This document discusses how philosophy of science can help biology education by addressing conceptual issues and developing skills. It analyzes the concept of adaptation, showing how its meaning has changed over time and split into multiple concepts. While history of science can help dispel myths about science, philosophy can further improve scientific definitions and the "defining activity" skill. Developing skills like evaluation and criticism of definitions through explicit philosophy of science discussions may increase students' understanding and appreciation of science.

1. Pitfalls and strengths of adaptation in biology
education: How can philosophy of science help
Emanuele Serrelli
“Riccardo Massa” Department of Human Sciences
University of Milano Bicocca, Italy
1

2. Education
Authority Nature Of Science
(e.g. Bell et al. 2001)
SCIENCE
AIM: a particular
philosophically-
informed educational
focus that goes in the
of biology
direction of
emphasizing, Philosophy
increasing, and of science
maintaining the
authority of science.
H P S
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3. OUTLINE
• Why and how HPS studies are called into play in biology education (ex.
“laboratory”). NOS-HPS alliance
• Some bits of analysis of adaptation in philosophy of biology
• Back to biology education: Worries rised by conceptual analysis (including
those about the authority of science) and HPS answers currently adopted
• Underestimated roles for philosophy of science: skills for scientific
definition
• Conclusion
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4. (c) Photos by Franca Lasagna, 2009
McComas WF, ed. (2006). Investigating evolutionary biology in the
laboratory. National Association of Biology Teachers (NABT), Kendall-Hunt. 4

5. McComas WF, ed. (2006). Investigating evolutionary biology in the
laboratory. National Association of Biology Teachers (NABT), Kendall-Hunt. 5

6. • McComas (2006) showed how HPS is
useful for structuring the labs.
• For example, the collection relied on a
large body of analyses in philosophy of
biology, providing the logical structure
(fundamental logics and concepts) of
the Darwin-Wallace model of natural
selection as a series of interdependent
assertions that work together but can
be isolated and understood as
individual components. The two most
important: descent with modification
(furthermore divided in ten scientific
assertions) and natural selection
(furthermore divided in five).
Examples: differential survival, adaptation, convergence-
divergence, common descent, principles and difficulties of
systematics and biological classification.
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7. • Plus, labs are said to portray the nature
of science.
• students construct new meaningful
concepts and generate
“if...and...then...therefore” arguments
and hypothetico-deductive inferences,
managing “ideas that work extremely
well at explaining the natural world in
naturalistic terms we can understand,
making accurate predictions, and
guiding further empirical
research” (Clough, p. 72)
• laboratory “learning cycles” teach the
students that “debate, rethinking, and a
cycle of verification are important
elements of the scientific endeavor and,
as such, are inherent in healthy scientific
discourse” (McComas, p. 21).
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8. • So, labs realize the most fundamental
claims of NOS as a field of study:
• «Students have to become
scientific, not just learn
science» (e.g. Matthews 1994, p.
25; but well before, Dewey 1916).
• Laboratories are described as inspired
to HPS studies, and conversely as a
context in which it is possible (and
important) for students to discuss and
understand HPS (e.g. how natural
selection was discovered, or what’s to
be intended by “scientific law”).
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9. • Constructivism revised: concepts are
necessary in science education (as they
are in science, after all).
• Most constructivists recognize that there is a
public, symbolic, created world of science and
mathematics that children have to be
introduced to, and whose concepts they have
to internalize. They recognize further that
children are not going to discover this world,
its concepts and their relationships, merely by
private inquiry [...]. This recognition is a major
departure from individualist [AND
INDUCTIVIST] constructivism where students
create their own knowledge claims [Matthews
MR (1994). Science teaching. The role of history
and philosophy of science. Routledge, p. 155].
• Even in student-led learning methods,
teachers are are not going to avoid
giving concepts and definitions.
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10. • Points of incidence for POS on science
education:
• a general view of science [e.g. as an
active, circular, and self-corrective
process]
• the modularization of overarching
theoretical structures [e.g. to allow for
laboratories]
• the refining of concepts and definitions
• «The intricacies of biological
terminology, reflecting the complexity
of organisms themselves, are a ready
source of semantic confusion» (Ghiselin
1966).
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11. • Adaptation is a finalistic term
• It was inherited and co-opted by Darwin
• We see these beautiful co-adaptations most
plainly in the woodpecker and missletoe; and
only a little less plainly in the humblest parasite
which clings to the hairs of a quadruped or
feathers of a bird; in the structure of the beetle
which dives through the water; in the plumed
seed which is wafted by the gentlest breeze; in
short, we see beautiful adaptations everywhere
and in every part of the organic world [Darwin
1859, Chap. III Struggle for existence, pp.
60-61].
• Adaptation is an observable state of
things. It can also be referred to
particular traits (hence the plural form:
adaptations).
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12. • In addition to the state, Darwin’s book
marked the appearance of a natural
process as a cause of observed
adaptation
• […] it could be shown how the
innumerable species inhabiting this world
have been modified, so as to acquire that
perfection of structure and coadaptation
which most justly excites our admiration
(Darwin 1859, Introduction, pag. 3).
• Hence the verbal form, with NS as the
subject:
• Natural selection [...] will adapt the
structure of each individual for the benefit
of the community; if each in consequence
profits by the selected change (Darwin C.,
(1859), Chap. IV natural Selection, pag.82).
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13. • Retained finalism
• State / process ambiguity
• Active (NS, organisms) / passive
(organisms) form
• Induced “personization”
13

14. • Martin M (1972), Concepts of science
education. A philosophical analysis.
Glenview-London: Scott, Foresman &
Co.
• Darwin might be doing an ANALYTIC
RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
• A rational reconstruction is to be
evaluated [...] in terms of its ability to
improve upon standard usages for
scientific purposes. Depending on the
inadequacies of standard usage for
scientific purposes, a rational
reconstruction will depart more or less
from a reportive definition (p. 79).
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15. • Retained finalism
• State / process ambiguity
• Active (NS, organisms) / passive (organisms)
form
• Induced “personization”
• Adaptation splits:
• species: processual meaning is added
• individual: “more or less adapted” (to
become fitness)
• character (trait)
• Not perfect
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16. • Ghiselin (1966)
• “Adaptation” is «used for several
different concepts» (p. 148) but «useful
in discussing many types of
relationships» (p. 153) => retained.
• The state/process ambiguity leads to
«misuse, nonsense and paradox». «“An
animal is adapted” suggests that an
animal has adapted».
• Trouble purifying the state and
organism meaning (with “fitness” as a
benchmark word).
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17. • Blurred and unstable delimitation:
• When someone says that species x is
better adapted to its environment than
species y, he means something like
this: if his evaluation of the conditions
is correct, then the probability that x
will survive is greater than the
probability that y will survive. (149)
• When we say that an organism
becomes more adapted to its
environment, we mean that it becomes
so modified that the likelihood of
becoming extinct in that environment
is decreased (149).
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18. • Probabilistic nature of this state called adaptation:
• it is a big mistake to consider adaptation an
intrinsic property, or an actual condition, of the
relation between organism and environment
• crude and unphilosophical empiricists
• «we have no right to assume that
there have ever existed nonadapted
or ill-adapted organisms, for these
would not have been viable. Even the
most simply organized living things
are ideally adapted to their specific
environment. Types in which the new
adaptation to a changed environment
has not been sufficiently successful
have obviously died out».
• nominalistic metaphysicians
• «probabilistic entities are not real»
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19. • Environment has to be intended in
statistical terms as well:
• «By environment we do not mean only
those parts of the universe with which
an organism is interacting, but we
refer to the class of entities with which
it is likely to interact» (150).
• In conclusion:
• «When one conceives of both
“adaptation” and the “environment” as
statistical, population concepts, the
sophistical nature of certain
arguments becomes obvious» (150).
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20. • George C. Williams (1966), Adaptation and natural
selection
• to avoid «serious errors» in evolutionary
biology we should restrict the use of the
word adaptation to traits whose genetic
basis is demonstrably due to functional
selection
• «The only adaptations that clearly exist
express themselves in genetically defined
individuals and have only one ultimate
goal, the maximal perpetuation of the
genes responsible for the visible adaptive
mechanism» (Idem, pag. 252).
• We ought to «take the theory of natural
selection in its simpliest and most austere
form, the differential survival of alternative
alleles, and use it in an uncompromising
fashion whenever a problem of adaptation
arises» (Idem, pag. 270).
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21. • Gould & Vrba (1982)
• They share the structure/function/
effect problem
• They can make no use of
William’s population genetics
definition of the process
• Adaptation at a larger scale (vs.
extrapolation), as “tinkering”:
«Novelties come from previously
unseen association of old
material. To create is to
recombine» (Francois Jacob,
“Evolution and tinkering”, 1977)
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22. • Retained finalism
• State / process ambiguity
• Active (NS, organisms) / passive (organisms) form
• Induced “personization”
• Adaptation splits:
• species: processual meaning is added
• individual: “more or less adapted” (to become fitness)
• character (trait)
• Not perfect
• Effect/function/structure interplay
• Continuous transformation vs. recombination
• Disciplinary definitions
• PLUS gene in relation to phenotype (Lewontin, Rose & Kamin 1984),
organism-environment boundary (Oyama 2000; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray
2001; Pigliucci & Muller 2010).
• ...
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23. • Philosophers may be perfectly
comfortable with this situation
• Ghiselin’s extreme position: «It is
utterly irrelevant that improper usage,
intentional or otherwise, may give rise
to absurdities» (p. 153).
• Many problems are «mere pseudo-
problems to those fully aware of the
dangers» (p. 147).
• But is it irrelevant for biology education?
Philosophy reliable guide to scientific
concepts for scientific understanding?
• Also the problem of the perceived
authority of science?
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24. • Historical way out?
• Only when students understand how
science functions and how scientific
knowledge is generated can they truly
appreciate, understand and value
science itself […]. One potentially
fruitful approach in sharing important
elements of the nature of science may
be found in the use of history of
science in order to provide instruction
in how science functions
(Kampourakis & McComas 2010, pp.
638-9).
• History should: contextualize + explain
+ improve appraisal of the nature of
science + of the value of science
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25. • In “Epistemology and the teaching of science” (Nadeau & Désautels 1984)
the aim of HPS in education was to “dispel the myths” about science
Myth Pedagogical action
scientism
naive realism neutralization
blissful empiricism attenuation
credulous experimentalism elimination
blind idealism denunciation
excessive rationalism eradication
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26. • Today the list of myths is updated
(McComas 1998, 2006, 2008).
• However, exposing the historical
reasons for the logical and
terminological tragedy of adaptation
answers many myths, but doesn’t
necessarily offer a trustful happy end.
• To be fair, stories do partly answer the
question “where does the authority of
science come from?”, by showing the
“hard work” of biology, but philosophy
of science has other cards to play.
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27. Martin’s (1972) argument on scientific definitions
• All science educators and textbooks define terms and use definitions
• And, yes, «science teachers have the responsibility of conveying the
precise meaning of scientific terms in actual scientific practice» (p. 92); on
the other hand, «it is far better that the students either receive or discover
definitions that they can understand, even if these definitions are far from
accurate» (p. 93).
• “Defining activity” (p. 76) is an actual, integral part of scientific practice
(as the example of adaptation shows).
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28. Martin’s (1972) argument on scientific definitions
• «Usually there is no special emphasis on developing the skill of defining in
the training of scientists [...]. As in any activity, skill is best achieved
through systematic practice under the guiding hand of a teacher who has
already mastered the skill. It is to be hoped that such systematic training
will become part of science education» (p. 94, my emphasis). «As the
science student matures, the science teacher can not only covey the
meaning of scientific terms via definitions to the student, but also teach
the student how to define scientific terms and evaluate definitions» (p. 93,
my emph.).
• Some methodological ways to educate such a skill in the classroom: the
use of “stipulative definitions” (p. 93), explicit discussions on definition in
biological science before studying particular definitions (p. 90), and
exercise reciprocal criticism (p. 93).
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29. Martin’s (1972) argument on scientific definitions
• Martin does a useful taxonomy of definitions, but the point is that this is
probably an essential matter for philosophy of science: What does it mean
to define, what kinds of definitions there are... Multiple meanings and
meaning change emerge as constitutive to science.
• Yes, there probably will be internal HPS disagreements but there is a
reasonable consensus on some topics, and maybe novel synergies or
tradeoffs may emerge if a responsibility towards science education is
adopted.
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30. Conclusion (or: a particular philosophically-
informed educational focus)
• The authority of science comes from features like “scientific
definitions” (clarity, univocity...) but perhaps more from the related skills,
like those involved in the “defining activity”. These skills can probably be
learned (although normally they do not receive the proper attention in the
curriculum), and philosophy of science can have here a further, important
access point. My supposition is that the perspective of learning scientific
skills in science education may support the authority of science.
• Frederick Aicken, The nature of science (1984):
• ...there is nothing new in a drift towards the irrational, it is reassuring that the work of
scientists continues to move stubbornly in the opposite direction. Science seeks to
create order from disorder, to find some rational meaning in the apparently
meaningless, to oppose the natural tendency towards chaos [...]. It is the skill of
makinf use of the knowledge, not the knowledge itself, which matters (pp. 121, 139).
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