1. Lisbeth Eriksson & Ann-Marie Markström
Interpreting the concept of social pedagogy
Introduction
We believe there is considerable need to examine the purport of
social pedagogy in Sweden more thoroughly, and that this also
applies to our Nordic neighbors. (See e.g. Hegstrup 1996). Social
pedagogy is a vague term and we must try to pin down what we
want to discuss and define. One possible means would be to dis-
tinguish between social pedagogy as a term, as a concept, and as a
field of activity. What would this entail? If we begin with the term
social pedagogy, we see that it is composed of two words, social and
pedagogy. Breaking down the term into its components in this way
may give us some insight into what is meant; either pedagogy that
is social in some way, or social work with an element of education.
If we broaden our view and look at the meaning of the term social
pedagogy from a Nordic or European perspective, the scope and
content may differ. In order to fully grasp the concept of social
pedagogy, we may have to employ theories to make the concept less
vague. Describing the phenomenon of social pedagogy is a matter
of describing its various forms of expression.
In this chapter, we primarily wish to discuss the concept and
the manifestation of social pedagogy, but it has proved difficult to
1
distinguish between the two. One might say there is a problem in
1
A more in-depth discussion that also includes other factors such as the impor-
tance of social developments and the current theory formation, etc. can be
9

2. distinguishing theory from practice, something we find characteris-
tic of social pedagogy and other similar interdisciplinary subjects.
Social pedagogy is currently not a separate discipline at Swedish
universities. It is hard to say why this is and we can, of course,
only speculate. One conceivable explanation is that academic
studies have traditionally been primarily concerned with scientific
knowledge, episteme. We believe social pedagogy represents a dif-
ferent form of knowledge, that which is usually called phronesis or
practical wisdom. This will be discussed in greater detail at the end
of this chapter.
In order to capture the concept and manifestation of social
pedagogy, we will discuss three roots in the history of ideas that we
believe have influenced how the understanding of social pedagogy
evolved in Sweden. We are aware that this evolution played out dif-
ferently in other countries, where other roots in the history of ideas
may be deemed more important.
Social pedagogy emerged from at least three traditions. The first,
the Continental tradition, is based on Natorp’s thinking, which is a
philosophy about the becoming and being of Man. This tradition
exists on a higher level of generality than the second, the American
2
tradition, which is associated with social practice, i.e., social work .
Thus, we have a discourse that evolved within an empirical field.
The third, the pedagogical tradition, may be said to have a com-
bined theoretical and practical foundation.
The Continental tradition
The Continental tradition is the first one, with Paul Natorp as its
outstanding representative. Natorp was a neo-Kantian and part of
the Marburg School, and may be considered a proponent of critical
idealism. Kant based his theory on the opposition of rationalism
and empiricism (Mathiesen 1998). Based on the problem of theo-
retical knowledge, Kant created a new understanding of knowledge.
found in our book Den svårfångade socialpedagogiken (Eriksson & Markström,
2000).
2
See the arguments of Alvesson & Sköldberg about the different levels of
generality of theories, 1994, p 88 onwards.
10

3. Kant was convinced that one could arrive at scientifically objective
knowledge. He felt that one had to learn methods for attaining
valid knowledge. In this context, the transcendental method became
important.
The goal of the transcendental method is to find that which
associates diversity and complexity in our existence, the essence
being the concept or idea. An idea appears as a hypothesis that
must be contemplated. It is actualised when we ask questions about
what appears to us as experience. We must go beyond experience
as a basis for knowledge and this becomes a process where the final
goal is synthesis, the unity of ideas. This synthesis constitutes our
knowledge in time and space, which then becomes a new hypoth-
esis. In this manner, reality becomes dependent on our knowledge.
Kant’s famous words may illustrate this: “Thoughts without content
are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.” Perceptions are
always ordered in time and space, resulting in different forms of
human perception. Our creative imagination transforms our per-
ceptions into personal knowledge.
According to Natorp, the process of knowledge continues end-
lessly, and this attitude to knowledge causes him to oppose the
notion of some form of absolute knowledge. The idea is as far as we
have come in this process of knowledge. After all, thought extends
beyond our experience. Experience is necessary but not sufficient
in our knowledge of what is. Natorp also said that what is, is not
necessarily what should be.
Kant also discussed the areas of will and ethics. Ethics must
determine the task of the will. The concepts of action and will are
internally related to each other. Natorp believed that morals are cre-
ated in community and are the task of the community. Therefore,
he rejected the notion of the individual being solely responsible
for his actions, something he called proportional justice. (Natorp
1904). He felt that as members of a society we are a party to the
“poor morals” of the individual. Natorp also felt that we can only
talk about an action when there is a conscious good will behind it.
Good will is the basis for good ethics. This presupposes free will.
Man can have free will since he is something more than a natural
phenomenon. Man is capable of rational thoughts and actions.
11

4. Natorp founded a theory of social pedagogy based on Kant’s
fundamental precepts on morals. He expanded on Kant’s reasoning
and felt that Man can only become Man through human interac-
tion. Thus, human communion liberates rather than restricts the
individual. One of the fundamental precepts of social pedagogy is
that the individual and the community are each predicated upon
the other. Natorp believed that rising from the individual level to
the communal level enriches the self.
However, Natorp emphasised the importance of individual vari-
ation for the quality of communion. Genuine communion emanci-
pates as it is based on the independent and intentional participation
of the individual. The goal of education is to create communion and
to enhance moral development during the whole lifetime. Natorp
said that society and education are each predicated on the other
and that we must be aware of this or fail in our ambition to raise
(Mathiesen 1998). He saw social pedagogy as an instrument that
guides the individual will towards a higher level, that is, the com-
munal or collective will (Österberg 1997). This cannot be accom-
plished against the will of the individual but must be based on his
insight (Mathiesen 2000). One interpretation of Natorp’s ideas in
this context would be to view the process as the social integration of
the individual (Lorenz 1996). This could mean that the individual
becomes a tool for someone else’s will (Mathiesen 2000).
Natorp believed that in becoming aware, one’s notions are
communicated notions, beliefs communicated by the community,
and that this is emancipatory. We develop through our life in the
community. We achieve self-understanding only when we place
3
ourselves in relation to others.
Natorp said that theoretical learning is also an act of will. We
cannot learn unless we want to. The goal of education cannot be
achieved unless we also attain development of the will. Natorp
wanted Man to develop an individual will, in accordance with
his principle about interaction between the individual and the
community. The individual will can only do itself justice through
3
These thoughts have points in common e.g. with the basic thoughts in
hermeneutics, i.e. that man is created in dialogue with others.
12

5. experiencing the will of others. This is one of Natorp’s main points,
that the individual learns intention through experience in his inter-
actions with others. One of the tasks of social pedagogy is to
encourage people to develop an individual will.
The integrating activities of social pedagogy have evolved
through this tradition. As we interpret it, this tradition says that
the task was and remains socialisation or resocialisation aimed at
integration. Here we find a belief that human beings develop in
communion with others, that the human will can be formed and
transformed. However, Natorp’s philosophy to a certain extent
blurred the borders between the individual and society (Mathiesen,
2000). We also find ideas about a good society into which inte-
gration is worthwhile. The educational aspect of this reasoning is
clear. Natorp’s ontology of Man as being fundamentally social leads
him to dismiss the idea that we are capable of learning without
interaction with other people. Social pedagogy includes the task
of education, in particular education of the will. In this manner,
Natorp claims, one cannot distinguish between social pedagogy and
education in general.
The American tradition
In our view, the second pillar of social pedagogy is rooted in the
American tradition of social work. We find this tradition consider-
ably more practical in nature than the one based on Natorp’s philo-
sophy. It is clearly founded on empiricism.
The American tradition is represented by some prominent figures
who have been of great importance to the development of social
work. As is the case in the rest of the Western world, the American
tradition is rooted in philanthropy. One movement within the
American tradition, which we think has been most influential to
the treatment side of social pedagogy, is the case-work model.
Mary Richmond is one of the important figures in the American
4
tradition . She worked for a Charity Organisation in the United
4
According to Soydan (1993), Richmond belongs to the tradition that goes from
practice to theory and seeks the causes of social problems in the individual.
13

6. States around the turn of the 19th century. In 1917, she published
Social Diagnosis, in which she presented her method of social work,
later to become known as social case work. Since she collaborated
extensively with John Hopkins University and its medical faculty,
the model also became strongly influenced by medical thinking.
One result of this disease-oriented thinking, transferred to the
understanding of the occurrence and prevention of poverty and
social problems, was that social workers began to assess each case
individually. These assessments would later form the basis for their
supportive actions. By collecting data, the social worker would gain
definite and absolute knowledge about the causes of the problems.
Richmond regarded social treatment as a combination of efforts
through which changes would occur both in the individual and in
the social environment. The assessment was to be based on science,
and the strong and trusting relationship between the social worker
and the client was an important element of the work.
Thus, Richmond had a natural science, positivist point of
departure. She believed that social case work is characterised by
the interaction between the individual and society (Soydan 1993;
Trost & Levin 1999). It is based on insights and actions. These
insights consist both of insights into the individual and his or her
circumstances, and of insights into the surrounding environment,
the essence being the interaction between them. Actions can be
directed towards the client or towards the client’s environment.
Richmond’s thinking can be viewed as a dialectical cognitive model
in which theory is based on practice and mutual enrichment is the
outcome.
Developments after Mary Richmond led to the emergence of
two different schools, the diagnostic and the functional. The former
focused on making the correct diagnosis, with particular emphasis
placed on the client’s childhood. The latter emphasised the relation-
ship between the client and social worker, and the importance of
the here-and-now situation.
We believe that the American tradition has, above all, led to an
individual and therapeutic approach, an approach that begins with
a problem in the individual that must be “corrected” by means of
various treatment methods. We find this view of social pedagogy
14

7. fairly common in Sweden. As an example, in our opinion, Hessle’s
approach in part reflects this view. Hessle talks about social peda-
gogy in connection with psychosocial problems (Hessle, 1985). His
starting point is the two university disciplines of social work and
education. He states that their practical application consists of
psychosocial work. This can in turn be divided into social treat-
ment, preventive efforts, and psychotherapy. Social pedagogy then
becomes an element of social treatment. He says that social peda-
gogy is the “collective term for the advanced work for change that
goes on with psychosocially vulnerable groups, individuals, children,
youth, adults, and families in our society” (Hessle 1985, p 177).
Hessle also mentions that social pedagogy is in the border zone
between the individual and the society; it can point out potential
alternative ways of living and, by so doing, pave the way for changes
in the individual as well as society. As we see it, what Hessle means
by social pedagogy is primarily social treatment. We would like to
juxtapose Hessle’s view with the idea that the role of social pedagogy
is integration and resocialisation. From that perspective, the aim of
social pedagogy is to be a tool for the society to maintain normality
and stability (Gustavsson 1994).
The treatment approach is, thus, characteristic of this second
pillar of social pedagogy. The goal is the same as for the first pillar,
i.e., resocialisation and integration. We find that there is relatively
strong emphasis on various treatment methods in many academic
5
programs today. ‘Knowing’ various methods becomes important to
students. Treatment methods have sometimes evolved into theory
with little consideration given to praxis and resulting experience.
Many have asked whether a discipline evolves through methods
6
or through a theoretical perspective. We consider this a problem
today.
5
In Sweden today several different social pedagogy programs have been com-
bined with education for social workers and we do not think this is accidental.
Rather, it is a natural result of current developments in the practice of social
pedagogy.
6
Lecture by John Lundstøl at Lillehammer, 1998
15

8. New treatment methods, often emanating from the United
States, appear and are tested, but there is rarely any scientific
description of or reflection on social pedagogy in action. One of the
reasons may be a lack of discussion about the fundamental values
or theoretical considerations upon which we base our thoughts and
actions. Are our activities aimed at achieving integration or mobi-
lisation? Some scholars, including e.g., Swedner, have emphasised
the importance of consensus in a work group and of the group
having reflected upon fundamental values, such as perspectives on
knowledge, humanity, and society (Swedner 1996).
Pedagogical roots
The third pillar of social pedagogy, the pedagogical, has its roots
in e.g., the theories of John Dewey and Paulo Freire. Dewey’s
thoughts have had a strong influence on educational theory in
Sweden in the latter half of the 20th century. Like Natorp, Dewey,
who lived and worked in the United States, was to some extent
inspired by Hegel (Dewey 1916). This is particularly apparent in
Dewey’s dialectical perspective. Dewey believed that human beings
are constantly developing social beings, and that this development
goes on in interaction with the people around them. Dewey shared
these ideas with Natorp. Dewey also believed that every individual
is important and that the experiences of each individual must be
looked after and treasured.
Much of Dewey’s thinking revolves around the school, which
he viewed as an instrument of socialisation. The task of the school
was to pass on the collective knowledge of the society. Dewey had
a pragmatic view of knowledge, i.e. the value of knowledge is deter-
mined by its usefulness. Knowledge must serve the society and in
order for knowledge to be meaningful, it must be useful. Know-
ledge must help Man to manage better in society. The method of
acquiring knowledge is “learning by doing”. Knowing lacks inher-
ent value. He took no position on whether certain knowledge is
right or wrong, good or evil. Knowledge quite simply gains value
through its usefulness to the individual and, by extension, to society.
Education gradually shapes the consciousness of students. Habits
16

9. are formed, concepts are learned and feelings awakened. Through
this, the individual gradually comes to share in the intellectual and
moral resources that humanity has managed to collect throughout
history. There are clear parallels between this reasoning and the
ideas of Natorp. Dewey and Natorp agree that the overarching goal
7
of education is the establishment of the democratic community.
Yet another educationalist who has had great influence on social
pedagogy is the Latin American Professor of Education, Paulo
Freire. He is a prominent representative of Education for Liberation
and is perhaps best known for his focus on the dialectical process.
More so than Dewey, he emphasised the mobilizing and liberating
aspects of education. His basic outlook was Marxist and he fought
for an equal society without class differences (Freire 1974). Freire
was also inspired by Hegel. He represented a Christian-humanist
view of mankind. According to Freire, the most important pillars
of education for liberation are:
• dialogue
• conscientization
• liberation
• reflective action
• cultural synthesis
Freire believed that we become conscious through dialogue, and
that we learn to name the world. For many oppressed and marginal-
ized groups, the opportunity and the right to acquire a language and
be able to define the surrounding world are extremely important.
Through this and through reflective action, reality is transformed.
Man must reflect critically and act critically. Freire worked with
poor and oppressed people in Brazil. By becoming conscious, these
people would be able to change their reality. This way of thinking
has been important for development in Sweden, and is the basis
8
for ideas about empowerment, liberation, social mobilization, etc.
Since we consider mobilizing people’s own resources to be one of
7
This discussion is also brought forward by Mathiesen, 2000.
8
This thinking has been described by e.g. Ronnby and Swedner in Sweden.
17

10. the tasks of social pedagogy, it becomes natural in this context to
9
refer to Freire’s ideas.
It is here, in the third pillar of social pedagogy, that we can see
the mobilizing perspective. This pillar may be described by using
Alf Ronnby’s definition of social pedagogy. Ronnby talks about the
social pedagogical line of action, which he feels is based on thoughts
and theories about the social aspects of the production of knowl-
edge and conscientization (Ronnby 1983). He claims that the basic
idea is that human beings develop in social contexts, in communion
with others, in interactions with the group. Therefore, it becomes
the task of social pedagogy to “... give form to the social context,
where Man’s consciousness, knowledge, morals, and sociability can
develop favorably, as well as being a theory about it.” (Ronnby
1983,p 250). He regards social pedagogy as a method of working
with groups in order to activate local communities, thus a form of
community work. He strongly emphasizes the dynamics and the
potential of the group. Ronnby also views social pedagogy as an
ideal for popular education. The target groups Ronnby mentions
are groups suffering from problems and oppression. Thus, social
pedagogy should stimulate people to change their situations and
thereby also develop themselves during the process.
In our interpretation, what Ronnby primarily means by social
pedagogy is social mobilization. One could say that his views reflect
an emancipatory interest. The goal is the liberation of human
resources and life potential. Marginalization and deviant behavior
are seen as obstacles to human existence. The status of socially devi-
ant individuals is seen as an expression of a society that functions in
such a manner that these individuals are deprived of their basic pre-
10
requisites for living a well functioning life . Thus, deviant behavior
is not viewed as an “expression of having failed in the socialization
process” (Gustavsson 1994, p. 8). It is not primarily a question of
9
When it comes to prominent pedagogical figures, Rousseau and Pestalozzi are
important for understanding of the roots of social pedagogy. We choose not
to discuss their ideas in this paper, but their views are presented in Den svår-
fångade socialpedagogiken (Eriksson & Markström 2000).
10
See Natorp’s discussion of proportional justice.
18

11. resocializing and integrating people who are marginalized in various
ways, but of mobilizing people’s own resources, which is an emanci-
patory perspective. This perspective is not very common in Sweden
today, but we find it to be one whose time has come.
Problems in society create problems for the individual. Society
does not have the resources to deal with these problems. People
must come together in their local communities and solve their own
problems (Ronnby 2000). The role of the social educator in this
context is that of initiator. This is work that takes place mainly
outside of public institutions. Many have declared that our society
is moving in that direction, but we believe that it is an oversimplifi-
cation to believe that social pedagogy changes when society does.
We are also dealing here with fundamental values. Social peda-
gogy will hardly become emancipatory if the goal is resocializa-
tion and integration. Social pedagogical praxis is certainly affected
by social development, but only to a certain extent. One could
view this perspective as really being concerned with transforming
the power structures of society, in which case it may naturally be
considered politically dangerous. Changes to the power structures
may occur on different levels. Social pedagogy can contribute to
the liberation of people (Sernhede 1996; Swedner 1996). One can
also see the interest in change within the field of social pedagogy as
directed towards social structures and processes, rather than towards
the individual (Wahlberg 1997).
We can say that the roots of social pedagogy in the history of
ideas deal with human beings developing in dialogue with other
humans. Individual free will and thought take place in the relation-
ships and encounters with others. Consequently, relation and com-
munication are important concepts. In the history of ideas, these
thoughts can, in one way or another, be traced back to Kant and
also, to a certain extent, to Hegel. We are dealing with currents of
ideas wherein the individual is important and where changes ema-
nate from the grass roots level, and not from the more official sector
of our society (Swedner 1996). This is the type of thinking that also
encourages action. So, although the roots of these are ideas, if we
go far back in the past, somehow converge in Kant, this does not
19

12. preclude their having developed in somewhat different directions
since.
Knowledge and social pedagogy
On one level, the roots in the history of ideas can help us to under-
stand the concept of social pedagogy. Another approach is to asso-
ciate social pedagogy with other concepts relevant in the context,
such as ‘Bildung’ and humanism, which may provide a different
understanding. In this context, and in order to attempt to clarify
other possible meanings of the concept, we choose to view social
pedagogy in the context of epistemology. We believe that social
pedagogy may be viewed as an expression of the form of knowledge
that has been called phronesis since the days of Aristotle. However,
phronesis is not only considered a form of knowledge, but also an
ethic, which in our opinion applies to social pedagogy as well.
Originally, it was Aristotle who, around 300 BC, categorized
knowledge into three forms: episteme, techne, and phronesis
(Gustavsson 1996). He also distinguished between theory and
practice. Aristotle believed that theoretical knowledge was about
Man’s reflection on his existence. Practical knowledge deals only
with what could have been different — it is about human action.
It encompasses politics, ethics, and rhetoric. Aristotle regarded
techne and phronesis as practical knowledge. In our view, practical
knowledge is of great and decisive importance for social pedagogy
when it is action-oriented. Phronesis or practical wisdom deals with
our good judgement and is closely tied to human actions. This
view of knowledge has also been discussed in connection with the
schooling of democratic citizens, an area where associations with the
integrating element of social pedagogy are clear. To possess practical
wisdom means that one can wisely interpret situations and act cor-
rectly based on sound judgement (See e.g Nussbaum 1995).
There are several similarities between phronesis and social peda-
gogy. Of course there are also differences. The most important simi-
larity is that social pedagogy and phronesis can both be viewed as an
ethic and as a form of knowledge. Social pedagogy and phronesis are
action-oriented. A person who possesses phronesis has good judge-
20

13. ment that helps him make the right decisions at the right time. He
cannot rely on general rules. The same applies to social pedagogy.
One must act according to the unique situation in which one finds
oneself, one is, in other words, dependent on the situation. It is
impossible to determine the right decision in a specific situation by
consulting books on methodology or other sets of rules. One must
be responsive to the signals given by the situation. The demands
of the isolated situation are often complex. Aristotle spoke of this
kind of flexibility, and Sernhede also emphasizes flexibility. In this
context, he mentions improvisation as an approach. Improvisation
is also part of phronesis as defined by Aristotle.
There are situations where personal knowledge is not enough.
In those cases, we can employ more general rules derived from
experience, sometimes many years of experience. However, it must
be possible to change the rules as new experience is added to the
old. Aristotle claims that general rules and regulations can be very
helpful as long as they are not contradicted by the unique. As social
educators, we can make use of relevant research that, like laws and
regulations, often represents many years of thought. Theories help
us to gain an understanding of how we might be able to act. The
main principle, however, is that each situation and person is unique,
a particular case. It could be said that we emphasize the individual
in the collective. Both Aristotle and prominent figures in social
pedagogy expound on the importance of the community, but we
must also be able to discern the individual in the crowd. Natorp
says that it is in the community that Man ”is created”, and Aristotle
proclaims that virtues are acquired in a social community.
Other similarities between phronesis and social pedagogy are
found in their emphasis on feelings and imagination; two active
ingredients of phronesis. We might call the synthesis of these two
phenomena empathy, or say that one result of active feelings and
imagination could be empathy. My feelings help me empathize
with how others experience their situations. This gives me some
knowledge about what might be the right thing to do in a specific
situation. The social pedagogical approach stresses the importance
of empathy. We also talk about using ourselves as an instrument or
tool in social pedagogy. This means that we must use our feelings
21

14. and our imagination. As one explores one’s way towards finding the
11
best solution, one cannot rely on theory alone.
In summary, it can be said that phronesis represents a form of
knowledge that can be equated with possessing good judgement.
This is judgement that helps one make the right decisions at the
right time. Characteristic of this form of knowledge is an emphasis
on the individual, on the unique, rather than the general, and an
emphasis on feelings and imagination, as well as experience.
Social pedagogy may be seen as a form of knowledge where good
judgement is allowed to prevail. It is knowledge based on the idea
of beginning with the individual, an action-oriented form of knowl-
edge where the situation determines the response. We use feelings
and imagination (creativity) in our search for the right decision
and action.
Phronesis may also be viewed as an ethic where the goal is a good
life. A good life is made up of an array of activities consistent with
the virtues. Social pedagogy may be regarded in a similar manner
(but here there is an alternative and the goal of social pedagogy may
be considered controversial). The goal of its activities is that human
beings must be able to live a good life and be integrated members
of society. A good life can be achieved when we are empowered to
make our own choices, when we have access to the resources of our
society, etc. It is the task of social pedagogy to help people to reach
this goal if they cannot manage it independently. One big and per-
haps important difference here is that phronesis is something that
resides in oneself, whereas, in the sense that we have described it
here, social pedagogy is knowledge or ethics possessed by someone
else and used to support others.
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11
Another early educator of great importance to social pedagogy was Pestalozzi.
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