This week, were studying civil liberties. Lets look at an interest.docx
Writing Sample 2
1. QUESTION PRESENTED
Although the present case raises multiple issues our Union may discuss, Amici curiae is
particularly concerned with the issue of whether the governments installation and use of a GPS
device to generate and store data about Jones’ movements and locations constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment of United States Constitution.
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The United Civilians Freedom Riders Union (“UCFRU”) is a nationwide, nonprofit,
bipartisan organization with more than 750,000 members dedicated to liberty, equality, and this
nation’s civil rights laws. On October 18, 2011, UCFRU released its statement on location
tracking, where union members urged that we must “carry forward Fourth Amendment
safeguards into the Digital Age.” The Union concluded that the Fourth Amendment requires law
enforcement to obtain a warrant before employing GPS technology to conduct prolonged
tracking of an individual’s movement, even if on public streets. The present case interests
UCFRU because it represents an opportunity to improve Fourth Amendment doctrine and
maintain that provision’s protections in the modern era.
BACKGROUND
In the fall of 2005, the Metropolitan Police Department Safe Streets Task Force (“task
force”) tracked the movements of Antoine Jones in order to gather evidence for an ongoing
narcotics investigation. On September 27, 2005, the task force installed a Global Positioning
System (“GPS”) device on a motor vehicle registered to Jones’ wife (“the car”). The GPS device
remained attached to the car until October 24, 2005. During this twenty-eight day period, the task
force, along with the GPS device was able to pinpoint the location of the car at every instance.
The GPS had an antenna that received signals from satellites. The GPS used these signals to
determine its latitude and longitude every ten seconds, accurately pinpointing its location to
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2. within 50 to 100 feet. The task force connected that data to software that plotted the car’s
location and movement on a map. The software also created a comprehensive record of the car’s
locations.
The task force, depending on the needs of the investigation, sometimes monitored the GPS
device live and other times reviewed its stored data. The task force could track the car’s
individual trips as well as identify patterns in the car’s daily routine. For example, it could note
repeated visits to particular locations. Over the twenty-eight day period, the task force had
constant access to the car’s location, except during a five-day period where the GPS device’s
batteries had expired. During this period, the task force visited the car to install new batteries.
The task force would not have been able to obtain this comprehensive real-time and historical
record of the car’s movements without the aid of the GPS. With the GPS, the task force was able
to collect far more detailed information than it would have if they had collected the same
evidence through physical surveillance, let alone collect this information more furtively and at
minimal expense.
The task force obtained a warrant on September 16, 2005 to install the GPS onto the car,
but its authorization expired before the GPS device was installed. Additionally, the September
16th order authorized the task force to install the GPS device only within the District of
Columbia, but they installed the GPS device while the car was parked in Maryland. As a
consequence, the task force’s continuous GPS surveillance was undertaken without a valid
search warrant. The government used the GPS data as a central part of its criminal case against
Jones for his alleged involvement in a drug trafficking conspiracy. In October 2005, investigators
arrested Jones and his fellow defendants and charged them under 21 U.S.C. § 846 with
conspiracy to distribute cocaine, among other crimes. The government used the GPS data to
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3. establish Jones’ presence at the house alleged to have been the center of the drug activity. Jones
moved to suppress the GPS evidence prior to trial. The District Court of the District of Columbia
denied the motion, allowing the government to use the GPS data except data recorded while the
car was parked in Jones’ private garage. A jury acquitted Jones of all charges except for a
conspiracy charge, which resulted in a hung jury. Jones was then retried on the conspiracy
charge and convicted. He was sentenced to life in prison.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the conviction, concluding that
the government’s use of a GPS device to record the totality and pattern of defendant’s movement
from place to place, for nearly a month intruded upon his reasonable expectation of privacy. As a
consequence, the Court of Appeals determined that the GPS tracking was a search under the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and also ruled that the GPS data should have been
excluded because the government had not obtained a valid warrant or justified its failure to do so
under the well-recognized and limited exceptions to the warrant requirement. The U.S.
government filed for certiorari on April 15, 2011. This Court granted certiorari on June 27,
2011, inter alia, to decide whether warrantless GPS surveillance constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals decision concerning the claim that the
government’s installation and use of a GPS device to generate and store data about Jones’
movements and locations constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. First, Katz’s
expectation of privacy standard applies and thus Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy was
violated when the police, each day, for twenty-four hours, for a month and without a warrant
followed every movement he made. Second, Amici also agrees with the Court of Appeals that
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4. U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) is inapplicable to this case and therefore Jones had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements when he was driving his car.
I. Under Katz, the government engages in a Fourth Amendment search whenever it
“intrudes on another’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” U.S. v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring). A person has an expectation of privacy when he seeks to preserve
something as private. Id. at 351. Furthermore, whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable
depends in large part upon (1) whether that expectation relates to information that has been
actually or constructively exposed to the public, U.S. v. Jones, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. App.
2010), and (2) whether the individual's expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable." Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000).
Applying the first part of the rule, Jones sought to preserve the entirety of his movements
as private. Also, Jones’ movements in their entirety were not actually exposed to the public since
the likelihood that Jones would expect anyone to observe all of his movements is “effectively
nil.” Jones, 615 F.3d at 558. It is also highly unlikely that Jones’ movements were constructively
exposed because the entirety of Jones’ movements plots a compilation of what his daily routines
were like and where he resided at particular times and this is an emphatic intrusion into Jones’
personal life. Applying the second part of the rule, society can reasonably accept that the
prolonged use of a GPS device to monitor and reveal an intimate picture of Jones’ life and his
habits violates his expectation of privacy and thus should not be allowed. To accept otherwise
would be to allow invasive, unabridged and wide-open investigations on whomever the
government pleases without a justifiable warrant.
II. Knotts is distinguishable. First, as the Court of Appeals states, “Knotts held only that a
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
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5. privacy in his movements from one place to another, not that such a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements whatsoever, world without end, as the Government
would have it.” Id. at 557. Second, unlike the beeper in Knotts, the GPS here was able to track
the car’s individual trips as well as identify patterns in the car’s daily routine. Third, unlike in
Knotts, where the police followed the defendant for a mere 100 miles, here the defendant was
followed for twenty fours, every day, for twenty-eight days. The length of this investigation
reveals a greater amount of information, which is far more detailed and invasive then a mere
100-mile investigation.
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE GOVERNMENT’S INSTALLATION
AND USE OF A GPS DEVICE TO GENERATE AND STORE DATA ABOUT JONES’ MOVEMENTS
AND LOCATIONS CONSTITUTED A SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
On September 27, 2009, the Metropolitan task force installed a GPS device onto Jones’
car without his knowledge or consent and for over four weeks the task force was able to obtain
satellite generated data of every movement Jones made in his vehicle for 24 hours of every day.
The device automatically communicated with orbital satellites to calculate its longitude and
latitude at ten-second increments, and transmitted this data to a remote government computer. It
ultimately generated and stored over 2,000 pages of data about Jones’ movements and locations
over the four-week period. The task force would not have been able to obtain this comprehensive
real-time and historical record of the car’s movement without the aid of this GPS and its
technology. Furthermore, the government would be incapable of proving Jones’ guilt without
this intrusive GPS technology.
Amici agrees with the Court of Appeals that the government’s installation and use of the
GPS device constituted a Fourth Amendment search for two reasons. First, Katz’s expectation of
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6. privacy standard applies and thus Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy was violated when
the police for twenty fours hours every day for a month and without a warrant followed every
move he made. Second, Amici also agrees with the Court of Appeals that U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276 (1983) is inapplicable to this case and therefore Jones had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements.
A. JONES’REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE POLICE,
FOR TWENTY-FOUR HOURS, EVERY DAY, FOR A MONTH AND WITHOUT A WARRANT
FOLLOWED JONES’ EVERY MOVEMENT
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pac. R. Co.
v. Botsgford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). As this court held in Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967), "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," and wherever an individual may
harbor a reasonable "expectation of privacy," he is entitled to be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion. Id. at 361.
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part that “the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches...shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. Amen. IV. Under Katz, the government engages in
a Fourth Amendment search whenever they “intrude on another’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.” Id. at 351. “A person has an expectation of privacy when he seeks to preserve
something as private.” Id. at 740. Furthermore, whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable
depends in large part upon (1) whether that expectation relates to information that has been
actually or constructively exposed to the public, Jones, 615 F.3d at 558, and (2) whether the
individual's expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."
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7. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338 (2000). Information is actually exposed when an individual observes what
a reasonable person expects another might actually observe and not what that person could have
observed. Jones, 615 F.3d at 559. Information is constructively exposed when an individual
observes in whole the privacy interests of another in no greater detail than he would in its
constituent parts; therefore not exposing the most intimate details of that person‘s life. Id.
Although there is no “talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that society
is prepared to accept as reasonable,” O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (plurality
op.), this Court has in the past measured the reasonableness of privacy expectations against “the
everyday expectations of privacy that we all share,” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990).
Applying the first part of the rule, Jones had an expectation of privacy when he sought to
preserve the entirety of his movements as private. Also, it is highly unlikely that Jones’
movements in their entirety, over the course of a month were actually exposed to the public since
the likelihood that Jones would expect anyone to observe all of his movements is “effectively
nil.” Jones, 615 F.3d at 558. Second, it is also highly unlikely that Jones’ movements were
constructively exposed even though each individual move may have been exposed, because the
“whole reveal[ed] more than…did the sum of its parts.” Id. at 558. Essentially, the entirety of
Jones’ movements plots a compilation of what his daily routines were like, where he resided at
particular times, and this is an emphatic intrusion into Jones’ personal life. Therefore, Jones
sought to preserve the entirety of his movements as private.
Applying the second part of the rule, society can reasonably accept that the prolonged use
of a GPS device to monitor and reveal an intimate picture of Jones’ life and his habits violates
his expectation of privacy and therefore should not be allowed. To accept otherwise would be to
allow invasive, unabridged and wide-open investigations on whomever the government pleases
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8. without a justifiable warrant.
1. JONES HAD AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY WHEN HE SOUGHT TO PRESERVE
THE ENTIRETY OF HIS MOVEMENTS AS PRIVATE
At the outset, Amici readily concedes that Jones may expect his movements, on any
given day, to be actually exposed to another, but Jones surely does not expect that the entirety of
his movements be monitored and recorded for a month by a task force via a surreptitiously
installed GPS device. The record of the sum of his movements reveals the intimacies of his life.
Surely, Jones’ would not want to reveal such intimacies nor expect such events to occur. Thus,
Jones sought to preserve the entirety of his movements as private.
2. THE GOVERNMENT OVERSTEPS THE BOUNDS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
WHEN THEY POSIT THAT WHATEVER A PERSON ACTUALLY EXPOSES TO THE
PUBLIC COULD OPENLY BE VIEWED AND THEREFORE IS NOT PROTECTED BY
THE CONSTITUTION
In Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the defendant was convicted of transmitting
wagering information by telephone in violation of a federal statute. At trial, the court permitted
the government to introduce evidence of defendant's telephone conversations. These
conversations were overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and
recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth and listened in. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in affirming defendant’s conviction, rejected the contention that
the recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment because there was no
physical entrance into the area occupied by defendant. This Court reversed and held, that one
who occupied a telephone booth, shut the door behind him, and paid the toll that permitted him
to place a call was entitled to assume that the words he uttered into the mouthpiece would not be
broadcast to the world. This Court acknowledged and Amici agrees that a person’s expectation of
privacy is violated when he does not expect another to listen in on his conversations, although he
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9. is in a public place.
In Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334 (2000) the defendant was a passenger on a bus that left to
another state. On the way, the bus arrived at a checkpoint. There, a border patrol agent boarded
the bus to check the immigration status of its passengers. After checking all the passengers
accordingly, the patrol agent squeezed the soft luggage, which passengers had placed in the
overhead storage space above the seats. The patrol agent squeezed defendant’s bag, and noticed
that the bag contained a brick-like object. When the agent opened the bag he discovered a brick
of drugs. As a result, defendant was indicted for conspiracy to possess drugs, and possession
with intent to distribute drugs in violation of a federal law. In Federal District Court, the
defendant moved to suppress the drugs and argued that the agent conducted a search of his bag in
violation of the Fourth Amendment when he squeezed his bag in the manner that he did. The
District Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, and found him guilty on both counts.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit confirmed the view that the agent's
manipulation of the bag was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This
Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. This court held that the agent's physical
manipulation of the defendant's carry-on luggage violated the Fourth Amendment. This Court,
inter alia, reasoned that the defendant had exhibited an actual expectation of privacy by using an
opaque bag and placing that bag directly above his seat and the defendant's expectation of
privacy was one that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. This court reasoned that
although defendant could expect that his bag would be exposed to certain kinds of touching and
handling, the defendant surely did not expect that the agent's physical manipulation of his
luggage would exceed the casual contact expected by other passengers.
In California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), police investigated defendant’s backyard
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10. for growing marijuana plants. The police could not observe anything from ground level because
a 6-foot outer fence and a 10-foot inner fence surrounded the defendant’s yard. Shortly
thereafter, the police officers secured a private plane, flew over the yard and made naked-eye
observations, which provided the basis for a search warrant. As a result of those observations the
defendant was charged for cultivating marijuana in his backyard. Prior to trial, the defendant
made a motion to suppress the plants seized in the search. The trial court denied the defendant's
motion. As a result, the defendant pleaded guilty. The Court of Appeals of California First
Appellate District, reversed, holding that the warrantless aerial surveillance of the curtilage of
the defendant's home violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that the height and existence of the fences demonstrated that the defendant's reasonable
expectation of privacy was abridged because the aerial surveillance had not been the result of a
routine patrol, but had been conducted for the express purpose of observing this enclosure within
the defendant's curtilage. This Court reversed and held that the Fourth Amendment is not
violated by a warrantless naked-eye observation of a fenced-in backyard within the curtilage of a
home from an airplane operating in public airspace. This Court further reasoned that the
defendant’s reasonable expectation was not contravened because it was reasonable for people
who are flying by, and who cared to look down to see the defendant’s marijuana plants.
Like the defendant in Katz, where he did not expect any reasonable individual to listen in
on his conversations while he was in the telephone booth, here the defendant also did not expect
any reasonable individual to observe the entirety of his movements, let alone the task force.
Surely, defendant does not want to reveal such a intimate picture to the police. The government
gravely misstates their claim when they advocate that Jones’ movements over the course of a
month were actually exposed to the public and therefore the police could have lawfully followed
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11. Jones everywhere he went on public roads over the course of a month. The assumption of the
government’s argument is twofold. First the government assumes that the person viewing the
defendant is the appropriate candidate to consider what is private or not. Second, the government
assumes that whatever is left to the public eye in plain view may be considered public and not
private. To the contrary, as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has addressed, “we
ask not what another person can physically and may lawfully do but rather what a reasonable
person expects another might actually do.” Jones, 615 F.3d at 559. The Court of Appeals’
observation expresses that the reasonable person from the defendant’s point of view is the
appropriate candidate to consider whether something is private, and not the person viewing him.
Like the defendant in Bond where he did not expect any reasonable person to inspect his
bag in such an exploratory manner, here the defendant again does not expect any reasonable
person to observe all of his movements. Therefore, the entirety of Jones’ movements could not
have been actually exposed to the task force. The underlying assumption of the argument
comparing these two cases is that in Bond where the defendant considered the contents of his bag
private, the defendant in this case considers the totality of his movements private as well.
Evidently, the entirety of Jones’ movements reveals the intricate details of his life, such as where
he eats, his habits, where he resides, and what activities he enjoys. Such an invasion of privacy
violates Jones’ expectation of privacy and thus cannot be allowed.
Unlike the defendant in Ciraolo, where it was reasonable to expect individuals who are
flying over and who cared to look down to observe his crops growing in his backyard, here it is
unreasonable for a person in Jones’ position to expect that his every move would be observed
and recorded by a task force, with a surreptitiously installed GPS device on his car, twenty four
hours, everyday for a month. As the Court of Appeals has reasoned, “the likelihood a stranger
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12. would observe all those movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil.” Jones, 615 F.3d at
558. As a consequence, the sum of Jones’ movements were not actually exposed.
3. JONES MOVEMENTS WERE NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY EXPOSED
Petitioner states that U.S. Dep’t. of Justice v. Nat’l Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749
(1989) and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) are inapplicable to this case since they do
not answer whether Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy when he was driving on the
public thoroughfare. The petitioner’s argument contains two errors. First, National Reporters and
Smith apply, in that combined, they succinctly illustrate what the Court of Appeals cites as the
“mosaic theory.” Jones, 615 F.3d at 562. Essentially, the mosaic theory illustrates the concept
that notwithstanding the fact that although a person may observe snippets of Jones’ movements it
is highly unlikely for a person to see the whole of Jones’ movement. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v.
Nat’l Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (there this Court held subjects had a privacy
interest in the aggregated whole distinct from their interest in the bits of information of which it
was composed); See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (this Court explained that
defendant could not reasonably expect privacy in the list of numbers because that list was
composed of information that he had voluntarily conveyed to the company and that it had
facilities for recording and was free to record). The aggregate of Jones’ movements provides the
police with the necessary information, such as places frequently visited, to indict Jones, whereas
the snippets of Jones’ movements present isolated incidents that are not helpful because they
reveal little about him or his travels. Second, the petitioner again sidesteps the aggregate of what
a full picture of Jones’ movements could paint (mosaic theory) as opposed to a single day and
pleads that whatever is out in the open may be considered in free view to the public and therefore
abdicates itself from constitutional protection. In contrast, Amici agrees with the Court of
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13. Appeals in that
“Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed
by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly,
what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of
information can each reveal more about a person than does any
individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a
gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as
does one‘s not visiting any of these places over the course of a
month. The sequence of a person‘s movements can reveal still
more; a single trip to a gynecologist‘s office tells little about a
woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby
supply store tells a different story.” Jones, 615 F.3d at 562.
Amici does not contend that the use of GPS surveillance to capture criminals be
abolished. In fact, Amici agrees that GPS surveillance and other technology is necessary for the
aggressive pursuit of criminal justice. Rather, like the Court of Appeals, Amici illustrates that the
prolonged, intrusive, unwarranted use of the GPS, in this case, to record and observe all of Jones’
movements paints a picture drastically different than a snippet of its whole would. This type of
GPS surveillance is not constitutionally admissible and cannot be permitted.
4. SOCIETY CAN ACCEPT JONES’ EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AS REASONABLE
To ascertain whether Jones’ expectation of privacy is reasonable requires “a source outside
the Fourth Amendment, such as understandings that are recognized or permitted by society. U. S.
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984). Plainly, Jones’ expectation of privacy is measured
objectively. All people have differing personalities and attain different experiences throughout
life and what one may consider an invasion of privacy is different from another person’s view.
Thus, it is worth mentioning again that although there is no “talisman that determines in all cases
those privacy expectations that society is prepared to accept as reasonable,” Ortega, 480 U.S. at
715, this Court has in the past measured the reasonableness of privacy expectations against “the
everyday expectations of privacy that we all share,” Olson, 495 U.S. at 98.
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14. Applying these principles to the facts, society is prepared to recognize Jones’ expectation
of privacy in his movement over the course of a month as reasonable. As stated earlier, the
prolonged use of a GPS device reveals an intimate picture of Jones’ life. For over four weeks, the
task force compiled 2,000 pages worth of data from the GPS device about where Jones resided.
At first blush, this only reveals places, but places frequently visited reveal activities, hobbies, and
personal places of interest. Again, Amici stresses that for the world to accept such a pervasive
account of an individual’s life as reasonable would be to allow invasive, unabridged and wide-
open investigations on whomever the government pleases without a justifiable warrant.
B. THE KNOTTS CASE IS INAPPLICABLE TO OUR CASE AND THUS JONES HAS A
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS MOVEMENTS
The government, using only the narrow holding in Knotts argues that the GPS surveillance
of Jones’ vehicle was permissible because a person who went from place to place on public
thoroughfares had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Since he is willingly exposing his
activities to the public, he does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy. If this Court
solely relies on this shred of reasoning as the government outlines in their argument, this Court
as Justice Breyer stated at oral argument for this issue on November 8, 2011, can come to only
one logical conclusion, “then there [exists] nothing to prevent the police or the government from
monitoring 24 hours a day the public movement of every citizen of the United States...” U.S. v.
Jones, No. 10-1259 petitioner’s original oral argument, transcript page 12, line 25 (November 8,
2011). Such an intrusion on the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy cannot be allowed.
Furthermore, Knotts is distinguishable and therefore does not apply to our case. First, as
the Court of Appeals correctly notes, “Knotts held only, that a person traveling in an automobile
on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another, not that such a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
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15. movements whatsoever, world without end, as the government would have it.” Jones, 615 F.3d
at 557. Second, the GPS here implicates the privacy interests of a person greater than the beeper
in Knotts does. Third, the length of the investigation here and what it revealed about Jones is in
stark contrast to the length of the investigation in Knotts and what it revealed about the defendant
there.
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY STATES, “KNOTTS HELD ONLY THAT A
PERSON TRAVELING IN AN AUTOMOBILE ON PUBLIC THOROUGHFARES HAS
NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS MOVEMENTS FROM ONE
PLACE TO ANOTHER, NOT THAT SUCH A PERSON HAS NO REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS MOVEMENTS WHATSOEVER, WORLD
WITHOUT END, AS THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE IT.”
In Knotts, this Court explicitly stated,
“[Defendant] does not actually quarrel with this analysis, though
he expresses the generalized view that the result of the holding
sought by the Government would be that "twenty-four hour
surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible, without
judicial knowledge or supervision." Brief for [Defendant]. But the
fact is that the "reality hardly suggests abuse," Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978); if such dragnet-type law
enforcement practices as [defendant] envisions should eventually
occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether
different constitutional principles may be applicable.” Id. at 283.
This Court reasoned above that unlike in Knotts, where there was a discrete journey
implicating no expectation of privacy, a case in the future may involve a dragnet-type law
enforcement practice that may implicate an expectation of privacy. Such a dragnet-type law
enforcement practice is prevalent here. Therefore, different constitutional principles apply. This
Court avoided answering the question of whether prolonged twenty-four hour surveillance was a
search under the Fourth Amendment when they limited the holding in Knotts to its facts.
Keeping this mind, unlike the government who uses Knotts to exemplify that any person may be
subject to prolonged, unwarranted, and unfettered surveillance by the police, the Knotts holding
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16. is clear in that it did not concern itself with the question presented here. Thus the principal of law
expounded in Knotts does not extend to this case.
2. THE GPS DEVICE USED HERE IMPLICATES A PERSON’S PRIVACY INTERESTS
GREATER THAN A BEEPER WOULD.
The GPS device used here implicates Jones’ privacy interests greater than a beeper in
Knotts would have. The distinctions between the GPS and the beeper are critical to this Court’s
consideration of the broader question of constitutionality for two reasons. First, it further
amplifies the distinction between our case and Knotts and second it explains the influence of
such a distinction on the constitutionality of using such an intrusive device.
As to the first point, unlike the beeper in Knotts, the GPS in this case had an antenna that
received signals from satellites. The GPS used these signals to determine its latitude and
longitude every ten seconds, accurately pinpointing its location to within 50 to 100 feet. The
GPS was capable of transferring data to software that plotted the car’s location and movements
on a map. This software also created a comprehensive record of the car’s locations. The beeper
had no associated software with such capabilities, let alone was it capable of transferring data to
another device. Unlike the beeper, the GPS did not need to be followed to keep a live signal. The
task force merely pressed a button and learned of Jones’ whereabouts instantaneously. The GPS
could be monitored live or left unattended because it stored data for the task force’s leisure
review later. Again, the beeper had none of these capabilities. Unlike the beeper, the GPS was
able to track the car’s individual trips as well as identify patterns in the car’s daily routine. For
example, it could note repeated visits to particular locations. The distinctions between the GPS
here and the beeper in Knotts are apparent when contrasted side by side, but the implications that
the GPS has on Jones’ expectation of privacy when compared against if the task force in this
case would follow Jones with the beeper in Knotts are disturbing.
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17. As to the second point, if the task force were to use the beeper in Knotts here, they would
not get the benefit of following Jones for twenty-eight days because that would be exhausting
and costly. Second, they would have to script their findings and create the patterns of Jones’
movements themselves. This is time consuming and prone to human error, the error that the GPS
software does not possess. As a result, using the GPS rather than the beeper avails the police not
only of records, locations, and habits, it reveals the intimacies of Jones’ life.
3. THE LENGTH OF THE INVESTIGATION HERE AND WHAT IT REVEALED ABOUT
JONES IS IN STARK CONTRAST TO THE LENGTH OF THE INVESTIGATION IN
KNOTTS AND WHAT IT REVEALED ABOUT THE DEFENDANT THERE
The more time an individual spends investigating another, especially in a consecutive
fashion, the more that person may reveal about another’s life. As the Court of Appeals correctly
articulated that unlike in Knotts, where “the police followed the container as it was driven from
the place of purchase…to [Knotts‘s] secluded cabin…a trip of about 100 miles,” here the
investigation was 24 hours a day, every day, for twenty-eight days. Jones, 615 F.3d at 556. This,
of course has far greater implications when combined with an intrusive GPS device as opposed
to a short trip to another state with a beeper . (See Amici Heading B, Point II for a discussion of
such implications). The distinctions are blatant and thus Knotts does not apply to our case.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, this court should affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia because the government’s installation and use of a GPS device to generate and store
data about Jones’ movements and locations constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment,
since when they engaged in such conduct that violates Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy.
Final Exam Number- 3879
Course- Organized White Collar Crime
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