In this talk, presented in June 2016 at KAIST, I argue that it is time for the next generation of cybersecurity strategies. These must have a governance focus, and be based on international laws, declarations and agreements, basic internet rights and public good provisions.

1. National Cyber
Security Strategies
A contradiction in terms?

2. root@myops:~# whoami
• Theoretical chemist and philosopher by training (PhD 1993 and 2012)
• Wrote DALTON program code [in FORTRAN]
• Played with supercomputers such as Cray Y-MP
• First got hacked in 1991
• Worked 15 years as IT Infrastructure architect for various NZ
companies
• Now lead the IT Security team @UoA by day
• Lecture in cyber security at Unitec and UoA
• Present at technical cyber security conferences

3. root@myops:~# whoami > graphic

4. Security trainwreck: tech pre-conditions
Eternal economic disincentives to build better security in:
1. Rapid consumerisation, hence feature driven development
2. Time and Cost driven market model (lowering quality)
3. Rapid development cycles and an ‘unstable’ (i.e. rapidly evolving
and incompatible between versions) technology stack requiring
rapid re-engineering of key components
With IoT, to make it worse, these disincentives are meeting:
4. Long expected lifetimes

5. Examples: Why this is important
How secure is your tech? What does that mean exactly?
How secure is your data in Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, WhatsApp and
others?
Does the NZ prime minister really understand the difference between
bulk collection (which he admits) and mass surveillance (which he
denies)?
Can Donald Trump really ‘fix the internet’ by calling Bill Gates for advice
on how to ‘close some parts off’?

6. Put this on twitter: look at the screen

7. Contents
1. Nations, states, security, cyber security, privacy and the stacks
2. The Snowden effect and the Snowden paradox
3. Why raw ‘freedom’ fails
4. At what level should the cyber [in]security problem be tackled?
5. A social philosophy of cyber security
6. A national cyber security strategy

8. Nations, states, security, cyber
security, privacy and the stacks

9. What is a ‘nation’?
There are many dimensions
• Economic
• Social
• Legal
• Historical
• Geopolitical
• Population

10. Origin of nationhood
Crisis of the Seventeenth century
• Thirty year war in Germany
(1618-1648)
• Dutch revolt (1568- 1648)
• Military revolution
Treaty of Westphalia (1648)
Social philosophy (Hobbes, Locke)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Les_Grandes_Miseres_de_la_guerre

11. Westphalian principles of nationhood
Westphalian sovereignty
• Territorial authority
• Religious tolerance
• Non-interference in another
state’s internal affairs
• Equality on the international
scene
http://www.britannica.com/event/Thirty-Years-War

12. A new player in nationhood
At Webstock 2013 Bruce Sterling
defined what he calls ‘The Stacks’
A new type of corporation that
uses lock-tight integration of
hardware and software in order to
form a branded ecosystem
http://vimeo.com/63012862
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/22/google-information-tax-new-state

13. ‘Stacks’: GOOG, AAPL, FB, MSFT, TWTR
• Size: very large, both in terms of employees and users
• Vertically integrated global software structures used by millions
• Proprietary OS’s AND devices AND large server farms AND loyal user
base AND proprietary revenue stream AND (sometimes) own money
• The internet of old had users, the stacks have livestock
• Advertising as a revenue model depends on surveillance
• Stacks have social networks and buy IOT / VR companies
• Livestock security can be detrimental to revenue models

14. Are the ‘stacks’ nations?
• Google, Apple, Facebook now larger in turnover than GDP of many
small nations
• Each has their own ‘cloud’ – i.e. ‘informational territory’
• The military now talk about ‘cyber’ as the ‘fifth domain’ (i.e. theatre
of war) after land, water, air and space
• You usually sign a EULA and privacy statement – some kind of
fundamental human right as a citizen of that ‘state’?
• They buy hardware companies at rapid clip: Nest, Oculus Rift, Kinetic

15. The Snowden effect and the
Snowden paradox

16. ‘Snowden effect’
Increase in public concern about surveillance, data privacy and
information security resulting from the Snowden revelations
Some comments
• Most security professionals suspected this sort of capability in our
agencies all along, we just had no proof
• Laws are now being changed around the globe (which is a good thing
and a bad thing)
• Change of how some of the major cloud providers implement security
http://www.whoishostingthis.com/blog/2015/05/20/snowdens-global-impact/

17. Snowden effect
An illustration: as a result of this most
famous PostIt note ever, Google now
encrypts its data centre traffic

18. The Snowden paradox
The public professes to be worried about issues of privacy and security,
yet signs up en masse for services that
1. Are built upon surveillance as a business model, rather than an
incidental feature
2. Have a EULA subject to unilateral change as a basic protection of
‘human rights’
3. Practice widespread censorship and tax evasion
4. Are predicated on a business model where their users are the
product

19. Why ‘freedom’ fails

20. What is freedom?
Different interpretations in different domains
Roosevelt’s four freedoms could be seen as what is required of a nation:
1. Freedom of speech and expression
2. Freedom of [religion]
3. Freedom from want
4. Freedom from fear
F. D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address to the Congress, January 6, 1941

21. Typical ‘NSA spies on us’ talk
• Telephone system was designed to be intercepted – this was bad
• Then the internet created freedom – this was good
• Then the NSA was afraid of the internet ‘going dark’
• And started listening to everything
• Then we were freed by Snowden
• And encrypted everything
• The progress of encrypted communications is now generating wider
political crisis
• Last words of the NSA: I’ll be back

22. It makes for nice quotes
“Whatever else, history will record of them that they didn't think long
before acting. Presented with a national calamity which also
constituted a political opportunity, nothing stood between them and all
the mistakes that haste can make for history to repent at leisure. And
what they did, of course—in secret, with the assistance of judges
chosen by a single man operating in secrecy, and with the connivance
of many decent people who believed themselves to be doing the only
thing that would save the society—was to unchain the listeners from
law.”
http://www.snowdenandthefuture.info/PartI.html

23. But…there is more at stake
Surveillance and espionage have always been a legitimate, though
somewhat murky, state function
• Subject to political control and governance
• With generally a separation between intelligence and counter-
intelligence
With the ‘stacks’ we now get the first ‘states’ whose model is entirely
predicated on mass surveillance and monetisation of that data
• Without such controls and separations
• And a EULA as your basic human rights

24. Example: There is more at stake
• Tapping the phone system required a warrant, which needed to be
acquired by a legal process
• Bulk collection of data (i.e. actual conversations) will never get a
warrant
• Bulk collection of metadata doesn’t need one
• Our politicians have a poor understanding of the issues
• ‘States’ based explicitly on monetisation of surveillance data do not
have any policies and controls on the data they hoover up
• And these ‘states’ like a monopoly on that data

25. Raw ‘freedom’ and freedom
• Of the ‘four freedoms’ only two are provided by the stacks and then
in limited form (‘speech and expression’ and ‘religion’)
• Some stacks now have censorship
• Their international practices have the effect that the stacks are
detrimental to the remaining two freedoms
• Tax evasion erodes ‘freedom from want’ in many nations
• Secret backroom deals (though not called ‘diplomacy’) erode freedom
from ‘fear’ in many others

26. A sense of the problems
• States cannot just help themselves indiscriminately to data
• Disruptive changes to data environments make legal overhaul
inevitable
• Politicians are incapable of exerting effective governance and controls
on the ‘stacks’, though they can do local deals
• The ‘stacks’ should be included in such discussion, but how?
• Of the ‘four freedoms’ only two are provided by the stacks (‘speech
and expression’ and ‘religion’)
• Can philosophers help? Yes, but they haven’t been very helpful so far

27. At what level should the cyber
[in]security problem be tackled?

28. Where philosophers go wrong…
• In philosophy education, general disconnect between history and
philosophy
• We see ‘bad behaviour’ as a personal problem, not as a systemic
problem (lack a sociological point of view)
Hence
• Cyber security is seen as a problem of ‘hackers’ lacking ethical
behaviour

29. Is cyber insecurity an ethical problem?
Let’s suppose cyber insecurity is a primarily an issue of failing personal
ethics.
Then we have three very big problems. They are
1. The principles problem
2. The actor / attribution problem
3. The implementation problem

30. 1. The principles problem
What is ‘ethical’?

31. What principles?
Two unsatisfactory answers:
Answer 1: Turn the question around
• What sort of principles would make ‘hacking’ wrong?
• Are these the right ones?
Answer 2: Look at ‘environmental ethics’
• (e.g. Floridi) All binary data has inherent rights

32. What makes ‘hacking’ ‘wrong’
Why do people hack? Are all these motivations ‘wrong’?
• Curiosity
• Intellectual property
• Defacements and activism
• Thieving
• Scamming
• Spying
• Sabotage
• The ‘Fifth Domain’ (i.e. ‘war’)

33. ‘Environmental’ ethics [Floridi]
Information ‘environment’ with global principles
• entropy ought not to be caused in the infosphere (null law);
• entropy ought to be prevented in the infosphere;
• entropy ought to be removed from the infosphere;
• the flourishing of informational entities as well as of the whole
infosphere ought to be promoted by preserving, cultivating and
enriching their properties.
Where ‘entropy’ is information destruction or corruption

34. A cyber basic set of rights?
• Could we define an ‘ethical actor’ – i.e. an entity with duties,
obligations and ethical demands?
For that we need a basic set of rights
• The problem with EULAs
• The price we pay for insisting on more privacy

35. The EULA
Is a EULA sufficient protection?
One AV company (F-Secure) decided to find
out. They let people sign the EULA on the left
to get free WiFi
Spot the ‘Herod clause’
Six people signed up
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2
014/sep/29/londoners-wi-fi-security-herod-
clause

36. The Google ‘opt out’ village (The Onion)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lMChO0qNbkY

38. 2. The actor / attribution problem
In many / most cases of digital evil, ‘whodunit’ is difficult or
fundamentally impossible
Secrecy and security requirements a large barrier to open
communication
Thomas Rid: Attribution “is what states make of it” – i.e. a complex
political process of negotiation
Example: Did NORK hack Sony and SWIFT?

39. Attribution example 1
Who did this?
This is the well-known
‘CryptoLocker’ ransomware
Encrypts your files, then
asks for a ransom
Payment instructions on an
onion routed website
Payment is in bitcoin

40. Attribution example 2
And its ugly cousin ‘Petya’, same idea

41. Assumptions of the cyber attribution
problem
Three assumptions (all limited and insufficient)
1. Attribution is one of the most intractable problems of an emerging
field, created by the underlying technical architecture and
geography of the Internet
2. A binary view on attribution: for any given case, the problem can
either be solved, or not be solved
3. Attributive evidence is readily comprehensible, the main challenge
is finding the evidence itself, not analysing, enriching, and
presenting it
Thomas Rid (The Journal of Strategic Studies, 2015, 38(1–2), 4–37)

42. The Q model

43. The attribution problem (Bruce Schneier)
Is attribution intractable? Not really, but there is a difference between
1. I know you did it
2. I can prove to you that I know you did it
3. I can prove publicly that I know you did it
4. I can prove in a court of law that you did it
The scope and size of attribution depends on what you want from it

44. Attribution is an intelligence problem
• Intelligence (or INTEL) is someone’s interpreted view of the world
• Intelligence gathering follows an intelligence cycle
• Intelligence is information which is analysed, enriched, and presented
• Where does that ‘intelligence’ sit on the ladder of Schneier’s four
escalating questions?
• What does the data look like?

45. Threat Intel Cycle / Pyramid of Pain
Direction
Collection
CollationAnalysis
Reporting
http://detect-respond.blogspot.co.nz/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html

46. 3. The implementation problem
• How do we enforce our cyber security in practice?
• Governance models on the internet?

47. Who is responsible? Roles of the state
Market
oversight
Law
Enforcement
National
Security
National
Defence
Regulators Police and
prosecutors
Civil protection
authorities
Military and
intelligence
agencies
Correcting
market failures
Fighting
cybercrime
Protecting
critical
infrastructures
Executing
military and
intelligence
operations

48. My terrorist, your
freedom fighter, and a
government as well
]Hacking Team[ was a somewhat odious
outfit supplying surveillanceware to dubious
governments around the globe
They were comprehensively hacked and all
their data stolen

49. Cyber insecurity is not an ethical problem
• No broadly supported principles
• No actor
• No implementation
What about criminals then?
• Criminals are unethical because they display criminal behaviour (i.e.
stealing, lying, cheating), not because they are hackers

50. A social philosophy of cyber
security

51. Social Philosophy of cyber security
More big problems, but ones we can solve more readily
• Is a cyber social contract possible?
• If so, what would make it up?
• Should cyber security be a public good? [i.e. open to all if it’s provided
for any members of a group]
• Should ‘stacks’ be regulated?
Note and comment: at the moment nation states can’t even get stacks to pay
their taxes, so good luck with the rest

52. Social Contract theory [general structure]
Look at it as a philosopher of science would
Go from ‘atomic’ to ‘aggregate’ state
1. Postulate a ‘state of nature’ (hypothetical but not always)
2. Postulate a set of atomic and universal rights and obligations
3. Stipulate the conditions for a contract discussion [discursive model]
4. Stipulate participant trade-offs [game theory or other]
5. Simulate the discussion
6. Formulate the outcome: a ‘just’ arrangement

53. Social Contract theory [historical structure]
• Hobbes and the Civil War / Restoration
• Locke and the Glorious Revolution
• Rawls and the welfare state
Contract modelling is influenced by historical conditions

54. The ‘original hacker’ contract?
1. ‘State of nature’ A large unregulated internet
2. Rights and obligations The four freedoms of open source
3. Rationality model Make it work
4. Trade-off Let’s share everything
5. Simulate Information wants to be free
6. Outcome Privacy is evil, the ‘Circle’

55. Minimal ‘stacks’ contract
1. ‘State of nature’ Collection of walled gardens
2. Rights and obligations Sign some EULA / privacy statement
3. Rationality model It ‘just works’
4. Trade-off Convenience for me, data for you
5. Simulate Convenience is noticeable, surveillance
invisible
(i) I like convenience
(ii) I ignore what I can’t see
6. Outcome Welcome to ‘our community’

56. A (perhaps) desirable contract
1. ‘State of nature’ A large open internet
2. Rights and obligations Rights of basic protocols
Distributed trust anchors
3. Rationality model Interoperability
4. Trade-off Privacy and integrity over convenience
5. Simulate Iteration of trust anchors
6. Outcome ‘Aware digital presence’

57. A brief word on distributed trust anchors
• Tracers and tethers
• Tether is a verifiable trust anchor
• Tracer is its ongoing certification
• Blockchain and others
Technical solutions to a political problem: the
risk at the moment is that states look at the
internet from the starting point of national
security and are willing to trade network public
health for national security
http://www.wrr.nl/fileadmin/en/publicaties/PDF-Rapporten/The_public_core_of_the_internet_Web.pdf

58. A national cyber security strategy

59. With all of this
• It’s no surprise that national cyber security strategies are a bit of a
muddle
• In most countries, strategies are now in their second generation
• First generation acknowledged the existence of the problem
• Second generation has some sort of remediation / resilience focus
• We need a third generation which has a governance focus

60. First generation of strategies
Generally recognise the existence of the problem and try to raise
awareness
Example: New Zealand’s policy from 2011. Objectives are to
• raise the cyber security awareness and understanding of individuals
and small businesses;
• improve the level of cyber security across government; and
• build strategic relationships to improve cyber security for critical
national infrastructure and other businesses.

61. Second generation of strategies
What usually gets addressed (NZ, UK, NL) is
1. National resilience
2. Crime
3. Diplomatic relations and cooperation
4. Capability
What is usually not explicitly addressed is the tension between the
nation and the ‘stacks’

62. Example
The Dutch Cyber Security Assessment does a very good job of reporting
against a ‘second generation’ cyber security strategy on an ongoing
basis
It is available in Dutch and English
Reports have been produced every year since 2012
https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/Cyber+Security+Assessment+Netherlands

63. Third generation of strategies
Without wanting to run ahead, a third generation is needed, which has
a governance focus, possibly with binding laws, basic internet rights
and public good provisions
We have a precedent: Grotius’ Mare Liberum (1609) covered
governance of the ‘second domain’ in an era of rapid naval expansion
of Western Europe
For us as philosophers: ‘ethics’ is not going to solve the governance
problem, we need an alternative!

64. Conclusions
• We have built a new domain of ‘faulty tech’
• This domain is a social domain, not a personal domain
• Exploits of faulty tech are not necessarily an ethical failure
• Philosophical thinking on the issue should be based on a social
philosophy, not on ethics
• Most countries now have second generation strategies
• We need a third generation based on governance, fundamental rights
and public good provisions which includes the large tech companies
as states of their own – i.e. as diplomatic efforts

65. Questions?