PSA - Lezione 28 ottobre 2014 - RISK

Analisidel rischio: ilcasodell’incendiodi strutturecivili
CORSO DIPROGETTAZIONE STRUTTURALE ANTINCENDIO
1
October 28 2014
www.francobontempi.org
Konstantinos Gkoumas, Ph.D., P.E.
Franco Bontempi, Ph.D., P.E.
Facoltà di Ingegneria
Sapienza Università di Roma

Index
•System approach to fire safety design
•Risk/fire risk/risk analysis
•Risk assessment process
•Risk analysis
•Hazard analysis
•Risk acceptance
•Risk reduction
•References
2
ANALISI DEL RISCHIO:
IL CASO DELL’INCENDIO DI STRUTTURE CIVILI

3

•System approach to fire safety design
•Risk
-fire risk
-risk types
-risk analysis
4

System approach to fire safety design
CORSO DI PROGETTAZIONE STRUTTURALE ANTINCENDIO
MINOR
SPREAD
STOP FIRE FIRE SPREAD
suppression
Y
MAJOR
SPREAD
STRUCTURAL
INTEGRITY
AVOID
CASUALITIES
LOCALISED
DAMAGE
STRUCTURAL
FAILURES
N
mitigation
Y
N
fire safe design
Y
N
FIRE
robust design
Y
N
MAJOR
COLLAPSE
AVOID
DIRECT
DAMAGE
AVOID
COLLAPSE
1
2
3
4
0 OBJECTIVE prevention
fire safety design -
structural
fire safety design -
non structural
GLOBAL
SAFETY
LOSS OF
GLOBAL
SAFETY
AVOID
INDIRECT
DAMAGE
Y N
The fire safety is framed in different
“safety levels”, corresponding to
different safety objectives.
IL CASO DELL’INCENDIO
DI STRUTTURE CIVILI
5

(Fire) RiskEstimation*
*(following SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering)
Provide answer to the following questions
1.Whatcould happen?
2.How bad would it be if it did happen?
3.How likely is it to happen
6

Whatisrisk?
Risk can be defined as the probability that the harmor damagefrom a particular hazardis realized.
Risk is measured in terms of consequencesand likelihood(a qualitative description of probability or frequency). In mathematical terms risk can be defined as:
risk= f(frequencyor probability, consequence) (1)
In the case of an activity with only one event with potential consequences, a risk(R) is the probability(P) that this event will occur multiplied with the consequences(C) given the event occurs:
R= PC(2)
The risk of a system is the sum of the risks of all harmful events of that system:
(3)
푅푆= 푅푖 푛 푖=1 7

Risktypes
•Life safety risks are normally presented in two ways:
-Individual risk and
-Societal risk
•Individualrisk:
The purpose of the individual risk is to ensure that individuals in the society are not exposed to unacceptably high risks. It can be defined as the risk to any occupant on the scene for the event/hazard scenario i.e. it is the risk to an individual and not to a group of people.
•Societalrisk:
Societal risk is not looking at one individual but is concerned with the risk of multiple fatalities. People are treated as a group, there are no considerations taken to the individuals within the group i.e. the definition of the risk is from a societal point of view.
Source: Jönsson, 2007
8

Whatisriskanalysis?
•A big family of different approaches, methodsand complex modelscombining various methododicalcomponents for specific tasks
•Systematic analysis of sequencesand interaction effects in potential accidents, thereby identifying weak points in the system and recognizing possible improvement measures
•Risk analysis makes the quantificationof risks feasible
9

The risk assessment process
10

The risk assessment process
Start
Definition of the system
Hazard identification
Probability analysis
Consequence analysis
Additional safety measures
Risk estimation
Risk evaluation
Risk criteria
Acceptable risk?
Stop
Risk analysis
Risk evaluation
YES
NO
Risk reduction
11

Definition of the system (context establishment)
Define the operational environment and the context of the risk assessment process
–Definition of the scopeor the risk assessment process
•This includes determining the timeframe (e.g. from planning to dismantling), the required resources and the depth of analysis required.
–Definition of the strategic and organizational context
•The nature of the organization in charge of the risk management and the environment in which it operates is established
–Identification of the stakeholdersand objectives
•The relationships that are interdependent with the organization are defined, the impacts that might occur are accounted for, as well as and what each is wanting out of the relationship
–Determination of the evaluation criteria
•Decide what level of risk the organization is prepared to accept
12

a.Whatcan happen
b.Howcan ithappen
Means for hazard identification:
•Decompositionof the system into a number of components and/or subsystems
•Identification of possible states of failurefor the considered system and sub-systems
•Identification of howthe hazards might be realized for the considered system and subsystems
Source: Faber, 2008
13

DI STRUTTURE CIVILI
Hazard identification – system decomposition
A. Structure
1. Main components
(d) Foundations
(c) Towers
(b) Anchor systems
(a) Main cables
(h) Cable saddle
(e) Railway girder
(f) Highway girders
(g) Expansion joints
(e) Non str.elements
(a) Steel
(b) Concrete
(c) Prestressed c.
(d) Alluminium/iron
3. Materials
(f) Coating
4. Systems
(a) Electrical
(c) Hydraulics
(b) Mechanical
(e) Bitumen
(e) Plastic
2. Secondary comp.
(d) H.R. attachments
(c) TMD
(b) Buffers
(a) Hanger ropes
B. Users
1. Highway traffic
(b) Commercial
(a) Private
2. Railway traffic
(b) Commercial
(a) Private
(a) Heavy
(b) Hazard mat.
(c) Military
3. Exceptional traffic
C. Facilities
1. Over the bridge
(b) Railway
(a) Highway
2. By the bridge
(a) Highway
(b) Railway
(c) Toll booths
(d) Control center
(e) Parking
(a) Maritime traffic
3. Under the bridge
D. Dependencies
1. Power
3. Financial
2. Communications
4. Supplies
5. Emerg. Responce
(a) First aid
(b) Police
(c) Fire brigade
(d) Hospitals
6. Ext. Contractors
E. Linkage
1. Economy
3. Military
2. Social
F. Operation
1. Authorities
(b) Management
2. Aspects
(a) Bridge authorities
(b) Goverment
(c) Region
5. Personnel
(c) Maintenance
(a) Financial
(b) Other
(a) Technical
G. Technology
(a) GPS
(b) Accelerometers
(c) Strain gauges
(e) Thermometers
(g) CCTV
(f) WIM
(d) Seismographs
(h) Field equipment
1. Monitoring
2. Control
(a) Cable control
(d) Railway traffic
(c) Highway traffic
(b) TMD
3. Data transmission
(b) Wireless
(a) Cable
4. Computer center
(b) Software
(a) Hardware
(d) Internet/LAN
(c) Data bases
4. Regulations
3. Policies
4. Location
(c) External
Hierarchical Holographic Models (HHM)
(Defined in Haimes, 1981)
14

Risk analysis: hazard identification
•Qualitative methods
Studies based on the generic experience of personnel and do not involve mathematical estimations.
•Quantitative methods
Mathematical estimations that rely upon historical evidence or estimates of failures to predict the occurrence of an event.
•Semi-quantitative methods
Combination of the above (mostly, qualitative methods with applied numerical values).
Source: Nolan, D. P. Handbook of Fire and Explosion Protection Engineering Principles for Oil, Gas, Chemical, and Related Facilities, 1986
15

Source: Aven, T. Risk Analysis: Assessing Uncertainties beyond Expected Values and Probabilities. John Wiley & Sons, 2008
Risk analysis: hazard identification
16

Hazard identification. Qualitative Methods
Checklist or Worksheet
A standardized listing which identifies common protection features required for typical facilities is compared against the facility design and operation. Risksare expressed by the omission of safety systemsor system features.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
Each hazard is identified with potential causes and effects. Recommendations or known protective measures are listed.
What-If analysis
A safety study which by which “What-If’ investigative questions (brainstorming approach) are asked by an experienced team of a hydrocarbon system or components under examination. Risks are normally expressed in a qualitative numerical series (e.g., 1 to 5).
HAZOP -HAZardand OPerabilityanalysis(analisi di pericolo e operabilità)
A formal systematic critical safety study where deviationsof design intent of each component are formulated and analyzed from a standardized list. Risks are typically expressed in a qualitative numerical series (e.g., 1 to 5) relative to one another.
Source: Nolan, D.P. 1986. Handbook of Fire and Explosion Protection Engineering Principles for …. Noyes, New Jersey 17

Hazard identification. Qualitative Methods
Event Trees (ET) –alberodeglieventi
A mathematical logic model that mathematically and graphically portrays the combination of events and circumstances in an accident sequence, expressed in an annual estimation.
Fault Trees (FT) –alberideiguasti
A mathematical logic model that mathematically and graphically portrays the combination of failures that can lead to a specific main failure or accident of interest, expressed in an annual estimation.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
A systematic, tabular method of evaluating the causes and effects of known types of component failures, expressed in an annual estimation.
Source: Nolan, D.P. 1986. Handbook of Fire and Explosion Protection Engineering Principles for …. Noyes, New Jersey 18

•Risk analysis
•Qualitative risk analysis
•Quantitative risk analysis
19

Risk analysis
•Risk analysis
–Probability-as the likelihood of the risk occurrence
–Impact -consequences if the risk occurs
•risk proximity, meant as the point in time during which a risk will impact
•Risk analysis -methods
–Qualitative Risk Analysis, in which numbers and probabilities are used not extensively or at all
–Quantified Risk Analysis(QRA)
–Probabilistic Risk Analysis(PRA), in which the system risk is represented as a probability distribution
20

Risk analysis and system complexity
High-Probability/ Low-Consequences(HPLC) Low-Probability/ High-Consequences (LPHC) StochasticComplexityDeterministicAnalysisMethodsQualitativeRiskAnalysisQuantitative/ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisPragmaticRiskScenariosStochasticComplexityDeterministicAnalysisMethodsQualitativeRiskAnalysisQuantitative/ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisPragmaticRiskScenarios
21

Qualitative Risk analysis
•Qualitative Risk Analysis is the simplestmethod of risk analysis, and generally is used during the preliminary analysis phases.
•It consists in using subjective assessments of risks, and consequently, in ranking them in a subjective manner.
•Sources for information to be used in the analysis can be drown from previous experiences, history of events and consultation of experts.
•The rankingof risks is qualitative, e.g. risk (1) > risk (2) > risk (3), while a description can be added. Eventually, a likelihood-consequence matrix can be constructed.
•The biggest drawback of QRA is that there is neither a clear indication of the risk’s magnitude nor an absolute scale of how serious the risk might be, so, for a comprehensive risk analysis of more complex systems, quantitative methods should be preferred.
22

Qualitative risk analysis methods: risk matrix
•A risk matrix typically provides a discrete partitioning of relative consequences along one dimension and relative likelihood along the other.
•The entry in each matrix cell may include a description of hazards known or believed to have that combination of consequence severity and likelihood.
Source: NFPA, SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 3rdedition, 2002
Source: Furness, A., Muckett, M. Introduction to Fire Safety Management. Elsevier, 2007.
23

Qualitative risk analysis methods: SWOT analysis
24
Strengths: characteristics of the business or project that give it an advantage over others.
Weaknesses: characteristics that place the business or project at a disadvantage relative to others
Opportunities: elements that the project could exploit to its advantage
Threats: elements in the environment that could cause trouble for the business or project

Quantitative Risk analysis
•Quantified (or quantitative) Risk Analysis (QRA) combines the consequences and frequencies of accident scenarios to estimate the level of risk.
•In respect to the Qualitative method, QRA implicates the acquaintance of probabilities that describe the likelihoodof the outcomes and their consequences.
•QRA started with the chemical industries from the 70s and the offshore industry from the 80s.
•QRA is traditionally expressed through the decompositionof the system. This frequently is done by the use of event trees and fault trees.
25

FTA and ETA
•ETA (event tree analysis) provides a structure for postulating an initiating event and analyzing the potential outcomes
•FTA (fault tree analysis) begins with a failure and provides a structure to look for potential causes
26

Event tree analysis
•Event trees pictorially represent the logical order in which events in a system can occur. Event trees begin with an initiating event, and then the consequences of the event are followed through a series of possible paths.
•Each path is assigned a probability of occurrence. Therefore, the probability of the various possible outcomes can be calculated.
•Event tree analysis is based on binary logic, in which an event has either happened or not, or a component has failed or has not.
•It is valuable to analyze the consequences arising from a failure or undesired event.
27

Event tree analysis: illustration (1)
28
Event trees are helpful in considering all the possible outcomes (on the right-hand side) from an initiating event(on the left-hand side), which is usually ignition for fire risks.
The frequencyof the initiating event can be estimated from fire report data, and the conditional probabilities of the sub-events can be quantified from fire report data or fault trees.

Event tree analysis: illustration (2)
Source: Fire Risk in Metro Tunnels and Stations HyderConsulting
29

Fault tree analysis
30
Fault trees are helpful in quantifying the probability of a top eventof concern (such as the failure of a fire protection system) from all the potential root causes (at the bottom), again quantified from fire report data.

Fault tree analysis
general conclusion (event)
•Fault trees look like a complement to event trees.
•The idea is to begin with a general conclusion (event) and, using a top-downapproach, to generate a logic model that provides for both qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the system reliability.
Source: googlepictures search “Fault tree”
31

Fault tree analysis -symbols
Basic event-failure or error in a system component or element (example: switch stuck in open position)
Initiating event-an external event (example: bird strike to aircraft)
Undeveloped event-an event about which insufficient information is available, or which is of no consequence
Conditioning event-conditions that restrict or affect logic gates (example: mode of operation in effect)
Intermediate event: can be used immediately above a primary event to provide more room to type the event description.
Source: Fault Tree Handbook. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NUREG–0492
32

Fault tree analysis –gate symbols
OR gate -the output occurs if any input occurs
AND gate -the output occurs only if all inputs occur (inputs are independent)
Exclusive OR gate -the output occurs if exactly one input occurs
Priority AND gate -the output occurs if the inputs occur in a specific sequence specified by a conditioning event
Inhibit gate -the output occurs if the input occurs under an enabling condition specified by a conditioning event
Source: Fault Tree Handbook. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NUREG–0492
33

Advantages and disadvantages of FTA
•Disadvantages
1.There is a possibility of oversight and omission of significant failure modes.
2.It is difficult to apply Boolean logic to describe failures of system components that can be partially successful in operation and thereby affect the operation of the system, e.g. leakage through a valve.
3.For the quantitative analysis there is usually a lack of pertinent failure data. Even when there are data they may have been obtained from a different environment.
•Advantages
1.It provides a systematic procedure for identifying faults that can exist within a system.
2.It forces the analyst to understand the system thoroughly.
Source: Hasoferet al. 2007, Risk Analysis in Building Fire Safety Engineering
34

Cause –consequence diagrams
•The combination of fault trees and event trees leads to the creation of cause-consequence diagrams.
TimeRevealed from the Monitoring systemS3S2S1ConsequencesInfraction of traffic lawImproper speedRoad conditionVehicle flowblockedYESYESNONOOtherIniziative eventRoadAccident
35

DI STRUTTURE CIVILI
SCENARIO PROBABILITY
A1 PA*P1
A2 PA*(1-P1) *P2 *P3
A3 PA*(1-P1) *P2*(1-P3 )
A4 PA*(1-P1) *(1-P2)*P3
A5 PA*(1-P1) *(1-P2)*(1-P3)
B1 PB*P1
B2 PB*(1-P1) *P2 *P3
B3 PB*(1-P1) *P2*(1-P3 )
B4 PB*(1-P1) *(1-P2)*P3
B5 PB*(1-P1) *(1-P2)*(1-P3)
C1 PC*P1
C2 PC*(1-P1) *P2 *P3
C3 PC*(1-P1) *P2*(1-P3 )
C4 PC*(1-P1) *(1-P2)*P3
C5 PC*(1-P1) *(1-P2)*(1-P3)
Triggering
event
Fire
ignition
1. Fire
extinguished
by personnel
2. Intrusion of
fire fighters
Arson
Explosion
Short
circuit
Cigarette
fire
YES (P1)
NO (1-P1) YES (P2)
NO (1-P2)
Scenario
Other
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
3. Fire
suppression
YES (P3)
NO (1-P3)
YES (P3)
NO (1-P3)
Fire
location
AREA A
(PA)
YES (P1)
NO (1-P1) YES (P2)
NO (1-P2)
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
YES (P3)
NO (1-P3)
YES (P3)
NO (1-P3)
AREA B
(PB)
YES (P1)
NO (1-P1) YES (P2)
NO (1-P2)
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
YES (P3)
NO (1-P3)
YES (P3)
NO (1-P3)
AREA C
(PC)
Quantified Risk Analysis: cause – effect diagrams
36

F (frequency) –N (numberoffatalities) curve
•An F–N curve is an alternative way of describing the risk associated with loss of lives.
•An F–N curve shows the frequency (i.e. the expected number) of accident events with at least N fatalities, where the axes normally are Logarithmic.
•The F–N curve describes risk related to large-scale accidents, and is thus especially suited for characterizing societal risk.
37

38

Source: NFPA, SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 3rdedition, 2002
39

Index
•Risk acceptance
-ALARP
-Human life (!)
40

Risk acceptance
Source: Persson, M. Quantitative Risk Analysis Procedure for the Fire Evacuation of a Road Tunnel -An Illustrative Example. Lund, 2002
41

Risk acceptance –ALARP (1)
RISK MAGNITUDEINTOLERABLEREGIONAsLowAsReasonablyPracticableBROADLY ACCEPTABLEREGIONRisk cannot be justified in any circumstancesTolerable only if risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost is greatly disproportionate to the improvement gainedTolerable if cost of reduction would exceed the improvements gainedNecessary to maintain assurance that the risk remains at this levelAsLowAsReasonablyAchievableRISK levelAsLowAsReasonablyAchievable
42

Risk acceptance –ALARP (2)
Source: googlepictures search “ALARP”
43

Monetary values –cost of human life (!)
•What is the maximum amount the society (or the decision-maker) is willing to pay to reduce the expected number of fatalities by 1?
•Typical numbers for the value of a statistical life used in cost-benefit analysis are 1–10 million euros. The Ministry of Finance in Norway has arrived at a value at approximately 2 million euros.
Guideline values for the cost to avert a statistical life (euros), used by an oil company
44

F-N diagrams: case study on a 180m road tunnel
www.francobontempi.org 45
120MW Fire[fat+inj/year]0.00E+002100MW Fire[fat+inj/year]0.00E+003Bleve of 50kg propane cylinder[fat+inj/year]0.00E+004Motor spirit pool fire[fat+inj/year]0.00E+005VCE of motor spirit[fat+inj/year]0.00E+006Chlorine release[fat+inj/year]0.00E+007BLEVE of 18t propane tank[fat+inj/year]0.00E+008VCE of propane[fat+inj/year]0.00E+009Propane torch fire[fat+inj/year]0.00E+0010Ammonia Release[fat+inj/year]0.00E+0011Acrolein in bulk release[fat+inj/year]0.00E+0012Acrolein in cylinder release[fat+inj/year]0.00E+0013BLEVE of a 20t CO2 tank[fat+inj/year]0.00E+00All scenarios[fat+inj/year]0.00E+001+220MW - 100MW FIRES [fat+inj/year]0.00E+003+13BLEVE (except propane in bulk) [fat+inj/year]0.00E+004+5Flammable liquids [fat+inj/year]0.00E+006+10+11+12Toxic products [fat+inj/year]0.00E+007+8+9Propane in bulk [fat+inj/year]0.00E+00

DI STRUTTURE CIVILI
퐹푁 =
푖=1
푛
푓푖
퐸푉 =
푖=1
푛
푓푖 ∙ 푁푖
EVENT
Event
Frequency
Event
Consequence
Cumulative Frequency
(per year)
E1 f1 N1
F1 = f1
E2 f2 N1 F2 = f1 + f2
E3 f3 N2 F3 = f1 + f2 + f3
E4 f4 N4 F3 = f1 + f2 + f3 + f4
..... ..... ..... .....
En fn Nn Fn = f1 + f2 + f3 + f4+.....+ fn
F-N diagrams: case study on a 180m road tunnel

DI STRUTTURE CIVILI
Case study: 180m road tunnel
Trial 1 BASIS calculation
Trial 2 Total traffic [veh/h] 7200 72000
HGV ratio [-] 0.01 0.99
TrDen (traffic density) [-] 0.78 3.79
Bus/Coaches ratio [-] 0.01 0.99
HGV ratio [-] 0.01 0.99
Bus/Coaches ratio [-] 0.01 0.99
Trial 6 Light vehicles average speed [km/h] 80 179
Trial 7 HGV/Bus average speed [km/h] 60 119
Trial 8 Delay for stopping approaching traffic [s] 9000 1
Trial 9 Area (Urban/Rural) [-] urban rural
Trial 10 Average density of population [hab/km2] 0.01 999000
Trial 11 DG-HGV traffic [veh/h] 5 10000
Trial 12 Average number of people in a light vehicle [-] 2 10
Trial 13 W (effective width) [m] 10 5
Trial 14 H (effective height) [m] 6 3
Trial 15 VnN (volume flow rate along tunnel at nodes) [m3/s] 120 0
Trial 16 VnE (volume flow rate along tunnel at nodes) [m3/s] 210 0
Trial 17 tE (Time taken to activate emergency ventilation) [mins] 0.2 60
Trial 18 Xe (average spacing between emergency exits) [m] 90 1000
Trial 19 Cam (camber) [%] 0 100
Trial 20 Ad (open area of discrete drains) [m2] 0.075 0
Trial 21 Ecom (emergency coms) → 1, 2 o 3 [-] 3 1
Type of construction → 1 o 2 [-] 2 1
trad (internal radius) [m] - 6
dlin (lining thickness) [m] - 0.3
trad (wall thickness) [m] 0.2 -
dlin (roof slab thickness) [m] 0.2 -
Ns (Number of segments) [-] 6 15
Xs (Segment lengths) [m] 30 12
Nsub (number of sub-segments per segment) [-] 3 2
total number of sub-segments [-] 18 30
Xsub (actual sub-segment lengths) [m] 10 6
Trial 24 Number of lanes [-] 2 5
Trial 4
Trial 3
Trial 22
Trial 5
Trial 23
1 20MW Fire [fat+inj/year]
2 100MW Fire [fat+inj/year]
3 Bleve of 50kg propane cylinder [fat+inj/year]
4 Motor spirit pool fire [fat+inj/year]
5 VCE of motor spirit [fat+inj/year]
6 Chlorine release [fat+inj/year]
7 BLEVE of 18t propane tank [fat+inj/year]
8 VCE of propane [fat+inj/year]
9 Propane torch fire [fat+inj/year]
10 Ammonia Release [fat+inj/year]
11 Acrolein in bulk release [fat+inj/year]
12 Acrolein in cylinder release [fat+inj/year]
13 BLEVE of a 20t CO2 tank [fat+inj/year]
All scenarios [fat+inj/year]
1+2 20MW - 100MW FIRES [fat+inj/year]
3+13 BLEVE (except propane in bulk) [fat+inj/year]
4+5 Flammable liquids [fat+inj/year]
6+10+11+12 Toxic products [fat+inj/year]
7+8+9 Propane in bulk [fat+inj/year]
Societal Risk
EV (Expected Value of the dead)
Societal Risk
30m (distance from the route) [fat+inj/year]
80m [fat+inj/year]
200m [fat+inj/year]
500m [fat+inj/year]
30m [fat+inj/year]
80m [fat+inj/year]
200m [fat+inj/year]
500m [fat+inj/year]
Individual Risk
Direction A
Direction B
Individual Risk
4 analysis for every trial
Grouping

Risk reduction
48

Riskreduction
Source: Brussaardet al. 2004. The Dutch Model for the Quantitative Risk Analysis of Road Tunnels. 49

Risk reduction (2) -monitoring and system response
Time132AccidentAccident evolutionPre-accidentsituationPre-accidentMonitoringPre-accidentSystem ResponseAccidentLocalizationEvolution of System ResponseAccident evolution MonitoringSystemResponse
50

•NFPA, SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 3rdedition, 2002
•Jönsson, J. Combined Qualitative and Quantitative Fire Risk Analysis –Complex Urban Road Tunnel. Arup partners, 2007.
•Faber, M.H. (2008) Risk and Safety in Civil, Environmental and GeomaticEngineering. ETH Zürich, lecture notes, available online on 01/2011 at: http://www.ibk.ethz.ch/fa
•Haimes, Y. Y. (1981). Hierarchical holographic modeling. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 11(9), pp. 606–617.
•Nolan, D.P. 1986. Handbook of Fire and Explosion Protection Engineering Principles for Oil, Gas, Chemical, and Related Facilities. Noyes, New Jersey
•Aven, T. Risk Analysis: Assessing Uncertainties beyond Expected Values and Probabilities. John Wiley & Sons, 2008
•Furness, A. , Muckett, M. Introduction to Fire Safety Management. Elsevier, 2007.
•Fire Risk in Metro Tunnels and Stations, HyderConsulting, available on 05.2011 at http://hkarms.myftp.org/web_resources/Conference_Presentation/Fire_Risk_Metro_Tunnels_Stations.pdf
•Fault Tree Handbook. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NUREG–0492
•Hasoferet al. 2007, Risk Analysis in Building Fire Safety Engineering
•Persson, M. Quantitative Risk Analysis Procedure for the Fire Evacuation of a Road Tunnel -An Illustrative Example. Lund, 2002
•Brussaardet al. 2004. The Dutch Model for the Quantitative Risk Analysis of Road Tunnels. Available on 05.2011 at http://www.rws.nl/rws/bwd/home/Tunnelveiligheid/dutch%20model.pdf
•Gkoumas, K. 2008. Basic aspects of risk-analysis for civil engineering structures. Handling Exceptions in Structural Engineering: RobustezzaStrutturale, ScenariAccidentali, ComplessitàdiProgetto, Roma, 13-14 novembre. http://www.francobontempi.org/handling_papers.php
References
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