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The Newest Element of Risk
Metrics: Social Media
Ian Amit
@iiamit
Spot the problem
Basic Motivation - hottest/easiest vector!
• “… in previous years, we saw phishing messages come and go and
reported that the overall effectiveness of phishing campaigns was
between 10 and 20%. This year, we noted that some of these stats went
higher, with 23% of recipients now opening phishing messages and
11% clicking on attachments. Some stats were lower, though, with a
slight decline in users actually going to phishing sites and giving up
passwords.”
• “For two years, more than two-thirds of incidents that comprise the
Cyber-Espionage pattern have featured phishing.”
• 2015 DBIR
Why do I want this? (1)
Why do I want this? (1)
Why do I want this? (2)
Why do I want this? (3)
• Are you engaged in a “controversial” practice?
Financial
Services
DIB Healthcare
Pharma Agribusiness LEA
Energy
Coming up with a solution…
Let’s create a framework!
The solution should provide:
How feasible is it?
Sentiment Analysis
and German Elections
“Twitter can be seen as a valid real-
time indicator of political sentiment.”
http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM10/paper/viewFile/1441/1852
Goal, Question, Metric
Victor Basili
Goals establish
what we want to
accomplish.
Questions help us
understand how to
meet the goal.
They address
context.
Metrics identify the
measurements that
are needed to
answer the
questions.
Goal 1 Goal 2
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
GQM Example: Patch Management
Patching Scorecard
Goal 1: Comprehensive
Goal 2: Timely
Goal 3: Cost Efficient
Goal 1: Comprehensive
%Coverage by Asset category
%Coverage by Risk
Unix
Windows Server
Desktop
OS
Compo
Likelihood
Impact
By Asset Category
By Location (DMZ, Se
By Business Unit
By Asset Category
By Location (DMZ, Semi-
Goal 2: Timely
What should our Priorities be for timeliness?
What is Policy for timeliness?
What other Considerations for Timeliness?
What is time to patc
What is time to pat
What % are Late by
What are our Repeat Offende
likelih
Impac
corecard Goal 2: Timely
Goal 3: Cost Efficient
Cost
Risk Reduction
Hour per Asset spent Patching
By Asset Category
By Location (DMZ, Semi-Pub, Internal)
By Cost Per Hour
Hour per Asset, by ALE per Hour
Hour per asset category
GQM for SMRM
• Goal: Provide a social media risk scorecard for a person/
organization.
• Questions: How would one’s OA affect the likelihood of a threat?
How would one’s OA affects the impact of a threat, and the areas of
impact? How does unsanctioned presence of someone affect said
threats?
• Metrics: Provide a qualitative* approach to measuring the overall
risk, as well as specific aspects of the social media presence.
*And when we say qualitative we lie a little bit…
More Goals!
• Provide a measurable way to quantify risk associated with online activity of the
organization and it's employees.
• Provide another measure for quantifying risk of working with 3rd parties and
contractors.
• Create a score for executives to measure their social media exposure (from an
exec protection perspective, insider trading, etc...)
• Create a score for measuring and comparing intra and extra industry social media
risk ratings
• Be able to quantify the effect of changing controls, processes and policies on the
risk associated with social media.
Enter, SMRM!
Is the individual risky?
Is the individual risky?
Is the individual risky?
Is the individual risky?
Scorecard Development
• Started with the basics, comparative measurements…
• Qualitative approach dictates trying to leave quantitative elements
out (which we kind’a try to). So the compromise was to provide a
fairly detailed breakdown of elements, and instead of measuring
them on a scale, only indicate presence (1 or 0).
• Aggregation didn't work (per-se), Averaging would not take into
account the full magnitude of the largest elements, MAX() would not
factor in contribution from smaller ones. We have to provide more
accurate weights…
Scoring Approach
• Ended up with providing a weighting system for the major elements
and their importance to the organization (context?!).
• Given X points to distribute between Y elements. Weight = Y’/X
where Y’ is the number of points given to each element.
• Sum(Y’…Y’’)=1
• Apply weighting to the scorecard to get weighted risk score. (where
weights are appropriate for the organization’s operational context).
Scorecard Status
Likelihood
Manifestation
Impact
# online
threats
Personal
Scorecard Status
Likelihood
Manifestation
Impact
# online
threats
Likelihood
Manifestation
Impact
# online
threats
Corporate
Malicious Content
Negative
Sentiment
Information
Leaks
What Data do I Need?
Size
# of monitored assets
Geography
Chatter
Impersonations
Sentiment
How can you do it?
Step 1
None at all None but public
information
Volitional Enforced
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Collect <ALL> the data
E T L
Scraping
Twitter Scraping:
http://knightlab.northwestern.edu/2014/03/15/a-beginners-guide-to-collecting-twitter-data-and-a-
bit-of-web-scraping/
<link rel="alternate" type="application/json+oembed" href="https://
api.twitter.com/1/statuses/oembed.json?id=623493258958606336"
title="Guy Fieri, CISO on Twitter: &quot;Which is more dangerous
@nudehaberdasher, @0xcharlie, @a_greenberg stunt in the wild, or
Nationalist Attribution Rhetoric from @taosecurity?&quot;">
Step 5
Store the data
MARCUS SAYS 

BIG DATA
Step 6
Analysis
Example of Using SA for Subjective Rating
Warning - subjectivity ahead!
Step 6b
Big data magic
Step 7
Scorecard
DEMO
Where can you get it?
• The Society of Information Risk Analysts
• http://www.societyinforisk.org
• As well as on the SMRM site:
• http://risk-metrics.com/
Take-away
1. Check what is your current social media security policy (if you have
one).
2. Do you have a current risk model that incorporates social media as
part of it (attack surface / information leak / intelligence)
3. Measure your current social media risk posture for key individuals in
your organization.
• And then in 2-3 months - measure again to see whether any changes
you have implemented in light of the initial measurement had the right
impact.
Thank you!
Questions?
@iiamit
References
Sentiment analysis and german elections: http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM10/paper/viewFile/
1441/1852
Analyze tone of text: https://tone-analyzer-demo.mybluemix.net/
Analyze personality based on text: https://watson-pi-demo.mybluemix.net/
Sentiment analysis (list from http://breakthroughanalysis.com/2012/01/08/what-are-the-most-powerful-open-source-
sentiment-analysis-tools/)
Python NLTK (Natural Language Toolkit), http://www.nltk.org/, but see also http://text-processing.com/demo/
sentiment/
R, TM (text mining) module, http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tm/index.html, including tm.plugin.sentiment.
RapidMiner, http://rapid-i.com/content/view/184/196/.
GATE, te General Architecture for Text Engineering, http://gate.ac.uk/sentiment/.
Apache UIMA is the Unstructured Information Management Architecture, http://uima.apache.org/ — also sentiment
classifiers for the WEKA data-mining workbench, http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/. See http://www.unal.edu.co/
diracad/einternacional/Weka.pdf for one example.
Stanford NLP tools, http://www-nlp.stanford.edu/software/
LingPipe, (pseudo-open source). See http://alias-i.com/lingpipe/demos/tutorial/sentiment/read-me.html.

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Social Media Risk Metrics

  • 1. The Newest Element of Risk Metrics: Social Media Ian Amit @iiamit
  • 3. Basic Motivation - hottest/easiest vector! • “… in previous years, we saw phishing messages come and go and reported that the overall effectiveness of phishing campaigns was between 10 and 20%. This year, we noted that some of these stats went higher, with 23% of recipients now opening phishing messages and 11% clicking on attachments. Some stats were lower, though, with a slight decline in users actually going to phishing sites and giving up passwords.” • “For two years, more than two-thirds of incidents that comprise the Cyber-Espionage pattern have featured phishing.” • 2015 DBIR
  • 4. Why do I want this? (1)
  • 5. Why do I want this? (1)
  • 6. Why do I want this? (2)
  • 7. Why do I want this? (3) • Are you engaged in a “controversial” practice? Financial Services DIB Healthcare Pharma Agribusiness LEA Energy
  • 8. Coming up with a solution…
  • 9. Let’s create a framework!
  • 11. How feasible is it? Sentiment Analysis and German Elections “Twitter can be seen as a valid real- time indicator of political sentiment.”
  • 13. Goal, Question, Metric Victor Basili Goals establish what we want to accomplish. Questions help us understand how to meet the goal. They address context. Metrics identify the measurements that are needed to answer the questions. Goal 1 Goal 2 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
  • 14. GQM Example: Patch Management Patching Scorecard Goal 1: Comprehensive Goal 2: Timely Goal 3: Cost Efficient
  • 15. Goal 1: Comprehensive %Coverage by Asset category %Coverage by Risk Unix Windows Server Desktop OS Compo Likelihood Impact By Asset Category By Location (DMZ, Se By Business Unit By Asset Category By Location (DMZ, Semi-
  • 16. Goal 2: Timely What should our Priorities be for timeliness? What is Policy for timeliness? What other Considerations for Timeliness? What is time to patc What is time to pat What % are Late by What are our Repeat Offende likelih Impac
  • 17. corecard Goal 2: Timely Goal 3: Cost Efficient Cost Risk Reduction Hour per Asset spent Patching By Asset Category By Location (DMZ, Semi-Pub, Internal) By Cost Per Hour Hour per Asset, by ALE per Hour Hour per asset category
  • 18. GQM for SMRM • Goal: Provide a social media risk scorecard for a person/ organization. • Questions: How would one’s OA affect the likelihood of a threat? How would one’s OA affects the impact of a threat, and the areas of impact? How does unsanctioned presence of someone affect said threats? • Metrics: Provide a qualitative* approach to measuring the overall risk, as well as specific aspects of the social media presence. *And when we say qualitative we lie a little bit…
  • 19. More Goals! • Provide a measurable way to quantify risk associated with online activity of the organization and it's employees. • Provide another measure for quantifying risk of working with 3rd parties and contractors. • Create a score for executives to measure their social media exposure (from an exec protection perspective, insider trading, etc...) • Create a score for measuring and comparing intra and extra industry social media risk ratings • Be able to quantify the effect of changing controls, processes and policies on the risk associated with social media.
  • 25.
  • 26. Scorecard Development • Started with the basics, comparative measurements… • Qualitative approach dictates trying to leave quantitative elements out (which we kind’a try to). So the compromise was to provide a fairly detailed breakdown of elements, and instead of measuring them on a scale, only indicate presence (1 or 0). • Aggregation didn't work (per-se), Averaging would not take into account the full magnitude of the largest elements, MAX() would not factor in contribution from smaller ones. We have to provide more accurate weights…
  • 27. Scoring Approach • Ended up with providing a weighting system for the major elements and their importance to the organization (context?!). • Given X points to distribute between Y elements. Weight = Y’/X where Y’ is the number of points given to each element. • Sum(Y’…Y’’)=1 • Apply weighting to the scorecard to get weighted risk score. (where weights are appropriate for the organization’s operational context).
  • 29. Personal Scorecard Status Likelihood Manifestation Impact # online threats Likelihood Manifestation Impact # online threats Corporate Malicious Content Negative Sentiment Information Leaks
  • 30. What Data do I Need? Size # of monitored assets Geography Chatter Impersonations Sentiment
  • 31. How can you do it?
  • 32. Step 1 None at all None but public information Volitional Enforced
  • 35. Step 4 Collect <ALL> the data E T L
  • 36. Scraping Twitter Scraping: http://knightlab.northwestern.edu/2014/03/15/a-beginners-guide-to-collecting-twitter-data-and-a- bit-of-web-scraping/ <link rel="alternate" type="application/json+oembed" href="https:// api.twitter.com/1/statuses/oembed.json?id=623493258958606336" title="Guy Fieri, CISO on Twitter: &quot;Which is more dangerous @nudehaberdasher, @0xcharlie, @a_greenberg stunt in the wild, or Nationalist Attribution Rhetoric from @taosecurity?&quot;">
  • 37. Step 5 Store the data MARCUS SAYS 
 BIG DATA
  • 39. Example of Using SA for Subjective Rating Warning - subjectivity ahead!
  • 40.
  • 43. DEMO
  • 44. Where can you get it? • The Society of Information Risk Analysts • http://www.societyinforisk.org • As well as on the SMRM site: • http://risk-metrics.com/
  • 45. Take-away 1. Check what is your current social media security policy (if you have one). 2. Do you have a current risk model that incorporates social media as part of it (attack surface / information leak / intelligence) 3. Measure your current social media risk posture for key individuals in your organization. • And then in 2-3 months - measure again to see whether any changes you have implemented in light of the initial measurement had the right impact.
  • 47. References Sentiment analysis and german elections: http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM10/paper/viewFile/ 1441/1852 Analyze tone of text: https://tone-analyzer-demo.mybluemix.net/ Analyze personality based on text: https://watson-pi-demo.mybluemix.net/ Sentiment analysis (list from http://breakthroughanalysis.com/2012/01/08/what-are-the-most-powerful-open-source- sentiment-analysis-tools/) Python NLTK (Natural Language Toolkit), http://www.nltk.org/, but see also http://text-processing.com/demo/ sentiment/ R, TM (text mining) module, http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tm/index.html, including tm.plugin.sentiment. RapidMiner, http://rapid-i.com/content/view/184/196/. GATE, te General Architecture for Text Engineering, http://gate.ac.uk/sentiment/. Apache UIMA is the Unstructured Information Management Architecture, http://uima.apache.org/ — also sentiment classifiers for the WEKA data-mining workbench, http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/. See http://www.unal.edu.co/ diracad/einternacional/Weka.pdf for one example. Stanford NLP tools, http://www-nlp.stanford.edu/software/ LingPipe, (pseudo-open source). See http://alias-i.com/lingpipe/demos/tutorial/sentiment/read-me.html.