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FFRI, Inc.
Confidential
Fourteenforty Research Institute, Inc.
FFRI, Inc.
http://www.ffri.jp
ARMv8-M TrustZone:
A New Security Feature for Embedded Systems
FFRI, Inc.
Confidential
• Architecture for embedded devices (Cortex-M Processor family)
which was announced in Nov 2015.
• In order to comprehensively support for embedded systems that
require the characteristics of the conventional ARMv6-M/ARMv7-M
architecture, ARMv8-M has prepared 2 sub-profiles.
– Baseline
• For Ultra-low-power products
• Similar to the ARMv6-M
– Mainline
• A full-featured, microcontroller
products and high-performance
embedded systems.
• Similar to the ARMv7-M
ARMv8-M Architecture
2
ARMv8-M
Mainline
ARMv8-M
Baseline
(Optional)
Floating-Point
(Optional)
DSP
FFRI, Inc.
Confidential
• Security features that ARM processor provides.
– Cortex-A family or next-generation Cortex-M processors
• It is possible to separate/isolate the security level by adding
the security state.
– e.g. Normal World & Secure World
• ARMv8-M architecture has a different mechanism than
TrustZone to provide traditional ARMv8-A architecture, which
is optimized for embedded systems.
TrustZone
3
FFRI, Inc.
Confidential
• Add a monitor mode, it is separated into “Normal World” and
“Secure World”.
– To transition monitor mode,
use SMC instruction.
– A kind of virtualization feature using
the OS monitor.
• iPhone of Secure Enclave
are known to have been using
the TrustZone.
• For more information, please refer to the our research paper,
which was published in March 2013. (Japanese only)
TrustZone (ARMv7, ARMv8-A, etc…)
4
ARMv8-A
Normal World Secure World
Monitor
User Mode
Priv Mode
User Mode
Priv Mode
FFRI, Inc.
Confidential
• Add a secure state, it is possible into Non-secure Handler/Thread
mode and Secure Handler/Thread mode.
– The state transition to use the branch instruction.
– System rises by default in the “Secure” state.
• Throughout the reminder of this article describes ARMv8-M TrustZone.
TrustZone (ARMv8-M)
5
ARMv7-M
Handler
Mode
Thread
Mode
ARMv8-M
Non-secure
Handler
Mode
Thread
Mode
Secure
Handler
Mode
Thread
Mode
FFRI, Inc.
Confidential
• In addition to the definition by the developer of microcontrollers and
SoC, it can also be defined the software by utilizing the SAU and
IDAU interfaces.
• Memory spaces can be
divided into three.
(See the figure on the right)
• State of the processor is
dependent on definition of
the memory space.
ARMv8-M TrustZone - Memory space separation
6
SAU: Software Attribution Unit
IDAU: Implementation Defined Attribution Unit
Secure
Non-Secure
Callable
Non-Secure
Code
Data
Stack
Heap, etc…
Code
Data
Stack
Heap, etc…
Entry to
Secure
Code
Vector of
secure
gateway
0xffffffff
0x00000000
FFRI, Inc.
Confidential
• To call processing of the Secure region from the Non-Secure
region, it is necessary to relay a secure gateway.
– The first instruction of the function to be called from Non-Secure
region MUST always SG (Secure Gateway) instruction.
– SG instruction MUST be present in the NSC (Non-Secure Callable)
region.
• In case of call processing of the Non-Secure region from the
Secure region, push current state to stack and then branch to
Non-Secure region.
– When processing branch to the Non-Secure region, reserved value
FNC_RETURN is set to Link Register. (LR)
– When returning to Secure region branches to this Link Register.
(FNC_RETURN)
ARMv8-M TrustZone – Secure Gateway
7
FFRI, Inc.
Confidential
• If Non-Secure region program accessed directly to address of
the Secure region occurs following exception.
– In Mainline SecureFault(7), in Baseline HardFault(3) is an
exception occurs in Secure State.
ARMv8-M TrustZone - Secure Gateway
8
/* Secure */
Func_A:
;Secure Routine
bxns lr
/* NSC */
Func_A_Entry:
SG
b Func_A
/* Non-Secure */
bl Func_A_Entry
…
/* Secure */
Func_A:
;Secure Routine
blxns r0
…
/* NSC */
Func_A_Entry:
SG
b Func_A
/* Non-Secure */
Func_B:
;Non-Secure Routine
bx lr
(3)
(4)
(5)(1)
(2)
Secure
State
Non-Secure
State
State transition of the processor
(1)
(2)
(3), (4)
(5)
0xffffffff
0x00000000
Exception
FFRI, Inc.
Confidential
• Region number is assigned in the memory space defined by the
aforementioned SAU and IDAU.
– Possible to know whether
it has the security attribute
target is continuous by the
region number.
• New TestTarget (TT) instruction
to return security attributes and
region number from the address.
– By using TT instruction, it is
possible to know address
range of the array or structure
is belong to the same region.
ARMv8-M TrustZone - Test Target
9
Secure
Non-Secure
Secure
Non-Secure
0xffffffff
0x00000000
Secure
Region
#4
Non-
Secure
Region#3
Secure
Region
#2
Non-
Secure
Region
#1
Start-End address range is
same region.
Start-End address is
across the different
regions.
Start-End address range is
same region.
FFRI, Inc.
Confidential
• Even for embedded device architecture that supported the TrustZone,
protection of data it is realistic also due to this technology for a variety
of IoT and in-vehicle devices.
• For example, IoT device vendors by storing in advance the firmware in
the Secure region, it can be expected that the reverse engineering
measures.
ARMv8-M TrustZone - example usage for
embedded systems
10
ECU ECU
TrustZone enabled processor
in embedded device
ARMv8-M
ARMv8-M
Secure
FW
Libraries
Key
Non-Secure
User Data
Drivers, etc…
IoT/M2M
Devices
FFRI, Inc.
Confidential
• In this paper, we introduce the TrustZone of information that has
published at this time in relation to ARMv8-M.
– There is a specification change possibility in the future because some
document is still Beta.
• In Febrary 2016, the processor and evaluation board of ARMv8-M
architecture has not been confirmed in the market.
– For even compiler, GCC and Clang is currently working.
• For automotive, already HSM (Hardware Security Module) is present as
a standard.
– Therefore, semiconductor manufactures are mainly shipped microcontroller
products that conform to this standard as automotive.
– With the advent of the ARMv8-M, the future there is a possibility that
products utilizing the TrustZone is announced.
Summary
11
FFRI, Inc.
Confidential
• Whitepaper – ARMv8-M Architecture Technical Overview
– https://community.arm.com/docs/DOC-10896
• ARM® コンパイラ ソフトウェア開発ガイド バージョン6.3
– http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.dui
0773dj/pge1446115999905_00009.html
• (動画) ARMv8-M architecture: what’s new for developers
– https://youtu.be/V5zr5mPjAvU
• FFRI Monthly Research – セキュアハードウェアの登場とその分析
– http://www.ffri.jp/assets/files/monthly_research/MR201303_Trust
Zone.pdf
References
12
ARM® and TrustZone® are trademarks of ARM Ltd.

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ARMv8-M TrustZone: A New Security Feature for Embedded Systems (FFRI Monthly Research 2016.02)

  • 1. FFRI, Inc. Confidential Fourteenforty Research Institute, Inc. FFRI, Inc. http://www.ffri.jp ARMv8-M TrustZone: A New Security Feature for Embedded Systems
  • 2. FFRI, Inc. Confidential • Architecture for embedded devices (Cortex-M Processor family) which was announced in Nov 2015. • In order to comprehensively support for embedded systems that require the characteristics of the conventional ARMv6-M/ARMv7-M architecture, ARMv8-M has prepared 2 sub-profiles. – Baseline • For Ultra-low-power products • Similar to the ARMv6-M – Mainline • A full-featured, microcontroller products and high-performance embedded systems. • Similar to the ARMv7-M ARMv8-M Architecture 2 ARMv8-M Mainline ARMv8-M Baseline (Optional) Floating-Point (Optional) DSP
  • 3. FFRI, Inc. Confidential • Security features that ARM processor provides. – Cortex-A family or next-generation Cortex-M processors • It is possible to separate/isolate the security level by adding the security state. – e.g. Normal World & Secure World • ARMv8-M architecture has a different mechanism than TrustZone to provide traditional ARMv8-A architecture, which is optimized for embedded systems. TrustZone 3
  • 4. FFRI, Inc. Confidential • Add a monitor mode, it is separated into “Normal World” and “Secure World”. – To transition monitor mode, use SMC instruction. – A kind of virtualization feature using the OS monitor. • iPhone of Secure Enclave are known to have been using the TrustZone. • For more information, please refer to the our research paper, which was published in March 2013. (Japanese only) TrustZone (ARMv7, ARMv8-A, etc…) 4 ARMv8-A Normal World Secure World Monitor User Mode Priv Mode User Mode Priv Mode
  • 5. FFRI, Inc. Confidential • Add a secure state, it is possible into Non-secure Handler/Thread mode and Secure Handler/Thread mode. – The state transition to use the branch instruction. – System rises by default in the “Secure” state. • Throughout the reminder of this article describes ARMv8-M TrustZone. TrustZone (ARMv8-M) 5 ARMv7-M Handler Mode Thread Mode ARMv8-M Non-secure Handler Mode Thread Mode Secure Handler Mode Thread Mode
  • 6. FFRI, Inc. Confidential • In addition to the definition by the developer of microcontrollers and SoC, it can also be defined the software by utilizing the SAU and IDAU interfaces. • Memory spaces can be divided into three. (See the figure on the right) • State of the processor is dependent on definition of the memory space. ARMv8-M TrustZone - Memory space separation 6 SAU: Software Attribution Unit IDAU: Implementation Defined Attribution Unit Secure Non-Secure Callable Non-Secure Code Data Stack Heap, etc… Code Data Stack Heap, etc… Entry to Secure Code Vector of secure gateway 0xffffffff 0x00000000
  • 7. FFRI, Inc. Confidential • To call processing of the Secure region from the Non-Secure region, it is necessary to relay a secure gateway. – The first instruction of the function to be called from Non-Secure region MUST always SG (Secure Gateway) instruction. – SG instruction MUST be present in the NSC (Non-Secure Callable) region. • In case of call processing of the Non-Secure region from the Secure region, push current state to stack and then branch to Non-Secure region. – When processing branch to the Non-Secure region, reserved value FNC_RETURN is set to Link Register. (LR) – When returning to Secure region branches to this Link Register. (FNC_RETURN) ARMv8-M TrustZone – Secure Gateway 7
  • 8. FFRI, Inc. Confidential • If Non-Secure region program accessed directly to address of the Secure region occurs following exception. – In Mainline SecureFault(7), in Baseline HardFault(3) is an exception occurs in Secure State. ARMv8-M TrustZone - Secure Gateway 8 /* Secure */ Func_A: ;Secure Routine bxns lr /* NSC */ Func_A_Entry: SG b Func_A /* Non-Secure */ bl Func_A_Entry … /* Secure */ Func_A: ;Secure Routine blxns r0 … /* NSC */ Func_A_Entry: SG b Func_A /* Non-Secure */ Func_B: ;Non-Secure Routine bx lr (3) (4) (5)(1) (2) Secure State Non-Secure State State transition of the processor (1) (2) (3), (4) (5) 0xffffffff 0x00000000 Exception
  • 9. FFRI, Inc. Confidential • Region number is assigned in the memory space defined by the aforementioned SAU and IDAU. – Possible to know whether it has the security attribute target is continuous by the region number. • New TestTarget (TT) instruction to return security attributes and region number from the address. – By using TT instruction, it is possible to know address range of the array or structure is belong to the same region. ARMv8-M TrustZone - Test Target 9 Secure Non-Secure Secure Non-Secure 0xffffffff 0x00000000 Secure Region #4 Non- Secure Region#3 Secure Region #2 Non- Secure Region #1 Start-End address range is same region. Start-End address is across the different regions. Start-End address range is same region.
  • 10. FFRI, Inc. Confidential • Even for embedded device architecture that supported the TrustZone, protection of data it is realistic also due to this technology for a variety of IoT and in-vehicle devices. • For example, IoT device vendors by storing in advance the firmware in the Secure region, it can be expected that the reverse engineering measures. ARMv8-M TrustZone - example usage for embedded systems 10 ECU ECU TrustZone enabled processor in embedded device ARMv8-M ARMv8-M Secure FW Libraries Key Non-Secure User Data Drivers, etc… IoT/M2M Devices
  • 11. FFRI, Inc. Confidential • In this paper, we introduce the TrustZone of information that has published at this time in relation to ARMv8-M. – There is a specification change possibility in the future because some document is still Beta. • In Febrary 2016, the processor and evaluation board of ARMv8-M architecture has not been confirmed in the market. – For even compiler, GCC and Clang is currently working. • For automotive, already HSM (Hardware Security Module) is present as a standard. – Therefore, semiconductor manufactures are mainly shipped microcontroller products that conform to this standard as automotive. – With the advent of the ARMv8-M, the future there is a possibility that products utilizing the TrustZone is announced. Summary 11
  • 12. FFRI, Inc. Confidential • Whitepaper – ARMv8-M Architecture Technical Overview – https://community.arm.com/docs/DOC-10896 • ARM® コンパイラ ソフトウェア開発ガイド バージョン6.3 – http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.dui 0773dj/pge1446115999905_00009.html • (動画) ARMv8-M architecture: what’s new for developers – https://youtu.be/V5zr5mPjAvU • FFRI Monthly Research – セキュアハードウェアの登場とその分析 – http://www.ffri.jp/assets/files/monthly_research/MR201303_Trust Zone.pdf References 12 ARM® and TrustZone® are trademarks of ARM Ltd.