This document discusses securing the smart grid, particularly at the edge where many small and resource-constrained devices are located. It notes that hackers have previously infiltrated nuclear power plant systems through external networks. While more complex smart devices have sufficient processing power and encryption for security, simple devices require solutions that use little code space and power. The document proposes a solution using a lightweight cipher and authentication protocol to securely transmit smart meter data along the power supply network. Key challenges in implementing security include managing a large number of keys and providing privacy and authentication without excessive processing demands. Event management and responding to situations in real time is also an issue requiring mature infrastructure.

1. Securing the Smart Grid at the
Edge
Hanns-Christian L. Hanebeck
August 10, 2010
© 2009-2010 Revere Security. All rights reserved. www.reveresecurity.com 1

2. The Robespierre Leadership Model
“I must see which way the
crowd is headed ... for I
am their leader!"
© 2009-2010 Revere Security. All rights reserved. 2

3. Do We Need to Secure the Edge?
On January 25, 2003 hackers infected the Davis-
Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio with a worm.
The virus entered through a “secure” T1 line for an
external consulting firm. While the infection did not
harm the plant, which had been off-line during the
worm attack, it caused the Safety Parameter
Display System to be down for five hours and the
plant process computer for six.
Four years later, IBM researcher Scott
Lunsford hacked into a nuclear power plant
and claimed that entering through the SCADA
network “… turned out to be one of the
easiest penetration tests I'd ever done …”
Source: Forbes, America’s Hackable Backbone, Oct. 2007
© 2009-2010 Revere Security. All rights reserved. Image Sources: nbc.com and smartgridsecurity.blogspot.com 3

4. Is Technology Available to Secure the Edge?
Complex Smart Devices
• 32-bit or higher microprocessor
• AES /ECC Encryption very well suited
• Revere Hummingbird very well suited
today
Simple Smart Devices
• 16-bit or lower microprocessor
• AES /ECC Encryption too large, too expensive
• Revere Hummingbird perfectly suited
© 2009-2010 Revere Security. All rights reserved. 4

5. Old Security Doesn’t Always Solve NEW Problems
Phones Traditional Security Framework
?
Physical Infrastructure Mobile
Devices
?
Networks and Servers
Very few
Sensors ? experts
worldwide
& SCADA Very long
Endpoints: Laptops, PCs
time to
market
Processes and Applications
Little
customer & ?
? consumer
People and Identities
pull RFID Tags
Smart
Meters Data, Information, Knowledge
© 2009-2010 Revere Security. All rights reserved. 5

6. Requirements for Security at the Edge
Little Code Space Required – Fits on a 16-bit Chip
Short Messages e.g. 16-bit Cipher
Built-in MAC Easy to Integrate
Anonymous Communications
Lower Power Requirement
Mutual Authentication Protocol
Simple, Scalable Key Management
System
© 2009-2010 Revere Security. All rights reserved. 6

7. Security Along the Power Supply
Security at the EDGE of the Smart Grid necessitates handling
of many small, resource constrained devices
Utility
SCADA Smart Meter
Consumption
Generation
Storage Substation
© 2009-2010 Revere Security. All rights reserved. 7

8. Security for Smart Metering
Protecting Smart 5
Meters will
require industrial- 6
strength security 3
on a very small
footprint. 3
4
1 Consumer uses energy 2
1
2 Smart Meter records and transmits consumption data
3 Wireless networks (Wi-Max, cell, BPL, etc.) transmit information to the utility
4 Utility aggregates usage data, prepares pricing and makes information available to the consumer
5 Consumer accesses the information online
6 Consumer makes choices that will affect energy consumption
© 2009-2010 Revere Security. All rights reserved. 8

9. Smart Meter Security Example
Sensus iCon Smart Meter
TI MSP430
Hummingbird is up to 416% faster and
consumes 76% less power than AES (EAX’).
© 2009-2010 Revere Security. All rights reserved. Image Sources: ukfrrnell.com and joysco.com 9

10. Implementing Security - Key Management
• Highly complex
Key • Need to manage keys on the smart meter (HAN)
Management • Requires very high level of systemic security
Challenges • Keys might need to be assigned on a temporary basis
• Handhelds and laptops for key commissioning may be
lost
Solution • Distributed hierarchical system architecture
• Scalable to well more than 100 million keys
• Authentication of field devices by installed smart meters
• Anonymous identification and key management to protect privacy
• Secure assignment of temporary session keys
© 2009-2010 Revere Security. All rights reserved. 10

11. Implementing Security – Other Challenges
• Authentication is vital to prevent unwanted access
Built-in • It ensures that commands and data are authorized
Authentication • In cases where encryption and authentication are
required, a one-pass approach is superior
• Consumers will likely want ownership of and control
Consumer over their own consumption data
Privacy • The integration of multiple devices into one standards-
based home area network will be difficult at best
• Consumers will likely use third-party devices to control
their energy consumption and data
• Smart Grid security necessitates the ability to react to
Event events in near real-time
Management • This requires a highly mature event management
infrastructure (bus) and a lot of knowledge about
business rules
• It is unclear who owns and manages these systems
© 2009-2010 Revere Security. All rights reserved. 11

12. Implementing Security – Other Challenges
“The key to
winning is getting
to where the puck
is going to be
next.”
“The Great One”
© 2009-2010 Revere Security. All rights reserved. 12

13. Questions?
Chris Hanebeck
(214) 415-2648
chris.hanebeck@reveresecurity.com

14. Securing the Smart Grid at the
Edge
Hanns-Christian L. Hanebeck
August 10, 2010
© 2009-2010 Revere Security. All rights reserved. www.reveresecurity.com 14