Workshop on Vehicular Networks and Sustainable Mobility Testbed

1. Ecosystems in the city
Workshop on Vehicular Networks and Sustainable Mobility
Testbed
Alexandre Sousa (avs@portodigital.pt, avs@ismai.pt)
.
Associação Porto Digital
.
ISMAI — Instituto Universitário da Maia
April 24, 2015

2. Porto Digital infrastructure
The needed utilities infrastructure
Budget limitations: build it in layers, reuse as much as
possible
The added-value is in the cars and trucks, not the network
The ecosystem
API, creative commons license, allow creating derived
content
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 2 / 10

3. Porto Digital infrastructure
The needed utilities infrastructure
Budget limitations: build it in layers, reuse as much as
possible
The added-value is in the cars and trucks, not the network
The ecosystem
API, creative commons license, allow creating derived
content
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 2 / 10

4. Porto Digital infrastructure
The needed utilities infrastructure
Budget limitations: build it in layers, reuse as much as
possible
The added-value is in the cars and trucks, not the network
The ecosystem
API, creative commons license, allow creating derived
content
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 2 / 10

5. If I was your boss ...
... and you were my smart team
Management prep talk: do more with less, ...
Security and privacy: know-how, budget, hubris, simplicity
(a few war stories)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 3 / 10

6. The budget approach
Airbus A 340, 5K per line of code (25 years ago)
Il y a du feu dans les toilettes
Fault tolerance, heisenberg bugs
Mechanical failure vs electronic failure, my 15 year car
What is secure software: even worse than fault-tolerant, a
malicious person is going to try to make it fail in the worst
possible moment and with the worst possible
consequences
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 4 / 10

7. The budget approach
Airbus A 340, 5K per line of code (25 years ago)
Il y a du feu dans les toilettes
Fault tolerance, heisenberg bugs
Mechanical failure vs electronic failure, my 15 year car
What is secure software: even worse than fault-tolerant, a
malicious person is going to try to make it fail in the worst
possible moment and with the worst possible
consequences
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 4 / 10

8. The budget approach
Airbus A 340, 5K per line of code (25 years ago)
Il y a du feu dans les toilettes
Fault tolerance, heisenberg bugs
Mechanical failure vs electronic failure, my 15 year car
What is secure software: even worse than fault-tolerant, a
malicious person is going to try to make it fail in the worst
possible moment and with the worst possible
consequences
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 4 / 10

9. The know-how approach
Small smart teams accomplish a lot
5 in Portugal, 50 in Denmark, 100 in the US
NATO command and control (Pentaghon, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, 5 people, 3 from telecom school PT army)
The city factor: Porto vs Lisboa
The stupidity factor (the million dollar bug)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 5 / 10

10. The know-how approach
Small smart teams accomplish a lot
5 in Portugal, 50 in Denmark, 100 in the US
NATO command and control (Pentaghon, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, 5 people, 3 from telecom school PT army)
The city factor: Porto vs Lisboa
The stupidity factor (the million dollar bug)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 5 / 10

11. The know-how approach
Small smart teams accomplish a lot
5 in Portugal, 50 in Denmark, 100 in the US
NATO command and control (Pentaghon, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, 5 people, 3 from telecom school PT army)
The city factor: Porto vs Lisboa
The stupidity factor (the million dollar bug)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 5 / 10

12. Assumptions are the mother of all evil
Forget that an address change has security implications
and it had to be logged
Proved secure military protocol, it failed ... (random
number that wasn’t)
Nothing is secure? There’s the one time pads
Two way authentication, two channels ... SMS + web but
smartphone (my obsolete OS phone)
Malware in the firmware (1974 airforce report, Ken
Thompson in ACM Turing Award 84 lecture)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 6 / 10

13. Assumptions are the mother of all evil
Forget that an address change has security implications
and it had to be logged
Proved secure military protocol, it failed ... (random
number that wasn’t)
Nothing is secure? There’s the one time pads
Two way authentication, two channels ... SMS + web but
smartphone (my obsolete OS phone)
Malware in the firmware (1974 airforce report, Ken
Thompson in ACM Turing Award 84 lecture)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 6 / 10

14. Assumptions are the mother of all evil
Forget that an address change has security implications
and it had to be logged
Proved secure military protocol, it failed ... (random
number that wasn’t)
Nothing is secure? There’s the one time pads
Two way authentication, two channels ... SMS + web but
smartphone (my obsolete OS phone)
Malware in the firmware (1974 airforce report, Ken
Thompson in ACM Turing Award 84 lecture)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 6 / 10

15. Assumptions are the mother of all evil
Forget that an address change has security implications
and it had to be logged
Proved secure military protocol, it failed ... (random
number that wasn’t)
Nothing is secure? There’s the one time pads
Two way authentication, two channels ... SMS + web but
smartphone (my obsolete OS phone)
Malware in the firmware (1974 airforce report, Ken
Thompson in ACM Turing Award 84 lecture)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 6 / 10

16. Assumptions are the mother of all evil
Forget that an address change has security implications
and it had to be logged
Proved secure military protocol, it failed ... (random
number that wasn’t)
Nothing is secure? There’s the one time pads
Two way authentication, two channels ... SMS + web but
smartphone (my obsolete OS phone)
Malware in the firmware (1974 airforce report, Ken
Thompson in ACM Turing Award 84 lecture)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 6 / 10

17. Assumptions are the mother of all evil
Forget that an address change has security implications
and it had to be logged
Proved secure military protocol, it failed ... (random
number that wasn’t)
Nothing is secure? There’s the one time pads
Two way authentication, two channels ... SMS + web but
smartphone (my obsolete OS phone)
Malware in the firmware (1974 airforce report, Ken
Thompson in ACM Turing Award 84 lecture)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 6 / 10

18. Intuition traps
Beware of your intuition
A rope around the spherical earth, 1 meter slack, can a cat
pass below it?
SSL, public-key cryptography, the birthday attack
The visual microphone
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 7 / 10

19. Intuition traps
Beware of your intuition
A rope around the spherical earth, 1 meter slack, can a cat
pass below it?
SSL, public-key cryptography, the birthday attack
The visual microphone
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 7 / 10

20. Intuition traps
Beware of your intuition
A rope around the spherical earth, 1 meter slack, can a cat
pass below it?
SSL, public-key cryptography, the birthday attack
The visual microphone
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 7 / 10

21. Intuition traps
Beware of your intuition
A rope around the spherical earth, 1 meter slack, can a cat
pass below it?
SSL, public-key cryptography, the birthday attack
The visual microphone
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 7 / 10

22. Simplicity
Low tech solutions: children’s labor, how to fire a person,
75 euros 25 cents vs 8.35 M
The Regulations problem, why are they important?
The million dollar bug: one sentence ... and trusting others,
... it could have destroyed the work of everyone in Porto
The fraud MBA
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 8 / 10

23. Simplicity
Low tech solutions: children’s labor, how to fire a person,
75 euros 25 cents vs 8.35 M
The Regulations problem, why are they important?
The million dollar bug: one sentence ... and trusting others,
... it could have destroyed the work of everyone in Porto
The fraud MBA
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 8 / 10

24. Simplicity
Low tech solutions: children’s labor, how to fire a person,
75 euros 25 cents vs 8.35 M
The Regulations problem, why are they important?
The million dollar bug: one sentence ... and trusting others,
... it could have destroyed the work of everyone in Porto
The fraud MBA
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 8 / 10

25. Simplicity
Low tech solutions: children’s labor, how to fire a person,
75 euros 25 cents vs 8.35 M
The Regulations problem, why are they important?
The million dollar bug: one sentence ... and trusting others,
... it could have destroyed the work of everyone in Porto
The fraud MBA
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 8 / 10

26. Solution for the security of Regulations
Scientific council opposition, use children again ...
Literate programming
Visual comparison (LATEX dot level precision)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 9 / 10

27. Solution for the security of Regulations
Scientific council opposition, use children again ...
Literate programming
Visual comparison (LATEX dot level precision)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 9 / 10

28. Conclusion
Hubris, don’t be too cocky
Trust no one, know a little about the related fields
Defense in depth
Analogical solutions combined with digital solutions
Simplicity
Think out of the box
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 10 / 10