1. Culture Sensitivity for Humanitarian Action
Oxford Brooks University
Philip Taiwo
Individual Essay, 2013
When a country fails to provide the basic needs of survival for its people, the
international community is faced with the issue of intervention. However, it is unclear
whether there is any existing on clearly defined doctrine to guide governments or
humanitarian organizations in these matters. Some people believe that the protection of
sovereignty is more important than the possible benefits of intervention, preferring that
governments focus on domestic concerns. Opposing this are those who believe that
humanitarian intervention is necessary to resolve many conflicts and that the
preservation of life trumps all else. Still another mentality suggests that these two goals
are not mutually exclusive—that the members of the international community are
capable of controlling their own countries while still being able to intervene in some
countries. This essay will attempt to examine International Intervention in the Case of
the Sierra Leonean Civil War
According to the UN, 2005 saw the end of a highly successful peacekeeping mission in
Sierra Leone (UN, Year in Review: 2005, 2006). The United Nations Mission in Sierra
Leone (UNAMSIL), the UN boldly asserts s "oversaw a feeble process... demonstrating
how the world body can respond to the needs and demands of countries emerging from
conflict in a rapidly changing global environment " (UN, Year in Review: 2005, 2006).
Similarly, the mission was seen as a good war for British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who
championed intervention, as was British involvement in Former Yugoslavia. UNAMSIL
lasted for 6 years, long after the initial conflict was resolved. The Sierra Leonean Civil
War actually began in 1991, as rebels (supported by Liberia's Charles Taylor) began
seizing Diamond mines, collecting supporters along the way (Gberie, 2005). The goals
of the RUF were sometimes blurred, and with no triadic nexus, ethnic conflict or obvious
oppression to speak of, the Sierra Leonean civil war would prove a difficult one to
understand, let alone tackle.
International intervention is by no means a modern phenomenon, however, since the
end of the Cold War the meaning, understanding and implementation of International
intervention has changed rapidly (Fassin&Pandolfi, 2010) , with ever growing emphasis
on the "Responsibility to Protect" (Evans &Sahnoun, 2002) . International intervention is
b broadly separated in two categories: coercive intervention and co-operative
intervention, however many scholars recognize the possibility, or rather evolution of a

2. third, hybrid category. Coercive intervention is intervention without the consent of both
sides of a conflict and is typically against the ruling party. Co-operative intervention
tends to follow a peace accord, and can involve humanitarian assistance, mediation or
peacekeeping. From an academic point of view, then, Sierra Leone is a wonderful case
study for analyzing the justification, and effectiveness, of different means of intervention.
This essay shall chronologically examine the various attempts at intervention in the
Sierra Leonean conflict, and to what extent they were effective. This essay shall
ultimately find that International Intervention was indeed a primary factor in ending the
conflict, and that without it low -level conflict may have continued until this day.
To begin with, it must be made clear that intervention in Sierra Leone would present
immediate problems. Firstly, unlike the majority of civil wars prior to the Sierra Leonean,
there was no ethnic conflict nor was there an overarching ideological difference, nor
was there an historical grievance between the combatants. As consequently recognized
by Paul Collier, this, at least on the surface, was a war of greed, an economic Civil War
(Collier, 2000). Rich in natural minerals, Sierra Leone was the archetype of the
"Resource Curse" (Collier, 2000). A result of this was the diamonds of Sierra Leone
funded the rebel forces (RUF), and as long as they had control of the diamond mines,
and as long as there was trade, it would be in their interest to prolong the conflict.
Secondly, the practices of the soldiers of the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) were near
despicable. As the Civil War progressed, the action of the SLA became increasingly
despicable to the point that there was no discernible difference between the soldiers
and the rebel militia. "Sobel" ( a portmanteau of Soldier and Rebel) became a widely
used term for the soldiers who engaged i n the same looting and pillaging as the RUF,
and were actually complicit in the RUFs violence, trading arms for pay (Abdullah, 2004).
Perhaps learning from many criticisms lodged against it after Bosnia and Kosovo, the
UN Was very slow in actively engaging in Sierra Leone. Instead, the first instance of
International Intervention came in the shape of the Economic Community of West
African States' Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1993. ECOMOG's involvement was
initially an example of coercive intervention. Aligned with the SLA, ECOMOG helped
push back the RUF, and seized back some diamond mines. Unprecedented in Africa at
the time, such intervention, to restore the democratically -elected head government,
ECOMOG was poorly equipped and trained, and provided no extra expertise. Also, it is
this essays view that such partisan intervention was not justified. Although internal
sovereignty was being challenged, and democracy is of course favorable to dictatorship,
the SLA was as guilty of humanitarian crimes as the RUF. Nevertheless, this regional
intervention proved to be inadequate and the conflict continued at a low level which was
perfect for the rebels.

3. As the situation worsened, the International Monetary Fund funded mercenary group
Executive Outcomes, to push back the rebel forces. EO, well-trained, paid and
equipped groups were highly successful in recovering diamond mines. A common
argument for international intervention is if it is successful, it is justified. The success,
however, was not in bringing p peace but only in minimizing the effect on international
trade. It is no surprise that this form of military intervention, not under the patronage of
the United Nations, has always been hard for the general western public to accept.
Whilst EO were successful, it is despicable that the International Monetary Fund should
fund military operations in a sovereign state. There is little difference, beyond the
aesthetic, between the IMF being permitted to indent a state’s sovereignty in the interest
of freeing its riches, and Charles Taylor, or a 'terrorist' group doing the same.
The subsequent Abidjan peace plan was overseen by the United Nations and the
Organization of African Unity, the first real example of cooperative intervention. The
peace plan asserted that the EO would leave Sierra Leone, and be immediately
replaced with a neutral peacekeeping force. It is hard to argue with the motives of
mediation, as they are explicitly in the interest of peace. However, such a peace plan
smacked of rashness and was counterproductive. As the EO left, no peacekeeping
force has yet to be deployed and Sierra Leone quickly plunged back into violence.
When a peacekeeping force eventually did arrive, it came in the shape of a returning
ECOMOG. At the same time, the UN dispatched a monitoring group (of around 50
observers) to report on whether peace was being maintained. Of course, monitoring is a
useful tool in combating civil war, and necessary for the international community to be
kept abreast of development, particularly in areas of large-scale humanitarian dangers
(Berdal& Economides, 2007). In this case, the monitoring exposed the inadequacies of
ECOMOG led to the eventual deployment of the UN Peacekeeping force. ECOMOG
and the UN observers were at loggerheads during this period, with ECOMOG soldiers
resenting the observers "they are here on holiday. I wish we could open the beaches for
them to sun -tan and enjoy their dollars" (Berdal& Economides, 2007). This two-tier
intervention is detrimental to tackling conflict. A power struggle inevitably arose between
ECOWAS and the UN, as ECOWAS felt it was being used as a scapegoat whilst the UN
failed to fund ECOMOG with better equipment and more troops. This threatened the
peace process as Nigeria, wary of the UN's actions, began to withdraw troops in 1999.
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Lowe, Roberts, Welsh, &Zaum, 2008), the UN
Peacekeeping force finally arrived in Sierra Leone. The same peacekeeping force which
in 1988 was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for representing the "manifest will of the
community of nations" (Goulding, 451 -64), and is widely regarded as a force for good.
With no personal gains to be made, and no offensive mandate, they are often a
welcome sight in a conflict, at least by civilians. In the time after the ECOMOG troops
had left, the rebels had done well in seizing the opportunity. Within a few months,

4. 18,000 UN peacekeepers had been deployed, the majority from the ECOWAS nations
(Adebajo, 2008). However, the UN still failed to adequately equip the peacekeepers,
just as it had ECOMOG. Furthermore the mission details were complex and
misunderstood by many. Once again, also, a power struggle arose as some senior
peacekeepers accused the Nigerian members of the mission of colluding to prolong the
war, so that they may benefit from the illicit diamond trade, and whilst no proof was
found, the damage to the missions’ reputation was done. It is imperative that a
peacekeeping mission is seen, at all times, to be above and beyond the deplored
violence of a war’s combatants. (Goulding, 451 -64).
It is also imperative that the peacekeepers are seen to have a stronger military force
than the combatants; otherwise their deterrent potential is diminished. However, in this
case, the presence of the UN Peacekeeping force did more harm than good. The RUF
asserted that the peace accord made no mention of the UN sending the force, and as
such would not adhere to their involvement. The peacekeepers would soon find out that
the "biggest problem in implementing peace accords in civil wars is getting parties to
live up to their commitments" (Stedman, 1996). Whilst the Sierra Leonean people had
high expectations of the blue helmets, it quickly became clear the peacekeepers were ill
-equipped and the position of the UN became increasingly feeble very quickly. The RUF
continued to draft in more troops from Liberia. The rebel held diamond rich, areas
remained a no -go area for peacekeepers and this was proven in just a matter of
months as peacekeepers were kidnapped by RUF troops, who subsequently seized
their weapons and used them to march on Freetown. As a mode of co-operative
intervention, should the peacekeepers have been in a conflict due to a peace plan that
was clearly not going to be acted upon?
This resulted in the British military forces, under Tony Blair (a proponent of
Humanitarian Intervention), coming to the rescue unilaterally. The British involvement
was successful both in rescuing the non -combatant hostages, and in raising global
awareness of the Civil War. Certainly, the impact of the unilateral involvement of the
British forces, strong, well -equipped, and well organized was huge. The Security
Council put Sierra Leone at the top of the agenda, and in July 2000 Security Council
Resolution 1306 officially placed a diamonds embargo on Sierra Leone.
The diamond embargo was not the first placed on Sierra Leone. The Security Council
had previously implemented an arms embargo. The effectiveness of arms embargoes is
often disputed and it is the case in Sierra Leone that the embargo was frivolous at best.
No nations in favor with the United Nations (i.e. not Libya or Liberia) have openly been
selling weaponry to the rebels before the embargo. The weaponry was essentially sold
in return for the diamonds, something no state would wish to expose. As such, the cloak
and dagger means of arming the RUF continued, especially as ECOMOG, proved
inadequate to do anything better than dent trade. The diamond embargo was infinitely

5. more successful in ending the Civil War. Initially the embargo was laughable as it was a
"stand -alone measure, not part of a coercive strategy; and because of poor
implementation" (Oudraat, 2000) Once the UN made it part of the peacekeeping
mission and that of international governments to see that no diamonds left Sierra
Leone, rebel funding began to deplete. Again, however, it was the British military that
was the most successful at enforcing the embargo. The diamond embargo also finally
saw the UN acknowledging Charles Taylor, of Liberia, as a key belligerent of the Sierra
Leonean Civil War and once he was targeted the war was essentially over (Hirsch,
2001).
The UN proved to be a more influential in rehabilitating the nation once the war was
over. The disarmament programme was a success. With the RUF officially defeated,
UNAMSIL oversaw the Sierra Leonean Disarmament, Demobilization and reintegration
programme, which has begun (slowly) after the Lome Peace accord. What becomes
clear when looking at the UN released figures of the programme is that during the
conflict, the international organizations that intervened simply had no idea of the
magnitude of the situate ion (161% of predicted figures) (UN, DDR, 2004) . This raises
the questions then, of how effective were the monitoring groups. In observing the
conflict progression, and how rash was it for the UN to send in peacekeepers with
incomplete information. Certainly, one can see how the lessons were learnt with regards
the proposed UN invasion of Iraq, eventually taken unilaterally by USA. As the UN
acknowledges “The government of Sierra Leone came to fully understand that it could
not eliminate the insurgency and could not rely on the allegiance of its own army. For
their part, the rebels factored in British military intervention and regional development,
particularly the embargo on Liberia and the precarious position of the government there"
(UN, DDR, 2004), once again highlighting the impact of British intervention.
Really, it was after the conflict that the UN begun to really demonstrate expertise.
UNAMSIL offered incentives for regions that were certified "arms free" and the carrot
approach proved highly successful. The Lome accord also arranged for the
implementation of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee, an approach this essay is
vehemently in favor of. H historically, after a civil war a pattern has emerged of
communities divided between victor and opponents, each with tales of horror and
victimization. This rhetoric can haunt a nation for generations and subsequently lead to
a renewal of war. It is with this that the committee was established to "address impunity,
to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to
prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered” (Adebajo, 2008). It is
important that a Truth and Reconciliation is seen to be an internal affair, and as such
was chaired by Sierra Leoneans.
The UN had an arguably larger job in arranging the Special Court for Sierra Leone, to
try those accused of the most serious war crimes. The accused were many but included

6. Charles Taylor, FodaySankoh and Johnny Koroma. For precedent's sake, such an act is
crucial for making it clear that humanitarian crime will not be tolerated in the
international community (Bass, 2000). However, as previously stated, the soldiers of the
SLA were in many ways as involved in the humanitarian suffering as the rebels and if
not more shamefully as they were the badge of the nation. Nevertheless, in a clear
example of "to the victor go the spoils", no state combatant has been brought i n front of
the court. As Vinjamuri and Snyder assert, one of the key effects of such trials is to
"emphasize the guilt of particular individuals and thereby defuse the potential for future
cycles of violence." (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2003). If justice is to be within the ever -
growing mandate of International Intervention, then much like a democratic national
judiciary, it should be unbiased, fair, and willing to charge all those who in any way
break the peace of the rules of war.
If it is so, that the outcome e of intervention justifies the means, and then surely the sum
of International Intervention in the Sierra Leonean Civil War is justified. Effective, also,
as although still one of the poorest nations on Earth, Sierra Leone has undoubtedly
found the route to democracy, and has shown no real sign of slipping back into conflict.
This is not to say, however, that the International Intervention was without criticism.
Sierra Leone was an unprecedented case in when the conflict began, lacking in clear
lines of division. Perhaps mindful of a public relations disaster, or perhaps sensitive to
the history of the Sierra Leonean people (particularly the Krio); The United Nations
was happy to delegate Intervention to ECOWAS. ECOWAS was formed for economic
purposes, with little experience in military intervention and this was problematic from the
very beginning. It would have better for all involved if the UN had taken the reins after
the Abidjan Peace Accord. It should no longer be acceptable for the UN to delegate
peacekeeping missions to the nearest regional organization.
Interventionists failed, for far too long, to see the link between the diamonds of Sierra
Leone, the international community, and the conflict. Had the embargo been placed
sooner, the Civil War could have ended years before it did. As stated earlier, the Sierra
Leonean Civil War saw many means of intervention used some more effective than
others. What cannot be tolerated? However, is the half -hearted approach the United
Nations took to intervening early-on.
Bibliography
Abdullah, I. (2004). Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War.
Dakar: African Books Collective.

7. Adebajo, A. (2008). The Security Council and Three Wars in West Africa. In Lowe,
Roberts, Welsh, &Zaum, The UN Security Council and War (pp. 466-493). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Aksar, Y. (2004). Implementing International Humanitarian Law. London: Routledge.
Ballentine, K., & Sherman, J. (2003). The Political Economy of Armed Conflic:
BeyondGreed and Grievance. London: Lynne Reinner.
Bass, G. J. (2000). Stay the Hand of Vengeance. New York: Princeton.
Berdal, M., & Economides, S. (2007). United Nations Interventionism. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Collier, P. (2000). Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective. In M. Berdal, & D.
Malone, Greed and Grievance (pp. 91-112). Colorado: Lynne Reinder Publications.
Evans, G., &Sahnoun, M. (2002).The Responsibility to Protect.Foreign Affairs.Vol 18,
99- 110.
Fassin, D., &Pandolfi, M. (2010).Contemporary States of Emergency. Cambridge: MIT.
Gberie, L. (2005). A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra
Leone. London: c. hurst.
Goulding, M. (451 -64).The Evolution of Peacekeeping.International Affairs, 1993.
Hirsch, J. L. (2001). Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy.
Colorado: Lynne Reinner Press.
Lowe, Roberts, Welsh, &Zaum. (2008). The United Nations Security Council and War.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Oudraat, C. d. (2000).Making Economic Sanctions Work.Survival, 105-27.
Stedman, S. J. (1996). Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict. In M. Brown, The
International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (p. 346). Washington: MIT.
UN.(2004). DDR. Retrieved Jan 4, 2012, from UN DDR Resource Centre:
http://www.unddr .org/countryprogrammes.php?c=60
UN. (2006). Year in Review: 2005. Retrieved 12 18, 2011, from United Nations: Major
Peacekeeping operations:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/2005/sierra_leone.htm

8. Vinjamuri, L., & Snyder, J. (2003).Trials and Error. International Security, 5-44.