SlideShare une entreprise Scribd logo
1  sur  31
Télécharger pour lire hors ligne
Top Strategies to Capture Security
            Intelligence for Applications
            John B. Dickson, CISSP
            Denim Group, Ltd.




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved
John Dickson
  • Principal of Denim Group
  • 15-year information security consultant
    background
  • Ex-Air Force security analyst at AFCERT
  • Trident Data Systems, KPMG, SecureLogix,
    and Denim Group information security
    consultant
  • Works with CIO’ s and CSO’s to build
    successful software security initiatives
  • Educates non-developer security professionals
    how to manage application risk




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved   1
Denim Group Background
 • Professional services firm that builds & secures enterprise applications
         – External application assessments
                  • Web, mobile, and cloud
         – Software development lifecycle development (SDLC) consulting
 • Classroom and e-Learning for PCI compliance
 • Secure development services:
         – Secure .NET and Java application development
         – Post-assessment remediation
 • Deep penetration in Financial Services, Banking, Insurance,
   Healthcare and Defense market sectors
 • Customer base spans Fortune 500
 • Contributes to industry best practices through the Open Web
   Application Security Project (OWASP)

© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                            2
Overview

 •     Today’s network security intelligence
 •     The target of choice – applications
 •     In application defenses
 •     Application logging blocking and tackling
 •     WAF’s and application IDS
 •     Virtual patching for web applications
 •     Conclusion




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved   3
Today’s Network Security Intelligence
  • Key information from security-related events in the organization can
    be collected
           – The broader range the better
           – A variety of key security events on a multitude of devices
                   • Firewalls
                   • Remote access servers
                   • Critical servers (e.g., active directory)
  • Correlation and analysis capabilities are also mature
           – Context important to analysis
  • Network and server logging market maturing
           – Marketplace includes Security Event Managers (SEM), Security Information and
             Event Managers (SIEM), and Advanced Logging Products
           – May address certain compliance requirements like Sarbanes-Oxley




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                          4
Today’s Network Security Intelligence



                                                     The very crowded
                                                     SIEM market




                                                     Source: Gartner Group, Magic Quadrant for
                                                     Security Information and Management, May 2012




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                                   5
Today’s Network Security Intelligence
  • What do network defenders really need?
           – What, when, where, and how an event occurred
           – In a format that is external to the system or the application that created it
           – In a predictable format that is straightforward to import to SIEMs




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                           6
The target of choice – applications

  • App level breaches accounted for 10% of breaches overall, but 54%
    for large organizations
  • Only 20% of all organizations were in compliance with PCI DSS
    Requirement 6
           – Develop and maintain secure systems and applications
  • Only 57% of large organizations were compliant with the PCI DSS
    Requirement 6
  • The average number of days a website was exposed to at least one
    serious vulnerability is 231 days
  • XSS was found in 55% of websites in 2011
                                                     Sources: Verizon Business System, 2012 Breach
                                                     Report and WhiteHat Security Report




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                                   7
Application Vulnerability – Injection
                                   #1 in OWASP Top 10

 • “Getting into” a file system or database used to imply establishing a
   root session or a direct SQL connection

 • By exploiting applications, attackers can accomplish their goals
   without such direct access
         – The whole system trusts the application
         – Attackers will try to leverage that trust




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                         8
With normal input
 User Name:                  johndoe
 Password:                   myBirthday

 SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE USERNAME='johndoe' AND
 PASSWORD='myBirthday'




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved   9
With malicious input
 User Name: johndoe
 Password:   '; DROP DATABASE; --

 SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE USERNAME='johndoe' AND PASSWORD=' ';
 DROP DATABASE; -- '




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                10
What Is It?

    •     Occurs when unfiltered user inputs are combined
          with static text and then sent to an interpreter.
    •     The interpreter then executes commands of the
          attackers choosing rather than the commands
          specified in the application.
    •     Very common application security flaw with potentially
          disastrous security implications.
    • We will focus on SQL injection because it is the
      most common.
    •     Other common injection flaws include OS Command,
          XML, and LDAP.



© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                 11
In application defenses

  • A chasm exists between the development and operations/security
    communities
           – DevOps and Rugged Software Development changing that gap
  • Most software developers don’t build enterprise software with
    security in mind
           – Outside the largest banks and financial institutions, the security of software is
             less important (vs. features and functionality)
  • Most defensive coding focused on filtering malicious inputs
           – Very little focus on the fidelity of application logging to enhance security response
  • Most logging done to capture software debugging info
           – Developers want to understand how an application failed
           – Enhanced security information rarely a requirement for logging




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                                   12
The very real state of in application defenses


  • Example application log #1




  logger.warn("Caught exception " + e);
  e.printStackTrace();




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved   13
The very real state of in application defenses
  • Example application log #2



  logger.info("Failed login for user " + username + "
  with password '" + password + "'");




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved      14
The very real state of in application defenses
  • Example application log #3



  logger.info("Order placed with credit card number "
  + creditCardNumber);




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved      15
The very real state of in application defenses
  • What did we learn from these examples?
           – Developers might log information that actually creates more security
             headaches
           – Developers might not log information that is needed to analyze an attack
           – Developers might not log key security events in a human readable format
           – Developers might log information that is not in a format that is easily
             consumable by a SIEM (i.e., structured data)
           – Developers rarely ask security operations analysts
             for input on the types of logging needed
           – Developers rarely worry about the need to conduct
             trusted logging




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                      16
Application logging blocking and tackling

 • Security operators must inject themselves into the design phase of
   development projects to articulate security event logging
   requirement.
 • Security operators need to better understand application-layer
   information and how it can help them better identify security events.
 • Developers need to increase the fidelity of the security event
   information the do send to logs.




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                         17
Application logging blocking and tackling

 • Increasing the fidelity of security event logging – HOW?
 • Need to focus on:
         –     What
         –     When
         –     Where
         –     How
 • Key events to log:
         – Authentication
         – Authorization
         – Access
                                                     Source: “How to Do Application Logging Right,”
                                                     Chuvakin, Anton, and Peterson, Gunnar.




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                                    18
Which events to log
 •     Input validation failures
 •     Output validation failures
 •     Authentication successes and failures
 •     Authorization failures
 •     Session management failures
 •     Application errors and system events
 •     Application and related systems start-ups and shut-downs
 •     Use of higher-risk functionality
 •     Legal and other opt-ins

                                                     Source: OWASP Application Logging Cheat Sheet


© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                                   19
Which events attributes to log
 •     Log date and time
 •     Event date and time
 •     Interaction identifier
 •     Application address
 •     Service
 •     Window/form/page
 •     Code location
 •     Source
 •     User ID
 •     Type of event
                                                     Source: OWASP Application Logging Cheat Sheet


© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                                   20
Which events never to log
 •     Passwords
 •     Sensitive system attributes
 •     Source code
 •     Session identification values
 •     Sensitive business information
 •     Patient information (EPI)
 •     Bank account or payment card holder data
 •     HR, Payroll, M&A data or anything generally more sensitive than logs



                                                     Source: OWASP Application Logging Cheat Sheet


© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                                   21
Application logging blocking and tackling
  • Example application log #4



  logger.debug("Failed login for user: " +
  logEscape(username));




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved   22
Application logging blocking and tackling
  • Example application log #5



  logger.warn("User " + logEscape(username) + "
  attempted to access document id " +
  logEscape(documentId) + " without sufficient
  permissions");
  ;



© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved   23
WAF’s and application IDS
 • Broad set of technologies that enable enhanced application-layer
   logging
 • Provide insight into Port 90/443 where most firewall don’t have info
 • Can block certain attack patterns at the application layer
 • Most WAF’s in production are not set in blocking mode
 • Block obvious web application vulnerabilities like XSS & SQL Injection
         – Less effective on business logic or authorization rules




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                          24
AppSensor
 • A conceptual framework that offers guidance to implement intrusion
   detection capabilities into existing application
 • Utilizes standard security controls and recommendations for
   automated response policies based upon detected behavior.
 • Identifies malicious users within the application and eliminate the
   threat by taking response actions.




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                       25
AppSensor

 • An attacker often requires numerous probes and attack attempts in
   order to locate an exploitable vulnerability within the application.
 • By using AppSensor, it is possible to identify and eliminate the threat
   of an attacker before they are able to successfully identify an
   exploitable flaw.




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                           26
AppSensor

 • Behavior examples (~50)

         –     2 Detection Points 2.1 RequestException
         –     2.1.1 RE1: Unexpected HTTP Command
         –     2.1.2 RE2: Attempt to Invoke Unsupported HTTP Method
         –     2.1.3 RE3: GET When Expecting POST
         –     2.1.4 RE4: POST When Expecting GET
         –     2.1.5 RE5: Additional/Duplicated Data in Request
         –     2.1.6 RE6: Data Missing from Request
         –     2.1.7 RE7: Unexpected Quantity of Characters in Parameter
         –     2.1.8 RE8: Unexpected Type of Characters in Parameter



© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                         27
Virtual patching for web applications

  • Receives vulnerabilities from application vulnerability scanners
           – Dynamic or static analysis (source code) reviews
  • Creates “virtual patches” that are sent to WAFs and block a URL
           – Mod Security
           – F5
           – Imperva
  • Ecosystems being created to facilitate this process via certain open
    source tools
           – ThreadFix – Application vulnerability aggregation and management system
  • Enable defenders to block a vulnerable web page/application while
    developers are remediating source code




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                     28
References

  • “How to Do Application Logging Right,” Chuvakin, Anton, and
    Peterson, Gunnar
           –    http://arctecgroup.net/pdf/howtoapplogging.pdf
  • From White Hat Website Security Statistics Report
           –    https://www.whitehatsec.com/assets/WPstats_summer12_12th.pdf
  • “Magic Quadrant for Security Information and Event Management,”
    Garter Group, May 2012
           –    http://www.gartner.com/technology/reprints.do?id=1-
                1AOG9W9&ct=120529&st=sb&elq=51f9879c322f4bc8b964591857bdafa1
  • 2012 Verizon Breach Report
  • App Sensor Project, Open Web Application Security Project
           –    https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_AppSensor_Project




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                             29
Contact Info
 John Dickson, CISSP & Principal
 (210) 572-4400
 john@denimgroup.com

 Twitter: @johnbdickson




© Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved   30

Contenu connexe

Tendances

What Permissions Does Your Database User REALLY Need?
What Permissions Does Your Database User REALLY Need?What Permissions Does Your Database User REALLY Need?
What Permissions Does Your Database User REALLY Need?Denim Group
 
Social Networks and Security: What Your Teenager Likely Won't Tell You
Social Networks and Security: What Your Teenager Likely Won't Tell YouSocial Networks and Security: What Your Teenager Likely Won't Tell You
Social Networks and Security: What Your Teenager Likely Won't Tell YouDenim Group
 
The Need For Open Software Security Standards In A Mobile And Cloudy World
The Need For Open Software Security Standards In A Mobile And Cloudy WorldThe Need For Open Software Security Standards In A Mobile And Cloudy World
The Need For Open Software Security Standards In A Mobile And Cloudy WorldDenim Group
 
Software Security: Is OK Good Enough? OWASP AppSec USA 2011
Software Security: Is OK Good Enough? OWASP AppSec USA 2011Software Security: Is OK Good Enough? OWASP AppSec USA 2011
Software Security: Is OK Good Enough? OWASP AppSec USA 2011Denim Group
 
Monitoring Attack Surface to Secure DevOps Pipelines
Monitoring Attack Surface to Secure DevOps PipelinesMonitoring Attack Surface to Secure DevOps Pipelines
Monitoring Attack Surface to Secure DevOps PipelinesDenim Group
 
Building a Mobile Security Program
Building a Mobile Security ProgramBuilding a Mobile Security Program
Building a Mobile Security ProgramDenim Group
 
Building Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSA
Building Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSABuilding Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSA
Building Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSADenim Group
 
ThreadFix 2.4: Maximizing the Impact of Your Application Security Resources
ThreadFix 2.4: Maximizing the Impact of Your Application Security ResourcesThreadFix 2.4: Maximizing the Impact of Your Application Security Resources
ThreadFix 2.4: Maximizing the Impact of Your Application Security ResourcesDenim Group
 
Do You Have a Scanner or Do You Have a Scanning Program? (AppSecEU 2013)
Do You Have a Scanner or Do You Have a Scanning Program? (AppSecEU 2013)Do You Have a Scanner or Do You Have a Scanning Program? (AppSecEU 2013)
Do You Have a Scanner or Do You Have a Scanning Program? (AppSecEU 2013)Denim Group
 
ThreadFix 2.2 Preview Webinar with Dan Cornell
ThreadFix 2.2 Preview Webinar with Dan CornellThreadFix 2.2 Preview Webinar with Dan Cornell
ThreadFix 2.2 Preview Webinar with Dan CornellDenim Group
 
The ThreadFix Ecosystem: Vendors, Volunteers, and Versions
The ThreadFix Ecosystem: Vendors, Volunteers, and VersionsThe ThreadFix Ecosystem: Vendors, Volunteers, and Versions
The ThreadFix Ecosystem: Vendors, Volunteers, and VersionsDenim Group
 
SecDevOps: Development Tools for Security Pros
SecDevOps: Development Tools for Security ProsSecDevOps: Development Tools for Security Pros
SecDevOps: Development Tools for Security ProsDenim Group
 
Managing Your Application Security Program with the ThreadFix Ecosystem
Managing Your Application Security Program with the ThreadFix EcosystemManaging Your Application Security Program with the ThreadFix Ecosystem
Managing Your Application Security Program with the ThreadFix EcosystemDenim Group
 
Thread Fix Tour Presentation Final Final
Thread Fix Tour Presentation Final FinalThread Fix Tour Presentation Final Final
Thread Fix Tour Presentation Final FinalRobin Lutchansky
 
Running a Software Security Program with Open Source Tools
Running a Software Security Program with Open Source ToolsRunning a Software Security Program with Open Source Tools
Running a Software Security Program with Open Source ToolsDenim Group
 
Developing Secure Mobile Applications
Developing Secure Mobile ApplicationsDeveloping Secure Mobile Applications
Developing Secure Mobile ApplicationsDenim Group
 
ThreadFix 2.1 and Your Application Security Program
ThreadFix 2.1 and Your Application Security ProgramThreadFix 2.1 and Your Application Security Program
ThreadFix 2.1 and Your Application Security ProgramDenim Group
 
RSA 2015 Blending the Automated and the Manual: Making Application Vulnerabil...
RSA 2015 Blending the Automated and the Manual: Making Application Vulnerabil...RSA 2015 Blending the Automated and the Manual: Making Application Vulnerabil...
RSA 2015 Blending the Automated and the Manual: Making Application Vulnerabil...Denim Group
 
Using ThreadFix to Manage Application Vulnerabilities
Using ThreadFix to Manage Application VulnerabilitiesUsing ThreadFix to Manage Application Vulnerabilities
Using ThreadFix to Manage Application VulnerabilitiesDenim Group
 
Hybrid Analysis Mapping: Making Security and Development Tools Play Nice Toge...
Hybrid Analysis Mapping: Making Security and Development Tools Play Nice Toge...Hybrid Analysis Mapping: Making Security and Development Tools Play Nice Toge...
Hybrid Analysis Mapping: Making Security and Development Tools Play Nice Toge...Denim Group
 

Tendances (20)

What Permissions Does Your Database User REALLY Need?
What Permissions Does Your Database User REALLY Need?What Permissions Does Your Database User REALLY Need?
What Permissions Does Your Database User REALLY Need?
 
Social Networks and Security: What Your Teenager Likely Won't Tell You
Social Networks and Security: What Your Teenager Likely Won't Tell YouSocial Networks and Security: What Your Teenager Likely Won't Tell You
Social Networks and Security: What Your Teenager Likely Won't Tell You
 
The Need For Open Software Security Standards In A Mobile And Cloudy World
The Need For Open Software Security Standards In A Mobile And Cloudy WorldThe Need For Open Software Security Standards In A Mobile And Cloudy World
The Need For Open Software Security Standards In A Mobile And Cloudy World
 
Software Security: Is OK Good Enough? OWASP AppSec USA 2011
Software Security: Is OK Good Enough? OWASP AppSec USA 2011Software Security: Is OK Good Enough? OWASP AppSec USA 2011
Software Security: Is OK Good Enough? OWASP AppSec USA 2011
 
Monitoring Attack Surface to Secure DevOps Pipelines
Monitoring Attack Surface to Secure DevOps PipelinesMonitoring Attack Surface to Secure DevOps Pipelines
Monitoring Attack Surface to Secure DevOps Pipelines
 
Building a Mobile Security Program
Building a Mobile Security ProgramBuilding a Mobile Security Program
Building a Mobile Security Program
 
Building Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSA
Building Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSABuilding Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSA
Building Your Application Security Data Hub - OWASP AppSecUSA
 
ThreadFix 2.4: Maximizing the Impact of Your Application Security Resources
ThreadFix 2.4: Maximizing the Impact of Your Application Security ResourcesThreadFix 2.4: Maximizing the Impact of Your Application Security Resources
ThreadFix 2.4: Maximizing the Impact of Your Application Security Resources
 
Do You Have a Scanner or Do You Have a Scanning Program? (AppSecEU 2013)
Do You Have a Scanner or Do You Have a Scanning Program? (AppSecEU 2013)Do You Have a Scanner or Do You Have a Scanning Program? (AppSecEU 2013)
Do You Have a Scanner or Do You Have a Scanning Program? (AppSecEU 2013)
 
ThreadFix 2.2 Preview Webinar with Dan Cornell
ThreadFix 2.2 Preview Webinar with Dan CornellThreadFix 2.2 Preview Webinar with Dan Cornell
ThreadFix 2.2 Preview Webinar with Dan Cornell
 
The ThreadFix Ecosystem: Vendors, Volunteers, and Versions
The ThreadFix Ecosystem: Vendors, Volunteers, and VersionsThe ThreadFix Ecosystem: Vendors, Volunteers, and Versions
The ThreadFix Ecosystem: Vendors, Volunteers, and Versions
 
SecDevOps: Development Tools for Security Pros
SecDevOps: Development Tools for Security ProsSecDevOps: Development Tools for Security Pros
SecDevOps: Development Tools for Security Pros
 
Managing Your Application Security Program with the ThreadFix Ecosystem
Managing Your Application Security Program with the ThreadFix EcosystemManaging Your Application Security Program with the ThreadFix Ecosystem
Managing Your Application Security Program with the ThreadFix Ecosystem
 
Thread Fix Tour Presentation Final Final
Thread Fix Tour Presentation Final FinalThread Fix Tour Presentation Final Final
Thread Fix Tour Presentation Final Final
 
Running a Software Security Program with Open Source Tools
Running a Software Security Program with Open Source ToolsRunning a Software Security Program with Open Source Tools
Running a Software Security Program with Open Source Tools
 
Developing Secure Mobile Applications
Developing Secure Mobile ApplicationsDeveloping Secure Mobile Applications
Developing Secure Mobile Applications
 
ThreadFix 2.1 and Your Application Security Program
ThreadFix 2.1 and Your Application Security ProgramThreadFix 2.1 and Your Application Security Program
ThreadFix 2.1 and Your Application Security Program
 
RSA 2015 Blending the Automated and the Manual: Making Application Vulnerabil...
RSA 2015 Blending the Automated and the Manual: Making Application Vulnerabil...RSA 2015 Blending the Automated and the Manual: Making Application Vulnerabil...
RSA 2015 Blending the Automated and the Manual: Making Application Vulnerabil...
 
Using ThreadFix to Manage Application Vulnerabilities
Using ThreadFix to Manage Application VulnerabilitiesUsing ThreadFix to Manage Application Vulnerabilities
Using ThreadFix to Manage Application Vulnerabilities
 
Hybrid Analysis Mapping: Making Security and Development Tools Play Nice Toge...
Hybrid Analysis Mapping: Making Security and Development Tools Play Nice Toge...Hybrid Analysis Mapping: Making Security and Development Tools Play Nice Toge...
Hybrid Analysis Mapping: Making Security and Development Tools Play Nice Toge...
 

Similaire à Top Strategies to Capture Security Intelligence for Applications

Skeletons in the Closet: Securing Inherited Applications
Skeletons in the Closet: Securing Inherited ApplicationsSkeletons in the Closet: Securing Inherited Applications
Skeletons in the Closet: Securing Inherited ApplicationsDenim Group
 
From SIEM to SA: The Path Forward
From SIEM to SA: The Path ForwardFrom SIEM to SA: The Path Forward
From SIEM to SA: The Path ForwardEMC
 
Jump Start Your Application Security Knowledge
Jump Start Your Application Security KnowledgeJump Start Your Application Security Knowledge
Jump Start Your Application Security KnowledgeDenim Group
 
Application Security Done Right
Application Security Done RightApplication Security Done Right
Application Security Done Rightpvanwoud
 
CIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile World
CIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile WorldCIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile World
CIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile WorldiMIS
 
CIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile World
CIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile WorldCIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile World
CIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile WorldiMIS
 
Threat Modeling for System Builders and System Breakers - Dan Cornell of Deni...
Threat Modeling for System Builders and System Breakers - Dan Cornell of Deni...Threat Modeling for System Builders and System Breakers - Dan Cornell of Deni...
Threat Modeling for System Builders and System Breakers - Dan Cornell of Deni...Denim Group
 
Key Resources - z/Assure Sales Presentation
Key Resources - z/Assure Sales PresentationKey Resources - z/Assure Sales Presentation
Key Resources - z/Assure Sales Presentationrfragola
 
Mobile Application Security Code Reviews
Mobile Application Security Code ReviewsMobile Application Security Code Reviews
Mobile Application Security Code ReviewsDenim Group
 
Migrating Critical Applications to the Cloud - isaca seattle - sanitized
Migrating Critical Applications to the Cloud - isaca seattle - sanitizedMigrating Critical Applications to the Cloud - isaca seattle - sanitized
Migrating Critical Applications to the Cloud - isaca seattle - sanitizedUnifyCloud
 
Migrating Critical Applications To The Cloud - ISACA Seattle - Sanitized
Migrating Critical Applications To The Cloud - ISACA Seattle - SanitizedMigrating Critical Applications To The Cloud - ISACA Seattle - Sanitized
Migrating Critical Applications To The Cloud - ISACA Seattle - SanitizedNorm Barber
 
Reducing Attack Surface in Budget Constrained Environments
Reducing Attack Surface in Budget Constrained EnvironmentsReducing Attack Surface in Budget Constrained Environments
Reducing Attack Surface in Budget Constrained EnvironmentsDenim Group
 
The Permanent Campaign
The Permanent CampaignThe Permanent Campaign
The Permanent CampaignDenim Group
 
The Permanent Campaign: Driving a Secure Software Initiative in the Enterprise
The Permanent Campaign: Driving a Secure Software Initiative in the EnterpriseThe Permanent Campaign: Driving a Secure Software Initiative in the Enterprise
The Permanent Campaign: Driving a Secure Software Initiative in the EnterpriseDenim Group
 
Protecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomware
Protecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomwareProtecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomware
Protecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomwareCloudera, Inc.
 
Using 80 20 rule in application security management
Using 80 20 rule in application security managementUsing 80 20 rule in application security management
Using 80 20 rule in application security managementDaveEdwards12
 
Oracle ADF Architecture TV - Design - Designing for Security
Oracle ADF Architecture TV - Design - Designing for SecurityOracle ADF Architecture TV - Design - Designing for Security
Oracle ADF Architecture TV - Design - Designing for SecurityChris Muir
 

Similaire à Top Strategies to Capture Security Intelligence for Applications (20)

Skeletons in the Closet: Securing Inherited Applications
Skeletons in the Closet: Securing Inherited ApplicationsSkeletons in the Closet: Securing Inherited Applications
Skeletons in the Closet: Securing Inherited Applications
 
From SIEM to SA: The Path Forward
From SIEM to SA: The Path ForwardFrom SIEM to SA: The Path Forward
From SIEM to SA: The Path Forward
 
Jump Start Your Application Security Knowledge
Jump Start Your Application Security KnowledgeJump Start Your Application Security Knowledge
Jump Start Your Application Security Knowledge
 
Web Application Security: Beyond PEN Testing
Web Application Security: Beyond PEN TestingWeb Application Security: Beyond PEN Testing
Web Application Security: Beyond PEN Testing
 
Application Security Done Right
Application Security Done RightApplication Security Done Right
Application Security Done Right
 
Application Hackers Have A Handbook. Why Shouldn't You?
Application Hackers Have A Handbook. Why Shouldn't You?Application Hackers Have A Handbook. Why Shouldn't You?
Application Hackers Have A Handbook. Why Shouldn't You?
 
CIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile World
CIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile WorldCIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile World
CIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile World
 
CIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile World
CIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile WorldCIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile World
CIO Summit: Data Security in a Mobile World
 
Threat Modeling for System Builders and System Breakers - Dan Cornell of Deni...
Threat Modeling for System Builders and System Breakers - Dan Cornell of Deni...Threat Modeling for System Builders and System Breakers - Dan Cornell of Deni...
Threat Modeling for System Builders and System Breakers - Dan Cornell of Deni...
 
Secure Iowa Oct 2016
Secure Iowa Oct 2016Secure Iowa Oct 2016
Secure Iowa Oct 2016
 
Key Resources - z/Assure Sales Presentation
Key Resources - z/Assure Sales PresentationKey Resources - z/Assure Sales Presentation
Key Resources - z/Assure Sales Presentation
 
Mobile Application Security Code Reviews
Mobile Application Security Code ReviewsMobile Application Security Code Reviews
Mobile Application Security Code Reviews
 
Migrating Critical Applications to the Cloud - isaca seattle - sanitized
Migrating Critical Applications to the Cloud - isaca seattle - sanitizedMigrating Critical Applications to the Cloud - isaca seattle - sanitized
Migrating Critical Applications to the Cloud - isaca seattle - sanitized
 
Migrating Critical Applications To The Cloud - ISACA Seattle - Sanitized
Migrating Critical Applications To The Cloud - ISACA Seattle - SanitizedMigrating Critical Applications To The Cloud - ISACA Seattle - Sanitized
Migrating Critical Applications To The Cloud - ISACA Seattle - Sanitized
 
Reducing Attack Surface in Budget Constrained Environments
Reducing Attack Surface in Budget Constrained EnvironmentsReducing Attack Surface in Budget Constrained Environments
Reducing Attack Surface in Budget Constrained Environments
 
The Permanent Campaign
The Permanent CampaignThe Permanent Campaign
The Permanent Campaign
 
The Permanent Campaign: Driving a Secure Software Initiative in the Enterprise
The Permanent Campaign: Driving a Secure Software Initiative in the EnterpriseThe Permanent Campaign: Driving a Secure Software Initiative in the Enterprise
The Permanent Campaign: Driving a Secure Software Initiative in the Enterprise
 
Protecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomware
Protecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomwareProtecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomware
Protecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomware
 
Using 80 20 rule in application security management
Using 80 20 rule in application security managementUsing 80 20 rule in application security management
Using 80 20 rule in application security management
 
Oracle ADF Architecture TV - Design - Designing for Security
Oracle ADF Architecture TV - Design - Designing for SecurityOracle ADF Architecture TV - Design - Designing for Security
Oracle ADF Architecture TV - Design - Designing for Security
 

Plus de Denim Group

Long-term Impact of Log4J
Long-term Impact of Log4JLong-term Impact of Log4J
Long-term Impact of Log4JDenim Group
 
Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...
Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...
Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...Denim Group
 
Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...
Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...
Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...Denim Group
 
Optimizing Security Velocity in Your DevSecOps Pipeline at Scale
Optimizing Security Velocity in Your DevSecOps Pipeline at ScaleOptimizing Security Velocity in Your DevSecOps Pipeline at Scale
Optimizing Security Velocity in Your DevSecOps Pipeline at ScaleDenim Group
 
Application Asset Management with ThreadFix
 Application Asset Management with ThreadFix Application Asset Management with ThreadFix
Application Asset Management with ThreadFixDenim Group
 
OWASP San Antonio Meeting 10/2/20
OWASP San Antonio Meeting 10/2/20OWASP San Antonio Meeting 10/2/20
OWASP San Antonio Meeting 10/2/20Denim Group
 
AppSec Fast and Slow: Your DevSecOps CI/CD Pipeline Isn’t an SSA Program
AppSec Fast and Slow: Your DevSecOps CI/CD Pipeline Isn’t an SSA ProgramAppSec Fast and Slow: Your DevSecOps CI/CD Pipeline Isn’t an SSA Program
AppSec Fast and Slow: Your DevSecOps CI/CD Pipeline Isn’t an SSA ProgramDenim Group
 
Using Collaboration to Make Application Vulnerability Management a Team Sport
Using Collaboration to Make Application Vulnerability Management a Team SportUsing Collaboration to Make Application Vulnerability Management a Team Sport
Using Collaboration to Make Application Vulnerability Management a Team SportDenim Group
 
Managing Penetration Testing Programs and Vulnerability Time to Live with Thr...
Managing Penetration Testing Programs and Vulnerability Time to Live with Thr...Managing Penetration Testing Programs and Vulnerability Time to Live with Thr...
Managing Penetration Testing Programs and Vulnerability Time to Live with Thr...Denim Group
 
Security Champions: Pushing Security Expertise to the Edges of Your Organization
Security Champions: Pushing Security Expertise to the Edges of Your OrganizationSecurity Champions: Pushing Security Expertise to the Edges of Your Organization
Security Champions: Pushing Security Expertise to the Edges of Your OrganizationDenim Group
 
The As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native Applications
The As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native ApplicationsThe As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native Applications
The As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native ApplicationsDenim Group
 
An Updated Take: Threat Modeling for IoT Systems
An Updated Take: Threat Modeling for IoT SystemsAn Updated Take: Threat Modeling for IoT Systems
An Updated Take: Threat Modeling for IoT SystemsDenim Group
 
Continuous Authority to Operate (ATO) with ThreadFix – Bringing Commercial In...
Continuous Authority to Operate (ATO) with ThreadFix – Bringing Commercial In...Continuous Authority to Operate (ATO) with ThreadFix – Bringing Commercial In...
Continuous Authority to Operate (ATO) with ThreadFix – Bringing Commercial In...Denim Group
 
A New View of Your Application Security Program with Snyk and ThreadFix
A New View of Your Application Security Program with Snyk and ThreadFixA New View of Your Application Security Program with Snyk and ThreadFix
A New View of Your Application Security Program with Snyk and ThreadFixDenim Group
 
Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...
Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...
Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...Denim Group
 
AppSec in a World of Digital Transformation
AppSec in a World of Digital TransformationAppSec in a World of Digital Transformation
AppSec in a World of Digital TransformationDenim Group
 
The As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native Applications
The As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native ApplicationsThe As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native Applications
The As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native ApplicationsDenim Group
 
Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...
Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...
Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...Denim Group
 
AppSec in a World of Digital Transformation
 AppSec in a World of Digital Transformation AppSec in a World of Digital Transformation
AppSec in a World of Digital TransformationDenim Group
 
Enumerating Enterprise Attack Surface
Enumerating Enterprise Attack SurfaceEnumerating Enterprise Attack Surface
Enumerating Enterprise Attack SurfaceDenim Group
 

Plus de Denim Group (20)

Long-term Impact of Log4J
Long-term Impact of Log4JLong-term Impact of Log4J
Long-term Impact of Log4J
 
Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...
Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...
Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...
 
Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...
Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...
Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Software Supply Chain Security ...
 
Optimizing Security Velocity in Your DevSecOps Pipeline at Scale
Optimizing Security Velocity in Your DevSecOps Pipeline at ScaleOptimizing Security Velocity in Your DevSecOps Pipeline at Scale
Optimizing Security Velocity in Your DevSecOps Pipeline at Scale
 
Application Asset Management with ThreadFix
 Application Asset Management with ThreadFix Application Asset Management with ThreadFix
Application Asset Management with ThreadFix
 
OWASP San Antonio Meeting 10/2/20
OWASP San Antonio Meeting 10/2/20OWASP San Antonio Meeting 10/2/20
OWASP San Antonio Meeting 10/2/20
 
AppSec Fast and Slow: Your DevSecOps CI/CD Pipeline Isn’t an SSA Program
AppSec Fast and Slow: Your DevSecOps CI/CD Pipeline Isn’t an SSA ProgramAppSec Fast and Slow: Your DevSecOps CI/CD Pipeline Isn’t an SSA Program
AppSec Fast and Slow: Your DevSecOps CI/CD Pipeline Isn’t an SSA Program
 
Using Collaboration to Make Application Vulnerability Management a Team Sport
Using Collaboration to Make Application Vulnerability Management a Team SportUsing Collaboration to Make Application Vulnerability Management a Team Sport
Using Collaboration to Make Application Vulnerability Management a Team Sport
 
Managing Penetration Testing Programs and Vulnerability Time to Live with Thr...
Managing Penetration Testing Programs and Vulnerability Time to Live with Thr...Managing Penetration Testing Programs and Vulnerability Time to Live with Thr...
Managing Penetration Testing Programs and Vulnerability Time to Live with Thr...
 
Security Champions: Pushing Security Expertise to the Edges of Your Organization
Security Champions: Pushing Security Expertise to the Edges of Your OrganizationSecurity Champions: Pushing Security Expertise to the Edges of Your Organization
Security Champions: Pushing Security Expertise to the Edges of Your Organization
 
The As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native Applications
The As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native ApplicationsThe As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native Applications
The As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native Applications
 
An Updated Take: Threat Modeling for IoT Systems
An Updated Take: Threat Modeling for IoT SystemsAn Updated Take: Threat Modeling for IoT Systems
An Updated Take: Threat Modeling for IoT Systems
 
Continuous Authority to Operate (ATO) with ThreadFix – Bringing Commercial In...
Continuous Authority to Operate (ATO) with ThreadFix – Bringing Commercial In...Continuous Authority to Operate (ATO) with ThreadFix – Bringing Commercial In...
Continuous Authority to Operate (ATO) with ThreadFix – Bringing Commercial In...
 
A New View of Your Application Security Program with Snyk and ThreadFix
A New View of Your Application Security Program with Snyk and ThreadFixA New View of Your Application Security Program with Snyk and ThreadFix
A New View of Your Application Security Program with Snyk and ThreadFix
 
Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...
Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...
Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...
 
AppSec in a World of Digital Transformation
AppSec in a World of Digital TransformationAppSec in a World of Digital Transformation
AppSec in a World of Digital Transformation
 
The As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native Applications
The As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native ApplicationsThe As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native Applications
The As, Bs, and Four Cs of Testing Cloud-Native Applications
 
Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...
Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...
Enabling Developers in Your Application Security Program With Coverity and Th...
 
AppSec in a World of Digital Transformation
 AppSec in a World of Digital Transformation AppSec in a World of Digital Transformation
AppSec in a World of Digital Transformation
 
Enumerating Enterprise Attack Surface
Enumerating Enterprise Attack SurfaceEnumerating Enterprise Attack Surface
Enumerating Enterprise Attack Surface
 

Dernier

Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountPuma Security, LLC
 
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdfhans926745
 
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...Patryk Bandurski
 
Pigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping Elbows
Pigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping ElbowsPigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping Elbows
Pigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping ElbowsPigging Solutions
 
Key Features Of Token Development (1).pptx
Key  Features Of Token  Development (1).pptxKey  Features Of Token  Development (1).pptx
Key Features Of Token Development (1).pptxLBM Solutions
 
Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...
Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...
Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...Alan Dix
 
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...HostedbyConfluent
 
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesUnblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesSinan KOZAK
 
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Allon Mureinik
 
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationGenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationMichael W. Hawkins
 
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...shyamraj55
 
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 PresentationMy Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 PresentationRidwan Fadjar
 
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with NanonetsHow to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonetsnaman860154
 
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmaticsKotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmaticscarlostorres15106
 
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptxThe Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptxMalak Abu Hammad
 
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101Paola De la Torre
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsMark Billinghurst
 
Maximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptx
Maximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptxMaximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptx
Maximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptxOnBoard
 
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsIAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsEnterprise Knowledge
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)Gabriella Davis
 

Dernier (20)

Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
 
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
 
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
 
Pigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping Elbows
Pigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping ElbowsPigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping Elbows
Pigging Solutions Piggable Sweeping Elbows
 
Key Features Of Token Development (1).pptx
Key  Features Of Token  Development (1).pptxKey  Features Of Token  Development (1).pptx
Key Features Of Token Development (1).pptx
 
Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...
Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...
Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...
 
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
 
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesUnblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
 
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
 
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationGenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
 
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
 
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 PresentationMy Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
 
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with NanonetsHow to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
 
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmaticsKotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
 
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptxThe Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
 
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
 
Maximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptx
Maximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptxMaximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptx
Maximizing Board Effectiveness 2024 Webinar.pptx
 
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsIAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
 

Top Strategies to Capture Security Intelligence for Applications

  • 1. Top Strategies to Capture Security Intelligence for Applications John B. Dickson, CISSP Denim Group, Ltd. © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved
  • 2. John Dickson • Principal of Denim Group • 15-year information security consultant background • Ex-Air Force security analyst at AFCERT • Trident Data Systems, KPMG, SecureLogix, and Denim Group information security consultant • Works with CIO’ s and CSO’s to build successful software security initiatives • Educates non-developer security professionals how to manage application risk © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 1
  • 3. Denim Group Background • Professional services firm that builds & secures enterprise applications – External application assessments • Web, mobile, and cloud – Software development lifecycle development (SDLC) consulting • Classroom and e-Learning for PCI compliance • Secure development services: – Secure .NET and Java application development – Post-assessment remediation • Deep penetration in Financial Services, Banking, Insurance, Healthcare and Defense market sectors • Customer base spans Fortune 500 • Contributes to industry best practices through the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 2
  • 4. Overview • Today’s network security intelligence • The target of choice – applications • In application defenses • Application logging blocking and tackling • WAF’s and application IDS • Virtual patching for web applications • Conclusion © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 3
  • 5. Today’s Network Security Intelligence • Key information from security-related events in the organization can be collected – The broader range the better – A variety of key security events on a multitude of devices • Firewalls • Remote access servers • Critical servers (e.g., active directory) • Correlation and analysis capabilities are also mature – Context important to analysis • Network and server logging market maturing – Marketplace includes Security Event Managers (SEM), Security Information and Event Managers (SIEM), and Advanced Logging Products – May address certain compliance requirements like Sarbanes-Oxley © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 4
  • 6. Today’s Network Security Intelligence The very crowded SIEM market Source: Gartner Group, Magic Quadrant for Security Information and Management, May 2012 © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 5
  • 7. Today’s Network Security Intelligence • What do network defenders really need? – What, when, where, and how an event occurred – In a format that is external to the system or the application that created it – In a predictable format that is straightforward to import to SIEMs © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 6
  • 8. The target of choice – applications • App level breaches accounted for 10% of breaches overall, but 54% for large organizations • Only 20% of all organizations were in compliance with PCI DSS Requirement 6 – Develop and maintain secure systems and applications • Only 57% of large organizations were compliant with the PCI DSS Requirement 6 • The average number of days a website was exposed to at least one serious vulnerability is 231 days • XSS was found in 55% of websites in 2011 Sources: Verizon Business System, 2012 Breach Report and WhiteHat Security Report © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 7
  • 9. Application Vulnerability – Injection #1 in OWASP Top 10 • “Getting into” a file system or database used to imply establishing a root session or a direct SQL connection • By exploiting applications, attackers can accomplish their goals without such direct access – The whole system trusts the application – Attackers will try to leverage that trust © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 8
  • 10. With normal input User Name: johndoe Password: myBirthday SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE USERNAME='johndoe' AND PASSWORD='myBirthday' © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 9
  • 11. With malicious input User Name: johndoe Password: '; DROP DATABASE; -- SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE USERNAME='johndoe' AND PASSWORD=' '; DROP DATABASE; -- ' © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 10
  • 12. What Is It? • Occurs when unfiltered user inputs are combined with static text and then sent to an interpreter. • The interpreter then executes commands of the attackers choosing rather than the commands specified in the application. • Very common application security flaw with potentially disastrous security implications. • We will focus on SQL injection because it is the most common. • Other common injection flaws include OS Command, XML, and LDAP. © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 11
  • 13. In application defenses • A chasm exists between the development and operations/security communities – DevOps and Rugged Software Development changing that gap • Most software developers don’t build enterprise software with security in mind – Outside the largest banks and financial institutions, the security of software is less important (vs. features and functionality) • Most defensive coding focused on filtering malicious inputs – Very little focus on the fidelity of application logging to enhance security response • Most logging done to capture software debugging info – Developers want to understand how an application failed – Enhanced security information rarely a requirement for logging © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 12
  • 14. The very real state of in application defenses • Example application log #1 logger.warn("Caught exception " + e); e.printStackTrace(); © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 13
  • 15. The very real state of in application defenses • Example application log #2 logger.info("Failed login for user " + username + " with password '" + password + "'"); © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 14
  • 16. The very real state of in application defenses • Example application log #3 logger.info("Order placed with credit card number " + creditCardNumber); © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 15
  • 17. The very real state of in application defenses • What did we learn from these examples? – Developers might log information that actually creates more security headaches – Developers might not log information that is needed to analyze an attack – Developers might not log key security events in a human readable format – Developers might log information that is not in a format that is easily consumable by a SIEM (i.e., structured data) – Developers rarely ask security operations analysts for input on the types of logging needed – Developers rarely worry about the need to conduct trusted logging © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 16
  • 18. Application logging blocking and tackling • Security operators must inject themselves into the design phase of development projects to articulate security event logging requirement. • Security operators need to better understand application-layer information and how it can help them better identify security events. • Developers need to increase the fidelity of the security event information the do send to logs. © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 17
  • 19. Application logging blocking and tackling • Increasing the fidelity of security event logging – HOW? • Need to focus on: – What – When – Where – How • Key events to log: – Authentication – Authorization – Access Source: “How to Do Application Logging Right,” Chuvakin, Anton, and Peterson, Gunnar. © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 18
  • 20. Which events to log • Input validation failures • Output validation failures • Authentication successes and failures • Authorization failures • Session management failures • Application errors and system events • Application and related systems start-ups and shut-downs • Use of higher-risk functionality • Legal and other opt-ins Source: OWASP Application Logging Cheat Sheet © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 19
  • 21. Which events attributes to log • Log date and time • Event date and time • Interaction identifier • Application address • Service • Window/form/page • Code location • Source • User ID • Type of event Source: OWASP Application Logging Cheat Sheet © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 20
  • 22. Which events never to log • Passwords • Sensitive system attributes • Source code • Session identification values • Sensitive business information • Patient information (EPI) • Bank account or payment card holder data • HR, Payroll, M&A data or anything generally more sensitive than logs Source: OWASP Application Logging Cheat Sheet © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 21
  • 23. Application logging blocking and tackling • Example application log #4 logger.debug("Failed login for user: " + logEscape(username)); © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 22
  • 24. Application logging blocking and tackling • Example application log #5 logger.warn("User " + logEscape(username) + " attempted to access document id " + logEscape(documentId) + " without sufficient permissions"); ; © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 23
  • 25. WAF’s and application IDS • Broad set of technologies that enable enhanced application-layer logging • Provide insight into Port 90/443 where most firewall don’t have info • Can block certain attack patterns at the application layer • Most WAF’s in production are not set in blocking mode • Block obvious web application vulnerabilities like XSS & SQL Injection – Less effective on business logic or authorization rules © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 24
  • 26. AppSensor • A conceptual framework that offers guidance to implement intrusion detection capabilities into existing application • Utilizes standard security controls and recommendations for automated response policies based upon detected behavior. • Identifies malicious users within the application and eliminate the threat by taking response actions. © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 25
  • 27. AppSensor • An attacker often requires numerous probes and attack attempts in order to locate an exploitable vulnerability within the application. • By using AppSensor, it is possible to identify and eliminate the threat of an attacker before they are able to successfully identify an exploitable flaw. © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 26
  • 28. AppSensor • Behavior examples (~50) – 2 Detection Points 2.1 RequestException – 2.1.1 RE1: Unexpected HTTP Command – 2.1.2 RE2: Attempt to Invoke Unsupported HTTP Method – 2.1.3 RE3: GET When Expecting POST – 2.1.4 RE4: POST When Expecting GET – 2.1.5 RE5: Additional/Duplicated Data in Request – 2.1.6 RE6: Data Missing from Request – 2.1.7 RE7: Unexpected Quantity of Characters in Parameter – 2.1.8 RE8: Unexpected Type of Characters in Parameter © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 27
  • 29. Virtual patching for web applications • Receives vulnerabilities from application vulnerability scanners – Dynamic or static analysis (source code) reviews • Creates “virtual patches” that are sent to WAFs and block a URL – Mod Security – F5 – Imperva • Ecosystems being created to facilitate this process via certain open source tools – ThreadFix – Application vulnerability aggregation and management system • Enable defenders to block a vulnerable web page/application while developers are remediating source code © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 28
  • 30. References • “How to Do Application Logging Right,” Chuvakin, Anton, and Peterson, Gunnar – http://arctecgroup.net/pdf/howtoapplogging.pdf • From White Hat Website Security Statistics Report – https://www.whitehatsec.com/assets/WPstats_summer12_12th.pdf • “Magic Quadrant for Security Information and Event Management,” Garter Group, May 2012 – http://www.gartner.com/technology/reprints.do?id=1- 1AOG9W9&ct=120529&st=sb&elq=51f9879c322f4bc8b964591857bdafa1 • 2012 Verizon Breach Report • App Sensor Project, Open Web Application Security Project – https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_AppSensor_Project © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 29
  • 31. Contact Info John Dickson, CISSP & Principal (210) 572-4400 john@denimgroup.com Twitter: @johnbdickson © Copyright 2012 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 30