helical in its relaxed form but assumes a roughly spherical shape in the virus particle
  • 43. Phylogenetic relationships among members of the subfamily Coronavirinae and taxonomic position of MERS-CoV. de Groot R J et al. J. Virol. 2013;87:7790-7792
  • 46. NOVEL HUMAN CORONAVIRUSES 1) Human coronavirus 229E 2) Human coronavirus OC43 3) SARS-CoV (2003) 4) Human Coronavirus NL63 (HCoV-NL63, New Haven coronavirus) (2003) 5) Human coronavirus HKU1 (2005) 6) Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), previously known as Novel coronavirus 2012 and HCoV-EMC(2012)
  • 47. CORONAVIRUS What is MERS? Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) -a viral respiratory illness -caused by a coronavirus called “Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus” (MERS- CoV).
  • 48. MERS-COV • Q: What are the symptoms of MERS? • severe acute respiratory illness with symptoms of fever, cough, and shortness of breath. • About half of them died. • Some people were reported as having a mild respiratory illness.
  • 49. MERS-COV Genetic analysis—sufficient heterogeneity to support multiple separate animal-to-human transfers Cotten M, Watson SJ, Kellam P, et al. Transmission and evolution of the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus in Saudi Arabia: a descriptive genomic study. Lancet 2013; 382:1993.
  • 51. MERS-COV 1) “Index Patient” June 2012 KSA 2) Sept 2012, Qatar 3) Infected with no Epidemiologic link 4) Oct & Nov 2012 4 Men in 1 Family, Riyadh 2 died 5) Jordan 2 confirmed cases 6) January 2013, U.K. 7) Feb 2013, Px’s son 8) Family member 9) March 2013, Abu Dhabi, UAE 10) April 2013 23 confirmed cases 11 probable cases 11) May 2013, France 2 diagnosed 12) May 2013, Tunisia 3 cases 13) May 2013, Italy 3 cases
  • 52. MERS-COV Possible sources and modes of transmission: 1) Bats 2) Camels 3) Human-to-Human
  • 53. MERS-COV • Possible sources and modes of transmission: BATS • Bat Coronavirus RNA sequence closely related to MERS-CoV sequences • Might be a reservoir of MERS-CoV • unlikely that they are the immediate source
  • 54. MERS-COV • Possible sources and modes of transmission: CAMELS
  • 55. MERS-COV Possible sources and modes of transmission: CAMELS • Intermediate Hosts • viruses were quite similar and shared several unusual single nucleotide polymorphism • Attempts to isolate viruses were unsuccessful • Serologic studies have also suggested that camels are an important source of MERS-CoV • Using stored serum samples from 1992 to 2010, antibodies to MERS-CoV were detected as early as 1992 • 651 serum samples from dromedary camels (151 from 2003; 500 from 2013), 632 samples (97 percent) had antibodies against MERS-CoV, including all of the samples collected in 2003, prior to the outbreak in humans
  • 56. MERS-COV What is the significance of the recent finding of MERS-CoV in a camel? The critical questions are : • What is the route by which humans are infected? • In what way are they exposed? Most patients who have tested positive for MERS-CoV • had neither a human source of infection • nor direct exposure to animals, including camels It is still unclear whether camels, even if infected with MERS-CoV, play a role in transmission to humans.
  • 57. MERS-COV • Possible sources and modes of transmission: • Human-to-human transmission
  • 58. MERS-COV • Possible sources and modes of transmission: • Human-to-human transmission
  • 59. REVISED INTERIM CASE DEFINITION FOR REPORTING TO WHO AS OF 3 JULY 2013 CASE DEFINITIONS Confirmed case: A person with laboratory confirmation of infection with MERS-CoV Probable case:  A person with an acute respiratory infection (with or without fever) with clinical, radiographic, or histopathologic evidence of pulmonary parenchymal disease  No possibility of laboratory confirmation for MERS-CoV because either the patient or samples are not available for testing and  Close contact with a laboratory-confirmed case.
  • 60. REVISED INTERIM CASE DEFINITION FOR REPORTING TO WHO (AS OF 3 JULY 2013) PROBABLE CASE CLINICAL LABORATORY EPIDEMIOLOGICAL acute febrile respiratory illness with clinical, radiological, or histopathological evidence of pulmonary parenchymal disease MERS-CoV is unavailable or negative on a single inadequate specimen direct epidemiologic-link with a confirmed MERS-CoV case acute febrile respiratory illness with clinical, radiological, or histopathological evidence of pulmonary parenchymal disease inconclusive MERS-CoV laboratory test direct epidemiologic-link with a confirmed MERS-CoV case acute febrile respiratory illness of any severity inconclusive MERS-CoV laboratory test resident of or traveler to Middle Eastern countries where MERS-CoV virus is believed to be circulating in the 14 days before onset of illness
  • 61. CLINICAL MANIFESTATIONS • Incubation period - 5.2 days (1.9-14.7 days) • Clinical features : • 1) severely ill with pneumonia and acute respiratory distress syndrome • 2) some have had acute kidney injury
  • 63. MERS-COV LABORATORY ABNORMALITIES — AMONG 47 CASES OF MERS-COV INFECTION IN SAUDI ARABIA 11% 11% 14% 15% 34% 36% 49% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Elevated ALT Lymphocytosis Leukopenia Elevated AST Lymphopenia Thrombocytopenia Elevated LDH .
  • 64. MERS-COV Diagnosis 1) Polymerase chain reaction and sequencing -real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT- PCR) testing 2) Serology
  • 65. MERS-COV DIAGNOSIS rRT-PCR - real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction Lower respiratory tract specimens Serum samples
  • 66. MERS-COV DIAGNOSIS rRT-PCR Recommendations by WHO and CDC: 1) Lower respiratory tract specimens 2) Combined nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swab specimen 3) Acute and convalescent 4) blood, urine, and stool (uncertain) 5) Continued sampling and testing by rRT-PCR is encouraged 6) Nucleic acid sequencing in certain cases
  • 67. MERS-COV DIAGNOSIS rRT-PCR • false-negative results • specimen was of poor quality, • collected late or very early in the illness, • not handled and shipped appropriately, and • technical problems with the test. • Three rRT-PCR assays for routine detection of MERS-CoV have been developed
  • 68. MERS-COV DIAGNOSIS SEROLOGY • Detection of MERS-CoV Antibodies: • immunofluorescence assays • protein microarray assay • 2-stage approach by CDC • Screening: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) • Confirmation: indirect immunofluorescence test or microneutralization test
  • 69. MERS-COV Treatment NO antiviral agents are recommended for the treatment of MERS-CoV infection. 1) combination therapy with a)Interferon (IFN)-alpha-2b and b) Ribavirin appears promising None of the patients responded to therapy and all died of their illness. 2) Convalescent plasma, 3) Monoclonal antibodies, and 4) Inhibition of the main viral protease
  • 71. MERS-COV TRAVEL RECOMMENDATIONS The Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia recommended that in 2013, the following individuals postpone their plans to travel to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, for Hajj and/or Umrah due to the outbreak of MERS-CoV ●Elderly individuals (>65 years of age) ●Individuals with chronic diseases (eg, heart disease, kidney disease, respiratory disease, diabetes) ●Individuals with immunodeficiency (congenital or acquired) ●Patients with malignancy ●Patients with a terminal illness ●Pregnant women ●Children (<12 years of age)

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. Good morning Doctors.This is Jose Socrates “dee” EvardoneI’m going to do a special journal discussion about this new and infamous Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus.I call it special since we usually present researches and or RCTs.But this morning my report is about retrospective outbreak report, but on top of that I will also discuss the latest updates from World Health Organization as well as the United States Centers for disease Control and Prevention and UptoDate.
  2. The source is The New England Journal of Medicine.This was Published on November 22nd, 2012By Timothy A. Brighton, John W. Eikelboom, andKristy Mann ET AL
  3. The governorate of Al-Hasa, in eastern SaudiArabia, serves a mixed urban and rural populationof 1.1 million persons. A total of 4 hospitals designated as Hospitals A, B, C and DHospital A is a 150-bedgeneral hospital in the largest urban area (Al-Hufuf). The dialysis unit, which cares for 43 patientsin two shifts per day, is an open unit with16 beds spaced 1.3 to 1.5 m apart. The intensivecare unit (ICU) contains two open 6-bed bays.Hospitals B and C are also general hospitals inAl-Hufuf. Hospital D is a regional referral hospitallocated 160 km from Al-Hufuf.
  4. A person was considered to have a confirmed case of MERS-CoV infection if there was laboratory evidence of MERS-CoV and the person had either fever and at least one respiratory symptom or two respiratory symptoms without another identifiable cause. A person was considered to have a probable case of MERS-CoV infection if he or she was a household, family, or health care contact of a person with a confirmed case and if pneumonia developed without another confirmed cause and either laboratory testing for MERS-CoV was not performed or a single test was negative and no other specimens were available for testing.
  5. The date of onset was defined among febrile patients as the first day of fever that persisted for more than 48 hours and among afebrile patients as the first day of new cough or shortness of breath. A person was considered to have been exposed if he or she had had any faceto- face contact with a symptomatic patient who had a confirmed or probable case, was in the same hospital room or ward as a symptomatic case patient for more than 1 hour, moved into a bed vacated by a symptomatic case patient, was being cared for by a health care worker who was also caring for a symptomatic case patient, or was sharing hospital equipment with a symptomatic case patient.
  6. Laboratory SurveillanceBeginning in September 2012, the Saudi ArabianMinistry of Health requested that all patients with pneumonia requiring admission to the ICU be tested for MERS-CoV. Throat-swab (Eurotubo, Deltalab), sputum, tracheal-aspirate, or bronchoalveolar- lavage specimens were obtained and were placed in viral transport medium (Vircell), stored at 28°C, and transported within 72 hoursto the Ministry of Health regional reference laboratoryin Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where they weresubjected to real-time reverse-transcriptase–polymerase-chain-reaction (RT-PCR) assays totest for MERS-CoV.20 For all patients, the resultsof RT-PCR tests were confirmed by measuringcycle-threshold values for viral load.
  7. In response to an increase in the incidence of pneumonia among patients undergoing hemodialysis, Hospital A initiated active surveillance for pneumonia on April 20, 2013, and conducted aretrospective review of in-hospital deaths and cases of pneumonia from March 1 through April 19. They also reviewed the medical charts of patients with confirmed MERS-CoV infection to identify symptoms, laboratory findings, and clinical course. The Ministry of Health interviewed household contacts of patients with confirmed MERS-CoV infection and followed them for 14days after exposure.
  8. They mapped confirmed and probable MERSCoV cases in time and in space within health care facilities. For each case, they identified potential exposures, with the assumption that face-to-face contact or time spent in the same area conferreda greater risk than shared caregivers, which in turn conferred a greater risk than shared equipment.No assumptions were made about incubation periods. Three of the authors reviewed potential exposures independently; when more than one potential exposure was possible, the most likely source of exposure was identified by consensus among those authors and an additional author. The corresponding author vouches for the accuracy and completeness of the data.
  9. Sequencing and Phylogenetic AnalysisFull-genome sequences were obtained from specimensfrom four patients (Patients I, J, K, and V)What is Phylogenetic analysis: In biology, phylogenetics is the study of evolutionary relationships among groups of organisms, which are discovered through molecular sequencing data and morphological data matricesAmplicon products were sequenced with the useof the IlluminaMiSeq sequencer and assembledinto full genomes by means of assembly with theSPAdes 2 genome assembler, version 2.4.0. Assemblieswere validated with the use of referencebasedassembly (SMALT, version 0.7.4). The open reading frames of the novel genomes and a comparisonof nucleotide changes relative to theclosest existing MERS genome (England2_HPA)were analyzed with the use of Python scripts.Full-length genomes were combined withfive previously identified MERS-CoV genomes(KC776174, JX869059, KC667074, EMC/Munich/AbuDhabi/2013, and England2) and aligned withthe use of Molecular Evolution Genetics Analysis,version 5 (MEGA5), software. A second alignmentwas created to include only coding regions(ORF1ab, S, ORF3, ORF4a, ORF4b, ORF5, E, M,
  10. They calculated empirical cumulative density functions of the incubation period and serial intervals by computing the cumulative fraction of all observations that fell below each observed value in the respective data sets. They estimated the incubation period by identifying the earliest and latest time of possible exposure and the time of symptom onset for each case. Treating these times as interval-censored estimates of the incubation period for each person, we fit a log-normal distribution to these data using maximum-likelihood techniques. We then examined the robustness of our estimates with multiple definitions of onset and with the exclusion of particular cases.We estimated the serial interval by identifying the times of symptom onset in the patient and in the person who transmitted the infection (infected–infector pairs) and then fitting a lognormal distribution to these interval-censored data.They estimated the medians and 5th and 95th percentiles of the incubation period and the serial interval using the quantiles of the lognormal distribution fit to each data set (R statisticalpackage
  11. They estimated the serial interval by identifying the times of symptom onset in the patient and in the person who transmitted the infection (infected–infector pairs) and then fitting a lognormal distribution to these interval-censoredThey estimated the medians and 5th and95th percentiles of the incubation period and theserial interval using the quantiles of the lognormaldistribution fit to each data set
  12. Description of the OutbreakBetween April 1 and May 23, 2013, a total of 23confirmed cases of human infection with MERSCoVwere identified in the eastern province ofSaudi Arabia All confirmed cases and 11 probable caseswere part of a single outbreak involving fourhealth care facilities (Fig. 1).
  13. Description of the OutbreakBetween April 1 and May 23, 2013, a total of 23confirmed cases of human infection with MERSCoVwere identified in the eastern province ofSaudi Arabia All confirmed cases and 11 probable caseswere part of a single outbreak involving fourhealth care facilities (Fig. 1).
  14. Description of the OutbreakBetween April 1 and May 23, 2013, a total of 23confirmed cases of human infection with MERSCoVwere identified in the eastern province ofSaudi Arabia (Fig. S1 in the Supplementary Appendix).All confirmed cases and 11 probable caseswere part of a single outbreak involving fourhealth care facilities (Fig. 1).
  15. Illness in Patients at Hospital ACommunity IntroductionsOn April 4, Patient B was admitted to the ICU with a diagnosis of stroke. On hospital day 6,fever developed, and a throat-swab specimen wasobtained, which was negative for MERS-CoV.When pneumonia developed in the patient, MERSCoVwas identified on repeat testing. No epidemiologiclink between Patients A and B could beestablished.Patient C, who had been undergoing long-termhemodialysis, was admitted to Hospital A onApril 6 to the room adjacent to Patient A. He wasstill in that room on April 8, which was the dayon which fever developed in Patient A. Fever developedin Patient C 3 days later. He underwentdialysis in the hospital’s outpatient hemodialysisunit twice after the onset of symptoms — onApril 11 and April 13.
  16. Most of the case patients were men, and the median age was 56 yearsThe most common signs and symptoms were fever (in 87% of the patients) and cough (in 87%), and 35% presented with vomiting or diarrhea.
  17. Among patients in whom the illness progressed, the median time from the onset of symptoms to ICU admission was 5 days (range, 1 to 10), the median time to the need for mechanical ventilation was 7 days (range, 3 to 11), and the median time to death was 11 days (range, 5 to 27).
  18. One patient transmitted the infection to seven persons, one patient transmitted the infection to three persons, and four patients transmitted the infection to two persons each. The incubation period of confirmed cases was 5.2 days (95% confidence interval [CI], 1.9 to 14.7); distributions that were fit to our observed data indicated that 95% of infected patients would have an onset of symptoms by day 12.4 (95% CI of 95th percentile, 7.3 to 17.5), whereas 5% would have an onset of symptoms by day 2.2 (95% CI of 5th percentile, 1.2 to 3.1).We estimated that the serial interval was 7.6 days (95% CI, 2.5 to 23.1) (Fig. 3). The distributions that were fit to our observed data indicate that the serial interval was less than 19.4 days in95% of cases (95% CI of 95th percentile, 11.7 to 27.0) and less than 3.0 days in 5% of cases (95%CI of 5th percentile, 1.8 to 4.2).
  19. Phylogenetic analysis of the four MERS-CoV genomes showed that the viruses form a monophyletic clade with a bootstrap support of 100%The most closely related sequence to this clade is England2, with a genetic distance of 0.0008 substitutions per site. THEY estimated that the date of the most recent common ancestor of MERS-CoV was August 18, 2011 (95% highest posterior density [HPD, intervals for nucleotide sequences], November 1, 2009, to April 14, 2012). The date of the divergence of the Al-Hasa lineage was December 6, 2012 (95% HPD, July 18, 2012, to February 3, 2013), and the date of the most recent common ancestor of the Al-Hasa lineage was April 2, 2013 (95% HPD, February 7, 2013, to April 21, 2013)
  20. We and others have found that the severity ofillness associated with MERS-CoV infectionranges from mild to fulminantThe clinicalsyndrome is similar to SARS, with an initialphase of nonspecific fever and mild, nonproductivecough, which may last for several days beforeprogressing to pneumonia.Some patientswith MERS-CoV infection also had gastrointestinalsymptoms, a finding similar to that withSARSMERS-CoV is known to infect cell linesof the intestinal tract,but it is not yet knownwhat proportion of ill patients shed virus intheir stool. In the majority of patients in thiscluster, fever was high and persistent, but thepattern of pulmonary involvement on chest radiographywas variable.It is noteworthy that thesurvival rate was higher among patients whosecases were identified by means of active surveillanceduring the outbreak than among thosewhose cases were identified clinically.Althougha possible explanation is that the patients whosecases were identified by means of active surveillancewere younger and healthier than the patientswith primary cases, it is more likely thatenhanced surveillance was more effective at detectingless severe disease than was identificationof clinical features.Our estimates of the distribution of the incubationperiod are similar to those for SARS-CoVinfection, which was estimated to have a medianincubation period of 4.0 days, with 5% of casesdeveloping within 1.8 days and 95% within 10.6days.31 Our estimates of the serial interval ofMERS-CoV infection are somewhat shorter thanthose for SARS-CoV (median, 7.6 days vs. 8.4days), perhaps because transmission of MERSCoVinfection appears to occur earlier in thecourse of the illness.32 Our small sample led towide confidence intervals; however, bootstrappedsampling of our data showed the robustness ofour estimates with the inclusion and exclusionof particular cases.The rapid transmission and high attack rate in the dialysis unit raises substantial concerns
  21. about the risk of health care–associated transmissionof this virus. The apparent heterogeneityin transmission, with many infected patientsnot transmitting disease at all and one patienttransmitting disease to seven others, is reminiscentof SARS.33,34Epidemiologic and phylogenetic analyses supportperson-to-person transmission; however, itis not possible to be certain about whether therewere single or multiple introductions from thecommunity. Similarly, we are unable to determinewhether person-to-person transmissionoccurred through respiratory droplets or throughdirect or indirect contact and whether the viruswas transmitted when the contact was morethan 1 m away from the case patient. Becausesome patients presented with gastrointestinalsymptoms, and transmission appeared to occurbetween rooms on the ward, the current WHOrecommendations for surveillance and controlshould be regarded as the minimum standards35;hospitals should use contact and droplet precautionsand should consider the follow-up of personswho were in the same ward as a patientwith MERS-CoV infection.It is possible to explain all the episodes
  22. It is possible to explain all the episodes oftransmission in this outbreak by assuming thatpatients were infectious only when they were symptomatic; however, this does not rule out transmission during the incubation phase or during asymptomatic infection. Because this was a retrospective investigation, we may have missed exposures that were not documented or that were forgotten; we may also have misclassified community-acquired cases as health care– associated cases. Our choice of the most likely exposure to link patients may have been incorrect.Despite these limitations, multiple iterations of transmission mapping resulted in maps with similar overall results.Laboratory testing for MERS-CoV remains a challenge. Validated serologic assays are not yet available, and this may have limited the identification of cases. In this cluster, results of throat swabs were occasionally negative and repeat testing for MERS-CoV was required. It is not clear whether sputum or nasopharyngeal samples might be superior to throat samples or whether virus is shed more abundantly later in the course of the illness or in more severe illness, as it is in SARS.36 It seems prudent to conclude that one cannot reliably rule out MERS-CoV disease on the basis of a single negative test when a patient presents with the appropriate clinical syndrome and epidemiologic exposure.There is evidence that repeat testing and tests on sputum or bronchoalveolar-lavage fluid are of value in improving diagnostic accuracy.The repeated introduction of the infection into the community, the ongoing detection of new illness, and the substantial impact of hospital transmission in this outbreak underscore the importance of investigations into the community source of MERS-CoV. Without the ability to prevent community infection, prevention of health care transmission will remain a challenge. Outbreak- control measures included precautions for patients until 24 hours after symptoms resolved.To date, the Ministry of Health has found no evidence of transmission from patients in whom precautions have been discontinued. Further investigations to identify the duration of viral shedding as well as the complete spectrum of disease are needed to refine public health recommendations.
  23. Epidemic Disease OccurrenceLevel of diseaseThe amount of a particular disease that is usually present in a community is referred to as the baseline or endemic level of the disease. This level is not necessarily the desired level, which may in fact be zero, but rather is the observed level. In the absence of intervention and assuming that the level is not high enough to deplete the pool of susceptible persons, the disease may continue to occur at this level indefinitely. Thus, the baseline level is often regarded as the expected level of the disease.While some diseases are so rare in a given population that a single case warrants an epidemiologic investigation (e.g., rabies, plague, polio), other diseases occur more commonly so that only deviations from the norm warrant investigation. Sporadic refers to a disease that occurs infrequently and irregularly. Endemic refers to the constant presence and/or usual prevalence of a disease or infectious agent in a population within a geographic area. Hyperendemic refers to persistent, high levels of disease occurrence.Occasionally, the amount of disease in a community rises above the expected level. Epidemic refers to an increase, often sudden, in the number of cases of a disease above what is normally expected in that population in that area. 
  24. Outbreak carries the same definition of epidemic, but is often used for a more limited geographic area. Cluster refers to an aggregation of cases grouped in place and time that are suspected to be greater than the number expected, even though the expected number may not be known. Pandemic refers to an epidemic that has spread over several countries or continents, usually affecting a large number of people.Epidemics occur when an agent and susceptible hosts are present in adequate numbers, and the agent can be effectively conveyed from a source to the susceptible hosts. More specifically, an epidemic may result from:A recent increase in amount or virulence of the agent,The recent introduction of the agent into a setting where it has not been before,An enhanced mode of transmission so that more susceptible persons are exposed,A change in the susceptibility of the host response to the agent, and/orFactors that increase host exposure or involve introduction through new portals of entry.(47)HIV/AIDS is an example of one of the most destructive global pandemics in history.Influenza pandemics have occurred more than once.Spanish influenza killed 40-50 million people in 1918.Asian influenza killed 2 million people in 1957.Hong Kong influenza killed 1 million people in 1968.
  25. OutbreaksDefinitionAn outbreak can be defined as:• Two or more people who experience a similar illness or confirmedinfection, and are linked by a common factor, or• When the observed number of cases unaccountably exceeds theexpected number for a given place and time.The term can be used to describe a range of situations from localoutbreaks of food poisoning to international epidemics. The termsepidemic and outbreak are used interchangeably.
  26. Surveillance has been defined as the continuing scrutiny of allaspects of the occurrence and spread of a disease that are pertinentto effective control. It involves a systematic collection, collationand analysis of data and the prompt dissemination of the resultinginformation to those who need to know so that action can result
  27. Viral composition —-medium-sized, enveloped, positive-stranded RNA viruses-name derives from their characteristic crown-like appearance in electron micrographs-These viruses have the largest known viral RNA genomes, with a length of 27 to 32 kb. The host-derived membrane is studded with glycoprotein spikes and surrounds the genome, which is encased in a nucleocapsid that is helical in its relaxed form but assumes a roughly spherical shape in the virus particle (figure 1). Replication of viral RNA occurs in the host cytoplasm by a unique mechanism in which RNA polymerase binds to a leader sequence and then detaches and reattaches at multiple locations, allowing for the production of a nested set of mRNA molecules with common 3’ ends (figure 2).
  28. The spike (S) protein projects through the viral envelope and forms the characteristic spikes in the coronavirus “crown.”The membrane (M) protein has a short N-terminal domain that projects on the external surface of the envelope and spans the envelope three times, leaving a long C terminus inside the envelope.The nucleocapsid protein (N) associates with the RNA genome to form the nucleocapsid. It may be involved in the regulation of viral RNA synthesis and may interact with M protein during virus budding The hemagglutinin-esterase glycoprotein (HE) is found only in the betacoronaviruses, HCoV-OC43 and HKU1 The HE genes of coronaviruses have sequence homology with influenza C HE glycoprotein and may reflect an early recombination between the two viruses [9].The small envelope (E) protein leaves its C terminus inside the envelope and then either spans the envelope or bends around and projects its N terminus internally.Its function is not known, although in the SARS-CoV the E protein, along with M and N, are required for proper assembly and release of the virus [10].It is heavily glycosylated, probably forms a homotrimer, and mediates receptor binding and fusion with the host cell membrane. The major antigens that stimulate neutralizing antibody, as well as important targets of cytotoxic lymphocytes, are on the S protein [5]The M protein plays an important role in viral assembly [6].Cytotoxic T lymphocytes recognizing portions of the N protein have been identified [8].The hemagglutinin moiety binds to neuraminic acid on the host cell surface, possibly permitting initial adsorption of the virus to the membrane. The esterase cleaves acetyl groups from neuraminic acid. The small envelope (E) protein leaves its C terminus inside the envelope and then either spans the envelope or bends around and projects its N terminus internally.Its function is not known, although in the SARS-CoV the E protein, along with M and N, are required for proper assembly and release of the virus [10].
  29. What is coronavirus?Coronaviruses are a large family of viruses that cause illness in humans and animals. In people, coronaviruses can cause illnesses ranging in severity from the common cold to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).-the cause of up to one-third of community-acquired upper respiratory tract infections in adults and probably also play a role in severe respiratory infections in both children and adults. -certain coronaviruses cause diarrhea in infants and children -and their possible role in central nervous diseases has been suggested but not provenThe novel coronavirus, first detected in April 2012, is a new virus that has not been seen in humans before. In most cases, it has caused severe disease. Death has occurred in about half of cases.This new coronavirus is now known as Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). It was named by the Coronavirus Study Group of the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses in May 2013.
  30. Novel human coronavirusesFollowing the high-profile publicity of SARS outbreaks, there has been a renewed interest in coronaviruses among virologists. For many years, scientists knew about only two human coronaviruses (HCoV-229E and HCoV-OC43). Causing common colds.The discovery of SARS-CoV added a third human coronavirus.By the end of 2004, three independent research labs reported the discovery of a fourth human coronavirus. It has been named NL63, NL,(Human Coronavirus NL63 or HCoV-NL63 is a virus that was identified in 2003 in a child with bronchiolitis in the Netherlands.)and the New Haven coronavirusby different research groups.[6] The three labs are still arguing over which one discovered the virus first and has the right to name it.Early in 2005, a research team at the University of Hong Kong reported finding a fifth human coronavirus in two patients with pneumonia. They named it Human coronavirus HKU1.In September 2012, a sixth new type of coronavirus was identified, initially called Novel Coronavirus 2012, and now officially Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) [7][8]The World Health Organisation accordingly issued a global alert[9] The WHO update on 28 September 2012 said that the virus did not seem to pass easily from person to person.[10] However, on May 12, 2013, a case of contamination from human to human in France was confirmed by the French Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.[11] In addition, cases of person-to-person transmission have been reported by the Ministry of Health in Tunisia. Two confirmed cases seem to have caught the disease from their late father, who became ill after a visit to Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
  31. The Coronavirus Study Group of the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses has published a proposed new designation for the novel coronavirus, the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV).1Given the experience in previous international public health events, WHO generally prefers that virus names do not refer to the region or place of the initial detection of the virus. This approach aims at minimizing unnecessary geographical discrimination that could be based on coincidental detection rather than on the true area of emergence of a virus. WHO did not convene a group to discuss the naming of this virus. The proposed name - MERS-CoV - represents a consensus that is acceptable to WHO. It was built on consultations with a large group of scientists.
  32. Most people who got infected with MERS-CoV developed severe acute respiratory illness with symptoms of fever, cough, and shortness of breath. About half of them died. Some people were reported as having a mild respiratory illness.
  33. In an analysis of the full or partial genomes of MERS-CoV obtained from 21 patients with MERS-CoV infection in Saudi Arabia between June 2012 and June 2013, there was sufficient heterogeneity to support multiple separate animal-to-human transfersMoreover, even within a hospital outbreak in Al-Hasa, Saudi Arabia, there was evidence of more than one virus introduction. By estimating the evolutionary rate of the virus, the authors concluded that MERS-CoV emerged around July 2011 (95 percent highest posterior density July 2007 to June 2012)
  34. Geographic distribution — Since April 2012, over 250 laboratory-confirmed human infections with MERS-CoV have been reported to the World Health Organization (WHO), occurring in several countries in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Kuwait (figure 1); the majority of cases have occurred in Saudi Arabia, including some case clusters (figure 2) [20-23].Cases have also been reported from Tunisia, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Malaysia, and the Philippines. In the European and Asian countries and Tunisia, a patient developed illness after returning from the Middle East. In the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Tunisia, limited human-to-human transmission occurred among close contacts of the index casesCountries With Lab-Confirmed MERS CasesApril 2012 - PresentFranceItalyJordanKuwaitMalaysiaOmanQatarSaudi ArabiaTunisiaUnited Kingdom (UK)United Arab Emirates (UAE)
  35. 1)The index case was a patient in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, who was hospitalized with pneumonia in June 2012 The patient developed acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and acute kidney injury and died; MERS-CoV was isolated from his sputum.What is an index case or patient: The index case or primary case is the initial patient in the population of an epidemiological investigation,[1][2] or more generally, the first case of a condition or syndrome (not necessarily contagious) to be described in the medical literature, whether or not the patient is thought to be the first person affected.2)In September 2012, a nearly identical coronavirus was detected in a patient who also had an acute respiratory distress syndrome and acute kidney injury requiring admission to the intensive care unit The patient initially developed symptoms in Qatar but had recently traveled to Saudi Arabia and sought care in the United Kingdom 3)An additional case was reported from Qatar in a patient with severe pneumonia and acute kidney injury [26]. There was no apparent epidemiologic link between this patient and the other patient from Qatar.4)A cluster occurred in October and November 2012 in four men in one family in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, two of whom died [27]. None of the 24 other family members who lived with the infected patients or 124 healthcare workers who had contact with them became ill. Prior to hospitalization, the patients with MERS-CoV were cared for primarily by female relatives. Following hospital admission, the patients were visited only by male relatives.●Two confirmed cases were subsequently reported in Jordan [26]. One patient had pneumonia and pericarditis and the other had pneumonia and disseminated intravascular coagulation [28]. Both of these patients died during a cluster of 11 pneumonia cases that occurred in April 2012 and included eight healthcare workers [29]. Disease was milder in the unconfirmed probable cases than in the confirmed cases [28]. Testing of stored samples confirmed the diagnosis.●In January 2013, a resident of the United Kingdom who had traveled to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed a severe respiratory illness, and diagnostic tests of respiratory specimens were positive for both MERS-CoV and H1N1 influenza A; he died in March 2013 [30]. In February 2013, this patient’s son (who was known to have underlying medical conditions) died from MERS-CoV infection after being in close contact with his father [31,32]. Another family member developed a mild illness and was also found to have MERS-CoV [31]. Neither of these individuals traveled to the Middle East, strongly suggesting that they acquired the virus via person-to-person spread.●In March 2013, a 73-year-old man with multiple myeloma was hospitalized in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, with pneumonia due to MERS-CoV [33]. He was transferred to a hospital in Munich, Germany, and developed acute respiratory distress syndrome and septic shock, resulting in death.●In April 2013, a cluster of 23 confirmed cases and 11 probable cases of MERS-CoV was detected in Al-Hasa in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia [34]. Almost all cases were directly linked to person-to-person exposure, most of them in the hemodialysis (nine cases) or intensive care (four cases) units of a single hospital. There were only two proven cases in healthcare workers, and only three family members (all of whom had visited the hospital) were proven infected despite a survey of over 200 household contacts.●In May 2013, a separate cluster of five cases was reported in eastern Saudi Arabia, in a different location than Al-Hasa [35]. All patients had comorbidities and were hospitalized at the same hospital. Two patients shared a hospital room.●In May 2013, a patient in France was diagnosed with MERS-CoV after returning to France from a vacation to the United Arab Emirates [32]. A second patient was diagnosed with MERS-CoV after sharing a hospital room with the first patient [32,36,37]. The first patient died and the second patient remains critically ill on extracorporeal membrane oxygenation. Both patients were immunocompromised; the first patient was a renal transplant recipient and the second patient received daily glucocorticoids for histamine-induced angioedema. No cases of secondary transmission were detected in more than 100 healthcare workers, despite the lack of use of personal protective equipment [37].●In May 2013, a family cluster of three cases was detected in Tunisia [35]. The index case had returned from a trip to Qatar five days prior to becoming ill and died one week later. Two adult children of the index case developed mild illness with MERS-CoV; one had traveled to Tunisia from Qatar, but the other one lived in Tunisia and had not traveled in the recent past.●In May 2013, a previously healthy man in Italy developed pneumonia with moderate respiratory distress and was diagnosed with MERS-CoV infection after he returned from a trip to Jordan [38]. Two close contacts were subsequently diagnosed with mild MERS-CoV infection, a one-and-a-half-year-old relative and a coworker. All three individuals recovered fully.●In July 2013, an 83-year-old man who owned a farm developed MERS-CoV infection with ARDS resulting in death [39]. Although it was reported that the patient was appropriately isolated and that infection control precautions were taken, four healthcare workers with exposure acquired MERS-CoV; two had mild disease and two were asymptomatic.●In November 2013, Spain reported a probable case of MERS-CoV infection in a 61-year-old woman with no underlying health conditions after she returned from Saudi Arabia [23]. The patient had visited Saudi Arabia from October 2 to November 1, 2013, initially in Medina then in Mecca for the Hajj. She reported no contact with animals or confirmed human cases. She first had symptoms of fever and cough on October 15 and was diagnosed with pneumonia in an emergency department in Mecca on October 28 or 29. She flew to Madrid on November 1 and required supplemental oxygen during the flight. Contact tracing has been undertaken by Spanish authorities. A second probable case has been reported involving a woman from Spain who traveled to Saudi Arabia with the probable case described above ●Additional cases have been identified in various parts of Saudi Arabia as well as in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Jordan, and Kuwait ●A sharply increased number of cases was reported in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in March and April 2014, including hospital-associated clusters [20]. The majority of cases occurred in Jeddah and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Individual cases were also reported in Greece, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Jordan in persons who had traveled from Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates to these countries. Up to 75 percent of cases in the March and April 2014 appeared to be secondary cases, meaning that the infections were acquired from another infected person. Most of the secondary cases occurred in healthcare workers and were either mildly symptomatic or asymptomatic. As noted above, an increased number of cases occurring in March and April has been observed each year between 2012 and 2014.
  36. Studies performed in Europe, Africa, and Asia, including the Middle East, have shown that coronavirus RNA sequences are found frequently in bat fecal samples and that some of these sequences are closely related to MERS-CoV sequencesIn a study from Saudi Arabia, 823 fecal and rectal swab samples were collected from bats, and, using a PCR assay, many coronavirus sequences were foundMost were unrelated to MERS-CoV, but, notably, one 190 nucleotide sequence in the RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene was amplified that had 100 percent identity with a MERS-CoV isolate cloned from the index patient with MERS-CoV infection; the sequence was detected from a fecal pellet of a Taphozousperforatus bat captured from a site near the home of the patient. MERS-CoV grows readily in several bat-derived cell lines [15].Although bats might be a reservoir of MERS-CoV, it is unlikely that they are the immediate source for most human cases because human contact with bats is uncommonIt is possible that another animal (eg, camel) serves as an intermediate host, although this remains unproven.
  37. As noted above, it is likely that animals serve as intermediate hosts for MERS-CoV. In 2013, MERS-CoV sequences were detected by reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) in samples from a juvenile camel belonging to a patient with MERS-CoV in Jeddah, Saudi ArabiaPhylogenetic analysis comparing several small portions of the MERS-CoV genome obtained from the camel to MERS-CoV sequenced from the human specimen demonstrated that the viruses were quite similar and shared several unusual single nucleotide polymorphisms.The patient had been caring for several ill camels in his herd of nine animals. Some of the camels had signs of respiratory illness, including nasal discharge. The patient also routinely consumed raw, unpasteurized camel milk from the herd.MERS-CoV was also detected by RT-PCR and sequencing from nasal swabs from 3 of 14 camels tested during an investigation of a farm in Qatar on which two farm workers developed MERS-CoV infection The nucleotide sequences of certain fragments of the virus that were sequenced were very similar to MERS-CoV from the two human cases on the same farm and an isolate from another human case. Nasal swabs from eight additional camels were positive by RT-PCR, but the virus identity could not be confirmed by sequencing. All of the camels appeared clinically well or had mild signs of infectionAttempts to isolate viruses were unsuccessful.In a second study from Saudi Arabia, MERS-CoV was also detected by RT-PCR from nasal swabs, and less commonly from rectal swabs, from dromedary camelsMERS-CoV nucleic acids were found more commonly in juvenile than in adult camels (35 versus 15 percent). Phylogenetic analysis demonstrated that the nucleocapsid sequence was identical and that a region of the spike gene and of the ORF1ab gene had &gt;99 percent sequence homology with previously published MERS-CoV sequences detected in humans. MERS-CoV has also been detected by RT-PCR from dromedary camels sampled in abattoirs in Egypt but imported for slaughter from Sudan and Ethiopia [55].Serologic studies have also suggested that camels are an important source of MERS-CoV:●Of 203 serum samples from dromedary camels in various regions of Saudi Arabia collected in 2013, 150 (74 percent) had antibodies to MERS-CoV by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assayThe rate of seropositivity was higher in adult than juvenile camels (&gt;95 percent among camels &gt;2 years of age versus 55 percent in camels ≤2 years of age). Using stored serum samples from 1992 to 2010, antibodies to MERS-CoV were detected as early as 1992. ●In another study, sera collected in June 2013 from 110 dromedary camels in Egypt had a high prevalence of MERS-CoV antibodies (94 percent using a microneutralization assay; 98 percent using a novel spike pseudoparticle neutralization assay)In contrast, no MERS-CoV antibodies were detected from other animals or humans in Egypt or Hong Kong.●In a study of 651 serum samples from dromedary camels in the United Arab Emirates (151 from 2003; 500 from 2013), 632 samples (97 percent) had antibodies against MERS-CoV, including all of the samples collected in 2003, prior to the outbreak in humans●MERS-CoV antibodies have also been reported in other studies of camels in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Nigeria What is the significance of the recent finding of MERS-CoV in a camel?On 11 November, the Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia announced that MERS-CoV had been detected in a camel linked to a human case in Saudi Arabia. This finding is consistent with previously published reports of MERS-CoV reactive antibodies in camels, and adds another important piece of information to our understanding of MERS-CoV ecology. However, this finding does not necessarily implicate camels directly in the chain of transmission to humans. The critical question that remains about this virus is the route by which humans are infected, and the way in which they are exposed. Most patients who have tested positive for MERS-CoV had neither a human source of infection nor direct exposure to animals, including camels. It is still unclear whether camels, even if infected with MERS-CoV, play a role in transmission to humans. Further genetic sequencing and epidemiologic data are needed to understand the role, if any, of camels in the transmission of MERS CoV to humans.
  38. What is the significance of the recent finding of MERS-CoV in a camel?On 11 November, the Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia announced that MERS-CoV had been detected in a camel linked to a human case in Saudi Arabia. This finding is consistent with previously published reports of MERS-CoV reactive antibodies in camels, and adds another important piece of information to our understanding of MERS-CoV ecology. However, this finding does not necessarily implicate camels directly in the chain of transmission to humans. The critical question that remains about this virus is the route by which humans are infected, and the way in which they are exposed. Most patients who have tested positive for MERS-CoV had neither a human source of infection nor direct exposure to animals, including camels. It is still unclear whether camels, even if infected with MERS-CoV, play a role in transmission to humans. Further genetic sequencing and epidemiologic data are needed to understand the role, if any, of camels in the transmission of MERS CoV to humans.
  39. The case clusters in the United Kingdom, Tunisia, Italy, and in healthcare facilities in Saudi Arabia and France strongly suggest that human-to-human transmission occursThe number of contacts infected by individuals with confirmed infections, however, appears to be limitedSecondary cases have tended to be milder than primary cases, and many secondary cases have been reported to be asymptomaticMore than half of all laboratory-confirmed secondary cases have been associated with healthcare settingsPossible modes of transmission may include droplet and contact transmission
  40. The case clusters in the United Kingdom, Tunisia, Italy, and in healthcare facilities in Saudi Arabia and France strongly suggest that human-to-human transmission occursThe number of contacts infected by individuals with confirmed infections, however, appears to be limitedSecondary cases have tended to be milder than primary cases, and many secondary cases have been reported to be asymptomaticMore than half of all laboratory-confirmed secondary cases have been associated with healthcare settingsPossible modes of transmission may include droplet and contact transmission
  41. CASE DEFINITIONS — For epidemiologic purposes, the following case definitions have been proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO) [67]:●Confirmed case – A person with laboratory confirmation of infection with MERS-CoV●Probable case – A person with an acute respiratory infection (with or without fever) with clinical, radiographic, or histopathologic evidence of pulmonary parenchymal disease (eg, pneumonia or acute respiratory distress syndrome) and•No possibility of laboratory confirmation for MERS-CoV because either the patient or samples are not available for testing and•Close contact with a laboratory-confirmed case. A close contact includes anyone who provided care for the patient, including a healthcare worker or family member or another individual who had other similarly close physical contact, and anyone who lived with or visited a case while the case was symptomatic.
  42. Probable caseThree combinations of clinical, epidemiological and laboratory criteria can define a probable case:A person with a febrile acute respiratory illness with clinical, radiological, or histopathological evidence of pulmonary parenchymal disease (e.g. pneumonia or Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome)ANDTesting for MERS-CoV is unavailable or negative on a single inadequate specimenANDThe patient has a direct epidemiologic-link with a confirmed MERS-CoV caseA person with a febrile acute respiratory illness with clinical, radiological, or histopathological evidence of pulmonary parenchymal disease (e.g. pneumonia or Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome)ANDAn inconclusive MERS-CoV laboratory test (that is, a positive screening test without confirmation)ANDA resident of or traveler to Middle Eastern countries where MERS-CoV virus is believed to be circulating in the 14 days before onset of illnessA person with an acute febrile respiratory illness of any severity ANDAn inconclusive MERS-CoV laboratory test (that is, a positive screening test without confirmation)ANDThe patient has a direct epidemiologic-link with a confirmed MERS-CoV case
  43. Incubation period — In an outbreak of MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia that resulted in laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV in 23 individuals, the median incubation period was 5.2 days (95% CI 1.9-14.7 days) [34]. In one secondary case that occurred in a patient in France who shared a room with an infected patient, the incubation period was estimated at 9 to 12 days [37].The World Health Organization (WHO) and the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommend that an evaluation for MERS-CoV be considered in individuals with a syndrome of MERS who returned from travel to the Arabian peninsula or neighboring countries within the past 14 days (rather than within 10 days, which was the timeframe recommended in earlier documents) [21]. Countries in or neighboring the Arabian Peninsula are defined below. (See &apos;In the United States&apos; below.)Clinical features — Most patients with MERS-CoV infection have been severely ill with pneumonia and acute respiratory distress syndrome, and some have had acute kidney injury [4,27,32-34,37,43,63]. Many patients have required mechanical ventilation and some have required extracorporeal membrane oxygenation. Other clinical manifestations that have been reported are gastrointestinal symptoms (anorexia, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea), pericarditis, and disseminated intravascular coagulation [27,28,32,37,43]. Among 12 critically ill patients, 11 had extrapulmonary manifestations including shock (in 11) and acute kidney injury (in 7) [63]. One immunocompromised patient presented with fever, diarrhea, and abdominal pain but without early respiratory symptoms; pneumonia was identified incidentally on a chest x-ray [32,37].As of late September 2013, 27 of 130 patients (21 percent) have had mild or no symptoms [22]. A few reports have described individuals with a mild respiratory illness not requiring hospitalization [21,44]. Several individuals with asymptomatic infection have been identified among contacts of patients with symptomatic infection [44,69,70]. As an example, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health screened more than 3000 close contacts of case patients using real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction of nasopharyngeal swabs and identified seven healthcare workers with MERS-CoV, two of whom were asymptomatic and five of whom had mild upper respiratory tract symptoms [44].It remains unclear whether persons with specific conditions are disproportionately infected with MERS-CoV or have more severe disease [22]. In a study of 47 patients with MERS-CoV infection in Saudi Arabia, 45 (96 percent) had underlying comorbidities, including diabetes mellitus (68 percent), hypertension (34 percent), chronic cardiac disease (28 percent), and chronic kidney disease (49 percent) [43]. One patient was receiving long-term immunosuppressive therapy with glucocorticoids. In a study of 12 critically ill patients with MERS-CoV infection, each individual had at least one comorbid condition; the median number of comorbid conditions was 3 (range 1 to 6) [63].The high rate of comorbidities reported must be interpreted with caution, since diabetes mellitus was frequently observed in a study of more than 6000 patients presenting to an outpatient clinic in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and because approximately half of the 47 patients described in the first study were part of an outbreak in a hemodialysis unit [43], where rates of chronic kidney disease and hypertension would be expected to be high [71].One stillbirth at five months gestation has been reported in a woman with MERS-CoV infection [72]. The woman developed vaginal bleeding and abdominal pain on the seventh day of illness with MERS-CoV, and she spontaneously delivered a stillborn infant. In another MERS-CoV infection in pregnancy occurring near term, a woman in the United Arab Emirates gave birth to an apparently healthy baby; the mother died after delivery [19].Several studies have shown that nonhuman primates develop MERS-CoV infection after inoculation with MERS-CoV and can therefore be used as animal models for studying MERS-CoV infection [73-75]. In contrast, mice, ferrets, and guinea pigs do not appear to be susceptible to MERS-CoV infection [75]. In one study, six rhesus macaques were inoculated with MERS-CoV through a combination of intratracheal, intranasal, oral, and ocular routes [73]. Within 24 hours, all animals developed anorexia, fever, tachypnea, cough, piloerection, and hunched posture. Chest x-rays showed localized infiltrates and increased interstitial markings. After the animals were euthanized, postmortem examinations showed multifocal to coalescent lesions throughout the lungs. Histopathology demonstrated infiltrates of neutrophils and macrophages, compatible with acute interstitial pneumonia.In another study by the same group, following inoculation with MERS-CoV, rhesus macaques developed a transient lower respiratory tract infection [74]. Clinical signs, virus shedding, virus replication in respiratory tissues, gene expression, inflammatory changes on histology, and cytokine and chemokine profiles peaked one day after infection and decreased rapidly over time. In nasal swabs and bronchoalveolar lavage fluid specimens, viral loads were also highest on day one postinfection and decreased rapidly. Two of three animals were still shedding virus from the respiratory tract on day six (the same day they were euthanized). MERS-CoV caused a multifocal, mild to marked interstitial pneumonia, with virus replication occurring primarily in Type I and II alveolar pneumocytes.Imaging findings — As noted above, among 47 cases of MERS-CoV disease in Saudi Arabia, abnormalities on chest radiography were noted in all 47 cases [43]. Imaging findings ranged from minimal to extensive abnormalities, including increased bronchovascular markings, airspace opacities, patchy infiltrates, interstitial changes, patchy to confluent airspace consolidations, nodular opacities, reticular opacities, reticulonodular shadowing, pleural effusions, and total opacification of lung segments and lobes; abnormalities were either unilateral or bilateral (image 1)
  44. The following clinical findings were observed among 47 patients with MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia [43]:●Fever (&gt;38°C) – 46 patients (98 percent)●Fever with chills or rigors – 41 patients (87 percent)●Cough – 39 patients (83 percent)●Shortness of breath – 34 patients (72 percent)●Hemoptysis – 8 patients (17 percent)●Sore throat – 10 patients (21 percent)●Myalgias – 15 patients (32 percent)●Diarrhea – 12 patients (26 percent)●Vomiting – 10 patients (21 percent)●Abdominal pain – 8 patients (17 percent)●Abnormal chest x-ray – 47 patients (100 percent)Of these 47 patients, 42 (89 percent) required intensive care and 34 (72 percent) required mechanical ventilation [43]. The median time from presentation for medical care to mechanical ventilation was 7 days (range 3 to 11 days) and to death was 14 days (range 5 to 36 days).
  45. Among 47 cases of MERS-CoV infection in Saudi Arabia, laboratory abnormalities included leukopenia (14 percent), lymphopenia (34 percent), lymphocytosis (11 percent), thrombocytopenia (36 percent), elevated aspartate aminotransferase (15 percent), elevated alanine aminotransferase (11 percent), and elevated lactate dehydrogenase (49 percent) Other reports have described lymphocytopenia with or without neutropenia, anemia, and/or thrombocytopeniaSome patients have shown progressive renal failure, with rising blood urea nitrogen and creatinine Disseminated intravascular coagulation and hemolysis have also been reported
  46. The World Health Organization (WHO) has developed a questionnaire to be used for the initial investigation of cases; it can be found on the WHO website [76].Preferred tests and specimen types — The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends that lower respiratory tract specimens should be the first priority for collection and real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) testing, since rRT-PCR testing of lower respiratory specimens appears to be more sensitive for detection of MERS-CoV than testing of upper respiratory tract specimens Given the potential severity of MERS-CoV infections, the risk for human-to-human transmission, and the limited data about the sensitivity of each diagnostic test, we suggest that multiple specimens be collected from different sites and at different times to increase the likelihood of detecting MERS-CoV [68,79]. Priority should be given to respiratory specimens (lower tract if obtainable and in all cases of severe disease; upper tract if disease is mild and lower tract specimens cannot be obtained). Serum samples (acute and convalescent samples ≥3 weeks later) should also be obtained for serologic testingWe recommend the following diagnostic approach, which has been adapted from guidelines issued by the CDC and WHO [68,77,78]:●Lower respiratory tract specimens such as sputum, endotracheal aspirate, or bronchoalveolar lavage fluid should be obtained for rRT-PCR testing from all cases of severe disease and from milder cases when possible.●Upper respiratory tract specimens should be obtained for rRT-PCR testing and should be either a combined nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swab specimen (two synthetic fiber swabs with plastic shafts, combined in a single collection container) or a 2 to 3 mL nasopharyngeal aspirate.●Acute and convalescent (14 to 21 days later) sera should be obtained for serologic testing. If only a single sample is to be obtained, it should be collected at least 14 days after onset of symptoms.●MERS-CoV has been detected using rRT-PCR from blood, urine, and stool, but the usefulness of these specimens for diagnosing MERS-CoV infection is uncertain.●Even after the diagnosis has been established, continued sampling and testing by rRT-PCR is encouraged, since this will increase our knowledge about the duration of virus shedding.●In certain cases, the diagnosis should be confirmed by nucleic acid sequencing [68].If a negative result is obtained from a patient for whom there is a high index of suspicion for MERS-CoV infection, additional specimens should be obtained and tested [68]. Possible reasons for false-negative results include that the specimen was of poor quality, that it was collected late or very early in the illness, that it was not handled and shipped appropriately, and that there were technical problems with the test.Laboratories with limited experience testing for MERS-CoV are encouraged to have their results confirmed by laboratories with greater experience (particularly negative specimens from patients in whom MERS-CoV infection is thought to be likely) [68]. Additional information about diagnostic testing can be found in a WHO document and in a CDC document [68,77].An emergency use authorization was issued by the US Food and Drug Administration in June 2013 for use of the rRT-PCR assay developed by the CDC on clinical respiratory, blood, and stool samples [80].Polymerase chain reaction and sequencing — Limited data from the cases sampled to date indicate that lower respiratory tract specimens (sputum, tracheal aspirates, bronchoalveolar lavage [BAL] fluid) are more sensitive for detection of MERS-CoV by rRT-PCR testing than those from the upper respiratory tract (combined nasopharyngeal and throat swab, nasopharyngeal aspirates) [25,27,32,33,37,68,78,81]. However, upper respiratory tract specimens are still useful for diagnosing MERS-CoV. As an example, in a series of 47 patients with MERS-CoV, the majority of patients were diagnosed using nasopharyngeal swabs [43].In a detailed analysis of a patient with multiple myeloma and MERS-CoV infection who succumbed after developing acute respiratory distress syndrome and septic shock, high concentrations of MERS-CoV were detected by rRT-PCR from respiratory specimens (BAL fluid or tracheobronchial secretions), peaking at 1.2 x106 copies/mL [33]. MERS-CoV was also detectable from oronasal secretions, stool, and urine, but at low concentrations. Only one of two oronasal specimens was positive by rRT-PCR (5370 copies/mL). No virus was detected from the blood of this patient, but it has been detected from the blood of another reported patient [37]. The low concentration of MERS-CoV detected from stool is notably different from the experience with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV); patients with SARS-CoV had high virus concentrations and prolonged excretion from stool. (See &quot;Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)&quot;, section on &apos;Polymerase chain reaction&apos;.)Three rRT-PCR assays for routine detection of MERS-CoV have been developed [68]. Currently described tests are an assay targeting a region upstream of the E protein gene (upE) [25] and assays targeting the open reading frame 1b (ORF 1b) [25] and the open reading frame 1a (ORF 1a) [82]. In some cases, sequencing should be performed for confirmation.Serology — Several serology assays have been developed for the detection of MERS-CoV antibodies, including immunofluorescence assays and a protein microarray assay [68,82-85]. The CDC has developed a two-stage approach, which uses an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) for screening followed by an indirect immunofluorescence test or microneutralization test for confirmation [68]. Any positive test by a single serologic assay should be confirmed with a neutralization assay. There are limited data on the sensitivity and specificity of antibody tests for MERS-CoV.According to the WHO, cases with a positive serologic test in the absence of PCR testing or sequencing are considered probable cases if they meet the other elements comprising the case definition of a probable case [68]. (See &apos;Case definitions&apos; above.
  47. The World Health Organization (WHO) has developed a questionnaire to be used for the initial investigation of cases; it can be found on the WHO website [76].Preferred tests and specimen types — The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends that lower respiratory tract specimens should be the first priority for collection and real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) testing, since rRT-PCR testing of lower respiratory specimens appears to be more sensitive for detection of MERS-CoV than testing of upper respiratory tract specimens Given the potential severity of MERS-CoV infections, the risk for human-to-human transmission, and the limited data about the sensitivity of each diagnostic test, we suggest that multiple specimens be collected from different sites and at different times to increase the likelihood of detecting MERS-CoV [68,79]. Priority should be given to respiratory specimens (lower tract if obtainable and in all cases of severe disease; upper tract if disease is mild and lower tract specimens cannot be obtained). Serum samples (acute and convalescent samples ≥3 weeks later) should also be obtained for serologic testingWe recommend the following diagnostic approach, which has been adapted from guidelines issued by the CDC and WHO [68,77,78]:●Lower respiratory tract specimens such as sputum, endotracheal aspirate, or bronchoalveolar lavage fluid should be obtained for rRT-PCR testing from all cases of severe disease and from milder cases when possible.●Upper respiratory tract specimens should be obtained for rRT-PCR testing and should be either a combined nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swab specimen (two synthetic fiber swabs with plastic shafts, combined in a single collection container) or a 2 to 3 mL nasopharyngeal aspirate.●Acute and convalescent (14 to 21 days later) sera should be obtained for serologic testing. If only a single sample is to be obtained, it should be collected at least 14 days after onset of symptoms.●MERS-CoV has been detected using rRT-PCR from blood, urine, and stool, but the usefulness of these specimens for diagnosing MERS-CoV infection is uncertain.●Even after the diagnosis has been established, continued sampling and testing by rRT-PCR is encouraged, since this will increase our knowledge about the duration of virus shedding.●In certain cases, the diagnosis should be confirmed by nucleic acid sequencing [68].If a negative result is obtained from a patient for whom there is a high index of suspicion for MERS-CoV infection, additional specimens should be obtained and tested [68]. Possible reasons for false-negative results include that the specimen was of poor quality, that it was collected late or very early in the illness, that it was not handled and shipped appropriately, and that there were technical problems with the test.Laboratories with limited experience testing for MERS-CoV are encouraged to have their results confirmed by laboratories with greater experience (particularly negative specimens from patients in whom MERS-CoV infection is thought to be likely) [68]. Additional information about diagnostic testing can be found in a WHO document and in a CDC document [68,77].An emergency use authorization was issued by the US Food and Drug Administration in June 2013 for use of the rRT-PCR assay developed by the CDC on clinical respiratory, blood, and stool samples [80].Polymerase chain reaction and sequencing — Limited data from the cases sampled to date indicate that lower respiratory tract specimens (sputum, tracheal aspirates, bronchoalveolar lavage [BAL] fluid) are more sensitive for detection of MERS-CoV by rRT-PCR testing than those from the upper respiratory tract (combined nasopharyngeal and throat swab, nasopharyngeal aspirates) [25,27,32,33,37,68,78,81]. However, upper respiratory tract specimens are still useful for diagnosing MERS-CoV. As an example, in a series of 47 patients with MERS-CoV, the majority of patients were diagnosed using nasopharyngeal swabs [43].In a detailed analysis of a patient with multiple myeloma and MERS-CoV infection who succumbed after developing acute respiratory distress syndrome and septic shock, high concentrations of MERS-CoV were detected by rRT-PCR from respiratory specimens (BAL fluid or tracheobronchial secretions), peaking at 1.2 x106 copies/mL [33]. MERS-CoV was also detectable from oronasal secretions, stool, and urine, but at low concentrations. Only one of two oronasal specimens was positive by rRT-PCR (5370 copies/mL). No virus was detected from the blood of this patient, but it has been detected from the blood of another reported patient [37]. The low concentration of MERS-CoV detected from stool is notably different from the experience with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV); patients with SARS-CoV had high virus concentrations and prolonged excretion from stool. (See &quot;Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)&quot;, section on &apos;Polymerase chain reaction&apos;.)Three rRT-PCR assays for routine detection of MERS-CoV have been developed [68]. Currently described tests are an assay targeting a region upstream of the E protein gene (upE) [25] and assays targeting the open reading frame 1b (ORF 1b) [25] and the open reading frame 1a (ORF 1a) [82]. In some cases, sequencing should be performed for confirmation.Serology — Several serology assays have been developed for the detection of MERS-CoV antibodies, including immunofluorescence assays and a protein microarray assay [68,82-85]. The CDC has developed a two-stage approach, which uses an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) for screening followed by an indirect immunofluorescence test or microneutralization test for confirmation [68]. Any positive test by a single serologic assay should be confirmed with a neutralization assay. There are limited data on the sensitivity and specificity of antibody tests for MERS-CoV.According to the WHO, cases with a positive serologic test in the absence of PCR testing or sequencing are considered probable cases if they meet the other elements comprising the case definition of a probable case [68]. (See &apos;Case definitions&apos; above.
  48. We recommend the following diagnostic approach, which has been adapted from guidelines issued by the CDC and WHO [68,77,78]:●Lower respiratory tract specimens such as sputum, endotracheal aspirate, or bronchoalveolar lavage fluid should be obtained for rRT-PCR testing from all cases of severe disease and from milder cases when possible.●Upper respiratory tract specimens should be obtained for rRT-PCR testing and should be either a combined nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swab specimen (two synthetic fiber swabs with plastic shafts, combined in a single collection container) or a 2 to 3 mL nasopharyngeal aspirate.●Acute and convalescent (14 to 21 days later) sera should be obtained for serologic testing. If only a single sample is to be obtained, it should be collected at least 14 days after onset of symptoms.●MERS-CoV has been detected using rRT-PCR from blood, urine, and stool, but the usefulness of these specimens for diagnosing MERS-CoV infection is uncertain.●Even after the diagnosis has been established, continued sampling and testing by rRT-PCR is encouraged, since this will increase our knowledge about the duration of virus shedding.●In certain cases, the diagnosis should be confirmed by nucleic acid sequencing
  49. If a negative result is obtained from a patient for whom there is a high index of suspicion for MERS-CoV infection, additional specimens should be obtained and tested [68]. Possible reasons for false-negative results include that the specimen was of poor quality, that it was collected late or very early in the illness, that it was not handled and shipped appropriately, and that there were technical problems with the test.Laboratories with limited experience testing for MERS-CoV are encouraged to have their results confirmed by laboratories with greater experience (particularly negative specimens from patients in whom MERS-CoV infection is thought to be likely)Three rRT-PCR assays for routine detection of MERS-CoV have been developed
  50. Several serology assays have been developed for the detection of MERS-CoV antibodies, including immunofluorescence assays and a protein microarray assayThe CDC has developed a two-stage approach, which uses an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) for screening followed by an indirect immunofluorescence test or microneutralization test for confirmationAny positive test by a single serologic assay should be confirmed with a neutralization assay. There are limited data on the sensitivity and specificity of antibody tests for MERS-CoV.According to the WHO, cases with a positive serologic test in the absence of PCR testing or sequencing are considered probable cases if they meet the other elements comprising the case definition of a probable case
  51. As with other coronaviruses, no antiviral agents are recommended for the treatment of MERS-CoV infection. In cell culture and animal experiments, combination therapy with interferon (IFN)-alpha-2b and ribavirin appears promising [90,91]. In a study in which MERS-CoV was grown in two different cell lines, high concentrations of interferon-alpha-2b or ribavirin were required to inhibit viral replication [90]. However, when used in combination at lower concentrations, IFN-alpha-2b and ribavirin resulted in a comparable reduction in viral replication as high concentrations of either agent alone.In a study of rhesus macaques, two groups of three monkeys were inoculated with MERS-CoV through a combination of intratracheal, intranasal, oral, and ocular routes; one group was treated with subcutaneous IFN-alpha-2b plus intramuscular ribavirin beginning eight hours after inoculation and the other group was not treated [91]. In contrast to untreated macaques, treated animals did not develop breathing abnormalities and showed no or very mild radiographic evidence of pneumonia. Treated animals had lower concentrations of serum and lung proinflammatory markers, fewer viral genome copies, and fewer severe histopathologic changes in the lungs.Combination therapy with IFN-alpha-2b and ribavirin was started a median of 19 days following admission in five critically ill patients with MERS-CoV infection and acute respiratory distress syndrome in Saudi Arabia [92]. None of the patients responded to therapy and all died of their illness.Other experimental therapies being investigated include convalescent plasma, monoclonal antibodies, and inhibition of the main viral proteaseThe WHO has issued recommendations for the management of severe respiratory infections suspected to be caused by MERS-CoV [
  52.  As of April 26, 2014, 93 of 261 patients (36 percent) with laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV infection reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) have diedBecause individuals with mild symptoms are less likely to be evaluated than patients with severe disease, those with MERS-CoV and mild disease might be underrepresented in published reports and reports from the World Health OrganizationThe reported case-fatality rate might therefore be an overestimate. This hypothesis is supported by an analysis pointing out that 14 of 19 (74 percent) patients with infection detected through routine surveillance died compared with 5 of 24 (21 percent) of secondary cases In a study of 47 patients with MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia, case-fatality rates rose with increasing age, from 39 percent in those younger than 50 years of age, to 48 percent in those younger than 60 years of age, to 75 percent in those aged 60 years or olderA separate analysis has shown similar findings.
  53. Detailed information for travelers to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, for Hajj and/or Umrah can be found on the World Health Organization (WHO) website [103]. The WHO does not recommend either special screening for MERS-CoV at points of entry or the application of any travel or trade restrictions.The Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia recommended that in 2013, the following individuals postpone their plans to travel to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, for Hajj and/or Umrah due to the outbreak of MERS-CoV [104]:●Elderly individuals (&gt;65 years of age)●Individuals with chronic diseases (eg, heart disease, kidney disease, respiratory disease, diabetes)●Individuals with immunodeficiency (congenital or acquired)●Patients with malignancy●Patients with a terminal illness●Pregnant women●Children (&lt;12 years of age