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Income risk and fertility decision
Oliwia Komada
November 22, 2018
Doctoral Seminar
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 1
Motivation
Risky childless world...
• Fertility is pro-cyclical (ex. Sobotka, Skirbekk & Philipo PopDevRev 2011;
Chatterjee & Vogl AER 2017; Jones & Schoonbroodt RED 2016)
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 2
Risky childless world...
• Fertility is pro-cyclical (ex. Sobotka, Skirbekk & Philipo PopDevRev 2011;
Chatterjee & Vogl AER 2017; Jones & Schoonbroodt RED 2016)
• Uncertainty meters a lot...
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 2
Risky childless world...
• Fertility is pro-cyclical (ex. Sobotka, Skirbekk & Philipo PopDevRev 2011;
Chatterjee & Vogl AER 2017; Jones & Schoonbroodt RED 2016)
• Uncertainty meters a lot...
• Differences in income growth volatility account for 61% of fertility
variation between US states during the post WWII baby boom.
(Chabe-Ferret & Gobbi 2018)
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 2
Risky childless world...
• Fertility is pro-cyclical (ex. Sobotka, Skirbekk & Philipo PopDevRev 2011;
Chatterjee & Vogl AER 2017; Jones & Schoonbroodt RED 2016)
• Uncertainty meters a lot...
• Differences in income growth volatility account for 61% of fertility
variation between US states during the post WWII baby boom.
(Chabe-Ferret & Gobbi 2018)
• Increase of husband occupation earnings risk by 1sd yields to
decrease of completed fertility by 1.5 children. (Sommer JME 2016)
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 2
Risky childless world...
• Fertility is pro-cyclical (ex. Sobotka, Skirbekk & Philipo PopDevRev 2011;
Chatterjee & Vogl AER 2017; Jones & Schoonbroodt RED 2016)
• Uncertainty meters a lot...
• Differences in income growth volatility account for 61% of fertility
variation between US states during the post WWII baby boom.
(Chabe-Ferret & Gobbi 2018)
• Increase of husband occupation earnings risk by 1sd yields to
decrease of completed fertility by 1.5 children. (Sommer JME 2016)
• Idiosyncratic earnings risk increase explains nearly
50% of fertility drop. (Sommer JME 2016)
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 2
This study
1. Fertility is too low or just lower due to idiosyncratic income risk?
→ individual vs. social planer choice
→ open vs. closed economy
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 3
This study
1. Fertility is too low or just lower due to idiosyncratic income risk?
→ individual vs. social planer choice
→ open vs. closed economy
2. If fertility is too low, is child benefit welfare improving?
→ PAYG pension system: social benefits and individual cost
→ immediate cost and future benefits
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 3
This study
1. Fertility is too low or just lower due to idiosyncratic income risk?
→ individual vs. social planer choice
→ open vs. closed economy
2. If fertility is too low, is child benefit welfare improving?
→ PAYG pension system: social benefits and individual cost
→ immediate cost and future benefits
3. Does it matter how we finance child benefit?
→ taxes imply a redistribution
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 3
This study
1. Fertility is too low or just lower due to idiosyncratic income risk?
→ individual vs. social planer choice
→ open vs. closed economy
2. If fertility is too low, is child benefit welfare improving?
→ PAYG pension system: social benefits and individual cost
→ immediate cost and future benefits
3. Does it matter how we finance child benefit?
→ taxes imply a redistribution
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 3
This study
1. Fertility is too low or just lower due to idiosyncratic income risk?
→ individual vs. social planer choice
→ open vs. closed economy
2. If fertility is too low, is child benefit welfare improving?
→ PAYG pension system: social benefits and individual cost
→ immediate cost and future benefits
3. Does it matter how we finance child benefit?
→ taxes imply a redistribution
→ redistribution can amplify risk: lump-sum tax
→ ... or insure against labor income risk: capital tax
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 3
Methodology
What do we do?
Our approach
We develop an overlapping generations model (OLG) with
endogenous fertility and idiosyncratic risk.
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 4
What do we do?
Our approach
We develop an overlapping generations model (OLG) with
endogenous fertility and idiosyncratic risk.
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 4
What do we do?
Our approach
We develop an overlapping generations model (OLG) with
endogenous fertility and idiosyncratic risk.
Main novelty
• Optimal fertility decision in the model with idiosyncratic risk.
• The computational model with endogenous fertility, idiosyncratic
risk and general equilibrium.
• Pronatalist policy effect with idiosyncratic risk captured.
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 4
Results in a nutshell
• In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk
are negatively correlated.
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 5
Results in a nutshell
• In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk
are negatively correlated.
• It reflects well pattern observed in the data.
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 5
Results in a nutshell
• In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk
are negatively correlated.
• It reflects well pattern observed in the data.
• Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are
ambiguous.
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 5
Results in a nutshell
• In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk
are negatively correlated.
• It reflects well pattern observed in the data.
• Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are
ambiguous.
• It matters how we finance child benefit:
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 5
Results in a nutshell
• In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk
are negatively correlated.
• It reflects well pattern observed in the data.
• Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are
ambiguous.
• It matters how we finance child benefit:
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 5
Results in a nutshell
• In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk
are negatively correlated.
• It reflects well pattern observed in the data.
• Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are
ambiguous.
• It matters how we finance child benefit:
→ lump sum tax welfare deteriorating
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 5
Results in a nutshell
• In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk
are negatively correlated.
• It reflects well pattern observed in the data.
• Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are
ambiguous.
• It matters how we finance child benefit:
→ lump sum tax welfare deteriorating
→ capital income tax brings welfare gains.
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 5
Part I - analytic framework
Model I
Consumers
Vt = ln(cy
t ) + φ ln(nt+1) + β ln(co
t+1(ζt+1))dΦ
subject to:
cy
t + at+1 + (p − ϕ)nt+1 = wt(1 − τ) − θt
co
t+1 = at+1Rt+1 + κζt+1wt+1 + ηt+1
where
ζt+1 ∈ {1 − δζ, 1 + δζ}
and probability of each stage is equal to 1
2
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 6
Government
• covers child benefit adjusting lump sum tax:
θt = ϕnt
• balances pension system
ηt+1 = wt+1τnt+1
Producers
Standard perfectly competitive representative firm with
Cobb-Douglas production function
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 7
Results I
Fertility is just lower due to risk in open economy
• individual consumer fertility choice
n =
φ
p − ϕ
c∗
y (δζ)
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 8
Fertility is just lower due to risk in open economy
• individual consumer fertility choice
n =
φ
p − ϕ
c∗
y (δζ)
• steady state social planer fertility choice
n =
φ + β
p + k − d
c∗
y (δζ)
where c∗
y (δζ) is decreasing function
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 8
Fertility is just lower due to risk in open economy
• individual consumer fertility choice
n =
φ
p − ϕ
c∗
y (δζ)
• steady state social planer fertility choice
n =
φ + β
p + k − d
c∗
y (δζ)
where c∗
y (δζ) is decreasing function
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 8
Fertility is just lower due to risk in open economy
• individual consumer fertility choice
n =
φ
p − ϕ
c∗
y (δζ)
• steady state social planer fertility choice
n =
φ + β
p + k − d
c∗
y (δζ)
where c∗
y (δζ) is decreasing function
Individual consumer ignore pension benefits and fertility link
→ fertility too low
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 8
Fertility is just lower due to risk in open economy
• individual consumer fertility choice
n =
φ
p − ϕ
c∗
y (δζ)
• steady state social planer fertility choice
n =
φ + β
p + k − d
c∗
y (δζ)
where c∗
y (δζ) is decreasing function
Individual consumer ignore pension benefits and fertility link
→ fertility too low
Individual consumer ignore the cost of capital for future generation
→ fertility too high
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 8
Fertility is just lower due to risk in open economy
• individual consumer fertility choice
n =
φ
p − ϕ
c∗
y (δζ)
• steady state social planer fertility choice
n =
φ + β
p + k − d
c∗
y (δζ)
where c∗
y (δζ) is decreasing function
Individual consumer ignore pension benefits and fertility link
→ fertility too low
Individual consumer ignore the cost of capital for future generation
→ fertility too high
Idiosyncratic income risk has the same impact on the individual consumer and
social planer → higher the risk lower the optimal fertility
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 8
Fertility may be too low due to risk in closed economy
Intuition:
• idiosyncratic income risk → precautionary savings
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 9
Fertility may be too low due to risk in closed economy
Intuition:
• idiosyncratic income risk → precautionary savings
• additional savings lower the interest rate and increase wages
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 9
Fertility may be too low due to risk in closed economy
Intuition:
• idiosyncratic income risk → precautionary savings
• additional savings lower the interest rate and increase wages
• ”risky” part of income increase
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 9
Fertility may be too low due to risk in closed economy
Intuition:
• idiosyncratic income risk → precautionary savings
• additional savings lower the interest rate and increase wages
• ”risky” part of income increase
• individual savings rate higher than social planer savings rate
→ (Ludwig Krueger 2018)
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 9
Fertility may be too low due to risk in closed economy
Intuition:
• idiosyncratic income risk → precautionary savings
• additional savings lower the interest rate and increase wages
• ”risky” part of income increase
• individual savings rate higher than social planer savings rate
→ (Ludwig Krueger 2018)
• individual consumption lower than social planer choice
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 9
Fertility may be too low due to risk in closed economy
Intuition:
• idiosyncratic income risk → precautionary savings
• additional savings lower the interest rate and increase wages
• ”risky” part of income increase
• individual savings rate higher than social planer savings rate
→ (Ludwig Krueger 2018)
• individual consumption lower than social planer choice
• individual fertility lower than social planer choice
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 9
Part II - computational model
Consumers
• uncertain lifetimes: live for j = 1, 2, ..., 20 five-year periods,
• survival rate πj,t < 1
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 10
Consumers
• uncertain lifetimes: live for j = 1, 2, ..., 20 five-year periods,
• survival rate πj,t < 1
• enter labor market at j = 5
• uninsurable earnings: endogenous labor with idiosyncratic
productivity process that follows AR(1) approximated by Markov
chain
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 10
Consumers
• uncertain lifetimes: live for j = 1, 2, ..., 20 five-year periods,
• survival rate πj,t < 1
• enter labor market at j = 5
• uninsurable earnings: endogenous labor with idiosyncratic
productivity process that follows AR(1) approximated by Markov
chain
• endogenous fertility: discrete choice made at j = 8 ,
n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 10
Consumers
• uncertain lifetimes: live for j = 1, 2, ..., 20 five-year periods,
• survival rate πj,t < 1
• enter labor market at j = 5
• uninsurable earnings: endogenous labor with idiosyncratic
productivity process that follows AR(1) approximated by Markov
chain
• endogenous fertility: discrete choice made at j = 8 ,
n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
• work till retirement age j = 14, later receive pension benefits
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 10
Consumers
• uncertain lifetimes: live for j = 1, 2, ..., 20 five-year periods,
• survival rate πj,t < 1
• enter labor market at j = 5
• uninsurable earnings: endogenous labor with idiosyncratic
productivity process that follows AR(1) approximated by Markov
chain
• endogenous fertility: discrete choice made at j = 8 ,
n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
• work till retirement age j = 14, later receive pension benefits
• pay Soc Sec contributions, labor, capital, consumption taxes
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 10
Consumers
• uncertain lifetimes: live for j = 1, 2, ..., 20 five-year periods,
• survival rate πj,t < 1
• enter labor market at j = 5
• uninsurable earnings: endogenous labor with idiosyncratic
productivity process that follows AR(1) approximated by Markov
chain
• endogenous fertility: discrete choice made at j = 8 ,
n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
• work till retirement age j = 14, later receive pension benefits
• pay Soc Sec contributions, labor, capital, consumption taxes
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 10
Government
• Collects taxes from labor income, capital income, consumption and
lump sum tax.
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 11
Government
• Collects taxes from labor income, capital income, consumption and
lump sum tax.
• Finances government spending.
• Balances pension system.
• Services debt.
Producers
Standard perfectly competitive representative firm with
Cobb-Douglas production function
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 11
Calibration
Preferences
• Preference for leisure γ matches average hours 33%
• Preference for children φ matches fertility rate 1.9
• Discounting rate δ matches interest rate 4%
Idiosyncratic productivity shock based on Kruger and Ludwig (2013):
• Persistence η = 0.95
• Variance ση = 0.0375
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 12
Calibration
Pension system
• Replacement rate ρ matches benefits as % of GDP 5.2%
• Contribution rate balances pension system in the initial steady
state
Child cost {pt = 0.15(1 − τ)(1 − τl )wt} matches average child cost in
terms of average wages
Taxes {τc, τl , τk} match revenue as % of GDP {9.2%, 3.8%, 3.6%}
Depreciation rate d matches investment rate of 25%
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 13
Results
Fertility rate decreases when income variance is higher
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 14
Fertility rate decreases when income variance is higher
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 15
Variance change explains 50 % of fertility drop
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 16
Child benefit raises fertility
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 17
Effects are similar for different fiscal tools
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 18
Fertility is higher. Does it make the World better place?
Measuring welfare effects
• Compare utility under the veil of ignorance
→ In which World would I rather be born?
• P − efficiency
→ care only about utility level, ignore cohort size
• express as a percent of consumption from pre-reform scenario
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 19
Welfare is lower when we use lump sum tax
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 20
Welfare increase when we use capital tax
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 21
Summary
Insights from this study
• In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk
are negatively correlated.
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 22
Insights from this study
• In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk
are negatively correlated.
• It reflects well pattern observed in the data.
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 22
Insights from this study
• In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk
are negatively correlated.
• It reflects well pattern observed in the data.
• Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are
ambiguous.
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 22
Insights from this study
• In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk
are negatively correlated.
• It reflects well pattern observed in the data.
• Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are
ambiguous.
• It matters how we finance child benefit:
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 22
Insights from this study
• In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk
are negatively correlated.
• It reflects well pattern observed in the data.
• Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are
ambiguous.
• It matters how we finance child benefit:
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 22
Insights from this study
• In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk
are negatively correlated.
• It reflects well pattern observed in the data.
• Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are
ambiguous.
• It matters how we finance child benefit:
→ lump sum tax welfare deteriorating
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 22
Insights from this study
• In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk
are negatively correlated.
• It reflects well pattern observed in the data.
• Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are
ambiguous.
• It matters how we finance child benefit:
→ lump sum tax welfare deteriorating
→ capital income tax brings welfare gains.
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 22
Thank you for your attention!
w: grape.org.pl
t: grape org
f: grape.org
e: o.komada@grape.org.pl
FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 23

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Income risk and fertility decision

  • 1. Income risk and fertility decision Oliwia Komada November 22, 2018 Doctoral Seminar FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 1
  • 3. Risky childless world... • Fertility is pro-cyclical (ex. Sobotka, Skirbekk & Philipo PopDevRev 2011; Chatterjee & Vogl AER 2017; Jones & Schoonbroodt RED 2016) FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 2
  • 4. Risky childless world... • Fertility is pro-cyclical (ex. Sobotka, Skirbekk & Philipo PopDevRev 2011; Chatterjee & Vogl AER 2017; Jones & Schoonbroodt RED 2016) • Uncertainty meters a lot... FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 2
  • 5. Risky childless world... • Fertility is pro-cyclical (ex. Sobotka, Skirbekk & Philipo PopDevRev 2011; Chatterjee & Vogl AER 2017; Jones & Schoonbroodt RED 2016) • Uncertainty meters a lot... • Differences in income growth volatility account for 61% of fertility variation between US states during the post WWII baby boom. (Chabe-Ferret & Gobbi 2018) FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 2
  • 6. Risky childless world... • Fertility is pro-cyclical (ex. Sobotka, Skirbekk & Philipo PopDevRev 2011; Chatterjee & Vogl AER 2017; Jones & Schoonbroodt RED 2016) • Uncertainty meters a lot... • Differences in income growth volatility account for 61% of fertility variation between US states during the post WWII baby boom. (Chabe-Ferret & Gobbi 2018) • Increase of husband occupation earnings risk by 1sd yields to decrease of completed fertility by 1.5 children. (Sommer JME 2016) FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 2
  • 7. Risky childless world... • Fertility is pro-cyclical (ex. Sobotka, Skirbekk & Philipo PopDevRev 2011; Chatterjee & Vogl AER 2017; Jones & Schoonbroodt RED 2016) • Uncertainty meters a lot... • Differences in income growth volatility account for 61% of fertility variation between US states during the post WWII baby boom. (Chabe-Ferret & Gobbi 2018) • Increase of husband occupation earnings risk by 1sd yields to decrease of completed fertility by 1.5 children. (Sommer JME 2016) • Idiosyncratic earnings risk increase explains nearly 50% of fertility drop. (Sommer JME 2016) FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 2
  • 8. This study 1. Fertility is too low or just lower due to idiosyncratic income risk? → individual vs. social planer choice → open vs. closed economy FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 3
  • 9. This study 1. Fertility is too low or just lower due to idiosyncratic income risk? → individual vs. social planer choice → open vs. closed economy 2. If fertility is too low, is child benefit welfare improving? → PAYG pension system: social benefits and individual cost → immediate cost and future benefits FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 3
  • 10. This study 1. Fertility is too low or just lower due to idiosyncratic income risk? → individual vs. social planer choice → open vs. closed economy 2. If fertility is too low, is child benefit welfare improving? → PAYG pension system: social benefits and individual cost → immediate cost and future benefits 3. Does it matter how we finance child benefit? → taxes imply a redistribution FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 3
  • 11. This study 1. Fertility is too low or just lower due to idiosyncratic income risk? → individual vs. social planer choice → open vs. closed economy 2. If fertility is too low, is child benefit welfare improving? → PAYG pension system: social benefits and individual cost → immediate cost and future benefits 3. Does it matter how we finance child benefit? → taxes imply a redistribution FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 3
  • 12. This study 1. Fertility is too low or just lower due to idiosyncratic income risk? → individual vs. social planer choice → open vs. closed economy 2. If fertility is too low, is child benefit welfare improving? → PAYG pension system: social benefits and individual cost → immediate cost and future benefits 3. Does it matter how we finance child benefit? → taxes imply a redistribution → redistribution can amplify risk: lump-sum tax → ... or insure against labor income risk: capital tax FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 3
  • 14. What do we do? Our approach We develop an overlapping generations model (OLG) with endogenous fertility and idiosyncratic risk. FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 4
  • 15. What do we do? Our approach We develop an overlapping generations model (OLG) with endogenous fertility and idiosyncratic risk. FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 4
  • 16. What do we do? Our approach We develop an overlapping generations model (OLG) with endogenous fertility and idiosyncratic risk. Main novelty • Optimal fertility decision in the model with idiosyncratic risk. • The computational model with endogenous fertility, idiosyncratic risk and general equilibrium. • Pronatalist policy effect with idiosyncratic risk captured. FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 4
  • 17. Results in a nutshell • In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk are negatively correlated. FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 5
  • 18. Results in a nutshell • In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk are negatively correlated. • It reflects well pattern observed in the data. FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 5
  • 19. Results in a nutshell • In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk are negatively correlated. • It reflects well pattern observed in the data. • Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are ambiguous. FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 5
  • 20. Results in a nutshell • In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk are negatively correlated. • It reflects well pattern observed in the data. • Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are ambiguous. • It matters how we finance child benefit: FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 5
  • 21. Results in a nutshell • In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk are negatively correlated. • It reflects well pattern observed in the data. • Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are ambiguous. • It matters how we finance child benefit: FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 5
  • 22. Results in a nutshell • In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk are negatively correlated. • It reflects well pattern observed in the data. • Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are ambiguous. • It matters how we finance child benefit: → lump sum tax welfare deteriorating FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 5
  • 23. Results in a nutshell • In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk are negatively correlated. • It reflects well pattern observed in the data. • Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are ambiguous. • It matters how we finance child benefit: → lump sum tax welfare deteriorating → capital income tax brings welfare gains. FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 5
  • 24. Part I - analytic framework
  • 26. Consumers Vt = ln(cy t ) + φ ln(nt+1) + β ln(co t+1(ζt+1))dΦ subject to: cy t + at+1 + (p − ϕ)nt+1 = wt(1 − τ) − θt co t+1 = at+1Rt+1 + κζt+1wt+1 + ηt+1 where ζt+1 ∈ {1 − δζ, 1 + δζ} and probability of each stage is equal to 1 2 FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 6
  • 27. Government • covers child benefit adjusting lump sum tax: θt = ϕnt • balances pension system ηt+1 = wt+1τnt+1 Producers Standard perfectly competitive representative firm with Cobb-Douglas production function FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 7
  • 29. Fertility is just lower due to risk in open economy • individual consumer fertility choice n = φ p − ϕ c∗ y (δζ) FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 8
  • 30. Fertility is just lower due to risk in open economy • individual consumer fertility choice n = φ p − ϕ c∗ y (δζ) • steady state social planer fertility choice n = φ + β p + k − d c∗ y (δζ) where c∗ y (δζ) is decreasing function FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 8
  • 31. Fertility is just lower due to risk in open economy • individual consumer fertility choice n = φ p − ϕ c∗ y (δζ) • steady state social planer fertility choice n = φ + β p + k − d c∗ y (δζ) where c∗ y (δζ) is decreasing function FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 8
  • 32. Fertility is just lower due to risk in open economy • individual consumer fertility choice n = φ p − ϕ c∗ y (δζ) • steady state social planer fertility choice n = φ + β p + k − d c∗ y (δζ) where c∗ y (δζ) is decreasing function Individual consumer ignore pension benefits and fertility link → fertility too low FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 8
  • 33. Fertility is just lower due to risk in open economy • individual consumer fertility choice n = φ p − ϕ c∗ y (δζ) • steady state social planer fertility choice n = φ + β p + k − d c∗ y (δζ) where c∗ y (δζ) is decreasing function Individual consumer ignore pension benefits and fertility link → fertility too low Individual consumer ignore the cost of capital for future generation → fertility too high FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 8
  • 34. Fertility is just lower due to risk in open economy • individual consumer fertility choice n = φ p − ϕ c∗ y (δζ) • steady state social planer fertility choice n = φ + β p + k − d c∗ y (δζ) where c∗ y (δζ) is decreasing function Individual consumer ignore pension benefits and fertility link → fertility too low Individual consumer ignore the cost of capital for future generation → fertility too high Idiosyncratic income risk has the same impact on the individual consumer and social planer → higher the risk lower the optimal fertility FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 8
  • 35. Fertility may be too low due to risk in closed economy Intuition: • idiosyncratic income risk → precautionary savings FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 9
  • 36. Fertility may be too low due to risk in closed economy Intuition: • idiosyncratic income risk → precautionary savings • additional savings lower the interest rate and increase wages FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 9
  • 37. Fertility may be too low due to risk in closed economy Intuition: • idiosyncratic income risk → precautionary savings • additional savings lower the interest rate and increase wages • ”risky” part of income increase FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 9
  • 38. Fertility may be too low due to risk in closed economy Intuition: • idiosyncratic income risk → precautionary savings • additional savings lower the interest rate and increase wages • ”risky” part of income increase • individual savings rate higher than social planer savings rate → (Ludwig Krueger 2018) FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 9
  • 39. Fertility may be too low due to risk in closed economy Intuition: • idiosyncratic income risk → precautionary savings • additional savings lower the interest rate and increase wages • ”risky” part of income increase • individual savings rate higher than social planer savings rate → (Ludwig Krueger 2018) • individual consumption lower than social planer choice FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 9
  • 40. Fertility may be too low due to risk in closed economy Intuition: • idiosyncratic income risk → precautionary savings • additional savings lower the interest rate and increase wages • ”risky” part of income increase • individual savings rate higher than social planer savings rate → (Ludwig Krueger 2018) • individual consumption lower than social planer choice • individual fertility lower than social planer choice FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 9
  • 41. Part II - computational model
  • 42. Consumers • uncertain lifetimes: live for j = 1, 2, ..., 20 five-year periods, • survival rate πj,t < 1 FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 10
  • 43. Consumers • uncertain lifetimes: live for j = 1, 2, ..., 20 five-year periods, • survival rate πj,t < 1 • enter labor market at j = 5 • uninsurable earnings: endogenous labor with idiosyncratic productivity process that follows AR(1) approximated by Markov chain FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 10
  • 44. Consumers • uncertain lifetimes: live for j = 1, 2, ..., 20 five-year periods, • survival rate πj,t < 1 • enter labor market at j = 5 • uninsurable earnings: endogenous labor with idiosyncratic productivity process that follows AR(1) approximated by Markov chain • endogenous fertility: discrete choice made at j = 8 , n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 10
  • 45. Consumers • uncertain lifetimes: live for j = 1, 2, ..., 20 five-year periods, • survival rate πj,t < 1 • enter labor market at j = 5 • uninsurable earnings: endogenous labor with idiosyncratic productivity process that follows AR(1) approximated by Markov chain • endogenous fertility: discrete choice made at j = 8 , n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} • work till retirement age j = 14, later receive pension benefits FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 10
  • 46. Consumers • uncertain lifetimes: live for j = 1, 2, ..., 20 five-year periods, • survival rate πj,t < 1 • enter labor market at j = 5 • uninsurable earnings: endogenous labor with idiosyncratic productivity process that follows AR(1) approximated by Markov chain • endogenous fertility: discrete choice made at j = 8 , n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} • work till retirement age j = 14, later receive pension benefits • pay Soc Sec contributions, labor, capital, consumption taxes FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 10
  • 47. Consumers • uncertain lifetimes: live for j = 1, 2, ..., 20 five-year periods, • survival rate πj,t < 1 • enter labor market at j = 5 • uninsurable earnings: endogenous labor with idiosyncratic productivity process that follows AR(1) approximated by Markov chain • endogenous fertility: discrete choice made at j = 8 , n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} • work till retirement age j = 14, later receive pension benefits • pay Soc Sec contributions, labor, capital, consumption taxes FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 10
  • 48. Government • Collects taxes from labor income, capital income, consumption and lump sum tax. FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 11
  • 49. Government • Collects taxes from labor income, capital income, consumption and lump sum tax. • Finances government spending. • Balances pension system. • Services debt. Producers Standard perfectly competitive representative firm with Cobb-Douglas production function FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 11
  • 50. Calibration Preferences • Preference for leisure γ matches average hours 33% • Preference for children φ matches fertility rate 1.9 • Discounting rate δ matches interest rate 4% Idiosyncratic productivity shock based on Kruger and Ludwig (2013): • Persistence η = 0.95 • Variance ση = 0.0375 FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 12
  • 51. Calibration Pension system • Replacement rate ρ matches benefits as % of GDP 5.2% • Contribution rate balances pension system in the initial steady state Child cost {pt = 0.15(1 − τ)(1 − τl )wt} matches average child cost in terms of average wages Taxes {τc, τl , τk} match revenue as % of GDP {9.2%, 3.8%, 3.6%} Depreciation rate d matches investment rate of 25% FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 13
  • 53. Fertility rate decreases when income variance is higher FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 14
  • 54. Fertility rate decreases when income variance is higher FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 15
  • 55. Variance change explains 50 % of fertility drop FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 16
  • 56. Child benefit raises fertility FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 17
  • 57. Effects are similar for different fiscal tools FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 18
  • 58. Fertility is higher. Does it make the World better place? Measuring welfare effects • Compare utility under the veil of ignorance → In which World would I rather be born? • P − efficiency → care only about utility level, ignore cohort size • express as a percent of consumption from pre-reform scenario FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 19
  • 59. Welfare is lower when we use lump sum tax FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 20
  • 60. Welfare increase when we use capital tax FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 21
  • 62. Insights from this study • In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk are negatively correlated. FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 22
  • 63. Insights from this study • In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk are negatively correlated. • It reflects well pattern observed in the data. FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 22
  • 64. Insights from this study • In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk are negatively correlated. • It reflects well pattern observed in the data. • Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are ambiguous. FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 22
  • 65. Insights from this study • In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk are negatively correlated. • It reflects well pattern observed in the data. • Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are ambiguous. • It matters how we finance child benefit: FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 22
  • 66. Insights from this study • In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk are negatively correlated. • It reflects well pattern observed in the data. • Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are ambiguous. • It matters how we finance child benefit: FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 22
  • 67. Insights from this study • In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk are negatively correlated. • It reflects well pattern observed in the data. • Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are ambiguous. • It matters how we finance child benefit: → lump sum tax welfare deteriorating FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 22
  • 68. Insights from this study • In standard OLG model fertility and idiosyncratic labor income risk are negatively correlated. • It reflects well pattern observed in the data. • Child benefit increase fertility however welfare effects are ambiguous. • It matters how we finance child benefit: → lump sum tax welfare deteriorating → capital income tax brings welfare gains. FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 22
  • 69. Thank you for your attention! w: grape.org.pl t: grape org f: grape.org e: o.komada@grape.org.pl FAME|GRAPE, Group for Research in Applied Economics, Warsaw School of Economics 23