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THE MAGIC OF SYMBIOTIC
SECURITY
Creating an Ecosystem of Security Systems
DAN CORNELL
¢  Founder    and CTO of Denim Group

¢  Software   developer by background (Java, .NET, etc)

¢  OWASPSan Antonio, Global Membership
  Committee




                                                       2
JOSH SOKOL
¢  Information   Security Program Owner at National
  Instruments

¢  Chair   of the OWASP Global Chapters Committee

¢  Co-Chairof OWASP AppSec USA 2012 (October
  23-26 in Austin, TX)
BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS
¢  We need an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS).
¢  We’ve budgeted $50,000 for it.

¢  Get us the best tool for our money.



How would you evaluate for purchase?
3 PARTY REVIEWS
 RD




¢  Overall   Ranking from SC Magazine Feb. 2011


1)    McAfee – 5 stars
2)    NitroGuard – 5 stars
3)    Top Layer Security – 5 stars
4)    Sourcefire – 4 stars
5)    CounterSnipe – 4 stars
INDUSTRY RANKINGS

                    1) McAfee
                    2) Sourcefire
                    3) HP
                    4) Cisco
                    5) IBM
COST
¢  Lowest   cost from SC Magazine Feb. 2011


1)    CounterSnipe - $500/site
2)    NitroGuard - $6,495
3)    Sourcefire - $8,995
4)    McAfee - $10,995
5)    Top Layer Security - $12,495
FEATURES
ü  Zero-day threat protection
ü  Inline protecting

ü  Passive monitoring

ü  Support for custom policies

ü  Real-time alerting

ü  Central management

ü  Compliance grade reporting

ü  High availability
THE INHERENT PROBLEM
¢  3rdParty Bias
¢  Incomplete Industry Rankings

¢  Cost is ALWAYS Negotiable

¢  Features are commodity
TOOLS ARE EVALUATED BASED ON CLASS
FEATURES; NOT ON ENTERPRISE VALUE.
                                                                ü Proprietary
                                                                Protocols

                                                                ü “Greedy”




                                           Vulnerability Mgmt
                        Malware Analysis
                                                                Platforms
 Firewall




                  NAC
            IPS




                                                                ü Tools Working
                                                                in Silos

                                                                ü Duplication of
                                                                Functionality
GAUGING ENTERPRISE VALUE
Separating the Wheat from the Chaff
CONSUMER CAPABILITIES
                        ü Events
                        ü Alerts
                        ü SNMP
                        ü Syslog
CONSUMERS CAN BE “GREEDY”




                            Exploitation –
                            Parasitism. The
                            leech gains food
                            and nutrients,
                            but the host
                            gains nothing
                            from having a
                            leech suck its
                            blood.
PROVIDER CAPABILITIES
                        ü Open API
                        ü Open DB
                        ü Data Export
SYMBIOTIC SECURITY
                     You can
                     assemble an
                     arsenal of
                     best-in-breed
                     tools that
                     work together.


                     Even smaller
                     purchases can
                     have a large
                     impact.
SYMBIOTIC SECURITY IS NOT
¢  A
    piece of hardware or software you can
  purchase.

¢  A   ranking system for vendors.

¢  A   label you can slap on your new product.
SYMBIOTIC SECURITY IS
¢  A   philosophy on how you evaluate purchases.

¢  A
    concept for creating an ecosystem of security
  systems.

¢  A
    means of making the tools we invest in more
  valuable to us.
BEWARE OF PSEUDO-SYMBIOSIS
¢  Single vendor with multiple product offerings
    that work together.
¢  Gives symbiotic functionality, but only within
    that vendors tool set.
¢  True Symbiotic Security is about being able to
    hand-pick your toolset and have them work
    together regardless of brand.
SECURITY TOOLS
And Their Classifications
DATA IN SILOS
¢  Reputation  data: Do I trust the source?
¢  Attack data: How am I being attacked?

¢  Vulnerability data: What attacks are my systems
    vulnerable to?
¢  Asset data: What versions of O/S and software
    am I running?
¢  Identity data: Who is using my systems?

¢  Data classification: Who should have access to
    what?
DATA IN SILOS (CONT)
¢  Trust   hierarchy: Who do I trust and who trusts
    me?
¢  Authentication data: Do I have access?

¢  Authorization data: What can I access?

¢  QA data: What has been tested?

¢  Trust boundaries: Is data crossing between two
    trust levels?
MAGIC HAPPENS
¢  Should   I accept packets from random IP X?

  —    Reputation data
  —    Attack data
  —    Vulnerability data
  —    Asset data
  —    Trust boundaries
MORE MAGIC
¢  Should   I allow random person X to download a file
  Y?

  —    Data classification
  —    Reputation data
  —    Authentication data
  —    Authorization data
  —    Trust boundaries
EVEN MORE MAGIC
¢  WithSymbiotic Security the possibilities are
  limited only by the security ecosystem you’ve put
  in place.

  —    Creation of WAF rules based on attack data.
  —    Is a targeted exploit actually going to affect the
        system?
  —    Should I allow a system on my network?
DEMAND SYMBIOTIC SECURITY
¢  Let
      vendors know up front that you will be
  evaluating the effectiveness of their tool based
  on:
   1.     Other tools in your environment their tool can
          consume data from.
   2.     Other tools in your environment their tool can
          provide data to.
   3.     The net increase in security for your entire tool
          ecosystem and not just their tools siloed
          functionality.
THREADFIX
Symbiotic Security In Action
THREADFIX - OVERVIEW
¢  ThreadFixis a software vulnerability
  aggregation and management system that helps
  organizations aggregate vulnerability data,
  generate virtual patches, and interact with
  software defect tracking systems.

¢  Freely   available under the Mozilla Public License
  (MPL)



¢  Hosted at Google Code:
  http://code.google.com/p/threadfix/
                                                          27
ThreadFix   Consolidates reports so managers can speak intelligently about
            the status and trends of security within their organization




                                                                    28
Vulnerability Import   • Pulls in static and dynamic results
                       • Eliminates duplicate results
                       • Allows for results to be grouped




                                                          29
Real-Time Protection   Virtual patching helps protect
                       organizations during remediation




                                                          30
Defect Tracking   • ThreadFix can connect to common defect trackers
                  • Defects can be created for developers
Integration       • Work can continue uninterrupted




                                                            31
THREADFIX - SYMBIOTIC
¢  Vendor-independent

¢  Ability to consume multiple technologies (SAST,
    DAST, IDS/IPS, WAF)
¢  Ability to produce output that can be consumed
    by other tools (RESTful API)
¢  Mapping vulnerability data with operational data
    in a bi-directional way
¢  Prioritization based on actual attack data rather
    than suppositions
SUBSET OF SECURITY TOOL
INTERACTIONS
DEMO
VENDORS: PLEASE SUCK LESS
¢  ThreadFix was created to solve a problem that
  security tool vendors have created.
  —    Proprietary protocols
  —    Lack of APIs
  —    Lack of standards
  —    Play nice!


¢  Some    have been very
helpful
  —    File format info
  —    Beta testing
  —    And so on
YOU KNOW WHAT WOULD MAKE ALL THIS WAY
EASIER?
¢    Common data standards!
      —    Scanning tools
      —    Event logs
      —    And so on…


¢    Current efforts:
      —    MITRE Software Assurance Findings
            Expression Schema (SAFES)
            ¢    http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/
                  2012/11_3671/
      —    OWASP Data Exchange Format
            Project
            ¢    https://www.owasp.org/index.php/
                  OWASP_Data_Exchange_Format_Project


                                                           36
SIMPLE SOFTWARE VULNERABILITY
LANGUAGE (SSVL)
¢  Common way to represent static and dynamic scanner
    findings
¢  Based on our experience building importers for
    ThreadFix
      —    It “works” for real-world applications because we are
            essentially using it

¢    Love to hear feedback
      —    Send me a request and I can share the document for
            editing/annotation

¢    Online:
      —    https://docs.google.com/document/d/
            1H5hWUdj925TtoZ7ZvnfHdFABe7hBCGuZtLUas29yBGI/
            edit?pli=1
      —    Or http://tinyurl.com/cslqv47

                                                                    37
SIMPLE SOFTWARE VULNERABILITY
LANGUAGE (SSVL)




                                38
VENDORS WIN TOO
¢  Industry vetted standards for communication
¢  Niche products with enterprise functionality

¢  Maximize R&D time and money

¢  Vendors can excel where it matters the most
IDEAS TO FURTHER THE CAUSE
¢  Speak
        with Gartner about adding symbiotic
  characteristics to their evaluation criteria.

¢  Create
         a list of tools with symbiotic
  characteristics.
HELP US HELP THE COMMUNITY
¢  http://www.symbioticsecurity.com/
QUESTIONS
Josh Sokol             Dan Cornell
josh.sokol@ni.com      dan@denimgroup.com
Twitter: @joshsokol    Twitter: @danielcornell

www.joshsokol.com      www.denimgroup.com
www.webadminblog.com   www.denimgroup.com/
                         threadfix
                       code.google.com/p/
                         threadfix
                       (210) 572-4400
                                                 42

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The Magic of Symbiotic Security

  • 1. THE MAGIC OF SYMBIOTIC SECURITY Creating an Ecosystem of Security Systems
  • 2. DAN CORNELL ¢  Founder and CTO of Denim Group ¢  Software developer by background (Java, .NET, etc) ¢  OWASPSan Antonio, Global Membership Committee 2
  • 3. JOSH SOKOL ¢  Information Security Program Owner at National Instruments ¢  Chair of the OWASP Global Chapters Committee ¢  Co-Chairof OWASP AppSec USA 2012 (October 23-26 in Austin, TX)
  • 4. BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS ¢  We need an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). ¢  We’ve budgeted $50,000 for it. ¢  Get us the best tool for our money. How would you evaluate for purchase?
  • 5. 3 PARTY REVIEWS RD ¢  Overall Ranking from SC Magazine Feb. 2011 1)  McAfee – 5 stars 2)  NitroGuard – 5 stars 3)  Top Layer Security – 5 stars 4)  Sourcefire – 4 stars 5)  CounterSnipe – 4 stars
  • 6. INDUSTRY RANKINGS 1) McAfee 2) Sourcefire 3) HP 4) Cisco 5) IBM
  • 7. COST ¢  Lowest cost from SC Magazine Feb. 2011 1)  CounterSnipe - $500/site 2)  NitroGuard - $6,495 3)  Sourcefire - $8,995 4)  McAfee - $10,995 5)  Top Layer Security - $12,495
  • 8. FEATURES ü  Zero-day threat protection ü  Inline protecting ü  Passive monitoring ü  Support for custom policies ü  Real-time alerting ü  Central management ü  Compliance grade reporting ü  High availability
  • 9. THE INHERENT PROBLEM ¢  3rdParty Bias ¢  Incomplete Industry Rankings ¢  Cost is ALWAYS Negotiable ¢  Features are commodity
  • 10. TOOLS ARE EVALUATED BASED ON CLASS FEATURES; NOT ON ENTERPRISE VALUE. ü Proprietary Protocols ü “Greedy” Vulnerability Mgmt Malware Analysis Platforms Firewall NAC IPS ü Tools Working in Silos ü Duplication of Functionality
  • 11. GAUGING ENTERPRISE VALUE Separating the Wheat from the Chaff
  • 12. CONSUMER CAPABILITIES ü Events ü Alerts ü SNMP ü Syslog
  • 13. CONSUMERS CAN BE “GREEDY” Exploitation – Parasitism. The leech gains food and nutrients, but the host gains nothing from having a leech suck its blood.
  • 14. PROVIDER CAPABILITIES ü Open API ü Open DB ü Data Export
  • 15. SYMBIOTIC SECURITY You can assemble an arsenal of best-in-breed tools that work together. Even smaller purchases can have a large impact.
  • 16. SYMBIOTIC SECURITY IS NOT ¢  A piece of hardware or software you can purchase. ¢  A ranking system for vendors. ¢  A label you can slap on your new product.
  • 17. SYMBIOTIC SECURITY IS ¢  A philosophy on how you evaluate purchases. ¢  A concept for creating an ecosystem of security systems. ¢  A means of making the tools we invest in more valuable to us.
  • 18. BEWARE OF PSEUDO-SYMBIOSIS ¢  Single vendor with multiple product offerings that work together. ¢  Gives symbiotic functionality, but only within that vendors tool set. ¢  True Symbiotic Security is about being able to hand-pick your toolset and have them work together regardless of brand.
  • 19. SECURITY TOOLS And Their Classifications
  • 20. DATA IN SILOS ¢  Reputation data: Do I trust the source? ¢  Attack data: How am I being attacked? ¢  Vulnerability data: What attacks are my systems vulnerable to? ¢  Asset data: What versions of O/S and software am I running? ¢  Identity data: Who is using my systems? ¢  Data classification: Who should have access to what?
  • 21. DATA IN SILOS (CONT) ¢  Trust hierarchy: Who do I trust and who trusts me? ¢  Authentication data: Do I have access? ¢  Authorization data: What can I access? ¢  QA data: What has been tested? ¢  Trust boundaries: Is data crossing between two trust levels?
  • 22. MAGIC HAPPENS ¢  Should I accept packets from random IP X? —  Reputation data —  Attack data —  Vulnerability data —  Asset data —  Trust boundaries
  • 23. MORE MAGIC ¢  Should I allow random person X to download a file Y? —  Data classification —  Reputation data —  Authentication data —  Authorization data —  Trust boundaries
  • 24. EVEN MORE MAGIC ¢  WithSymbiotic Security the possibilities are limited only by the security ecosystem you’ve put in place. —  Creation of WAF rules based on attack data. —  Is a targeted exploit actually going to affect the system? —  Should I allow a system on my network?
  • 25. DEMAND SYMBIOTIC SECURITY ¢  Let vendors know up front that you will be evaluating the effectiveness of their tool based on: 1.  Other tools in your environment their tool can consume data from. 2.  Other tools in your environment their tool can provide data to. 3.  The net increase in security for your entire tool ecosystem and not just their tools siloed functionality.
  • 27. THREADFIX - OVERVIEW ¢  ThreadFixis a software vulnerability aggregation and management system that helps organizations aggregate vulnerability data, generate virtual patches, and interact with software defect tracking systems. ¢  Freely available under the Mozilla Public License (MPL) ¢  Hosted at Google Code: http://code.google.com/p/threadfix/ 27
  • 28. ThreadFix Consolidates reports so managers can speak intelligently about the status and trends of security within their organization 28
  • 29. Vulnerability Import • Pulls in static and dynamic results • Eliminates duplicate results • Allows for results to be grouped 29
  • 30. Real-Time Protection Virtual patching helps protect organizations during remediation 30
  • 31. Defect Tracking • ThreadFix can connect to common defect trackers • Defects can be created for developers Integration • Work can continue uninterrupted 31
  • 32. THREADFIX - SYMBIOTIC ¢  Vendor-independent ¢  Ability to consume multiple technologies (SAST, DAST, IDS/IPS, WAF) ¢  Ability to produce output that can be consumed by other tools (RESTful API) ¢  Mapping vulnerability data with operational data in a bi-directional way ¢  Prioritization based on actual attack data rather than suppositions
  • 33. SUBSET OF SECURITY TOOL INTERACTIONS
  • 34. DEMO
  • 35. VENDORS: PLEASE SUCK LESS ¢  ThreadFix was created to solve a problem that security tool vendors have created. —  Proprietary protocols —  Lack of APIs —  Lack of standards —  Play nice! ¢  Some have been very helpful —  File format info —  Beta testing —  And so on
  • 36. YOU KNOW WHAT WOULD MAKE ALL THIS WAY EASIER? ¢  Common data standards! —  Scanning tools —  Event logs —  And so on… ¢  Current efforts: —  MITRE Software Assurance Findings Expression Schema (SAFES) ¢  http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/ 2012/11_3671/ —  OWASP Data Exchange Format Project ¢  https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ OWASP_Data_Exchange_Format_Project 36
  • 37. SIMPLE SOFTWARE VULNERABILITY LANGUAGE (SSVL) ¢  Common way to represent static and dynamic scanner findings ¢  Based on our experience building importers for ThreadFix —  It “works” for real-world applications because we are essentially using it ¢  Love to hear feedback —  Send me a request and I can share the document for editing/annotation ¢  Online: —  https://docs.google.com/document/d/ 1H5hWUdj925TtoZ7ZvnfHdFABe7hBCGuZtLUas29yBGI/ edit?pli=1 —  Or http://tinyurl.com/cslqv47 37
  • 39. VENDORS WIN TOO ¢  Industry vetted standards for communication ¢  Niche products with enterprise functionality ¢  Maximize R&D time and money ¢  Vendors can excel where it matters the most
  • 40. IDEAS TO FURTHER THE CAUSE ¢  Speak with Gartner about adding symbiotic characteristics to their evaluation criteria. ¢  Create a list of tools with symbiotic characteristics.
  • 41. HELP US HELP THE COMMUNITY ¢  http://www.symbioticsecurity.com/
  • 42. QUESTIONS Josh Sokol Dan Cornell josh.sokol@ni.com dan@denimgroup.com Twitter: @joshsokol Twitter: @danielcornell www.joshsokol.com www.denimgroup.com www.webadminblog.com www.denimgroup.com/ threadfix code.google.com/p/ threadfix (210) 572-4400 42