Publicité

Contenu connexe

Présentations pour vous(20)

Similaire à Francesco Аlbore fraud prevention, sofia conf 2016, olaf presentation(20)

Publicité
Publicité

Francesco Аlbore fraud prevention, sofia conf 2016, olaf presentation

  1. CONFERENCE Simplification in Cohesion Policy - Challenges, Expectations and Priorities Sofia, Bulgaria, 17. May 2016 PREVENTION OF INFRINGEMENTS AND FRAUDULENT IRREGULARITIES Francesco Albore, OLAF Directorate B Investigatins II, Unit B.5 Agricultural & Structural Funds III
  2. Contents 1. Introduction 2. OLAF - Mandate, Means and Activity 3. Cohesion policy - Figures, Procedures and Problems 4. Investigation and Prevention of fraud and irregularities 5. Conclusion
  3. Introduction  OLAF Directorate B is an Investigation Directorate  Focus on the investigative side of the matter  The exposé will therefore be: − lighter on statistics and legislative references; − heavier on practical stuff (pertinent to any Member State).  A short introduction of OLAF is appropriate
  4. OLAF - Mandate, Means and Activity  Expenditure side. EU budget principles.  OLAF carries out administrative investigations.  OLAF coordinates between national authorities - administrative, judicial.  Case selection - on complaints, ex officio.  OLAF is not an audit service.  OLAF is not in charge each time an irregularity is suspected.  Engaging OLAF - principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.  OLAF's best added value.  Results of the OLAF investigation - Final Report and Recommendation. Who implements Recommendations.
  5. Cohesion policy - Figures, Procedures and Problems  ERDF, ESF and CohF  Bulgaria as beneficiary of EU cohesion policy - amounts, ratios. € 1.1 billion received under the EU cohesion policy in 2014. Positio n Member State Cohesion policy funds as % of GNI 1 Hungary 4.4% 2 Latvia 3.4% 3 Lithuania 3.3% 4 Bulgaria 2.7% 5 Romania 2.5% 6 Greece 2.3% 7 Czech Republic 2.1% ... ... ... 28 ... ... € 7.4 billion overall allocated for 2014-2020.
  6. Cohesion policy - Figures, Procedures and Problems  Fraudulent irregularities  Fraud detection rate Period Detection Rate Bulgaria Detection Rate EU Note 2007-2013 0.22% 0.35% Several MS over 0.75% 2014 0.08% 0.50% Double number of MS over 0.35%
  7. 7 Irregularities reported (until March 2016) EU 27 Programming Period N° of irregularities Irregular amounts % of commitments % of payments 2000-06 28 193 5 237 041 432 2.4% 2.4% Of which fraudulent 1 972 627 982 932 0.3% 0.3% 2007-13 26 478 7 043 773 577 2.0% 3.4% Of which fraudulent 1 271 1 235 913 850 0.4% 0.6% Total 54 667 12 280 628 374 2.2% 2.9% Bulgaria Programming Period N° of irregularities Irregular amounts % of commitments % of payments 2007-13 254 89 303 708 1.3% 2.8% Of which fraudulent 34 7 303 890 0.11% 0.23%
  8. Programming period 2007-13 Reported irregularities – main patterns 8  Bulgaria  ERDF related cases 57% in N and 50% in amounts)  CF: 25% - 41%  Fraudulent irregularities: • ERDF 35% - 11% • ESF 62% - 20% • CF 3% - 69%  Between detection and reporting: 2.3 months  Between irregularity and detection: 36.8 months
  9. Distribution of irregularities according to localisation of project affected
  10. Distribution of fraudulent irregularities according to localisation of project affected 10
  11. Cohesion policy - Figures, Procedures and Problems  Follow up on OLAF recommendations for judicial action Position Member State Judicial Recommendations Indictments Rate of Indictment 1 Malta 5 4 80% 2 Poland 14 9 64% 3 Italy 61 32 52% 4 France 24 12 50% 5 Sweden 4 2 50% 6 Greece 23 11 48% 7 Germany 29 13 45% 8 Austria 7 3 43% 9 Bulgaria 30 12 40% 10 Belgium 45 17 38% 11 Netherlands 16 6 38% 12 Spain 28 9 32% 13 UK 23 5 22% 14 Romania 89 16 18% ... ... ... ... ... Total 479 161 34%
  12. Cohesion policy - Figures, Procedures and Problems  Cohesion policy associated with the other EU policies: − common ground to evaluate, check, control; − common rules on eligibility, financial management, professional conduct.  Vulnerability to irregularities of projects under the ERDF and CohF  Large infrastructure projects  Open public procurement procedure. Advantages: − attended by all eligible interested parties; − transparency of criteria for selection, scoring and ranking; − appeal of decisions of the contracting authority; − preliminary control of public procurement procedures.
  13. Investigation and Prevention of fraud and irregularities  Manipulated procurements  Conflict of interest  Meaning of the fraudster profile: o Clues to fraud will not be obvious. o Traces will be masked or obliterated. o Implicating documents may be denied authorship by the signing party. o Methods of perpetration will be disguised as necessary operations. o Technical assessment will be assigned to a competent but friendly party. o Influence over administrative decision not along line of official subordination. o Wrong benefit may not be immediately accomplished or collected. o Inadequate construction designed to last long enough to pass approvals.
  14. Investigation and Prevention of fraud and irregularities  Indispensable features of fraud: − Engenders of a wrong benefit − Accomplishes the wrong benefit − Collects the wrong benefit  Investigation of fraud and Prevention of fraud  Ideas from investigative observations: (1) Physical specifications (2) Division into Lots. Sequential (within reason) implementation (3) Designated fraud investigation body - central or decentralised units (4) Recruitment of expert fund managers
  15. Investigation and Prevention of fraud and irregularities  Recommendations of the EC in the recent Commission Report on the fight against fraud. Highlights: Recommendation 1 Use AFCOS to full potential. Develop the cooperation between national bodies. Recommendation 2 Transpose definition of conflict of interest into national legislation. Put effective and proportionate measures in place to tackle conflicts of interest. The role of Managing Authorities and Paying Agencies in detecting fraud should be enhanced, pursuant to the regulatory framework 2014-2020. Recommendation 3 Strengthen the work on detecting and reporting fraud. A combination of different control strategies is required. Use "red flags". Carry out risk assessment. Exhaust the IT intelligence tools. Use the experience collected in the Guidance Notes issued by the EC. Recommendation 4 All transactions, and all economic operators to be included in the population for controls. MS to exchange experiences in successful detection of fraud or irregularities.
  16. Conclusion  Questions - in the common panel discussion.  Wishes for Bulgaria's best success in the regular and full implementation of the allocated EU funds!  Thank You for Your kind attention! Francesco Albore (Francesco.albore@ec.europa.eu) OLAF Directorate B Investigatins II, Unit B.5 Agricultural & Structural Funds III

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. There is a certain degree of comparability between the two latest programming periods. Still in 2015 we keep on receiving irregularities related to the programming period 2000-06. The peak of irregularities received concerning this period happened between 2008 and 2010 (so between n+2 and n+4 of the reference period). We are observing the same trend for the programming period 2007-13. 2015 has been the peak so far. The overall impact of irregularities on payments is currently higher than in comparison with the previous year (3.4% vs 2.4%) but this should be adjusted with the final payments at programme closure (as showed by the impact on commitments which is currently lower than in comparison with the previous programming period). It should be underlined that we are looking at detected irregularities. This implies that national and European authorities have detected situations that were not compliant with rules and are taking correcting measures (e.g. recoveries, exclusion etc.) them. From this perspective, this is a potentially positive development to be considered also when we examine the annual error rate of the European Court of Auditors, taking into account that these detections/corrections happen, in average 3 years and 8 months after the irregularities have been committed. Detected fraud has been increasing in the EU between the two periods. This result is negative only if we assume that the level of controls has remained stable. Several elements (not least all the fraud awareness raising initiatives conducted by the EC) point to the fact that this is not the case and that indeed national authorities are more attentive to detect fraud. This is, in general, a good sign in view of the new anti-fraud provision contained in the Common Provision Regulations for the period 2014-20. For the period 2007-13, 12 cases have been reported as fraudulent by Bulgaria. The impact of fraud and irregularities on the commitments is somewhere half of the overall EU average. There is a significant increase in the fraudulent irregularities detected and reported in comparison with the previous programming period and the reporting has been happening in the last two years. The overall number of irregularities and related financial amounts are, on the other hand, significantly lower than in the previous period. However, as the bulk of irregularities is generally received in the years n+2 and +4 (therefore between 2015 and 2017), figures may still vary significantly in the near future. In particular when we look at fraud, detections are never easy, as fraud is per definition about deception. Therefore, detecting potentially fraudulent cases is always an indicator that anti-fraud systems are correctly in place. In OLAF we are still convinced (and I am sure that you will all agree with this) that still a certain amount of fraud goes undetected (and consequently unreported). So more efforts can always be done in this respect.
  2. As overall patterns, the Bulgaria present a situation which is different, compared to the overall EU picture highlighted in the previous slide. While irregularities related to the ERDF maintain a certain predominance in terms of nunber of cases (76%), their share on the overall financial amounts affected decreases to 58%. This implies that NL is the one of the very few countries where ESF irregularities present a higher average financial impact than the ERDF ones. Also in relation to fraudulent irregularities, all the 12 reported cases refer to ESF funded projects. The time gap between the irregularity and its detection is higher than the EU average.
  3. The present slide shows the geographical distribution of the detected irregularities, according to the localisation of the projects affected. In general more irregularities are detected where more money are spent. For Bulgaria, the majority of detected irregularities concern Zuid-Holland and Noord-Brabant. In terms of amounts affected by irregularities, these concern mainly Limbourg and Zuid-Holland. Unfortunately, no information has been yet provided in relation to the fraudulent irregularities concerning the localisation of the projects affected. Of course, another interesting visualisation would be comparing the irregular amounts with the money spent per province.
  4. The present slide shows the geographical distribution of the detected irregularities, according to the localisation of the projects affected. In general more irregularities are detected where more money are spent. For Bulgaria, the majority of detected irregularities concern Zuid-Holland and Noord-Brabant. In terms of amounts affected by irregularities, these concern mainly Limbourg and Zuid-Holland. Unfortunately, no information has been yet provided in relation to the fraudulent irregularities concerning the localisation of the projects affected. Of course, another interesting visualisation would be comparing the irregular amounts with the money spent per province.
Publicité