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UC Santa Barbara
*RWTH Aachen
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer:
On the Relations Between the Different Actors in
the Spam Landscape
Gianluca Stringhini, Oliver Hohlfeld*,
Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna
University of California, Santa Barbara
*RWTH Aachen
Spammer
Setting Up a Spam Operation
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 2
Harvester
Botmaster
What are the relations between the
different actors in a spam operation?
Fingerprinting the Actors
Harvesters
Disseminate email addresses on the web
Spammers
Fingerprint spam campaigns
Botnets
Each botnet implements SMTP differently [USENIX2012]
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 4
Fingerprinting the Entire Operation
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 5
Fingerprinting Email Harvesters
Server-side dynamic script to generate unique addresses
Websites of various type [IMC2012]
Various ways of embedding email addresses
Plaintext, mailto links, obfuscated JavaScript
We recorded IP address and user agent of visitors
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 6
Fingerprinting Botnets
SMTP Dialects [USENIX2012]
We can uniquely identify an email-sending program
by looking at the sequence of SMTP messages
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 7
HELO domain
RSET
MAIL FROM:<email-addr>
RCPT TO:<email-addr>
DATA
250 server
250 OK
250 OK
250 OK
Learning dialects spoken by botnets
Malware samples submitted to Anubis
• 18,849 malware samples sent an email
• 72 unique dialects
• Virustotal labels to name samples
Learning dialects spoken by legitimate clients
Virtual machines running 5 popular MTAs
Fingerprinting Spammers
We assume that a single spammer is
responsible for each spam campaign
We cluster emails into campaigns by:
• Subject line
• URL domain
• Mailer
• Sender email address
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 8
Analysis of the
Collected Data
Analysis of the Harvesters
9 different harvesters
613 email addresses were harvested
A single harvester harvested 415 addresses
Distributed harvester composed of 56 IP addresses
Turnaround time between 5 days and almost two years
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 10
Analysis of the SMTP Dialects
2,024 emails received sent by 7 different dialects
3 large botnets (Cutwail, Lethic, Kelihos)
2 MTAs (Postfix and Sendmail)
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 11
Country Distribution - Lethic
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 12
Country Distribution - Cutwail
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 13
Country Distribution - MTAs
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 14
Analysis of the Spam Campaigns
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 15
Campaign Number of Emails Topic
1 64 Counterfeit goods
2 180 Online dating
3 8 Financial scam
4 533 SEO
5 7 Email marketing
6 6 Phishing scam
7 30 Phishing scam
8 5 Phishing scam
Tracking Spammers Over Time
Each campaign is carried out by a different spammer
Spammers could run two campaigns simultaneously
We identify spammers by botnet + email list
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 16
Studying the Relationships
Between the Actors
Each botnet was rented by a single spammer
Multiple spammers used the same type of MTA
4 email lists were used by multiple spammers → purchased
Spammers keep using the same email list
Spammers using MTAs are more likely to harvest their
email addresses
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 17
Conclusions & Lessons Learned
We presented the first end-to-end analysis of the
spam delivery ecosystem
Our results show that spammers use the same
botnet and the same email list for a long time
This can be leveraged for spam mitigation
Our methodology could be used by other researchers
to perform larger-scale studies
The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 18
UC Santa Barbara
*RWTH Aachen
Questions?
gianluca@cs.ucsb.edu
@gianlucasb

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The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer: On the Relations Between the Different Actors in the Spam Landscape

  • 1. UC Santa Barbara *RWTH Aachen The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer: On the Relations Between the Different Actors in the Spam Landscape Gianluca Stringhini, Oliver Hohlfeld*, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna University of California, Santa Barbara *RWTH Aachen
  • 2. Spammer Setting Up a Spam Operation The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 2 Harvester Botmaster
  • 3. What are the relations between the different actors in a spam operation?
  • 4. Fingerprinting the Actors Harvesters Disseminate email addresses on the web Spammers Fingerprint spam campaigns Botnets Each botnet implements SMTP differently [USENIX2012] The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 4
  • 5. Fingerprinting the Entire Operation The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 5
  • 6. Fingerprinting Email Harvesters Server-side dynamic script to generate unique addresses Websites of various type [IMC2012] Various ways of embedding email addresses Plaintext, mailto links, obfuscated JavaScript We recorded IP address and user agent of visitors The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 6
  • 7. Fingerprinting Botnets SMTP Dialects [USENIX2012] We can uniquely identify an email-sending program by looking at the sequence of SMTP messages The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 7 HELO domain RSET MAIL FROM:<email-addr> RCPT TO:<email-addr> DATA 250 server 250 OK 250 OK 250 OK Learning dialects spoken by botnets Malware samples submitted to Anubis • 18,849 malware samples sent an email • 72 unique dialects • Virustotal labels to name samples Learning dialects spoken by legitimate clients Virtual machines running 5 popular MTAs
  • 8. Fingerprinting Spammers We assume that a single spammer is responsible for each spam campaign We cluster emails into campaigns by: • Subject line • URL domain • Mailer • Sender email address The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 8
  • 10. Analysis of the Harvesters 9 different harvesters 613 email addresses were harvested A single harvester harvested 415 addresses Distributed harvester composed of 56 IP addresses Turnaround time between 5 days and almost two years The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 10
  • 11. Analysis of the SMTP Dialects 2,024 emails received sent by 7 different dialects 3 large botnets (Cutwail, Lethic, Kelihos) 2 MTAs (Postfix and Sendmail) The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 11
  • 12. Country Distribution - Lethic The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 12
  • 13. Country Distribution - Cutwail The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 13
  • 14. Country Distribution - MTAs The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 14
  • 15. Analysis of the Spam Campaigns The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 15 Campaign Number of Emails Topic 1 64 Counterfeit goods 2 180 Online dating 3 8 Financial scam 4 533 SEO 5 7 Email marketing 6 6 Phishing scam 7 30 Phishing scam 8 5 Phishing scam
  • 16. Tracking Spammers Over Time Each campaign is carried out by a different spammer Spammers could run two campaigns simultaneously We identify spammers by botnet + email list The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 16
  • 17. Studying the Relationships Between the Actors Each botnet was rented by a single spammer Multiple spammers used the same type of MTA 4 email lists were used by multiple spammers → purchased Spammers keep using the same email list Spammers using MTAs are more likely to harvest their email addresses The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 17
  • 18. Conclusions & Lessons Learned We presented the first end-to-end analysis of the spam delivery ecosystem Our results show that spammers use the same botnet and the same email list for a long time This can be leveraged for spam mitigation Our methodology could be used by other researchers to perform larger-scale studies The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer 18
  • 19. UC Santa Barbara *RWTH Aachen Questions? gianluca@cs.ucsb.edu @gianlucasb