International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI) in collaboration with Ethiopian Economics Association. Eleventh Conference on Ethiopian Economy, July 18-20, 2013

1. 23/07/2013
Learning with Others - A Randomized Field
Experiment on the Formation of Aspirations in
Rural Ethiopia
Tanguy Bernard1, Stefan Dercon2, Kate Orkin2, and Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse1
1International Food Policy Research Institute, 2 University of Oxford
July 18, 2013
Eleventh International Conference on the Ethiopian Economy
Ethiopian Economic Association
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2.  Motivation
 Elements of the aspirations framework
 Aspirations project
 Field experiment – design and findings
Outline
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3.  Conceptual – ‘opportunities’
 Empirical – Why do the poor not ‘invest’?
 Ethiopians and fatalism?
 Focus 1 - ‘external circumstances’ and ‘opportunities’.
 Low returns to investments;
 Unexploited opportunities due to lack of information or
knowledge;
 Social constraints;
 Focus 2 - constraints associated with the manifested attributes of
decision makers
 Identity issues: sense of self;
 Psychological issues: impatience, commitment, and psychological
barriers
Aspirations failure perspective
Motivation – why aspirations
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4. 23/07/2013
 Aspirations:
 A desire or an ambition to achieve something
 An aim and implied effort to reach it
 A set of future-regarding preferences
 Related concepts
 Economics : Satisficing
 Psychology : Self-efficacy, locus of control
 Anthropology : Aspiration failures
 Common elements
 Goals and aspirations are important determinants of success;
 Evolution through time in response to circumstances;
 Role of social comparisons and learning from relevant others,
An individual-level yet culturally (collectively) determined attribute 
towards exploration of individual-group symbiosis
Elements of the Aspirations Perspective
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5. Elements of the Aspirations Perspective
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What are Aspirations?
 Aspirations have two distinctive aspects:
• Future-oriented - are goals that can only be satisfied at
some future time (differ from immediate gratifications);
• Motivators - are goals individuals are willing, in
principle, to invest time, effort or money in to attain
(different from idle daydreams and wishes)
Note: the ‘willingness to invest’ is ‘potential’, or
‘conditional’
 Aspirations and expectations – preference vs.
beliefs;
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6. Elements of the Aspirations Perspective
Why are aspirations important/useful?
Aspirations (or the capacity to aspire):
 Reflect bounded rationality;
 Are socially determined (social interaction);
 Are distributed unevenly within communities.
 Condition individual behaviour and well-being
 Useful device in analysing and/or addressing poverty
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7. Elements of the Aspirations Perspective
How do aspirations condition individual behaviour?
 Aspiration window:
 an individual’s cognitive world, his/her zone of ‘similar’, ‘attainable’
individuals;
 Reflects the information and economic opportunities of the local
environment;
 Multi-dimensional (‘similarity’);
 Aspiration gap:
 difference between the aspired ‘state’ and current ‘state’
 Conditions future-oriented behaviour - inverted U relationship
between gap and effort
A possible outcome is an aspiration failure - lack of pro-active
behaviour (or ‘under-investment’) towards filling the aspiration
gap
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8. Conceptual Schema
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9. Elements of the Aspirations Perspective
Measurement Issues
• Aspirations are not directly observable
– Revealed by observed behaviour: interpretation issues (linking
aspirations and behaviour)
– Elicited using subjective questions: measurement issues
• Limits to subjective assessment:
– Subjects: subjects’ willingness to report private knowledge, evaluation
apprehension, and subject role playing
– Instruments (attributes of): order of questions (anchoring), the
number of categories on the rating scale (odd-even), the adjectives that
are used as the endpoints of the rating scale, and the adverbs that
describe scale categories.
(e.g. Delavande et al. (2009), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) for
reviews)
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10. Elements of the Aspirations Perspective
Identification issues
• individual characteristics affect aspirations, aspiration windows
and behaviour (e.g. schooling levels, wealth, and family
background),
Particularly the endogeneity of the aspiration window a key
hurdle
• aspirations ‘cause’ success – a person with higher aspirations
may be more successful.
• Success ‘causes’ aspirations – a successful person may revise
his/her aspiration to a higher level, or
experiment, panel data
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11. The “Aspirations” project
Step 1 – correlates of aspiration-related concepts
Step 2 – test and validate a measurement strategy
Step 3 – assess validity of the “aspiration window” hypothesis
 An experiment
 Exogenous shock to aspirations: Mini-documentaries of local
success stories screened to randomly selected individuals.
Placebo: local TV show.
 3 rounds of data
• Baseline pre-treatment (Sept-Dec 2010)
• Aspirations retest immediately after treatment
• Follow-up (Mar-May 2011)
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12. Field Experiment - Aspirations Measures
200,000 ETB ~ value of
one harvest of chat from
one hectare
100,000 ETB ~ value of
one harvest of chat
from half a hectare
0 ETB
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13. Surveyed : Treatment, 6 households (12 individuals) in every village
Placebo, 6 households (12 individuals) in every village
Control, 6 households (12 individuals) in every village
Non-Surveyed : Treatment, 18 households (36 individuals)/ intense treatment
village
Placebo, 18 households (36 individuals)/ intense placebo village
Treatment village Placebo village
 16 Screening sites, 4 villages/screening site (2 Intense Treatment, 2 Intense
Placebo),
 36 households/village (18 households surveyed, 18 households not surveyed)
Field Experiment – Design
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14. On going experiment
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15. Field Experiment – Basic Features
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All
villages
Intense-
treatment
villages
Intense-
placebo
villages
# villages 64 32 32
# individuals 1,942 1,011 931
of which:
Treatment individuals 610 324 303
Control individuals 625 343 311
Placebo individuals 620 344 317
Avg # peers invited to treatment 0.83 1.23 0.39
(std.dev) (0.92) (0.96) (0.63)
Avg # peers invited to placebo 0.77 0.38 1.20
(std.dev) (0.89) (0.61) (0.95)

16. Field Experiment – Baseline Correlates of Aspirations
Income
aspiration
Wealth
aspiration
Education
aspiration
Social status
aspiration
Aspiration
index
Age -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.003
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)** (0.001)**
Age² 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)***
Gender (Male=1) 0.008 0.062 0.258 0.096 0.104
(0.002)*** (0.036)* (0.051)*** (0.049)** (0.021)***
Education (Read/write=1) -0.000 0.068 0.333 0.312 0.152
(0.002) (0.070) (0.051)*** (0.073)*** (0.027)***
R2 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.07
N 1,964 1,967 1,932 1,957 1,865
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects included but not reported; Robust standard errors in
parentheses
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17. Balance
Sample balanced on gender, literacy, age and most outcomes
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
All
Treatment
(T)
Placebo
(P)
Control
(C)
% compliance by treatment status 95 93.8 96.2 100
Education
(Read/write
=1)
Gender
(% male)
Age
(complete
d years)
Baseline Standarized ---- Aspiration
Income Wealth
Children's
Education
Social
Status
Aggregate
Difference:
T-C, p-value
0.02 0.32 0 0.84 0.15 0.86 0.1 0.14 0.03 0.35 0.05 0.43 0.09 0.08* 0.04 0.12
Difference:
P-C, p-value
0.02 0.32 0 0.93 0.05 0.94 0 0.89 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.83 0.04 0.55 0.01 0.5
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18. Field Experiment - Compliance and Potency of Treatment
Treatment
(standard
error)
Placebo
(standard
error)
Difference
(p-value)
Liked a lot what I saw?
0.95 0.73 0.22
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00)***
Discussed it a lot with my neighbours
0.87 0.71 0.15
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)***
Discussed it at least once with neighbours
over the past two weeks
0.32 0.21 0.11
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00)***
Content generated a lot of discussion
within community
0.92 0.72 0.20
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)***
Assessment of Documentaries and Placebo
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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19. Field Experiment - Compliance and Potency of Treatment
How does his/her present condition
fares compared to yours today?
He/she is
worse off
We’re about
the same
He/she is
better off
How did his/her
initial condition
fared compared
to yours five years
ago?
He/she was worse off 9.35 1.40 40.19
We were about the same 4.83 2.49 12.15
He/she was better off 6.70 1.71 21.18
Table 5 – Relevance of documentaries
Cell proportions are reported. The totals of all cells add up to 100. N=642
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20. Impact on Aspirations - Estimation strategy
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21. Treatment and Placebo Effects on Aspirations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment
0.027 0.026
(0.018) (0.018)
Placebo
0.016 0.015
(0.018) (0.018)
# peers w/treatment
0.026 0.021
(0.010)*** (0.009)**
# peers w/placebo
0.001 -0.022
(0.010) (0.012)*
Baseline aspiration
0.132 0.157 0.132 0.157
(0.062)** (0.050)*** (0.062)** (0.050)***
Constant
0.053 0.038 0.095 0.018
(0.035) (0.036) (0.037)*** (0.037)
R2 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08
N 1,210 1,258 1,210 1,258
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects not reported; Robust standard errors in parenthesis
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22. Treatment and Placebo Effects on Expectations
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects not reported; Robust standard errors in parenthesis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment
0.051 0.049
(0.023)** (0.023)*
Placebo
0.021 0.018
(0.021) (0.021)
# peers w/treatment
0.024 0.032
(0.010)** (0.010)***
# peers w/placebo
0.015 0.007
(0.011) (0.014)
Baseline expectations
0.401 0.074 0.402 0.075
(0.056)*** (0.032)** (0.057)*** (0.032)**
Constant
-0.047 -0.070 -0.028 -0.093
(0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047)
R2 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.06
N 1,093 1,141 1,093 1,141
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23. Treatment and Placebo Effects on Future-Oriented Behaviour
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects not reported; Robust standard errors in parenthesis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment
-3.33 -3.83
(12.61) (12.67)
Placebo
-8.46 -8.85
(16.91) (16.865)
# peers w/treatment
18.48 24.91
(7.97)** (10.6)**
# peers w/placebo
-9.63 -9.47
(8.49) (6.73)
Baseline time
allocation - Work
0.69 0.61 0.70 0.60
(0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)***
Constant
138.1 167.7 156.0 141.7
(79.4)* (81.8)** (87.2)* (74.9)*
R2
0.3 0.18 0.3 0.18
N 1,280 1,317 1,280 1,317
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Treatment effects on time allocation - work

24. Treatment and Placebo Effects on Future-Oriented Behaviour
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects not reported; Robust standard errors in parenthesis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment
19.97 19.84
(12.93) (13.04)
Placebo
26.39 26.83
(12.79)** (13.01)**
# peers w/treatment
-0.74 -10.87
(6.60) (6.28)*
# peers w/placebo
1.79 3.35
(6.52) (5.71)
Baseline time
allocation - Work
0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Constant
522.6 549.2 519.8 560.2
(34.2)*** (33.3)*** (34.9)*** (33.8)***
R2
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
N 1,284 1,322 1,284 1,322
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Treatment effects on time allocation - leisure

25. Treatment and Placebo Effects on Future-Oriented Behaviour
Savings Savings Deposits Deposits Withdrawals Withdrawals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment
186.9 63.5 33.7
(106.4)* (22.3)*** (17.2)*
Placebo
126.1 17.9 4.6
(95.1) (20.6) (9.3)
# peers with treatment
34.3 -37.1 -5.4
(85.9) (11.9)*** (6.7)
# peers with placebo
-28.2 -7.0 7.7
(46.9) (10.5) (6.2)
Baseline savings
0.741 0.658 -0.011 0.137 0.004 0.016
(0.578) (0.513) (0.011) (0.198) (0.017) (0.019)
Constant
-105.3 -24.9 80.9 24.1 55.2 32.7
(314.9) (271.4) (47.9)* (21.8) (108.1) (16.4)**
R2 0.16 0.29 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
N 1,258 1,288 1,258 1,288 1,258 1,288
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects and controls for age, age², gender and education not
reported; Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Table 10 – Treatment effects on savings behaviour
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26. Treatment and Placebo Effects on Future-Oriented Behaviour
Table A1 - Direct and indirect treatment effect on Locus of Control
LOC
others
LOC others LOC internal LOC
internal
LOC chance LOC
chance
Treatment
-0.027 0.083 -0.030
(0.051) (0.038)** (0.044)
Placebo -0.015 -0.027 -0.028
(0.050) (0.039) (0.043)
# peers w/treatment
-0.056 -0.016 -0.059
(0.028)** (0.020) (0.023)**
# peers w/placebo
-0.002 -0.018 0.023
(0.028) (0.023) (0.025)
Baseline LOC
0.196 0.212 0.089 0.098 0.166 0.144
(0.031)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.027)*** (0.025)***
Constant
1.720 1.736 2.726 2.684 1.900 1.911
(0.120)*** (0.127)*** (0.124)*** (0.123)*** (0.105)*** (0.104)***
R2 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05
N 1,341 1,372 1,342 1,373 1,341 1,374
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects not reported; Robust standard errors in parenthesis
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27. Treatment and Placebo Effects on Future-Oriented Behaviour
Table A2 - Direct and indirect treatment effect on Perception of Poverty
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects not reported; Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Poverty due to Fate Poverty Structural Poverty Individual
Treatment
-0.108 0.033 0.088
(0.048)** (0.038) (0.042)**
Placebo
-0.005 0.058 0.072
(0.048) (0.037) (0.042)*
# peers
w/treatment
-0.048 -0.046 -0.011
(0.027)* (0.021)** (0.024)
# peers
w/placebo
0.008 -0.012 -0.005
(0.029) (0.023) (0.025)
Baseline
percept poverty
0.060 0.028 0.111 0.052 0.058 0.083
(0.031)* (0.031) (0.033)*** (0.030) (0.032)* (0.030)***
Constant
2.397 2.506 2.465 2.723 2.907 2.869
(0.116)*** (0.120)*** (0.120)*** (0.114)*** (0.124)*** (0.119)***
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
N 1,339 1,368 1,337 1,368 1,339 1,370
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28. Observations
 "Weak" treatment, but:
 Documentaries affected aspirations, expectations, time
allocation, savings behaviour, and perceptions more than
the placebo even 6 months after treatment;
 Direct and, even more visible, indirect (group) effects are
detected – more of an aspiration window story rather
than a role model one;
 It is not obvious why some effects are direct (savings)
while others are indirect (time allocation);
 Further analysis;
 Expanding coverage – Malawi, Pakistan via IFPRI;
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