1. Christian Nonduality
Anglican - Roman Dialogue
NEW: Cathlimergent
Internet Forum
The Christian
Nonduality Blog
Home
Radical Emergence -
Nonduality & the
Emerging Church
Emergence Happens
When:
To Avow & Dis-avow
an Axiological
Vision of the Whole
Montmarte,
Colorado Springs &
the Kingdom
Wanted: Women
Warriors
Maiden, Mother,
Crone & Queen:
archetypes &
transformation
East Meets West
Discipline, Doctrine & Dogma – Roman & Anglican
Ki, Qi, Chi, Prana &
Kundalini Dialogue
No-Self & Nirvana
elucidated by I once strongly considered converting from Roman to Anglican
Dumoulin Catholic, likely agonizing as much as
One: Essential
Writings in Newman, who converted in the opposite direction. How many times
Nonduality - a review have progressive Roman Catholics
Simone Weil
been sarcastically urged to go ahead and convert by various
John of the Cross
fundamentalistic traditionalists since our
Thomas Merton
The True Self
beliefs were "not in keeping with the faith?"
The Passion After all, while there has never been an infallible papal pronouncement
Hermeneutical to which I could not give my
Eclecticism &
Interreligious wholehearted assent, I otherwise do adamantly disagree with many
Dialogue
hierarchical positions such as regarding
The Spirit
a married priesthood, women priests, obligatory confession,
Christian Nonduality
eucharistic sharing, divorce and remarriage,
more on Nonduality
The Contemplative artificial contraception, various so-called grave & intrinsic moral
Stance disorders of human sexuality or any
Hesychasm
indubitable and a priori definitions employed vis a vis human
Mysticism - properly
considered
personhood and theological anthropology.
Karl Rahner At times, I truly have wondered if I belonged to Rome or Canterbury,
Wounded Innocence and I suspect many of you have, too,
Rogation Days and, perhaps, still do? My short answer is: You're already home; take a
Radical Orthodoxy look around ...

2. Presuppositionalism
vs Nihilism? In other words, for example, take a look, below, at some excerpts from
Science
the September 2007 report of the
Epistemic Virtue International Anglican - Roman Catholic Commission for Unity and
Pan-semio- Mission: Growing Together in Unity
entheism: a
pneumatological and Mission: Building on 40 years of Anglican - Roman Catholic
theology of nature
Dialogue.
Architectonic
Does anyone see any differences in essential dogma? Are some of you
Anglican - Roman
Dialogue not rather surprised at the extent of
The Ethos of Eros
agreement, especially given the nature of same?
Musings on Peirce
Are our differences not rather located in such accidentals as matters of
Eskimo Kiss Waltz
church discipline or in such moral
the Light Side of
Dark Comedy teachings where Catholics can exercise legitimate choices in their
Blog Visits moral decision-making? (To be sure,
Other Online
Resources
there
Are YOU Going to has been a creeping infallibility in such differences but there have
Scarborough Fair?
never been infallible pronouncements
Suggested Reading
regarding same.)
Tim King's Post
Christian Blog
"As we shall see, reputable theologians defend positions on moral
The Dylan Mass
issues contrary to the official teaching of
If You Are In
Distress, Spiritual or the Roman magisterium. If Catholics have the right to follow such
Otherwise
options, they must have the right to
pending
know that the options exist. It is wrong to attempt to conceal such
The Great Tradition
properly conceived knowledge from Catholics. It is wrong to
Postmodern present the official teachings, in Rahner's words, as though there were
Conservative
Catholic Pentecostal no doubt whatever about their
definitive correctness and as though further discussion about the
matter by Catholic theologians would be
inappropriate....To deprive Catholics of the knowledge of legitimate
choices in their moral decisionmaking,
to insist that moral issues are closed when actually they are still open,
is itself immoral." See:
“Probabilism: The Right to Know of Moral Options”, which is the third
chapter of __Why You Can
Disagree and Remain a Faithful Catholic__ and available online at
http://www.saintjohnsabbey.org/kaufman/chapter3.html
For those who have neither the time nor inclination for a long post,
you can safely consider the above as an
executive summary. My conclusion is that we belong neither to Rome
nor Canterbury, but to the Perfector
and Finisher of our faith. And I'm going to submit to
ever-ongoing finishing by blooming where I was planted among my
family, friends and co-religionists,
enjoying the very special communion between our Anglican, Roman
and Orthodox traditions, the special
fellowship of all my Christian sisters and brothers, and the general
fellowship of all persons of goodwill.

3. I gathered these excerpts together to highlight and summarize the
report but recognize these affirmations
should not be taken out of context. So, I made this url where the entire
document can be accessed:
http://tinyurl.com/35p69h
to foster the wide study of these agreed statements.
Below is my heavily redacted summary.
In reflecting on our faith together it is vital that all bishops ensure that
the Agreed Statements of ARCIC are
widely studied in both Communions.
The constitutive elements of ecclesial communion include: one faith,
one baptism, the one Eucharist,
acceptance of basic moral values, a ministry of oversight entrusted to
the episcopate with collegial and
primatial dimensions, and the episcopal ministry of a universal primate
as the visible focus of unity.
God desires the visible unity of all Christian people and that such unity
is itself part of our witness.
Through this theological dialogue over forty years Anglicans and
Roman Catholics have grown closer
together and have come to see that what they hold in common is far
greater than those things in which they
differ.
In liturgical celebrations, we regularly make the same trinitarian
profession of faith in the form of the
Apostles’ Creed or the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed.
In approaching Scripture, the Christian faithful draw upon the rich
diversity of methods of reading and
interpretation used throughout the Church’s history (e.g. historical-
critical, exegetical, typological,
spiritual, sociological, canonical). These methods, which all have
value, have been developed in many different contexts of the Church’s
life, which need to be recalled and
respected.
The Anglican Communion and the Catholic Church recognise the
baptism each confers.
Anglicans and Catholics agree that the full participation in the
Eucharist, together with Baptism and
Confirmation, completes the sacramental process of Christian
initiation.
We agree that the Eucharist is the memorial (anamnesis) of the
crucified and risen Christ, of the entire work
of reconciliation God has accomplished in him.
Anglicans and Catholics believe in the real presence of Christ in the
Eucharist.

4. While Christ is present and active in a variety of ways in the entire
eucharistic celebration, so that his
presence is not limited to the consecrated elements, the bread and wine
are not empty signs: Christ’s body
and blood become really present and are really given in these
elements.
We agree that the Eucharist is the “meal of the Kingdom”, in which the
Church gives thanks for all the
signs of the coming Kingdom.
We agree that those who are ordained have responsibility for the
ministry of Word and Sacrament.
Roman Catholics and Anglicans share this agreement concerning the
ministry of the whole people of God,
the distinctive ministry of the ordained, the threefold ordering of the
ministry, its apostolic origins,
character and succession, and the ministry of oversight.
Anglicans and Roman Catholics agree that councils can be recognised
as authoritative when they express
the common faith and mind of the Church, consonant with Scripture
and the Apostolic Tradition.
Primacy and collegiality are complementary dimensions of episcope,
exercised within the life of the whole
Church. (Anglicans recognise the ministry of the Archbishop of
Canterbury in precisely this way.)
The Roman Catholic Church teaches that the ministry of the Bishop of
Rome as universal primate is in
accordance with Christ’s will for the Church and an essential element
for maintaining it in unity and truth.
Anglicans rejected the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Rome as universal
primate in the sixteenth century.
Today, however, some Anglicans are beginning to see the potential
value of a ministry of universal
primacy, which would be exercised by the Bishop of Rome, as a sign
and focus of unity within a re-united
Church.
Anglicans and Roman Catholics both believe in the indefectibility of
the Church, that the Holy Spirit leads
the Church into all truth.
Both Anglicans and Catholics acknowledge that private confession
before a priest is a means of grace and
an effective declaration of the forgiveness of Christ in response to
repentance.
Throughout its history the Church has sought to be faithful in
following Christ’s command to heal, and this
has inspired countless acts of ministry in medical and hospital care.
Alongside this physical ministry, both

5. traditions have continued to exercise the sacramental ministry of
anointing.
Anglicans and Roman Catholics share similar ways of moral reasoning.
Both Communions speak of marriage as a covenant and a vocation to
holiness and see it in the order of
creation as both sign and reality of God’s faithful love.
All generations of Anglicans and Roman Catholics have called the
Virgin Mary ‘blessed’.
Anglicans and Roman Catholics agree that it is impossible to be faithful
to Scripture without giving due
attention to the person of Mary.
Genuine faith is more than assent: it is expressed in action.
Given our mutual recognition of one another’s baptism, a number of
practical initiatives are possible. Local
churches may consider developing joint programmes for the formation
of families when they present
children for baptism, as well as preparing common catechetical
resources for use in baptismal and
confirmation preparation and in Sunday Schools.
Given the significant extent of our common understanding of the
Eucharist, and the central importance of
the Eucharist to our faith, we encourage attendance at each other’s
Eucharists, respecting the different
disciplines of our churches.
We also encourage more frequent joint non-eucharistic worship,
including celebrations of faith,
pilgrimages, processions of witness (e.g. on Good Friday), and shared
public liturgies on significant
occasions. We encourage those who pray the daily office to explore
how celebrating daily prayer together
can reinforce their common mission.
We welcome the growing Anglican custom of including in the prayers
of the faithful a prayer for the Pope,
and we invite Roman Catholics to pray regularly in public for the
Archbishop of Canterbury and the leaders
of the Anglican Communion.
We note the close similarities of Anglican and Roman Catholic
lectionaries which make it possible to foster
joint bible study groups based upon the Sunday lectionary.
There are numerous theological resources that can be shared,
including professional staff, libraries, and
formation and study programmes for clergy and laity.
Wherever possible, ordained and lay observers can be invited to attend
each other’s synodical and collegial
gatherings and conferences.

6. Anglicans and Roman Catholics share a rich heritage regarding the
place of religious orders in ecclesial
life. There are religious communities in both of our Communions that
trace their origins to the same
founders (e.g. Benedictines and Franciscans). We encourage the
continuation and strengthening of relations between Anglican and
Catholic religious orders, and
acknowledge the particular witness of monastic communities with an
ecumenical vocation.
There are many areas where pastoral and spiritual care can be shared.
We acknowledge the benefit derived
from many instances of spiritual direction given and received by
Anglicans to Catholics and Catholics to
Anglicans.
We recommend joint training where possible for lay ministries (e.g.
catechists, lectors, readers, teachers,
evangelists). We commend the sharing of the talents and resources of
lay ministers, particularly between
local Anglican and Roman Catholic parishes. We note the
potential for music ministries to enrich our relations and to strengthen
the Church’s outreach to the wider
society, especially young people.
We encourage joint participation in evangelism, developing specific
strategies to engage with those who
have yet to hear and respond to the Gospel.
We invite our churches to consider the development of joint
Anglican/Roman Catholic church schools,
shared teacher training programmes and contemporary religious
education curricula for use in our schools.
END OF EXCERPTS regarding stated agreements
Below are excerpts recognizing DIVERGENCES regarding: 1) papal and
teaching authority 2) the
recognition and validity of Anglican Orders and ministries 3)
ordination of women 4) eucharistic sharing 5)
obligatory confession 6) divorce and remarriage 7) the precise moment
a human person is formed 8)
methods of birth control 9) homosexual activity and 10) human
sexuality.
Thanks,
JB
BEGIN EXCERPTS regarding stated disagreements:
While already we can affirm together that universal primacy, as a
visible focus of unity, is “a gift to be
shared”, able to be “offered and received even before our Churches are
in full communion”, nevertheless

7. serious questions remain for Anglicans regarding the nature and
jurisdictional consequences of universal primacy.
There are further divergences in the way in which teaching authority in
the life of the Church is exercised
and the authentic tradition is discerned.
In his Apostolic Letter on Anglican Orders, Apostolicae Curae (1896),
Pope Leo XIII ruled against the
validity of Anglican Orders. The question of validity remains a
fundamental obstacle to the recognition of
Anglican ministries by the Catholic Church. In the light of the
agreements on the Eucharist and ministry set out both in the ARCIC
statements and in the official
responses of both Communions, there is evidence that we have a
common intention in ordination and in the
celebration of the Eucharist. This awareness would have to be part of
any fresh evaluation of Anglican
Orders.
Anglicans and Roman Catholics hold that there is an inextricable link
between Eucharist and Ministry.
Without recognition and reconciliation of ministries, therefore, it is not
possible to realise the full impact of
our common understanding of the Eucharist.
The twentieth century saw much discussion across the whole Christian
family on the question of the
ordination of women. The Roman Catholic Church points to the
unbroken tradition of the Church in not
ordaining women. Indeed, Pope John Paul II expressed the conviction
that “the Church has no authority
whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women”. After careful
reflection and debate, a growing number
of Anglican Churches have
proceeded to ordain women to the presbyterate and some also to the
episcopate.
Churches of the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic
Church therefore have different disciplines
for eucharistic sharing. The Catholic Church does not permit the
Catholic faithful to receive the Eucharist
from, nor Catholic clergy to concelebrate with, those whose
ministry has not been officially recognised by the Catholic Church.
Anglican provinces regularly admit to
communion baptised believers who are communicant members from
other Christian communities.
Despite our common moral foundations, serious disagreements on
specific issues exist, some of which have
emerged in the long period of our separation.

8. Anglicans and Catholics have a different practice in respect of private
confession. “The Reformers’
emphasis on the direct access of the sinner to the forgiving and
sustaining Word of God led Anglicans to
reject the view that private confession before a priest was obligatory,
although they continued to maintain
that it was a wholesome means of grace, and made provision for it in
the Book of Common Prayer for those
with an unquiet and sorely troubled conscience.” Anglicans express
this discipline in the short formula ‘all
may, none must, some should’.
Whilst both Communions recognise that marriage is for life, both have
also had to recognise the failure of
many marriages in reality. For Roman Catholics, it is not possible
however to dissolve the marriage bond
once sacramentally constituted because of its indissoluble
character, as it signifies the covenantal relationship of Christ with the
Church. On certain grounds,
however, the Catholic Church recognises that a true marriage was
never contracted and a declaration of
nullity may be granted by the proper authorities. Anglicans have been
willing to recognise divorce
following the breakdown of a marriage, and in recent years, some
Anglican Churches have set forth
circumstances in which they are prepared to allow
partners from an earlier marriage to enter into another marriage.
Anglicans and Roman Catholics share the same fundamental teaching
concerning the mystery of human
life and the sanctity of the human person, but they differ in the way in
which they develop and apply this
fundamental moral teaching. Anglicans have no agreed teaching
concerning the precise moment from
which the new human life developing in the womb is to be given the
full protection due to a human person.
Roman Catholic teaching is that the human embryo must be treated as
a human person from the moment of
conception and rejects all direct abortion.
Anglicans and Roman Catholics agree that there are situations when a
couple would be morally justified in
avoiding bringing children into being. They are not agreed on the
method by which the responsibility of
parents is exercised.
Catholic teaching holds that homosexual activity is intrinsically
disordered and always objectively wrong.
Strong tensions have surfaced within the Anglican Communion
because of serious challenges from within

9. some Provinces to the traditional teaching on human
sexuality which was expressed in Resolution 1.10 of the 1998 Lambeth
Conference.
In the discussions on human sexuality within the Anglican
Communion, and between it and the Catholic
Church, stand anthropological and biblical hermeneutical questions
which need to be addressed.
END OF EXCERPTS regarding stated disagreements, some of which
seem rather incoherent once
considering certain of the agreements (for example, not recognizing
Anglican Orders and ministries!
Gimme a break!!!).
Discipline, Doctrine or Dogma? the Roman-Anglican CATHOLIC
Dialogue
I like to think of liberal and conservative, progressive and traditionalist,
in terms of
charisms, something analogous to pilgrims and settlers. And there is
room for the via
media, the middle path, something analogous to bridge-builders,
which might be the
loneliest and most difficult for, as Richard Rohr observes, they get
walked on by folks
coming from both directions.
Unfortunately, too much of what we see is nowadays is better
described in terms of maximalism,
minimalism and a/historicism. I'll unpack those terms below. Too
many so-called progressives consider
essential and core teachings as accidental and peripheral; too many so-
called traditionalists consider
accidental and peripheral teachings as essential and core. In essentials,
unity; in accidentals, diversity; in all
things, charity. (attributed to Augustine)
Ormond Rush writes, in Determining Catholic Orthodoxy: Monologue
or Dialogue (PACIFICA 12 (JUNE
1999): "The patristic scholar Rowan Williams speaks of 'orthodoxy as
always lying in the future'".
(see http://tinyurl.com/2p5q7w for the article)
Rush continues: Mathematicians talk of an asymptotic line that
continually approaches a given curve but
does not meet it at a finite distance. Somewhat like those two lines,
ressourcement and aggiornamento
never meet; the meeting point always lies ahead of the church as it
moves forward in history. Orthodoxy, in
that sense, lies always in the future. Christian truth is eschatological
truth. The church must continually
wait on the Holy Spirit to lead it to the fullness of truth.

10. Ressourcement and aggiornamento will only finally meet at that point
when history ends at the fullness of
time. "For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to
face. Now I know only in part; then I
will know fully, even as I have been fully known." (1 Cor 13:12)
To unpack this meaning further, see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ressourcement
In that Pacifica article, Rush draws distinctions between: 1) revelation
as propositional, where faith is
primarily assent and revelation as personalist, where faith is the
response of the whole person in loving
self-surrender to God; 2) verbal orthodoxy and lived orthopraxy; 3) the
Christological and
pneumatological; 4) hierarchical ecclesiology and communio
ecclesiology; and 5) monologic notion of
authority evoking passive obedience and dialogic notion of authority
evoking active obedience.
Rush then describes the extremes of on one hand,
1) dogmatic maximalism, where all beliefs are given equal weight;
2) magisterial maximalism, where the ecclesial magisterium, alone, has
access to the Holy Spirit;
3) dogmatic ahistoricism, where God's meaning and will are fixed and
clear to be seen;
and, on the other hand,
1) dogmatic minimalism, where all dogmatic statements are equally
unimportant;
2) magisterial minimalism, where communal guidance in
interpretation is superfluous;
3) dogmatic historicism, with an unmitigated relativist position
regarding human knowledge.
Rush finally describes and commends a VIA MEDIA between the
positions.
He notes that the church does not call the faithful that we may believe
in dogma, doctrine and disciplines
but, rather, to belief in God.
He describes how statements vary in relationship to the foundation of
faith vis a vis a Hierarchy of Truth
and thus have different weight:
to be believed as divinely revealed;
to be held as definitively proposed;
or as nondefinitively taught and requiring obsequium religiosum (see
discussion below re: obsequium).
The faithful reception of revelation requires interplay between the
different "witnesses" of revelation:
scripture, tradition, magisterium, sensus fidelium, theological

11. scholarship, including reason (philosophy)
and experience (biological & behavioral sciences, personal testimonies,
etc).
Rush thus asks: "How does the Holy Spirit guarantee orthodox
traditioning of the Gospel? According to
Dei Verbum, 'the help of the Holy Spirit' is manifested in the activity of
three distinguishable yet
overlapping groups of witnesses to the Gospel: the magisterium, the
whole people of God, and theologians.
The Holy Spirit guides each group of witnesses in different ways and to
different degrees; but no one alone
has possession of the Spirit of Truth."
Rush further asks: "The determination of orthodoxy needs to address
questions concerning the issue of
consensus in each of these three authorities. What constitutes a
consensus among theologians and how is it
to be ascertained? What constitutes a consensus among the one billion
Catholics throughout the world and
how is it to be ascertained? What constitutes a collegial consensus
among the bishops of the world with the
pope, and how is that consensus to be ascertained?"
As for obsequium religiosum, from
http://www.womenpriests.org/teaching/orsy3_2.asp
where it is written:
"Accordingly, the duty to offer obsequium may bind to respect, or to
submission-or to any other attitude
between the two."
"When the council spoke of religious obsequium it meant an attitude
toward the church which is rooted in
the virtue of religion, the love of God and the love of his church. This
attitude in every concrete case will
be in need of further specification, which could be 'respect', or could be
'submission,' depending on the
progress the church has made in clarifying its own beliefs. ... [W]e can
speak of obsequium fidei (one with
the believing church holding firm to a doctrine) ... [or] an obsequium
religiosum (one with the searching
church, working for clarification)."
Thus, on matters of dogma, I give obsequium fidei, and unqualified
assent (or submission); this includes
the creeds, the sacraments, the approach to scripture. On matters of
moral doctrine and church discipline, I
give my deference (or respect), even as I dissent, out of loyalty, on
many issues: married priests, women's
ordination, eucharistic sharing, obligatory confession, various moral
teachings re: so-called gravely,

12. intrinsic disorders of human sexuality; artificial contraception, etc.
Christian Nonduality
http://twitter.com/johnssylvest
Bird Photos by David Joseph Sylvest
johnboy@christiannonduality.com

13. Christian Nonduality
Maiden, Mother, Crone & Queen: archetypes & transformation
NEW: Cathlimergent
Internet Forum
The Christian
Nonduality Blog
Home
Radical Emergence -
Nonduality & the
Emerging Church
Emergence Happens
When:
To Avow & Dis-avow
an Axiological
Vision of the Whole
Montmarte,
Colorado Springs &
the Kingdom
Wanted: Women
Warriors
Maiden, Mother,
Crone & Queen:
archetypes &
transformation
East Meets West
Ki, Qi, Chi, Prana & There are rather clear archetypal themes playing out in our
Kundalini cosmologies and axiologies, likely related to brain development and
No-Self & Nirvana individuation processes.
elucidated by
Dumoulin A cosmology engages mostly our left-brain (thinking function of the
One: Essential left frontal cortex & sensing function of the left posterior convexity) as
Writings in
Nonduality - a review the normative and descriptive aspects of value-realization alternately
Simone Weil
establish and defend boundaries; we encounter the King-Queen and
Warrior-Maiden with their light and dark (shadow) attributes as
John of the Cross
expressed in the journeys of the spirit and the body, primarily through
Thomas Merton
a language of ascent.
The True Self
The Passion An axiology engages mostly our right-brain (intuiting function of the
Hermeneutical
right frontal cortex & feeling function of the right posterior convexity)
Eclecticism & as the interpretive and evaluative aspects of value-realization
Interreligious
Dialogue
alternately negotiate (e.g. reconciliation of opposites, harnessing the
power of paradox) and transcend boundaries; we encounter the Crone-
The Spirit
Magician and Mother-Lover with their light and dark attributes as
Christian Nonduality
expressed in the journeys of the soul and the other (Thou), primarily
more on Nonduality
through a language of descent.
The Contemplative
Stance
Hesychasm
Mysticism - properly
considered
Karl Rahner
Wounded Innocence
Rogation Days
Radical Orthodoxy

14. Presuppositionalism
vs Nihilism?
Science
Epistemic Virtue
Pan-semio-
entheism: a
pneumatological
theology of nature
Architectonic
Anglican - Roman
Dialogue
The Ethos of Eros
Musings on Peirce
Eskimo Kiss Waltz
the Light Side of
Dark Comedy Our propositional cosmologies and participatory axiologies seem to
Blog Visits best foster transformation when, beyond our passive reception of them
Other Online as stories about others, we actively engage the archetypal energies of
Resources their mythic dimensions for ourselves, with a contemplation ordered
Are YOU Going to toward action, and further, when, in addition to our rather selfish
Scarborough Fair?
inclinations and puerile expectations, they also include:
Suggested Reading
Tim King's Post
1) a priestly voice that sings of the intrinsic beauty to be celebrated in
Christian Blog seemingly repugnant realities
The Dylan Mass
2) a prophetic voice that is robustly self-critical when speaking the
If You Are In
truth
Distress, Spiritual or
Otherwise
3) a kingly voice that articulates a bias for the bottom, expressing both
pending
a privileging of the marginalized and a principle of subsidiarity when
The Great Tradition preserving goodness
properly conceived
Postmodern 4) a motherly voice that, seeing and calling all as her children, draws
Conservative every person into her circle of compassion and mercy with no trace of
Catholic Pentecostal
exclusion, only a vision of unity.
The Judaeo-Christian Mythos thus articulates a Way of the Cross,
where the Magician, Warrior, King & Lover are further initiated as
Priest, Prophet, King & Mother. The virtues and vices, health and
dysfunctions, light and shadow, of each archetype play out in terms of
boundary negotiation, defense, establishment and transcendence,
which have both authentic and counterfeit expressions. Such are the
dynamics explored in spiritual direction, enneagram work, personality
& adjustment psychology, individuation processes and the manifold
stage theories for intellectual, affective, moral, socio-political and faith
development of humans along the purgative, illuminative and unitive
ways. Such are the themes, then, that run through the dynamics of
addiction psychology and codependency, the false self and true self,
sexual exploitation versus intimacy, socialization versus
transformation, ego defense mechanisms and the persona, inordinate
attachments and disordered appetites, idolatry and kenosis, as they all
involve healthy and unhealthy, loving and sinful, boundary realities.
http://twitter.com/johnssylvest

15.
Christian Nonduality
http://twitter.com/johnssylvest
Bird Photos by David Joseph Sylvest
johnboy@christiannonduality.com

16. Christian Nonduality
Architectonic
NEW: Cathlimergent
Internet Forum
The Christian
Nonduality Blog
Home
Radical Emergence -
Nonduality & the
Emerging Church
Emergence Happens
When:
To Avow & Dis-avow
an Axiological
Vision of the Whole
Montmarte,
Colorado Springs &
the Kingdom
Wanted: Women
Warriors
Maiden, Mother,
Crone & Queen:
archetypes &
transformation
East Meets West
NOTES ON DEVISING AN ARCHITECTONIC-ORGANON
Ki, Qi, Chi, Prana &
Kundalini OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
No-Self & Nirvana
elucidated by 1) To describe Reality, devise an Architectonic/Organon of Human
Dumoulin Knowledge of
One: Essential
Writings in Environing Realities, which would include ourselves.
Nonduality - a review
2) To describe ourselves, devise such an account as would include the
Simone Weil
Human
John of the Cross
Thomas Merton Knowledge Manifold as an Environed Reality, which would include
both evaluative and
The True Self
The Passion rational continuua.
Hermeneutical 3) When devising a model of epistemic virtue (values), avoid the usual
Eclecticism &
Interreligious (and many)
Dialogue
overworked distinctions and employ the very real but often under-
The Spirit
appreciated
Christian Nonduality
more on Nonduality dichotomies.
The Contemplative 4) In our modal arguments for this or that reality, we must rigorously
Stance
define and
Hesychasm
Mysticism - properly
disambiguate our terms. Employ such criteria that, if met, will
considered guarantee the conceptual
Karl Rahner
compatibility of any attributes we employ in our conceptualizations of
Wounded Innocence
this or that reality.

17. Rogation Days
In order to be conceptually compatible, while, at the same time,
Radical Orthodoxy
avoiding any absurdities
Presuppositionalism
vs Nihilism? of parodied logic, attributes must not be logically impossible to
Science coinstantiate in our
Epistemic Virtue
arguments and they must also be described in terms that define a
Pan-semio-
entheism: a
reality's negative
pneumatological
theology of nature properties. For an example, see:
Architectonic http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=47897 and use
Anglican - Roman your edit/find
Dialogue
browser facility to scroll down quickly to the first occurrence of the
The Ethos of Eros
word “negativity”
Musings on Peirce
Eskimo Kiss Waltz and then also for the name of philosopher “Richard Gale”
the Light Side of 5) In defining such attributes as will describe the various aspects of this
Dark Comedy
or that
Blog Visits
Other Online reality, we must draw the proper distinctions between those aspects
Resources that are predicated a)
Are YOU Going to
Scarborough Fair? univocally b) equivocally or c) relationally vis a vis other realities.
Suggested Reading
Univocal is defined as
Tim King's Post having one meaning only. Equivocal means subject to two or more
Christian Blog
interpretations. These
The Dylan Mass
accounts necessarily utilize some terms univocally and others
If You Are In
Distress, Spiritual or equivocally. The equivocal
Otherwise
can be either simply equivocal or analogical. The analogical can be
pending
attributive (if real
The Great Tradition
properly conceived causes and effects are invoked) or proportional (if we are invoking
Postmodern similarities in the
Conservative
Catholic Pentecostal relationships between two different pairs of terms). If such an
similarity is essential to
those terms we have a proper proportionality but if it is accidental we
have an improper
proportionality, a metaphor. And we use a lot of metaphors, even in
physics, and they all
eventually collapse.
6) In our attempts to increase our descriptive accuracy of this or that
reality, we
must be clear whether we are proceeding through a) affirmation
[kataphatically, the via
positiva] b) negation [apophatically, the via negativa] or c) eminence
[unitively, neither
kataphatically nor apophatically but, rather, equivocally]. We must be
clear whether we
are proceeding a) metaphorically b) literally or c) analogically
[affirming the
metaphorical while invoking further dissimilarities].The best examples
can be found in
the book described at this url = http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/0-

18. 271-01937-9.html
, Reality and Mystical Experience by F. Samuel Brainard.
7) We must be clear regarding our use of First Principles: a)
noncontradiction b)
excluded middle c) identity d) reality's intelligibility e) human
intelligence f) the
existence of other minds and such. See Robert Lane’s discussion:
http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/lane/p-prilan.htm
8) We must be mindful of godelian (and godelian-like) constraints on
our
argumentation: a) complete accounts in formal systems are necessarily
inconsistent b)
consistent accounts in formal systems are necessarily incomplete and
c) we can model the
rules but cannot explain them within their own formal symbol system
[must reaxiomatize,
which is to say prove them in yet another system, at the same time,
suggesting we can, indeed, see the truth of certain propositions that we
cannot otherwise
prove]. We thus distinguish between local and global explanatory
attempts, models of
partial vs total reality.See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gödel's_incompleteness_theorem
9) We must employ semantical [epistemological] vagueness, such that
for
attributes a) univocally predicated, excluded middle holds and
noncontradiction folds b)
equivocally predicated, both excluded middle and noncontradiction
hold and c)
relationally predicated, noncontradiction holds and excluded middle
folds. Ergo, re: First
Principles, you got to know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em,
know when to
walk away, know when to run. See Robert Lane’s discussion:
http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/lane/p-prilan.htm
10) We must understand and appreciate the integral nature of the
humanknowledge
manifold (with evaluative and rational continuua) and Lonergan's
sensation, abstraction
& judgment: sensation & perception, emotion & motivation, learning &
memory,
intuition & cognition, non- & pre-inferential, abductive inference,
inductive inference,
deductive inference and deliberation.
11) We must appreciate and understand the true efficacy of: abduction,

19. fast & frugal
decision-making, ecological rationality, evolutionary rationality,
pragmatic rationality,
bounded rationality, common sense; also of both propositional and
doxastic justification,
and affective judgment: both aesthetic and prudential, the latter
including both pragmatic
and moral affective judgment. See http://www.free-
definition.com/Abduction-(logic).html
12) We must draw the distinction between peircean argument
(abduction, hypothesis
generation) and argumentation (inductive & deductive inference).See
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Reli/ReliKess.htm
13) We must draw a distinction between partial apprehension of a
reality and total
comprehension of a reality.
14) We must employ dialectical analysis, properly discerning where our
different
accounts of this or that reality a) agree b) converge c) complement or d)
dialectically
reverse. We must distinguish between this dialectic and hegelian
synthesis and resist false
irenicism, facile syncretism and insidious indifferentism, while
exercising due care in our
attempts to map conceptualizations from one account onto another.
Also, we should
employ our scholastic distinctions: im/possible, im/plausible,
im/probable and un/certain.
15) We must distinguish between the different types of paradox
encountered in our
various attempts to describe this or that reality a) veridical b) falsidical
c) conditional and
d) antinomial. We must recognize that all metaphysics are fatally
flawed and that their
root metaphors will eventually collapse in true antinomial paradox of
a) infinite regress
b) causal disjunction or c) circular referentiality [ipse dixit - stipulated
beginning or
petitio - question begging]. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox
16) As part and parcel of the isomorphicity implied in our
epistemological
vagueness, we must employ ontological vagueness, which is to say that
we must prescind
from the necessary to the probable in our modal logic. This applies to
the dance between
chance & necessity, pattern & paradox, random & systematic, order &

20. chaos.See
http://uhavax.hartford.edu/moen/PeirceRev2.html and the distinctions
between necessary
and non-necessary reasonings and also probable deductions.
17) We must properly integrate our classical causal distinctions such
that the
axiological/teleological [instrumental & formal] mediates between the
epistemological
[formal] and cosmological/ontological [efficient/material]. These
comprise a process and
not rather discrete events.This follows the grammar that the normative
sciences mediate
between our phenomenology and our metaphysics. See
http://hosting.uaa.alaska.edu/afjjl/LinkedDocuments/LiszkaSynopsisPeirce.htm
18) We must recognize the idea of emergence is mostly a heuristic
device inasmuch
as it has some descriptive accuracy but only limited predictive, hence,
explanatory
adequacy. It predicts novelty but cannot specify its nature.
Supervenience is even more
problematical, trivial when described as weak (and usually associated
with strong
emergence), question begging re: reducibility when described as strong
(and usually
associated with weak emergence).See
http://www.molbio.ku.dk/MolBioPages/abk/PersonalPages/Jesper/SemioEmergence.htm
Seehttp://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/Commentary on Don
Ross.htm
See http://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers.html
19) We must avoid all manner of dualisms, essentialism, nominalism
and a priorism
as they give rise to mutual occlusivities and mutual unintelligibilities in
our arguments
and argumentations. The analogia relata (of process-experience
approaches, such as the
peircean and neoplatonic triadic relational) that is implicit in the triadic
grammar of all of
the above-described distinctions and rubrics can mediate between the
analogia antis (of
linguistic approaches, such as the scotistic univocity of being) and the
analogia entis (of
substance approaches, such as the thomistic analogy of being). This
includes such triads
as proodos (proceeding), mone (resting) and epistrophe (return) of
neoplatonic dionysian

21. mysticism. It anticipates such distinctions as a) the peircean distinction
between objective
reality and physical reality b) the scotistic formal distinction c) the
thomistic distinction
between material and immaterial substance, all of which imply
nonphysical causation
without violating physical causal closure, all proleptical, in a sense, to
such concepts as
memes, Baldwinian evolution, biosemiotics, etc See
http://consc.net/biblio/3.html
20) We must avoid the genetic and memetic fallacies of Dawkins and
Dennett and
the computational fallacies of other cognitive scientists, all as described
by Deacon.See
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb/srb/10-3edit.html
21) We must denominate the "cash value" of getting our metaphysics
correct in
terms of the accuracy of our anthropologies and psychologies because
getting our
descriptive and normative accounts correct is preliminary to properly
conducting our
evaluative attempts, which will then inform the prescriptions we devise
for an ailing
humanity and cosmos, rendering such prescriptions efficacious,
inefficacious, and even
harmful. This signals the importance of the dialogues between science,
religion,
philosophy and the arts. Further regarding “cash value” and the
“pragmatic maxim” and
all it might entail, asking what difference this or that metaphysical,
epistemological or
scientific supposition might make, if it were true or not, can clarify our
thinking, such as
better enabling us to discern the circular referentiality of a tautology,
e.g. taking existence
as a predicate of being (rather than employing a concept such as
“bounded” existence).
22) We must carefully nuance the parsimony we seek from Occam's
Razor moreso
in terms of the facility and resiliency of abduction and not necessarily
in terms of
complexity, honoring what we know from evolutionary psychology
about human
abductive and preinferential process.See
http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/pscifor.
htm See http://kybele.psych.cornell.edu/~edelman/Psych-214-Fall-
2000/w7-3-

22. outline.text
23) At wits end, confronted with ineluctable paradox, in choosing the
most
compelling metaphysic, there is always the reductio ad absurdum. And
remember,
whatever is going on in analytical philosophy, semeiotics and
linguistics, you can know
thus much is true: A single, even small, thermonuclear explosion can
ruin your whole
day.
24) Regarding multiverse accounts, Polkinghorne rejects any notion
that science can
say anything about same if science is careful and scrupulous about
what science can
actually say, and this may be true, but it does seem that such an
explanatory attempt can
be indirectly determined at least consonant with what we are able to
directly observe
and/or indirectly measure (thinking of Max Tegmark's ideas). It is
plausible, for example,
insofar as it is an attempt to explain the apparent anthropic fine-
tuning.
25) Importantly, not all human knowledge is formal, which is what so
much of the
above has been about!
26) The major philosophical traditions can be described and
distinguished by their
postures toward idealism & realism, rationalism & empiricism, which
are related to their
various essentialisms and nominalisms, which can all be more
particularly described in
terms of what they do with the PEM (excluded middle) and PNC
(noncontradiction) as
they consider peircean 1ns, 2ns and 3ns, variously holding or folding
these First
Principles as they move from univocal to equivocal and relational
predications.
27) With the peircean perspective taken as normative, PEM holds for
1ns and 2ns
and PNC holds for 2ns and 3ns (hence, PNC folds for 1ns and PEM
folds for 3ns).
28) In a nominalistic perspective, PNC folds for 3ns and classical
notions of
causality and continuity are incoherent.
29) In an essentialistic perspective, PNC properly holds for 3ns but
PEM is

23. erroneously held for 3ns, suggesting that modal logic drives
algorithmically toward the
necessary and not, rather, the probable.
30) The nominalist’s objection to essentialism’s modal logic of the
necessary in 3ns
is warranted but folding PNC in 3ns is the wrong response, rendering
all notions of
causality incoherent.. The essentialist’s objection to nominalism’s
denial of any modal
logic in 3ns is warranted but holding PEM in 3ns is the wrong
response, investing reality
with an unwarranted determinacy. The peircean affirmation of PNC in
3ns and denial of
PEM in 3ns resolves such incoherency with a modal logic of probability
and draws the
proper distinctions between the univocal, equivocal and relational
predications, the
univocal folding PNC in 1ns, the equivocal folding PEM in 3ns and the
relational holding
PNC and PEM in 2ns.
31) The platonic rationalist-realist perspective is impaired by
essentialism. The
kantian rationalist-idealist perspective is impaired by both essentialism
and nominalism.
The humean empiricist idealist perspective is impaired by nominalism.
The aristotelian
empiricist realist perspective, with a nuanced hylomorphism, is not
impaired by
essentialism or nominalism but suffers from substantialism due to its
atomicity, which
impairs relationality. Finally, even a process-relational-substantial
approach must make
the scotistic/peircean formal distinction between objective reality and
physical reality.
Radically deconstructive, analytical, and even pragmatist, approaches
seize upon the
folding of PNC in 1ns and then run amok in denying PNC in 3ns and
sometimes even
2ns. Phenomenologists bracket these metaphysical considerations.
Existentialists argue
over what precedes what, existence vs essence, losing sight of their
necessary
coinstantiation in 2ns in physical reality and failing to draw the proper
distinction
between the objective reality of an attribute (its abstraction &
objectification) and the

24. physical reality where it is integrally instantiated. Neither essence nor
existence precedes
the other in physical reality; they always arrive at the scene together
and inextricably
intertwined.
32) The peircean grammar draws necessary distinctions between
univocal, equivocal
and relational predications of different aspects of reality but, in so
doing, is a heuristic
that does not otherwise predict the precise nature or degree of
univocity, equivocity or
relationality between those aspects. In that sense, it is like
emergentism, which predicts
novelty but does not describe its nature or degree. To that extent, it no
more resolves
philosophy of mind questions, in particular, than it does metaphysical
questions, in
general. What it does is help us to think more clearly about such issues
placing different
perspectives in dialogue, revealing where it is they agree, converge,
complement and
disagree. Further, it helps us better discern the nature of the paradoxes
that our different
systems encounter: veridical, falsidical, conditional and antinomial,
and why it is our
various root metaphors variously extend or collapse in describing
different aspects of
reality. It doesn’t predict or describe the precise nature of reality’s
givens in terms of
primitives, forces and axioms but does help us locate how and where
univocal, equivocal
and relational predications are to be applied to such givens by acting as
a philosophical
lingua franca between different perspectives and accounts.Where are
reality’s
continuities and discontinuities in terms of givens? The peircean
grammar speaks to how
they are related in terms of 1ns, 2ns and 3ns but not with respect to
nature or origin or to
what extent or degree (if for no other reason that not all phenomena
are equally probable,
in terms of 3ns). Is consciousness a primitive along with space, time,
mass and charge? Is
it emergent? epiphenomenal? explained by Dennett? described by
Penrose? a hard
problem as per Chalmers or Searle? an eliminated problem as per the
Churchlands? an

25. intractable problem as per William James? Each of these positions can
be described in
peircean terms and they can be compared and contrasted in a dialogue
that reveals where
they agree, disagree, converge and complement. They cannot be a
priori arbitrated by the
peircean perspective; rather, they can only be consistently articulated
and framed up
hypothetically on the same terms, which is to say, in such a manner
that hypotheticodeductive
and scientific-inductive methods can be applied to them and such that
a
posteriori experience can reveal their internal coherence/incoherence,
logical
consistency/inconsistency, external congruence/incongruence,
hypothetical
consonance/dissonance and interdisciplinary
consilience/inconsilience.
33) Do our various metaphysics collapse because of an encounter with
paradox that
is generated by a) the nature of the environing realities, which are
being explained? b) the
exigencies of the environed reality, which is explaining? or c) some
combination of
these? Is the paradox encountered veridical, falsidical, conditional or
antinomial? Did we
introduce the paradox ourselves or did an environing reality reveal its
intrinsic
paradoxical nature? We can describe reality’s categories (such as w/
CSP’s
phaneroscopy), a logic for those categories (such as CSP’s semeiotic
logic) and an
organon that relates these categories and logic (such as CSP’s
metaphysical architectonic)
and then employ such a heuristic in any given metaphysic using any
given root metaphor.
When we do, at some point, we will encounter an infinite regress, a
causal disjunction or
circular referentiality (petitio principii, ipse dixit, etc), and we might,
therefore, at some
level, have reason to suspect that those are the species of ineluctable
paradox that even
the most accurate metaphysics will inevitably encounter. If circular
referentiality is
avoidable, still, infinite regress and causal disjunction are not and our
metaphysics will

26. succumb to one or the other, possibly because these alternate accounts
present
complementary perspectives of reality and the nature of its apparent
continuities and
discontinuities (as measured in degrees of probability or as reflected in
the dissimilarities
between various givens and their natures and origins, some belonging
to this singularity,
some to another, this or another realm of reality variously pluralistic or
not).
34) What it all seems to boil down to is this: Different schools of
philosophy and
metaphysics are mostly disagreeing regarding the nature and degree,
the origin and
extent, of continuities and discontinuities in reality, some even
claiming to transcend this
debate by using a continuum of probability. The manifold and
multiform assertions
and/or denials of continuity and discontinuity in reality play out in the
different
conclusions of modal logic with respect to what is possible versus
actual versus necessary
regarding the nature of reality (usually in terms of givens, i.e.
primitives, forces and
axioms), some even claiming to transcend this modal logic by
substituting probable for
necessary. Even then, one is not so much transcending the fray as
avoiding the fray if one
does not venture to guess at the nature and degree, origin and extent,
of reality’s
probabilities, necessities, continuities and discontinuities. Sure, the
essentialists and
substantialists overemphasize discontinuities and the nominalists
overemphasize
continuities and the dualists introduce some false dichotomies, but
anyone who claims to
be above this metaphysical fray has not so much transcended these
issues with a new and
improved metaphysics as they have desisted from even doing
metaphysics, opting instead
for a meta-metaphysical heuristic device, at the same time, sacrificing
explanatory
adequacy. This is what happens with the emergentistic something
more from nothing but
and also what happens in semeiotic logic (for infinite regress is just as
fatal,
metaphysically, as causal disjunction and circular referentiality).

27. 35) Evaluating Hypotheses:Does it beg questions?Does it traffic in
trivialities? Does
it overwork analogies?Does it overwork distinctions? Does it
underwork
dichotomies?Does it eliminate infinite regress?
36) Not to worry, this is to be expected at this stage of humankind’s
journey of
knowledge. However, if the answer to any of these questions is
affirmative, then one’s
hypothesis probably doesn’t belong in a science textbook for now. At
any rate, given our
inescapable fallibility, we best proceed in a community of inquiry as we
pursue our
practical and heuristic (both normative and speculative) sciences.
37) Couching this or that debate in the philosophy of science in terms
of dis/honesty
may very well address one aspect of any given controversy. I have often
wondered
whether or not some disagreements are rooted in disparate approaches
to epistemic
values, epistemic goods, epistemic virtues, epistemic goals, epistemic
success, epistemic
competence or whatever is truly at issue. I don't know who is being
dishonest or not,
aware or unawares, but I think one can perhaps discern in/authenticity
in a variety of
ways.
38) In trying to sort through and inventory such matters, through
time, I have come
to more broadly conceive the terms of such controversies, not only
beyond the notions of
epistemic disvalue, epistemic non-virtue and epistemic incompetence,
but, beyond the
epistemic, itself. Taking a cue from Lonergan's inventory of
conversions, which include
the cognitive, affective, moral, social and religious, one might identify
manifold other
ways to frustrate the diverse (but unitively-oriented) goals of human
authenticity, whether
through disvalue, non-virtue or incompetence.
39) Our approach to and grasp of reality, through both the heuristic
sciences
(normative and theoretical) and practical sciences, in my view, is quite
often frustrated by
the overworking of certain distinctions and the underworking of
certain dichotomies, by

28. our projection of discontinuities onto continuities and vice versa. And
this goes beyond
the issue of the One and the Many, the universal and the particular, the
local and the
global, beyond the disambiguation and predication of our terms,
beyond the setting forth
of our primitives, forces and axioms, beyond the truth of our premises
and the validity of
our logic, beyond noetical, aesthetical and ethical norms, beyond our
normative/prescriptive, speculative/descriptive and
pragmatic/practical enterprises,
beyond all this to living life, itself, and to our celebration of the arts.
40) In this vein, one failure in human authenticity that seems to too
often afflict
humankind is the overworking of the otherwise valid distinctions
between our truly novel
biosemiotic capacities and those of our phylogenetic ancestry and kin,
invoking such a
human exceptionalism (x-factor) as divorces us from nature of which
we're undeniably a
part. Another (and related) failure, in my view, is the overworking of
distinctions
between the different capacities that comprise the human evaluative
continuum, denying
the integral roles played by its nonrational, prerational and rational
aspects, by its
ecological, pragmatic, inferential and deliberative rationalities, by its
abductive, inductive
and deductive inferential aspects, by its noetical, aesthetical and ethical
aspects. These
otherwise distinct aspects of human knowledge that derive from our
interfacing as an
environed reality with our total environing reality (environed vs
environing realities not
lending themselves to sharp distinctions either?) are of a piece, form a
holistic fabric of
knowledge, mirrored by reality, which is also of a piece, not lending
itself fully to any
privileged aspect of the human evaluative continuum, not lending itself
to arbitrary dices
and slices based upon any human-contrived architectonic or organon
of knowledge, for
instance, as might be reflected in our academic disciplines or curricula.
41) So, perhaps it is too facile to say religion asks certain questions and
employs
certain aspects of the human evaluative continuum, while philosophy

29. asks others, science
yet others? Maybe it is enough to maintain that science does not
attempt to halt infinite
regress because humankind has discovered, a posteriori, that such
attempts invariably
involve trafficking in question begging (ipse dixit, petitio principii,
tautologies, etc) or
trivialities or overworked analogies, often employ overworked
distinctions or
underworked dichotomies, often lack explanatory adequacy, pragmatic
cash value and/or
the authentication of orthodoxy by orthopraxis? Maybe it is enough to
maintain that
science does not attempt to halt infinite regress because humankind
now maintains, a
priori, with Godel, that complete accounts are inconsistent, consistent
accounts,
incomplete? Maybe it is enough to maintain that science traffics in
formalizable proofs
and measurable results from hypotheses that are testable within
realistic time constraints
(iow, not eschatological)?
42) Or, maybe we needn't maintain even these distinctions but can say
an hypothesis
is an hypothesis is an hypothesis, whether theological or geological,
whether eliminating
or tolerating the paradox of infinity, and that the human evaluative
continuum, if
optimally (integrally and holistically) deployed, can aspire to test these
hypotheses,
however directly or indirectly, letting reality reveal or conceal itself at
its pleasure --- but
--- those hypotheses that are intractably question begging or
tautological, that overwork
analogies and distinctions and underwork dichotomies, that lack
explanatory adequacy
and pragmatic cash value --- are, at least for now, bad science, bad
philosophy, bad
theology, bad hypotheses? They are not authentic questions? Pursue
them if you must.
Back-burner them by all means, ready to come to the fore at a more
opportune time. But
don't publish them in textbooks or foist them on the general public or
body politic; rather,
keep them in the esoteric journals with a suitable fog index to match
their explanatory

30. opacity.
43) In the above consideration, it was not my aim to resolve any
controversies in the
philosophy of science, in particular, or to arbitrate between the great
schools of
philosophy, in general. I did want to offer some criteria for more
rigorously framing up
the debates that we might avoid talking past one another. It does seem
that certain
extreme positions can be contrasted in sharper relief in terms of
alternating assertions of
radical dis/continuities, wherein some distinctions are overworked into
false dichotomies
and some real dichotomies are ignored or denied.
44) Thus it is that the different “turns” have been made in the history
of philosophy
(to experience, to the subject, linguistic, hermeneutical, pragmatic,
etc). Thus it is that
nominalism, essentialism and substantialism critique each other. Thus
it is that fact-value,
is-ought, given-normative, descriptive-prescriptive distinctions
warrant dichotomizing or
not. Thus it is that the One and the Many, the universal and particular,
the global and
local, the whole and the part invite differing perspectives or not. Thus it
is that different
aspects of the human evaluative continuum get singularly privileged
without warrant
such as in fideism and rationalism or that different aspects of the
human architectonic of
knowledge get over- or under-emphasized such as in radical
fundamentalism and
scientism.
45) Thus it is that certain of our heuristic devices get overworked
beyond their
minimalist explanatory attempts such as when emergence is described
as weakly
supervenient, which is rather question-begging, or as strongly
supervenient, which is
rather trivial. And yet one might be able to affirm some utility in
making such
distinctions as a weak deontology or weak teleology, or between the
strongly and weakly
anthropic?
46) Thus it is that idealism and realism, rationalism and empiricism,
fight a

31. hermeneutical tug of war between kantian, humean, aristotelian and
platonic
perspectives, transcended, in part, even complemented by, the
analytical,
phenomenological and pragmatic approaches. Thus it is that various
metaphysics must
remain modest in their heuristic claims of explanatory power as we
witness the ongoing
blending and nuancing of substance, process, participative and
semiotic approaches. Thus
it is that our glorious -ologies get transmuted into insidious –isms.
47) Thus it is that all of these approaches, whether broadly conceived
as theoretical,
practical and normative sciences (including natural sciences, applied
sciences, theological
sciences and the sciences of logic, aesthetics and ethics), or more
narrowly conceived as
the more strictly empirical sciences, offer their hypotheses for critique
by an authentic
community of inquiry --- neither falling prey to the soporific consensus
gentium
(bandwagon fallacy) and irrelevant argumentum ad verecundiam
(appeal to authority) nor
arrogating to one’s own hermeneutic some type of archimedean
buoyancy for all sure
knowledge, as if inescapable leaps of faith weren’t required to get past
unmitigated
nihilism and solipsism, as if excluded middle, noncontradiction and
other first principles
could be apodictically maintained or logically demonstrated, as if
knowledge and proof
were indistinct, as if all human knowledge was algorithmic and could
be formalized.
48) Miscellany: In the peircean cohort of the American pragmatist
tradition, one
would say that the normative sciences mediate between
phenomenology and
metaphysics, which could reasonably be translated into philosophy
mediates between our
scientific methodologies and our cosmologies/ontologies.So, there is a
proper distinction
to be made between our normative and theoretical sciences, both
which can be considered
heuristic sciences, and yet another distinction to be made between
them and what we
would call our practical sciences.

32. 49) I think it would be fair to say that we can bracket our [metaphysics]
and our
[cosmologies & ontologies] when doing empirical science but, at the
same time, we do
not bracket those aspects of philosophy that comprise our normative
sciences of logic,
aesthetics and ethics, which contribute integrally and holistically to all
scientific
endeavors and human knowledge pursuits. At least for my God-
concept, properly
conceived, suitably employed, sufficiently nuanced, carefully
disambiguated, precisely
defined, rigorously predicated --- to talk of empirical measurement
would be nonsensical.
50) I more broadly conceive knowledge & "knowing" and my
conceptualization
turns on the distinction between knowing and proving, the latter
consisting of formal
proofs. Since a God-concept would comprise a Theory of Everything
and we know, a
priori, from Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, that we cannot prove
such employing any
closed formal symbol system, a "proof" of God is out of the question.
51) Charles Sanders Peirce offers another useful distinction, which
turns on his
observations regarding inferential knowledge, which includes
abduction, induction and
deduction. Abductive inference is, in a nutshell, the generation of an
hypothesis. The
peircean distinction is that between an argument and argumentation.
Peirce offers, then,
what he calls the "Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," which
amounts to an
abduction of God, distinguishing same from the myriad other attempts
to prove God's
existence, whether inductively or deductively through argumentation.
Even the scholastic
and thomistic "proofs" realize their efficacy by demonstrating only the
reasonableness of
certain beliefs, not otherwise aspiring to apodictic claims or logically
conclusive
demonstrations. Peirce made another crucial distinction between the
"reality" of God and
the "existence" of God, considering all talk of God's existence to derive
from pure
fetishism, affirming in his own way, I suppose, an analogy of being
rather than a

33. univocity.
52) Given all this, one may find it somewhat of a curiosity that Godel,
himself,
attempted his own modal ontological argument. Anselm's argument,
likely considered the
weakest of all the classical "proofs" of God, was first called the
"ontological" argument
by Kant and was more recently given impetus by Hartshorne's modal
formulation. I think
these arguments by Godel and Hartshorne would be more compelling
if the modal
category of necessary was changed to probable and if the conceptual
compatibility of
putative divine attributes was guaranteed by employing only negative
properties for such
terms. At any rate, that Godel distinguished "formal proof" from
"knowing" is instructive,
I think, and his attempt at a modal ontological argument is also
revealing, suggesting,
perhaps, that one needn't make their way through half of Whitehead
and Russell’s
Principia in order to "know" that 2 + 2 = 4, but, rather, that would be
necessary only to
"prove" same.
53) I would agree that the statement, God cannot be measured, is true
for science as
narrowly conceived as natural science. More broadly conceived, science
includes
theology as a discipline and many typologies of the science-religion
interface would, for
instance, affirm the notion of hypothetical consonance between the
disciplines. Much of
Hans Kung's work entailed an elaborate formulation of the God
hypothesis, not
empirically testable by any means, but, which uses nihilism as a foil to
proceed reductio
ad absurdum toward what Kung calls a fundamental trust in uncertain
reality that, given a
suitable and "working" God-hypothesis, is not otherwise nowhere
anchored and
paradoxical. Another focus of theology as a scientific discipline is that
of practical
theology where orthopraxis might be considered to authenticate
orthodoxy.
54) Strong cases have been made by historians of science that
sustainable scientific

34. progress was birthed in the womb of a belief in creatio ex nihilo, in
other words, a belief
in the contingent nature of reality, which, when combined with the
Greek belief in
reality's rationality, provided the cultural matrix for science's explosive
growth in the
Christian West.
55) I suppose there is an element of the aesthetic that guides one
toward such an
interpretation as Bohm's rather than Bohr's, Chalmers, Searle or
Penrose rather than
Dennett, the Churchlands or Crick, Pascal rather than Nietzsche --- but
something else is
going on, and it is not time-honored, when anyone chooses info to fit
an interpretation,
which is a different enterprise from the formulation of alternative
interpretations that are
hypothetically consonant with whatever info is available at the time.
56) To say more succinctly what I elaborate below: Approaching facts is
one matter,
rules another, and facts about rules, yet another. There's no explaining
or justifying rules
within their own systems and one hops onto an epistemological pogo
stick, incessantly
jumping to yet another system with such explanatory/justificatory
attempts (cf. Godel).
Thankfully, Popperian falsification short circuits rule justification in
our pursuit of facts
and the reductio ad absurdum (with some caveats) short circuits
formal philosophy in our
pursuit of rule justification, which is otherwise, inescapably, going to
be question
begging, rendering our metasystems, in principle, tautological. An
example of a caveat
there is that one overworks the humean dictum re: existence as a
predicate of being when
asserting that existence cannot be taken as a predicate of being --
because it certainly can.
One underappreciates the humean perspective when one forgets that
taking existence as a
predicate of being is a tautology. But so are all metaphysics, which are
all fatally flawed.
None of this is about escaping all antinomial paradox but, rather,
finding the metasystem
least susceptible to multiple births of paradox, least pregnant with
paradox --- or, finding

35. that metasystem which, however fatally flawed, is least morbid.
57) In dealing with metasystem formulations, inevitably, we must
confront the timehonored
question: random or systematic? chance or necessity? order or chaos?
pattern or
paradox? At least, for me, this seems to capture the conundrum at
issue.This conundrum
is ubiquitous and presents itself not only in metaphysics but in physics,
not only in
speculative cosmology and the quantum realm but also in speculative
cognitive science
and the realm of consciousness. This is reminiscent of the dynamic in
the TV gameshow,
Jeopardy, for these dyads --- of random, chance, chaos, paradox vis a
vis systematic,
necessity, order, pattern --- offer themselves as answers to a larger
question posed in a
bigger framework. That question might be framed as: What is it that
mediates between
the possible and the actual?
58) My brain loves that question and pondering the implications of
those dyads
seems to help keep my neurotransmitters in balance, quite often firing
off enough extra
endorphins to help me pedal my bike an extra mile or two, any given
day. That question
presents when we consider reality both locally and globally, particularly
or universally, in
part or as a whole. I have pondered such extensively as set forth here:
http://bellsouthpwp.net/p/e/per-ardua-ad-astra/epistemic.htm and
elsewhere
http://bellsouthpwp.net/p/e/per-ardua-ad-astra/merton.htm [links at
the top of this page]
and one day I may take on the task of making such musings more
accessible. For now, it
seems that I have practiced the Franciscan virtue of seeking to
understand rather than to
be understood and turned it into a vice, practicing it to a fault.
59) I will say this: Science is a human convention, an agreement
entered into by an
earnest community of inquiry. It seems to operate on a consensus
regarding 1) primitives
(space, time, mass and energy/charge) 2) forces (strong and weak,
electromagnetic and
gravity) and 3) axioms (laws of thermodynamics and so forth) and the
relationships they

36. reveal as this community proceeds via 4) popperian falsification,
which, as Popper
properly understood and many others do not, is not, itself, falsifiable.
There are no strict
lines between physics and metaphysics inasmuch as any tweaking of
these categories by
theoretical scientists is meta-physical, for instance, such as by those
who'd add
consciousness as a primitive, quantum gravity as a force and statistical
quantum law as an
axiom. The crossing-over from philosophy to science and from
metaphysics to physics by
this or that notion is not so much determined a priori as based on any
given attributes of a
particular idea regarding primitives, forces and axioms but, rather,
takes place when such
can be framed up in such a manner as it can be empirically falsified. We
know this from
the history of philosophy, science and metaphysics -- although the
pace of cross-over has
slowed a tad.
60) Framing up reality in falsifiable bits and pieces is no simple matter
to one who
agrees with Haldane that reality is not only stranger than we imagine
but stranger than we
can imagine. Still, as is born into our very nature as epistemological
optimists, we might
temper this view by taking Chesterton's counsel that we do not know
enough about
reality, yet, to say that it is unknowable. We just do not know, a priori,
either where we
will hit an explanatory wall or where we will break through same, this
notwithstanding
such as G. E. Pugh's remark to the effect that if the brain were simple
enough for us to
understand it, we would be so simple that we couldn't.
61) What we do know, a priori, are our own rules and conventions and
we can
predict whether or not an explanatory wall will either be hit or
penetrated --- but only if
we narrowly conceive of that wall as being built with the bricks of
empirical evidence
and the mortar of formal proofs. An explanatory wall thus conceived is
indeed subject to
godelian constraints, which allow us to model rules that we are
otherwise precluded from

37. explaining. In reality, though, one would commit the equivalent of an
epistemological
Maginot Line blunder if one built her explanatory wall exclusively of
such materials, for,
as we know, a large portion of human knowledge lies outside of any
such a narrowly
conceived epistemic structure. Indeed, we know far more than we can
ever prove (or
falsify)
62) Now, to be sure, we must remain well aware that we are freely
choosing our
axioms and first principles and that, consistent with godelian and
popperian constraints,
they can neither be logically demonstrated, a priori, nor scientifically
falsified, a
posteriori. We should keep an eye open, too, to the critiques of
Descartes, Hume and
Kant, insofar as they seem to have anticipated, in many ways, these
godelian and
popperian formalizations, as well as some of the dynamics explored by
the analytical
cohort. What I personally cannot countenance, however, is any
epistemological caving in
to such constraints and critiques (cartesian, kantian and humean); the
proper response, if
the normative sciences are to retain any sway whatsoever, would seem,
rather, to be a
trading in of any naive realism for a critical realism (staying mostly
aristotelian cum
neoplatonic?). So, too, the humean fact-value distinction, worth
considering, should not
be overworked into a false dichotomy?
63) If, in our inescapable fallibility, we have been dispossessed of any
apodictic
claims to necessity and logical demonstrations of our first principles,
still, we do have at
our disposal the judicious use of the reductio ad absurdum as our
backdoor philosophy.
True enough, the counterintuitive is not, in and of itself, an infallible
beacon of truth, for
science has demonstrated many counterintuitive notions to be true,
given certain axioms.
Nonetheless, absent any demonstration to the contrary and guided by
an earnest
community of inquiry, would we not do best to reject such as solipsism
and radical

38. nihilism, and to embrace noncontradiction and excluded middle
(within the norms
suggested by both epistemological and ontological vagueness, which is
another
exhuastive consideration)?
64) So, yes, in freely choosing such axioms as we might employ in our
attempt to
answer the question --- What mediates between the possible and the
actual? --- we are
free to opt for chance or necessity, for order or chaos, for pattern or
paradox, for the
random or systematic, and we are free to apply such an option locally
and/or globally,
particularly or universally, to the whole of reality or to any part, and no
one can
dispossess us, through formal proof or with empirical evidence, of our
chosen axioms.
And, yes, once we have chosen such axioms, such meta-systems, we
must recognize that,
fundamentally, they are clearly tautological by design and in principle,
and that any
apologetic for same will be rather question begging. [Every time we
open an ontological
window, reality closes an epistemological door, I like to say.] The only
recourse we have
that seems to be at all compelling is the old reductio ad absurdum,
taking this or that set
of axioms, applying them to reality as best we have come to grasp same,
and, after
extrapolating it all to some putative logical conclusion, then testing it
all for congruence
with reality (and with whatever else happens to be in that suite of
epistemological criteria
as might comprise this or that community of inquiry's epistemic
desiderata).
65) As a relevant aside, I have found that we best modify our modal
ontological
logic of possible, actual and necessary to possible, actual and probable,
which allows one
to prescind from the dyads of chance/necessity, order/chaos,
pattern/paradox,
random/systematic --- as these more and more seem to describe
distinctions that should
not be overworked into dichotomies, not that I am an inveterate
peircean triadimaniac --
for I am, rather, a pan-entheistic tetradimaniac (seems to me to be the
least pregnant,

39. anyway).
66) What mediates between the possible and the actual? Probably, the
probable.
[And that may be the window Reality opened for Hefner's co-creators
as God shrunk
from the necessary? And that may be the future-oriented rupture
between our essential
possibilities and their existential realizations in Haught's teleological
account of original
sin?]
67) When the Beatles were with the Maharishi in India, at the end of
one session, he
offered anyone who was interested a ride back to the compound with
him on his
helicopter. John volunteered. When later queried about why he
decided to go, John
quipped: "Because I thought he'd slip me the answer." jb is going to slip
you the
answer.Ever heard of the pragmatic maxim?In my words, jb's maxim, it
translates into
What would you do differently if you had the answer? [And it doesn't
matter what the
question is or that it necessarily be THE question, whatever that is.]
Now, if Lonergan's
conversions --- cognitive, moral, affective, sociopolitical and religious -
-- were all fully
effected in a human being and that person were truly authentic in
lonerganian terms,
mostly transformed in terms of classical theosis, then how would an
authentic/transformed human answer the question: What would you
do differently if you
had the answer?S/he would answer thusly: Nothing.
68) That's what I really like most about lovers. I've seen them struggle
with all these
questions and have even seen them afflicted by these questions to an
extent, but lovers
are clearly among those for whom I know the answer to the above-
question is: Zero. Zip.
Zilch. Nada.That's the epitome of unconditional love and that's the
essence of the Imago
Dei.And that is a small comfort ... so, it's a good thing that comfort is
not what it's all
about, Alfie. Carry on. Do carry on
69) In another vein, all of philosophy seems to turn on those three big
questions of

40. Kant: What can I know? What can I hope for? What must I do?The
astute observer might
recognize that these questions correspond to truth, beauty and
goodness and have been
answered by philosophers in terms of logic, aesthetics and ethics and
by religions in
terms of creed, cult and code. They also correspond to the three
theological virtues of
faith, hope and love and to our psychological faculties of the cognitive,
affective and
moral (again, think Lonergan). At some point on my journey, I rested
and answered these
questions thusly: I don't know and I don't need to know. I don't feel
and I don't need to
feel. I love and I need to forgive.All of a sudden --- I kid ya not --- all
manner of truth,
beauty and goodness started chasing me rather than vice versa! If we
frame the issue in
terms of foci of concern, then the scientific focus will be more narrowly
defined than the
theological. The first is positivistic, the latter, philosophic.
70) The scientific focus looks at facts through the lens of popperian
falsification. It
structures its arguments formally and thus employs mathematics and
other closed,
formal symbol systems through which it can establish correspondence
between those
parts of reality we agree to call givens: primitives (space, time,
mass/charge, energy),
forces (weak, strong, electromagnetic, gravity) and axioms
(conservation,
thermodynamics). It seeks to provide descriptive accounts of these
parts of reality and
deals in proofs.
71) The philosophic focus is a wider perspective, which is to say it
embraces
additional concerns by looking through the lenses of the normative
sciences of logic,
aesthetics and ethics. It looks at rules. Its arguments are not formally
constructed but it
does try to establish coherence in its accounts of reality. It seeks to
provide evaluative
accounts of reality as a whole and deals in justifications.
72) Lonergan scholar, Daniel Helminiak, defines two additional foci of
concern,
which are progressively wider perspectives, the theistic and theotic, the

41. latter having to
do with human transformation in relation to God (and which might
represent one of many
perspectives presented at Star).
73) Broader perspectives, wider foci of concern, do not invalidate the
narrower foci,
if for no other reason, then, because they are focusing on different
aspects of reality, in
fact, additional aspects.
74) In Jeff's frontier town, out on the working edge of science, any
novel concepts
being introduced must indeed be precisely specified in the language of
science, which is
to say one must introduce a novel primitive, force or axiom, or a novel
interaction
between existing givens, into a closed, formal symbol system like
mathematics. This
novelty can then be tested for correspondence with reality, in other
words, factuality,
through popperian falisfication (which is not itself falsifiable).
75) As for unfortunate trends among scientists, philosophers and
theologians,
descriptively, in terms of blurred focus, these are manifold and varied
with no
monopolies on same? I am time-constrained, wrote this hurriedly and
must run. My next
consideration was going to be Theories of Everything and how they
should be
categorized and why? Any ideas?
76) Obviously, I could not elaborate a comprehensive
organon/architectonic of
human knowledge categories in only four paragraphs and thus did not
draw out such
distinctions as, for instance, the very living of life, itself, from the arts,
the practical
sciences, the heuristic sciences, the theoretical sciences, the normative
sciences and so
on. The particular point I was making, however, more particularly
turned on the
distinction between those matters in life which we prove versus those
which we
otherwise justify. As a retired bank chairman/president, I must say that
it would have
pleased me very much, too, to have seen the justice system derive more
of its rules from
logic. Note, also, the operative word, derive, and you'll have some

42. sense of how my
elaboration will unfold
77) Because one of the manifold criteria for good hypotheses vis a vis
the scientific
method is the making of measurable predictions in the context of
hypothetico-deductive
and inductive reasoning, we might properly talk about proof as being
more broadly
conceived, our descriptive accounts lending themselves to
measurements (and
hypothetical fecundity). Of course, induction, itself, is not formal logic,
anyway
78) Those trends that frighten me the most are the different
fundamentalisms
(including both the religious fundamentalisms and enlightenment
fundamentalism or
scientism).
79) By Theory of Everything (TOE). I mean such as M-theory,
superstrings,
quantum gravity, unified field theory, etc in the realm of theoretical
physics. I believe
there are metamathematical problems that inhere in such a TOE as set
forth in Godel's
incompleteness theorems. This is not to suggest a TOE could not be
mathematically
formulated but only to say it could not, in principle, be proven. Neither
is this to suggest
that, because it couldn't be formally demonstrated, we wouldn't
otherwise know we'd
discovered same.
80) A long time ago, my graduate research was in neuroendocrinology
Also, the
emergentist heuristic of something more from nothing but may have
implications for
some of the difficulties that remain in our understanding of
consciousness? As far as
philosophic accounts of same, my overall theological perspective
doesn't turn on whether
or not Dennett, Searle, Chalmers, Penrose, Ayn Rand or the
Churchlands are correct (vis
a vis the positivistic elements of their accounts), although, presently,
I'm leaning toward
Deacon's rather peircean biosemiotic perspective.
81) For me to have written this: "Neither is this to suggest that,
because it couldn't
be formally demonstrated, we wouldn't otherwise know we'd

43. discovered same," maybe I
was talking about both? I purposefully left the categorization of any
TOE open to tease
out different perspectives. My take, to avoid being too coy, is that a
TOE requires more
than a positivistic focus. It necessarily involves a broadening of our
scientific focus to
embrace the additional concerns of the philosophic. Some folks go
further.
82) It's my guess that Baldwinian evolution captures many
imaginations because it
employs the notion of downward causation. Furthermore, if one
frames up the problem of
consciousness biosemiotically, in some sense one recovers the classic
aristotelian notions
of material, formal and final causality. Exciting? Yes. But ...
83) However, one doesn't need to a priori dismiss cartesian dualism
and neither does
one need to a priori embrace a fully reductionistic philosophy of mind
(including the
physical causal closure of the universe) to, at the same time, recognize
that such
biosemiotic accounts do not, necessarily, violate known physical laws
or the idea of
physical causal closure. In other words, there can be strong and weak
versions of
downward causation, both being both nonphysical and nonreductive,
and the
emergentistic, biosemiotic account of evolving complexity utilizes the
weak version. This
does involve a work-around of frameworks that employ strictly
efficient causation.
84) What might some of us do with our imaginations? Well, we might
invoke
various analogies from different physical and/or semiotic accounts to
our philosophic,
metaphysical and even theological accounts. And, sometimes, we
might lose sight of how
progressively weak these analogies can become.
85) I suppose I could at least be pleased that Dawkins did not consider
mystics and
obscurantists to be a redundancy? My charitable interpretation would
be that he
recognized that the conscious and deliberate invocation of analogies by
authentic mystics,
who have their eyes open to this analogical dynamic (apophatically

44. inclined as they are!),
is valid (even if he might impute little pragmatic cash value to same),
while, for their
part, the obscurantists might even altogether deny the metaphorical
and analogical nature
of their extrapolations (not necessarily in bad faith). [The evidence in
favor of a
charitable interpretation is not being weighed here.] At any rate, the
medieval scotistic
notion of the formal distinction, the peircean distinction between
objective and physical
reality, and the semiotic notion of form realism don't invite ghosts into
machines or gods
into gaps. Metaphorically and analogically, and metaphysically,
however, different
notions of causation are ... let me say ... interesting.
86) All that said, consciousness remains way overdetermined,
scientifically
speaking, as well as, philosophically speaking, both epistemologically
and ontologically
open (as far as strongly emergent, weakly supervenient systems are
concerned, not to say
that supervenience might not be a rather trivial notion). Pugh may be
on to something: If
our brains were so simple we could understand them, we would be so
simple that we
couldn't (or something like that). I submit we have no a priori
justification for selecting a
philosophy of mind and precious little a posteriori warrant either. Gun
to my head,
however, I like Deacon (and his important nuances of the accounts of
Dennett and
Dawkins re: memetic, genetic and computational fallacies).
87) Godel's relevance to a TOE is controversial. I'd be willing to argue
both sides.
But let me agree with you by suggesting physics is formal and
physicists (and Nature and
God) are not, by drawing a distinction between proving and knowing,
by recognizing that
even if a TOE was mathematically formulated in a
positivistic/descriptive framework,
we'd have to fall back on our philosophic/evaluative framework to
justify our faith in it.
88) In reading Hawking's take on Godel's relevance to a TOE he does
seem to draw
an obvious direct metamathematical connection? But I cannot say that

45. he did so
unequivocally because almost everything else he said after that clearly
invoked Godel
analogously. So, at the very least, per Hawking, a physical theory is
going to be Godellike
(M-theory per his discussion). Hawking's lecture can be heard here:
http://www.damtp.cam.ac.uk/strtst/dirac/hawking/audio.ram
89) I can better wrap my positivistic mind around a weak anthropic
principle in the
same way I can accept weak versions of downward causation and weak
deontological
ethics even as I do not a priori rule out the strong versions. Heidegger's
question has been
rephrased, lately, as Why is there something and not rather something
else? and this
makes the strong anthropic principle more compelling in some
philosophic frameworks
(but understandably trivial in others). Wittgenstein's It's not how
things are but that things
are which is the mystical doesn't sway those who'd not take existence
as a predicate of
being, but what about a bounded existence, a universe in a multiverse,
in a pluralistic
reality? Maybe there is some univocity of being (Duns Scotist) and
some analogy of
being (thomism), too? [For instance, a pan-entheism is monistic,
dualistic and
pluralistic.]
90) Chesterton said that we do not know enough about reality to say
that it is
unknowable and Haldane says that reality is not only stranger than we
imagine but
stranger than we can imagine. They can both be correct. If humankind
does formulate a
TOE, it could well be something we have stumbled over and not rather
worked out
through hypothetico-deductive and inductive reasoning/imagination.
It not only takes
faith and the evaluative aspect of the human knowledge manifold to
believe a TOE might
be found. Those epistemic faculties would also necessarily be involved
in the recognition
that it had indeed been found.
91) To the extent that I may have had an agenda (transparent, I hope),
and to the
extent that agenda has been somewhat of an apologetic invoking

46. various (and sometimes
substantial)degrees of epistemological parity between the world's great,
extant
weltanschauungs, I am willing (and, in fact, pleased) to argue this point
in favor of your
conclusion. In that case, perhaps I have been concerning myself with
epistemological
strawmen or shadowboxing with the philosophical ghosts of
yesteryear, who advocated
logical positivism, radical empiricism, hyper-rationalism, scientism and
such or who
countered these with fideism, radical religious fundamentalism and
such, such advocacies
and counteradvocacies being the obverse sides of the same coin of the
realm of
epistemological hubris. As you are aware, neither do I countenance an
excessive
epistemological humility.
92) Perhaps we can say that for me to make such points on the
IRASnet or
MetaNexus would be a preaching to the choir, for the most part, and
that no discipline
has adopted that usage in a long time. In that case, I agree that I might
have drawn an
unnecessary distinction. Perhaps we can also suggest, however, that
not everyone,
perhaps even most (the un-disciplined), have been successfully
evangelized and that our
task is not done, our work is otherwise unfinished, and the distinction
for that audience
thus remains pertinent?
93) Theology (forgiving the erstwhile - I hope - extreme scholastic
realism)
employed what were known as the scholastic notations. Seminarians
were taught to place,
in the margin of their notebooks, little notes indicating whether a
proposition was: 1)
impossible 2) possible 3) improbable 4) implausible 5) uncertain 6)
plausible 7) probable
8) certain. Lately, in the modal logic of a) the possible b) the actual and
c) the necessary,
the latter has been amended to the probable, by some.
94) The distinction I'd offer here is something like Hume makes re:
skepticism and
induction. It is the distinction between the theoretical and the practical.
Even if a TOE is

47. beyond our grasp strictly theoretically speaking, all TOEs being fatally
flawed in
principle, still, from a practical perspective, I think it is fair to say that
we may be able to
justify our belief in a TOE, someday, in a universally compelling
manner. Does this
undermine my assertions re: Godel? I would say that I meant that it is
possible my
assertions could be undermined. How plausible or probable?
95) Since I am working on another project re: Criteria for Articulating a
TOE, I used
Michael's evocative query as a springboard in constructing my
epistemological preamble
to that project. Below is my original response, which I then edited and
sent along just
now as a much shorter version. I think TOE discussions are central to
the dialogue
between science and religion. However, they are notoriously difficult to
air out on listserv
forums because too much renormalization is required to translate all
hermeneutics into a
single lingua franca with logically compatible concepts and axioms.
With that caveat,
here it is for the few who may be interested.
96) To the extent that I may have had an agenda (transparent, I hope),
and to the
extent that agenda has been somewhat of an apologetic invoking
various (and sometimes
substantial) degrees of epistemological parity between the world's
great, extant
weltanschauungs, I am willing (and, in fact, pleased) to argue this point
in favor of your
conclusion. In that case, perhaps I have been concerning myself with
epistemological
strawmen or shadowboxing with the philosophical ghosts of
yesteryear, who advocated
logical positivism, radical empiricism, hyper-rationalism, scientism and
such or who
countered these with fideism, radical religious fundamentalism and
such, such advocacies
and counteradvocacies being the obverse sides of the same coin of the
realm of
epistemological hubris. As you are aware, neither do I countenance an
excessive
epistemological humility.
97) Theology (forgiving the erstwhile - I hope - extreme scholastic

48. realism)
employed what were known as the scholastic notations. Seminarians
were taught to place,
in the margin of their notebooks, little notes indicating whether a
proposition was: 1)
impossible 2) possible 3) improbable 4) implausible 5) uncertain 6)
plausible 7) probable
8) certain. Lately, in the modal logic of a) the possible b) the actual and
c) the necessary,
the latter has been amended to the probable. In semiotic logic, the
application of first
principles has been nuanced such that excluded middle and
noncontradiction hold or fold
based on modal categories under consideration (for the possible, NC
folds but EM holds;
for the actual, NC & EM hold; for the probable, NC holds but EM
folds). Such modal
logic reflects ontological vagueness. Such semiotic logic reflects
semantical or
epistemological vagueness. Alas, these are oversimplifications, but
they fit your thesis
(and mine).
98) Of course, a TOE would be, at best, consistent but incomplete. That
it would
thus not be absolute follows from any Godel-like implications
(arguably even directly
from Godel). It then follows that, having no recourse to apodictic proof,
we are thrown
back on the resources of our evaluative continuum as it works in
conjunction with the
other aspects of the human knowledge manifold (sensation,
perception, cognition,
rational continuum, etc), normatively guiding and regulating and
largely capacitating
them. It thus qualifies my godelian assertions only in the sense that
such constraints are
not overcome by JOTS (jumping outside the system, as some cavalierly
suggest) to the
extent that we are forever chasing the axioms for our axioms but are
overcome by JOTS
to the extent that we accept all attempts to justify a TOE as fatally
flawed from a
theoretical perspective but not necessarily from a practical perspective.
The godelian-like
implications, though not couched in this manner, are well-inventoried
by Suber in his The