IPT Austin Texas - Presentation Outline

Rules of Evidence on Opinions of Market Value
in Court or Administrative Hearings
IPT Property Tax Symposium, Austin, Texas
Tuesday, November 3, 2015
Jon M. Ripans, J.D., M.B.A. Finance
Attorney, Appraiser, Arbitrator/Mediator
http://www.linkedin.com/in/jonripans
jripans@gmail.com
I. This session is a multi-jurisdictional survey of the rules governing the types of
witnesses who are deemed competent to give opinion of value evidence in courts
of record, tax tribunals, and administrative hearings. Individuals in roles such as
assessors, appraisers, property owners, real estate brokers, tax consultants, and
others will be discussed. Learn more about the requirements in place for multiple
jurisdictions and discuss how various jurisdictions across the country have treated
opinion of value in other cases. At the end of the session, the attendee will have
an understanding of:
a. Identify witnesses who can give opinion of value testimony;
b. Learn the various settings in which opinion of value testimony is presented;
and
c. Differentiate how courts in various jurisdictions treat opinion of value
testimony.
II. The Fundamental Assumption Underlying This Presentation
a. The rules of evidence are mostly exclusionary rules designed to prevent lay
jurors from being misled, prejudiced, or tainted by “bad” evidence.
b. Court proceedings, with or without a jury, have the strictest rules of evidence
in most jurisdictions.
c. The rules of evidence, if any, for administrative hearings, such as boards of
equalization, tax tribunals, property tax hearing officers, etc., are almost always
less strict than the rules of evidence in courts of record.

d. Therefore, if evidentiary rules or court cases in a given jurisdiction say that
certain persons may provide opinion of value testimony, then those categories
of persons are likely to be competent witnesses for opinions of value in
property tax appeals at all levels. Examples include, but are clearly not limited
to the following:
i. Appraisers
ii. Brokers
iii. Individual Property Owners
iv. Corporate Property Owners
III. The Key Distinction in Evidentiary Matters is Admissibility vs. Weight and
Credibility
a. The fundamental analysis in the use of evidence is a two-step process:
i. Step One is the Admissibility of Evidence
1. What types of evidence are admissible?
2. Who is a competent witness for each type evidence?
3. What evidentiary foundation is needed to admit the evidence?
ii. Step Two is what Weight and Credibility should the trier of fact give
the evidence.
b. Weight and Credibility is an infinite topic that is beyond the scope of this
presentation because it involves how the trier of fact – a jury or a judge sitting
without a jury – perceives the credibility of the evidence and what weight they
choose to give to it.
c. Similarly, it is far beyond the scope of a one-hour presentation to cover all
types of evidence that could be used to argue value, but we will go over some
of them.
i. Cost Approach
1. Land
2. Construction Costs
3. Depreciation
4. Deferred Maintenance
5. Functional Obsolescence
6. External Obsolescence
ii. Income Approach
1. Market Rents
2. Other Income
3. Market Vacancy
4. Expenses
5. Cap Rate

6. Lease-Up/Stabilization
iii. Sales Comparison Approach
1. Comparables
2. Adjusting the Comparables to Subject Property
IV. There are two types of witnesses
a. Fact Witnesses with first-hand knowledge of particular facts
b. Opinion Witnesses who can give an opinion on the ultimate issue in dispute
and who are one of three types:
i. Expert Opinion Witnesses
ii. Skilled Witnesses
iii. Lay Opinion Witnesses
V. Jurisdictions
a. Alabama
i. In eminent domain proceeding, lay witness is competent to give his
opinion as to value if he has had an opportunity to form a correct
opinion and testifies, in substance, that he has done so. State v. Central
of Georgia R. Co., 293 Ala. 675, 309 So. 2d 452 (1975).
ii. Witness who had owned and subdivided land was qualified to give his
opinion as to market value of such land as witness for landowner in
condemnation proceeding. Code of Ala., Tit. 7, § 367. State v.
Holloway, 293 Ala. 543, 307 So. 2d 13 (1975).
iii. The owner of land, by virtue of his ownership, is considered prima
facie qualified to testify to its value without any further showing.
Presley v. B.I.C. Const., Inc., 64 So. 3d 610 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009), cert.
quashed, 64 So. 3d 627 (Ala. 2010).
iv. Homeowner rebutted the presumption that he was qualified to testify
as to the “fair market value” of his house as actually constructed, and,
thus, trial court acted was justified in excluding the dollar amount
offered by homeowner as evidence in trial on homeowner’s contract
and tort claims against construction company, where homeowner
indicated in his testimony that he did not have an opinion regarding the
fair market value of the house as actually constructed. Presley v. B.I.C.
Const., Inc., 64 So. 3d 610 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009), cert. quashed, 64 So.
3d 627 (Ala. 2010).
b. Alaska: An owner opinion of value of his property is competent even
though it may not be very persuasive. Gregory v. Padilla, 379 P.2d 951 (Alaska
1963).
c. Arizona

i. Owner may generally estimate value of his real or personal property
whether he qualifies as an expert or not. Acheson v. Shafter, 107 Ariz.
576, 490 P.2d 832 (1971).
ii. Lack of membership in professional appraisers organization went
solely to weight of real estate agent and broker testimony as to value of
property, not to admissibility. Higgins v. Arizona Sav. and Loan Ass’n,
90 Ariz. 55, 365 P.2d 476 (1961).
iii. Trial court refusal to permit witness who had 14 years’ experience in
conducting roadside business in Gila Bend area but had examined
property in Camp Verde area only once, one week before eminent
domain trial, to testify as to value of the Camp Verde area property was
not abuse of discretion. Parker v. State ex rel. Church, 89 Ariz. 124,
359 P.2d 63 (1961).
iv. A real estate saleswoman, a real estate broker and land appraiser, one
who had acted as broker in purchase and sale of ranches in area and
had managed ranches and one who had devoted himself exclusively to
buying and selling lands in area on his own account were qualified
generally to testify to value of land in area. State ex rel. Morrison v. Jay
Six Cattle Co., 88 Ariz. 97, 353 P.2d 185 (1960).
v. In condemnation case, trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting testimony of witness as to value of property, even though
witness was not a technical expert, where he appeared to have had
peculiar means of forming intelligent judgment as to value of property
in question. State v. McDonald, 88 Ariz. 1, 352 P.2d 343 (1960).
d. Arkansas
i. A landowner intimately familiar with her property is unquestionably
qualified to state an opinion about its value. City of Jacksonville v.
Nixon, 2014 Ark. App. 485, 442 S.W.3d 906 (2014).
ii. A non-expert witness, who is acquainted with the condemned land and
says he knows the market value, is competent to express an opinion as
to its market value. City of Springdale v. Keicher, 243 Ark. 161, 419
S.W.2d 800 (1967).
iii. Agent, who was in real estate business for five years and qualified as an
expert and who had viewed condemned property, was qualified to
express his opinion as to fair market value of land, in condemnation
proceeding. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Holt, 242 Ark.
287, 413 S.W.2d 643 (1967).

iv. Witness who lived three and one-half to four miles from property
taken, dealt in real estate and had done appraisal work for state and had
been familiar with property taken for 60 years was qualified to express
opinion as to fair market value of property before and after taking.
Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Sargent, 241 Ark. 783, 410
S.W.2d 381 (1967).
v. In eminent domain action, landowner is competent witness to testify as
to value of his land simply because he owns it, but landowner must
relate satisfactory explanation on cross-examination to justify his value
estimate. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Cook, 257 Ark. 98,
514 S.W.2d 215 (1974).
vi. Landowner opinion as to value of his land is admissible in evidence
whether he knows anything about land market values in area or not,
and opinion is admissible simply because he owns land and is qualified
to state opinion as to value of what he owns. Arkansas State Highway
Commission v. Jones, 256 Ark. 40, 505 S.W.2d 210 (1974).
vii. Where landowner is intimately acquainted with land and conditions and
its highest and best use, he may testify to value although opinion is not
based upon comparable sales or he lacks knowledge of property values,
but opinion is to be stricken when it is unrelated to any facts in record
and is apparently plucked from air and without fair and reasonable
basis. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Steen, 253 Ark. 908, 489
S.W.2d 781 (1973).
viii. Where it appeared that landowner estimate of before and after values
of land in condemnation action was based on value of property to him,
landowner testimony as to such estimate was improperly admitted.
Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Highfill, 248 Ark. 541, 452
S.W.2d 846 (1970).
ix. An owner of property is competent to testify as to value of his
property even though he has no knowledge of property values if he has
an intimate acquaintance with his property, but not every landowner
testimony constitutes substantial evidence. Arkansas State Highway
Commission v. Watson, 248 Ark. 422, 451 S.W.2d 741 (1970).
x. A landowner testimony is competent and admissible in eminent
domain proceeding as to value of his lands, regardless of his lack of
knowledge of property values, if a satisfactory explanation is given for
his conclusion; any infirmities in his testimony bear on weight rather

than admissibility. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Kennedy,
248 Ark. 301, 451 S.W.2d 745 (1970).
e. California
i. Market value may be proved by testimony of an expert such as an
appraiser and owner may testify as to value of his property without
qualifying as an expert. Buist v. C. Dudley De Velbiss Corp., 182 Cal.
App. 2d 325, 6 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1st Dist. 1960).
ii. The owner of property, whether generally familiar with such values or
not, is competent to estimate its worth, the lack of knowledge going to
the weight rather than admissibility of the testimony. City of Fresno v.
Hedstrom, 103 Cal. App. 2d 453, 229 P.2d 809 (4th Dist. 1951).
iii. In action by purchasers of motel against vendors for false
representations, it was within province of trial court to reject testimony
of real estate broker and appraiser as to value of motel at time of sale,
where such broker had never individually or as a broker bought or sold
a motel, although he had appraised a few motels. Hull v. Sheehan, 108
Cal. App. 2d 804, 239 P.2d 704 (2d Dist. 1952).
iv. To qualify a witness to testify as an expert to value of land, it is
necessary to show that he has peculiar means of forming an intelligent
and correct judgment as to value of the property in question because of
his familiarity with property in the neighborhood, his business
experience, and his familiarity with the market and sale of similar
property in the vicinity. Waters v. Lanigan, 137 Cal. App. 2d 268, 290
P.2d 370 (1st Dist. 1955).
v. The usual expert is qualified to give opinion as to value of property
being condemned by showing his familiarity with the property and with
other property in the neighborhood, his experience in the business, his
familiarity with the state of the market and with sales of similar
property in the vicinity. People v. La Macchia, 41 Cal. 2d 738, 264 P.2d
15 (1953).
vi. Farmers, farm appraisers and real estate brokers who were shown to be
familiar with value of farming land in community were competent to
give expert testimony on subject of value, and fact that some of them
had not seen farm for some time was not fatal, where there was
evidence that farm was then in substantially the same condition as
when last seen. Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744, 192 P.2d 935
(1948).

vii. Owner of property is allowed to estimate its worth whether or not he
has any special knowledge of such values, and credit and weight to be
given such evidence and its effect, as well as the resolution of conflicts
between such testimony and that of expert witness, is for trier of fact.
West Ann.Evid.Code, § 800. Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 8 Cal. App.
3d 844, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1st Dist. 1970).
viii. Generally, officer of corporate owner of land being valued is not
qualified to testify as to his opinion of value in issue unless he is
otherwise qualified. City of Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist Church, 1 Cal.
App. 3d 384, 82 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1st Dist. 1969).
ix. The owner of real or personal property may competently testify to its
value. Newhart v. Pierce, 254 Cal. App. 2d 783, 62 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1st
Dist. 1967).
x. Even if letter from board of supervisors to condemnees were to be
construed as an admission that property was worth $40,000, it was
inadmissible as it was not the expression of a witness qualified to
express an opinion as to value. West Ann.Evid.Code, §§ 810 et seq.,
813, 822, 1152. San Joaquin County v. Galletti, 252 Cal. App. 2d 840,
61 Cal. Rptr. 62 (5th Dist. 1967).
xi. Real estate agent who sold lot on behalf of owner was competent to
give opinion as to value of lot. Doctor v. Lakeridge Const. Co., 252
Cal. App. 2d 715, 60 Cal. Rptr. 824 (2d Dist. 1967).
f. Colorado
i. Before a witness is qualified to give an opinion as to value of property,
it must be shown that he had the means to form an intelligent opinion,
derived from an adequate knowledge of the nature and kind of
property in controversy, and of its value. City and County of Denver v.
Hinsey, 177 Colo. 178, 493 P.2d 348 (1972).
ii. Permitting of landowner’s appraisers to arrive at their opinions of fair
market value of property taken for highway purposes by hypothetically
carving it into residential building sites, estimating the value of each
site, and then adding estimated values of all the sites together was
improper and highly speculative and the admission of such evidence
into eminent domain proceeding was prejudicial error. C.R.S. 3,
50”1”17, 50”1”18. Department of Highways v. Schulhoff, 167 Colo.
72, 445 P.2d 402 (1968).
iii. It is proper for an owner to testify as to value of his own property.
Frankfort Oil Co. v. Abrams, 159 Colo. 535, 413 P.2d 190 (1966).

iv. Owner may testify as to his own estimate of value of land in
condemnation proceedings. Board of Directors of Baker Metropolitan
Water and Sanitation Dist. v. Calvaresi, 156 Colo. 173, 397 P.2d 877
(1964).
v. In action in eminent domain, former and current county assessors were
competent to testify concerning value of lands taken. 5 C.S.A. c. 142, §
2. McNulty v. Bobson, 117 Colo. 336, 187 P.2d 590 (1947).
vi. Husband, as owner of realty, was entitled to give his opinion as to its
value in divorce case involving property settlement. Stover v. Stover,
491 P.2d 1393 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
g. Connecticut
i. Whether purchaser’s expert witness specifically should have made
study of comparable sales of other property similar in nature was
question of judicial discretion in purchaser’s action against real estate
developer for misrepresentation. Richard v. A. Waldman & Sons, Inc.,
155 Conn. 343, 232 A.2d 307 (1967).
ii. Owner of property is competent to testify as to its market value.
Misisco v. La Maita, 150 Conn. 680, 192 A.2d 891 (1963).
iii. In determining value of residential realty for taxation, trial court was
entitled to consider and give some weight to testimony of real estate
agents, qualified as experts as to value of entire property and of
dwelling house based on replacement costs, though their estimates did
not include depreciation in one instance and in another failed to show
real cubic content of house. Thaw v. Town of Fairfield, 132 Conn. 173,
43 A.2d 65, 160 A.L.R. 679 (1945).
iv. Owner of franchise of oyster grounds could testify to value of his
franchise based upon prices paid by him for other oyster grounds in
the vicinity, even without his long experience as an oyster grower.
Lovejoy v. Town of Darien, 131 Conn. 533, 41 A.2d 98 (1945).
v. Homeowners are permitted to testify concerning their opinion as to the
fair market value of the property. Martin v. Martin, 101 Conn. App.
106, 920 A.2d 340 (2007).
vi. An owner of property is competent to testify as to its market value.
United Builders, Inc. v. Hala, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 508, 258 A.2d 115 (App.
Div. 1968).
h. Delaware
i. Admissible evidence of comparable sales falls into three categories: (1)
on direct examination as independent substantive evidence of value; (2)

on direct examination as a factual basis to substantiate opinion of
expert witness; and (3) on cross-examination to impeach an expert
witness by testing his preparation, accuracy and knowledge. State ex rel.
Price v. 0.0673 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Baltimore Hundred,
Sussex County, 224 A.2d 598 (Del. 1966).
ii. Evidence of income and expenditures of business carried on in
leasehold premises is admissible in fixing fair market value of lease on
condemned land. Improved Parcel of Land, Known as No. 400
Maryland Ave. in City of Wilmington, New Castle County v. State ex
rel. State Highway Dept., 57 Del. 454, 201 A.2d 453 (1964).
iii. Generally, owner may express opinion as to fair market value of
property, but where it plainly appears that owner has no knowledge of
value, presumption of knowledge is overcome, and owner opinion is
generally inadmissible. State ex rel. Smith v. 0.15 Acres of Land, More
or Less, in New Castle Hundred, New Castle County, 53 Del. 372, 169
A.2d 256 (1961).
iv. The owner of property is deemed qualified by reason of such
relationship as owner to give estimates of value of what he owns.
Fidanque v. American Maracaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch. 262, 92 A.2d 311
(1952).
i. Florida
i. An owner of property may testify in condemnation proceeding as to
value of property, although owner is not qualified as an expert.
F.S.A.Const. art. 10, § 6(a). Hill v. Marion County, 238 So. 2d 163 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1970).
ii. Testimony as to fair market value of property by taxing authorities’
expert, who based appraisal on potential future use of property which
would necessitate rezoning, was based on such speculation and
conjecture as to make testimony incompetent as basis for
determination of proper valuation, and admission of such testimony
violated statute requiring use of method of assessment so as to secure
just valuation. F.S.A. § 193.021. Bal Harbour Club, Inc. v. Dade
County, 222 So. 2d 428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1969).
iii. It was not an abuse of discretion to hold a witness qualified to testify as
an expert as to value of condemned land where person stated he had
been appointed by a probate court to make appraisals, made appraisals
for a lending institution, a lumber company, and for attorneys, and had
been called as a witness in a public housing authority condemnation

suit as an appraiser, even though he did not testify as to having made
appraisals of or as to having familiarized himself with values of
property in vicinity of condemned land in question. State Road Dept.
v. Outlaw, 148 So. 2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1963).
iv. Witness who testifies as to value of realty must have had adequate
opportunity to apprise himself of worth of realty and should know
particular property to be valued and value of land in vicinity or of same
class. Harbond, Inc. v. Anderson, 134 So. 2d 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2d Dist. 1961).
j. Georgia
i. New Statute Effective January 1, 2013: OCGA § 24-7-701(b): “A
witness need not be an expert or dealer in an article or property to
testify as to its value if he or she has had an opportunity to form a
reasoned opinion.”
ii. Old Statute: O.C.G.A. § 24-9-66: “Direct testimony as to market
value is in the nature of opinion evidence. One need not be an expert
or dealer in the article in question but may testify as to its value if he
has had an opportunity for forming a correct opinion.” The owner of
property is qualified to state his opinion as to value. Maddox v. State,
157 Ga. App. 696 (1981).
iii. Witness tendered an affidavit and was deposed. In his deposition, he
testified as to the value of the Ballybunion property based on tax
appraisals and recent sales that he had seen. In his affidavit, he opined
as to the fair market value of five of the properties at different relevant
points in time based on a "thorough knowledge of sales in the area,
having experience in buying and selling real estate, and reviewing the
tax valuations for [the property]." Thus, Safari showed that he had an
"opportunity to form a reasoned opinion" as required by OCGA § 24-
7-701 (b). Cf. Maree v. ROMAR Joint Venture, 329 Ga. App. 282, 295
(6) (a) (763 SE2d 899) (2014) (witness's testimony that she based her
opinion as to value on "rental rates in the area, information from
appraisals, and (her) knowledge of the commercial real estate market in
the area," was sufficient to show that she had an opportunity to form a
correct opinion as to value, the standard under the law prior to the
effective date of the new Evidence Code — July 1, 2013)[2]; In re
Estate of Hubert, 325 Ga. App. 276, 286 (6) (750 SE2d 511) (2013)
(testimony that witness "was familiar with the properties at issue, in
which he had an ownership interest, and that he also was familiar with

comparable properties, which he had considered in reaching his
opinion" provided a sufficient foundation under former law). Safari v.
Res-Ms Bayfront, LLC, Citation Pending (Ga. App., July 14, 2015)
iv. A person need not be a licensed real estate broker, appraiser, or
salesman to qualify as an expert sufficiently qualified to give his
opinion on the value of property. Wilson v. Wilson, 277 Ga. 801, 596
S.E.2d 392 (2004).
v. Witness who testified that he had sold some land in the community,
that he knew of other property that had been sold and that he was
about as familiar with market value of land in community as anyone
else was qualified to testify as to value of landowner’s property
allegedly rendered useless by defendant which operated stone quarry
and crushing business on its leased property adjacent to landowner’s
property and which allegedly had raised height of dam it had previously
constructed on its land for purpose of impounding water from stream
which flowed through landowner’s property so as to cause water to
back up and flood landowner’s property and which allegedly had
caused residue from crushed stone to settle thereon and thereby turn
property into a quagmire. Code § 38”1709. Gainesville Stone Co. v.
Parker, 224 Ga. 819, 165 S.E.2d 296 (1968).
vi. Objecting joint venturer’s testimony that she had based her estimated
rental value of joint venture’s property on rental rates in the area,
information from appraisals, and her knowledge of the commercial real
estate market in the area, was sufficient to create a foundation for the
jury to consider her opinion as to the property’s rental value, in
proceedings on breach of contract claim against managing joint
venturer. West’s Ga.Code Ann. § 24–9–66 (Repealed). Maree v.
ROMAR Joint Venture, 763 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
vii. Witness for state Department of Transportation (DOT) was qualified
to render expert opinion as to just and adequate compensation in
condemnation proceeding involving property whose highest and best
use was commercial development; witness held master’s degree in real
estate, witness had been licensed as real estate appraiser for 15 years,
witness had specialized in appraising commercial properties, witness
held real estate broker’s license and owned brokerage company, and
witness provided his opinion of just and adequate compensation in
approximately 35 condemnations. Woodland Partners Ltd. Partnership

v. Department of Transp., 286 Ga. App. 546, 650 S.E.2d 277 (2007),
cert. denied, (Sept. 24, 2007).
k. Hawaii: Owner of land is generally qualified to give his opinion as to
value of land and weight to be given such testimony is for jury. Territory by
Sharpless v. Adelmeyer, 45 Haw. 144, 363 P.2d 979 (1961).
l. Idaho
i. Owner of property is competent witness as to its value. Bratton v.
Slininger, 93 Idaho 248, 460 P.2d 383 (1969).
ii. Where taking of 20-foot strip of land for highway improvement
purposes would require porch steps situated on land taken to be built
in some other place, value of steps taken could have been considered
either as severance damages or as damages for improvement taken; but
any error in failure of findings to delineate specifically whether various
items of damages constituted valuations for property taken or
severance damages was rendered harmless where findings specifically
stated each item of property taken and valuation thereof and double
damages did not result. I.C. § 7”711, subds. 1, 2. State ex rel. Burns v.
Blair, 91 Idaho 137, 417 P.2d 217 (1966).
iii. One who had lived in the community for 32 years and who had
engaged in the garage, service station and wholesale petroleum business
and who was a director of a bank in the community and had served on
the bank loan committee and who was familiar with tract used for
service station, tavern and novelty shop and one who was an insurance
broker and in the real estate business and who had previously appraised
property on a number of occasions and who had dealt with all types of
property and had personally inspected the subject tract were qualified
to express an opinion concerning the market value of the subject tract;
the determination of the weight to be given to their opinions was for
the jury in condemnation case. State ex rel. Rich v. Halverson, 86
Idaho 242, 384 P.2d 480 (1963).
iv. As a general rule, the owner of property may testify as to its value.
Taysom v. Taysom, 82 Idaho 58, 349 P.2d 556 (1960).
v. An owner is competent to testify to value of property without further
qualification; however, the weight of his testimony is to be determined
from a consideration of his knowledge and experience in regard to the
value in question and unless his want of qualification is so complete
that his testimony is entirely worthless, it is for jury to assess its value.
Bancroft v. Smith, 80 Idaho 63, 323 P.2d 879 (1958).

m. Illinois
i. A witness who is familiar with the property at issue and has direct
knowledge of real estate values in the vicinity is competent to offer an
opinion about value. Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106,
284 Ill. Dec. 360, 810 N.E.2d 13 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 943, 125
S. Ct. 354, 160 L. Ed. 2d 256 (2004).
ii. Witness is competent to testify as to value of realty if it appears that he
has some peculiar means of forming an intelligent and correct
judgment as to value of land in question beyond what is presumed to
be possessed by men generally. Department of Public Works and
Bldgs. v. Oberlaender, 42 Ill. 2d 410, 247 N.E.2d 888 (1969).
iii. Professional real estate appraiser, who had for many years valued
properties throughout country and in Illinois, and who had spent
considerable time in examining premises and investigating facts on
which to base opinion, was competent to testify in condemnation case,
although he had no previous knowledge of land values in locality.
Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Divit, 25 Ill. 2d 93, 182
N.E.2d 749 (1962).
iv. Anyone who is acquainted with property and has knowledge of value,
either in sale or ownership of property nearby, is competent to testify
in a condemnation case. Department of Public Works and Bldgs. v.
Pellini, 7 Ill. 2d 367, 131 N.E.2d 55 (1955).
v. Anyone who is acquainted with realty and has knowledge of values
either in sale or ownership of realty nearby is competent to testify in
condemnation proceeding, and the question of the degree of his
experience is one of weight and not of competency of his testimony.
Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County v. Kercher, 394 Ill. 11, 66
N.E.2d 873 (1946).
vi. Trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to permit certain
witnesses owning property in area covered by challenged zoning
ordinance to testify as to valuations of land in area where there was an
absence of preliminary showing of factors upon which their opinions
as to valuation were based and testimony of certain witnesses could be
considered self-serving because they were plaintiffs. Tarala v. Village of
Wheeling, 25 Ill. App. 3d 349, 323 N.E.2d 454 (1st Dist. 1974).
vii. As a general rule, a witness may express his opinion as to market value
of real estate where it appears that witnessopinion is based on some

competence not possessed by general public. Stirs, Inc. v. City of
Chicago, 24 Ill. App. 3d 118, 320 N.E.2d 216 (1st Dist. 1974).
viii. An assessor is not per se objectionable as a witness in a condemnation
proceeding since he may well testify as to his judgment concerning
value of land, but he is not permitted to testify as to its assessed
valuation for taxation purposes. Department of Public Works and
Buildings v. Cohen, 9 Ill. App. 3d 85, 291 N.E.2d 883 (3d Dist. 1972).
ix. Witness is competent to testify as to value of land if it is shown that he
is acquainted with land and has knowledge of real estate values in
vicinity. Department of Business & Economic Development v.
Baumann, 9 Ill. App. 3d 1, 291 N.E.2d 213 (2d Dist. 1972).
x. Competency of a valuation witness in a condemnation proceeding is
established by showing that he is acquainted with the property
involved. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, Cook and Will
Counties v. Wagner, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 279 N.E.2d 754 (1st Dist.
1971).
n. Indiana
i. Witness who was owner of land adjoining that of defendants and who
was a contractor of many years of experience and was familiar with the
land of the defendants and had a detailed knowledge of other
commercial property in the immediate area was competent to testify to
the value of the defendant’s land. State v. Vaughan, 243 Ind. 221, 184
N.E.2d 143 (1962).
ii. Owner of trailer park, who had experience in dealing and fixing up
such parks and who had served as chairman of advisory board on
mobile home mapping and had done some work in the trailer park
owned by husband and wife, was competent to give his opinion as to
the value of the trailer park in a divorce proceeding. Tomchany v.
Tomchany, 134 Ind. App. 27, 185 N.E.2d 301 (Div. 1 1962).
o. Iowa
i. Witness was competent to testify in condemnation case as to value of
tract in industrial district along railway line, where witness was officer
and managing director of corporate landowner, was experienced in
development of other industrial districts along railway lines, was
familiar with tract and had knowledge of sales of industrial property in
the community. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway
Commission, 255 Iowa 292, 122 N.W.2d 323 (1963).

ii. Ordinarily the owner of property is deemed qualified by reason of his
ownership to express an opinion as to the value of his property for
purposes of determining its value for taxation, but the officer of a
private corporation which owns the property, unless he is a managing
officer, is not thereby qualified to testify as to its value, but it must be
further shown that he has knowledge of such value as qualifies him in
fact. Appeal of Dubuque-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 237 Iowa 1314, 25
N.W.2d 327 (1946).
iii. Consulting engineer, who was university graduate and licensed civil
engineer, geologist with college degree, and professional farm manager
and appraiser were properly permitted to give expert testimony on
value in proceeding for condemnation of property underlaid with sand
and gravel subject to removal by lessee. Comstock v. Iowa State
Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1301, 121 N.W.2d 205 (1963).
iv. In proceeding to determine value of farmland condemned, witness
who stated that he was familiar with land values of farms in
neighborhood and general farmer living in neighborhood were
qualified to give their opinions as to value of land condemned and
permitting witnesses to testify that farm in area sold at auction for $200
per acre was not prejudicial. Harmsen v. Iowa State Highway
Commission, 251 Iowa 1351, 105 N.W.2d 660 (1960).
p. Kansas
i. Given landowner’s admission that he did not have appraisal expertise,
landowner was not qualified to perform a cost appraisal, and therefore,
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding this evidence in
eminent domain proceeding. In re Eminent Domain, 320 P.3d 955
(Kan. 2014).
ii. In divorce proceeding, it was error to reject testimony put in form of
opinion on market value of real estate awarded to husband, where such
testimony was that of adjoining landowner claiming familiarity with
land sales in area. Gechter v. Gechter, 216 Kan. 360, 532 P.2d 1089
(1975).
iii. A landowner is a competent witness in a condemnation action to
testify as to value of his property. K.S.A. 26-201 et seq. McCall Service
Stations, Inc. v. City of Overland Park, 215 Kan. 390, 524 P.2d 1165
(1974).

iv. Owner of ranchland and former owners thereof and neighbors who
were thoroughly familiar with ranch were competent to testify as to
value of ranch. Fox v. Wilson, 211 Kan. 563, 507 P.2d 252 (1973).
v. Landowner is competent witness to testify as to value of his property.
State Highway Commission v. Lee, 207 Kan. 284, 485 P.2d 310 (1971).
vi. Landowner is competent witness to testify as to value of his property
in condemnation proceeding. Urban Renewal Agency of Wichita, Kan.,
Metropolitan Area v. Tate, 196 Kan. 654, 414 P.2d 28 (1966).
vii. The value of condemned property for a special use to which it is
adapted or put may be shown by persons familiar with such use, even
though they are not familiar with land values generally. Eisenring v.
Kansas Turnpike Authority, 183 Kan. 774, 332 P.2d 539 (1958).
viii. In a condemnation proceeding, opinion evidence is usually admitted
from persons who are not strictly experts, but who, from residing and
doing business in vicinity, familiarize themselves with land values. Mai
v. Garden City, 177 Kan. 179, 277 P.2d 636 (1954).
q. Kentucky
i. To be qualified to give opinion testimony about the value of property,
a lay witness must know the property to be valued and the value of the
property in the vicinity, must understand the standard of value, and
must be possessed of the ability to make a reasonable inference.
Summe v. Gronotte, 357 S.W.3d 211 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).
ii. In dissolution proceedings, when determining the fair market value of
real property with improvements and without improvements, expert
opinion is ordinarily necessary; to be qualified to express an opinion
upon fair market value of real property, a witness, including the owner
thereof, must possess some basis for a knowledge of market values.
Jones v. Jones, 245 S.W.3d 815 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).
iii. Unlike lay witness, expert valuation witness need not be acquainted
first hand with real estate values in the vicinity. Com., Dept. of
Highways v. Citizens Ice & Fuel Co., 365 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1963).
iv. Generally, owner of real property is a competent witness as to its value.
Barron v. Phelps, 238 S.W.2d 1016 (Ky. 1951).
v. In eminent domain proceeding, valuation expert knowledge or lack of
knowledge as to other real estate transactions affects only weight of his
testimony and not its admissibility. Com. Dept. of Highways v.
Tackett, 498 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1973).

vi. Landowner who testified to knowledge of some recent sales which he
regarded as comparable and who professed to know market value was
qualified to give expert testimony as to value of condemned tract.
Com., Dept. of Highways v. Castle, 467 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1971).
vii. Witness to be qualified to testify as to value of realty must know
property to be valued and value of property in vicinity, must
understand standard of value, and must be possessed of ability to make
reasonable inference. Whitesburg Municipal Housing Commission,
Urban Renewal Section v. Bates, 412 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1967).
viii. Condemnee and his witnesses were qualified as expert valuation
witnesses, where condemnee had dealt in real estate in community for
over 30 years, one witness had participated in board of education
purchase of several school construction sites, one of which was 1000
feet from condemnee property, and had appraised property in
neighborhood for loans and had bought and sold property in area, and
the other witness resided in community and owned land adjoining
condemnee land and had observed the local real estate market for 12
years. Com., Dept. of Highways v. Parsons, 383 S.W.2d 360 (Ky.
1964).
ix. Witnesses actively engaged in real estate business and acquainted with
property taken and familiar with land values in the area were qualified
to give competent testimony as to value of farm and damages to it.
Com., Dept. of Highways v. Merrill, 383 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1964).
x. An expert valuation witness need not be acquainted firsthand with land
values in vicinity of property under consideration, and if expert witness
establishes his qualifications, states he has studied the real estate market
and has seen the property condemned, his opinion will support a
verdict unless obviously unreasonable or shown to be without any
supporting basis. KRS 177.081 ”177.089. Robinette v. Com., Dept. of
Highways, 380 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1964).
xi. Condemnee, who, as speculator, had bought and sold 15 farms within
county, witness who had been engaged in real estate appraisal work for
28 years and witness who was real estate appraiser with 18 year’s
general experience, were qualified to give evaluation of interchange
property. Com., Dept. of Highways v. Coleman, 451 S.W.2d 636 (Ky.
1970).
xii. Co-owner of condemned land who was a teacher of general science
and agriculture and who professed to be familiar with sales of other

property in neighborhood of condemned land and considered himself
sufficiently informed by reason of his observation, background,
training, and experience was competent to express an opinion as to his
farm market value. Com., Dept. of Highways v. Villines, 445 S.W.2d
880 (Ky. 1969).
xiii. Real estate appraisers who were highway department employees
acquainted with property values in the area, and where condemnee,
president of local bank, local realtor, and part-time realtor, all of whom
had lived in local county for most of their lives and were familiar with
local land values were qualified to testify as to value of land. Com.,
Dept. of Highways v. White, 421 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1967).
xiv. Condemnee opinion as to market value of his property was
incompetent where condemnee did not affirmatively show that he had
some knowledge of property values. Com., Dept. of Highways v.
Horne, 418 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 1967).
xv. Refusal to allow owner of condemned motel property and licensed real
estate dealer to cite prices at which other motel properties in county
had sold was prejudicially erroneous although other properties had
substantial physical dissimilarities from condemned property, and sales
of other properties included more than real estate alone. Bennett v.
Com., Dept. of Highways, 417 S.W.2d 143 (Ky. 1967).
xvi. Witnesses who were unfamiliar with evaluation of property located at
highway interchange were not qualified to testify as expert appraisal
witnesses in condemnation proceeding involving such property. Com.,
Dept. of Highways v. Dale, 421 S.W.2d 864 (Ky. 1967).
xvii. Witness who testified for landowner in condemnation case, who had
worked for United States Department of Agriculture where witness
served as an appraiser of farm real estate, farm dwellings and as an area
supervisor, was qualified to testify to values in issue, and it was proper
for jury to consider such testimony. Com., Dept. of Highways v.
Sellers, 421 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1967).
r. Louisiana
i. A person need not be a professional real estate appraiser to give expert
testimony on value of land in expropriation proceedings. State
Through Dept. of Highways v. Menefee, 266 So. 2d 226 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 1972).

ii. A witness may be considered an expert in valuing land for a specific
use if he is familiar with land so adapted. Lafayette Airport Com’n v.
Roy, 265 So. 2d 459 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
iii. Landowner two appraisal witnesses who were experienced in
development of property on same side of lake as property expropriated
for pipeline purposes and who both had experience in buying and
selling lands were qualified as experts even though witnesses were not
well versed or schooled in technical approaches used in making
appraisals. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Roy, 249 So. 2d 587 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1971).
iv. In condemnation proceedings, discarding valuation by real estate
brokers was not an abuse of discretion, where one broker testified that
this was his first appraisal in the parish and the other testified that he
made no adjustments for such things as location, condition of the land,
and size. State Through Dept. of Highways v. Henry, 192 So. 2d 801
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
v. Landowner witnesses, who have experience with local real estate and
who are actively engaged in real estate appraisal work, are qualified to
appraise and evaluate owner property. State Through Dept. of
Highways v. Singletary, 185 So. 2d 642 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
vi. Landowner witnesses, who had experience with local real estate and
who were actively engaged in real estate appraisal work, were qualified
to appraise and evaluate owner property with which they were familiar,
and their testimony was properly considered in determining award.
LSA”R.S. 48:443. State Through Dept. of Highways v. Lumpkin, 147
So. 2d 80 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
vii. Real estate dealers in locality of expropriated land were capable of
expressing expert views on valuations of property in locality. State
Through Dept. of Highways v. Addison, 136 So. 2d 545 (La. Ct. App.
1st Cir. 1961).
viii. Men of long experience in real estate, who were familiar with lands in
the community, could give a fair appraisal of condemned property
based on their experience and knowledge of real estate in the
community, and such men could testify as experts, even though they
did not have the same qualifications as an expert offered by
condemnor. State Through Dept. of Highways v. Ebrecht, 135 So. 2d
630 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1961).

ix. Witnesses, one who was farmer, property owner, builder and lender,
one who was builder and vendor of homes, one who was bank
executive, and one who was licensed real estate broker were qualified
to testify to property values in expropriation proceeding and it was
proper to receive their evidence based on common sense approach or
conservative banker approach, though they did not use market data
approach by employing comparable sales or rest their conclusions on
cost less depreciation approach or any such theoretical formula. LSA
Const. art. 6, § 19.1; LSA”R.S. 48:441 to 48:460. State Through Dept.
of Highways v. Rooks, 131 So. 2d 125 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
x. Property owner’s witnesses, who together had 59 years’ experience in
real estate business and who were engaged in that business at time of
trial, were qualified as experts to give their opinion as to value of
ownersproperty and damage resulting from expropriation of a portion
thereof. State Through Dept. of Highways v. Milam, 130 So. 2d 145
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
s. Maine
i. Property owners, by reason of their ownership alone, may state their
opinion as to the fair market value of their property. Hutz v. Alden,
2011 ME 27, 12 A.3d 1174 (Me. 2011).
ii. In Maine owner of real or personal property may testify as to value
thereof. Simmons v. State By and Through State Highway
Commission, 234 A.2d 330 (Me. 1967).
iii. In determining value of limestone under strip of land taken by State
Highway Commission, opinion of president of corporate owner of
mineral rights under strip as to valuation was admissible, where he
showed considerable familiarity with limestone deposits of area and
market conditions, and he demonstrated familiarity with property in
question, its capacity to produce, and general market values in vicinity,
and values and capacities of competing quarries. Knox Lime Co. v.
Maine State Highway Commission, 230 A.2d 814 (Me. 1967).
iv. In vendor’s action for breach of contract for purchase of resort
property sold to different party after date set for performance for price
less than contract price vendor could properly testify as to fair market
value of the property on date set for performance. Towne v. Larson,
142 Me. 301, 51 A.2d 51 (1947).
t. Maryland

i. Owner of land being condemned is presumptively competent to testify
to his estimate of its value. Greater Baltimore Consol. Wholesale Food
Market Authority v. Duvall, 255 Md. 90, 256 A.2d 882 (1969).
ii. An individual owner of property is presumptively qualified to give his
opinion as to its value without qualification as an expert. M. A. Realty
Co. v. State Roads Commission, 247 Md. 522, 233 A.2d 793 (1967).
iii. Knowledge of real estate witness of comparable sales in vicinity of
condemned land is not the only test as to the qualification of witness to
give his opinion as to value of condemned land, but such knowledge is
certainly helpful in determining competency. Turner v. State Roads
Commission, 213 Md. 428, 132 A.2d 455 (1957).
iv. Owner of property, without other qualification, may estimate its value
and testify thereto. Jackson v. Linthicum, 192 Md. 272, 64 A.2d 133
(1949).
v. In action for damages to plaintiff garage allegedly caused by excavation
by defendants on adjoining land, one who had been a contractor for 40
years and was familiar with building values and also with the
construction of plaintiff building was properly allowed to express an
opinion as to the damage to the building although the hypothetical
question put to him did not describe the condition of the building in
full. Mullan v. Hacker, 187 Md. 261, 49 A.2d 640 (1946).
u. Massachusetts
i. Ordinarily, a real estate dealer or appraiser may testify as to value of
realty, whether or not he has seen it or sold realty in the neighborhood,
if he possesses sufficient experience and knowledge of values of other
similar realty in the particular locality, but it is not sufficient that he
may have a general knowledge of real estate values, and he should
possess knowledge and experience regarding the particular type of
realty involved, so as to enable him to form an intelligent and fairly
accurate estimate of diminution in actual market value occasioned by
takings. Lee Lime Corp. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 337
Mass. 433, 149 N.E.2d 905 (1958).
ii. A nonexpert owner of property may testify to its value upon the basis
of his familiarity with the characteristics of the property, his knowledge
or acquaintance with its uses, and his experience in dealing with it.
Epstein v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 752, 933
N.E.2d 972 (2010).

iii. Owner and operator of cranberry bogs, who had acted as broker for
sale or purchase of some 50 bogs, was entitled to state his opinion as to
adequacy of water control system of bog in reaching his appraisal of
diminution in value of property partially taken for highway purposes,
and he was entitled to consider previous testimony of civil engineer as
to existence of drainage problem on the bog. Wing v. Com., 359 Mass.
286, 268 N.E.2d 658 (1971).
iv. Where owner of locus seeking abatement of real estate taxes was
familiar with the property and knew what he had paid for minor
improvements and what rent he had received from building, and owner
was in the real estate investment business, appellate tax court was
warranted, in its discretion, in receiving owner testimony as to value.
Board of Assessors of Ipswich v. Smith, 357 Mass. 778, 260 N.E.2d
175 (1970).
v. In eminent domain proceeding, there was no error in allowing real
estate expert, who had considerable background in the field and had
reviewed appraisals on nearly 200 parcels taken by Commonwealth
some years previously, to testify, over objections, to fair market value
of parcels taken. Dorsyl Realty, Inc. v. Worcester Redevelopment
Authority, 357 Mass. 777, 258 N.E.2d 926 (1970).
vi. Broker and appraiser who had personally examined land, its
boundaries, and route of projected road was not destitute of the
necessary qualifications as expert as to value before and after taking.
Burchell v. Com., 350 Mass. 488, 215 N.E.2d 649 (1966).
vii. Witness, who had extensive experience for many years as owner,
manager, broker, developer and appraiser of realty of all kinds
throughout Commonwealth, was not disqualified, as matter of law,
from testifying as to value of parcel of realty, part of which was taken
for construction of expressway, by reason of fact that he had never
bought, sold or appraised realty in town where parcel was located and
had not viewed locus until shortly before trial. George v. Com., 348
Mass. 780, 203 N.E.2d 392 (1964).
viii. Corporate officer who knew plant and was also tannery expert was
properly permitted to express opinion as to value of tanning plant
buildings in action on fire policy for loss of buildings. M.G.L.A. c. 175
§§ 95, 96, 99. Agoos Leather Companies v. American & Foreign Ins.
Co., 342 Mass. 603, 174 N.E.2d 652 (1961).

ix. In proceeding to assess damages for taking of portion of petitioner
land on which existed a stream and partially usable dam, trial judge
erred in striking petitioner testimony on market value of land which he
had owned for some 20 years and had known more or less all his life.
Southwick v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 339 Mass. 666, 162
N.E.2d 271 (1959).
x. Where proceeding was brought for assessment of damages to
petitioner sand and gravel pit, a part of which was taken by
commonwealth, the value of the sand and gravel was not the measure
of damages, and it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude value of
separable material as a confusing and speculative factor in determining
the market value of property as real estate. Joseph De Vries & Sons,
Inc. v. Com., 339 Mass. 663, 162 N.E.2d 269 (1959).
v. Michigan
w. Minnesota
i. Testimony of an owner as to value of his property may be received on
issue of damages, and lack of foundation goes only to weight of
testimony and not to its admissibility. Jackson v. Buesgens, 290 Minn.
78, 186 N.W.2d 184 (1971).
ii. Tax assessor qualifications to express a valid appraisal of value of land
were supported by his knowledge of land values in particular area.
Alstores Realty, Inc. v. State, 286 Minn. 343, 176 N.W.2d 112 (1970).
iii. Person living in vicinity of land used for farming purposes is not, by
virtue of that fact alone, qualified to give expert testimony as to value
of part of such farm site for residential development. Vierling v.
Independent School Dist. No. 720, Scott County, 268 Minn. 304, 129
N.W.2d 338 (1964).
iv. In condemnation proceedings, testimony of value of property by the
owner is competent and a denial of his competence and a denial of his
right to testify constitutes reversible error even though the owner lays
no particular foundation for his opinion. Housing and Redevelopment
Authority In and For City of Minneapolis v. Zweigbaum, 257 Minn.
233, 100 N.W.2d 719 (1960).
v. The owner of property is competent to express his opinion as to value
of his property. H.P. Droher and Sons v. Toushin, 250 Minn. 490, 85
N.W.2d 273 (1957).

vi. Owner of property either real or personal is presumptively acquainted
with its value and may testify as to its value. Lehman v. Hansord
Pontiac Co., 246 Minn. 1, 74 N.W.2d 305 (1955).
vii. Opinion of a witness other than owner as to value of property need
not be based on any particular sales which witness has made or
observed, but his knowledge must be the result of observations he has
made or become aware of in the course of his business and not the
result of a special inquiry. Bartl v. City of New Ulm, 245 Minn. 148, 72
N.W.2d 303 (1955).
viii. A person engaged in appraising real estate over a number of years was
sufficiently qualified to give an opinion as to value of residential
property with water seepage in the basement even though he had not
actually bought and sold such property. Hafner v. Ritzinger, 256 Minn.
196, 97 N.W.2d 839 (1959).
x. Mississippi
i. Landowner may testify as to before and after value of his land but his
testimony should have some basis expressed in evidence on which to
substantiate his opinion. Bynum v. Mandrel Industries, Inc., 241 So. 2d
629 (Miss. 1970).
ii. Landowner was entitled to give her estimate of values in condemnation
proceedings. Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Spencer, 209
So. 2d 821 (Miss. 1968).
iii. Laymen can testify as to value of condemnee land provided they are
familiar with it before and after taking and are cognizant of land values
of comparable property as to quality, use and location, which is
adjacent, near or reasonably close to subject land so that same
comparison, favorable or unfavorable, can clearly be made, based upon
sales they have made or about which they have direct personal
knowledge. Pearl River Val. Water Supply Dist. v. Wood, 252 Miss.
580, 172 So. 2d 196 (1965).
iv. Witnesses, who had neither bought nor sold real estate in county in
which brick manufacturing plant was located but who were thoroughly
familiar with brick business and what such a plant should be worth,
were qualified to testify in condemnation proceeding as to value of
manufacturing plant before condemnation of portion of land and value
after such condemnation. Mississippi State Highway Commission v.
Meridian Brick Co., 245 Miss. 349, 147 So. 2d 302 (1962).

v. Owner of land was entitled to testify to its values before and after
closing of street. Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Fleming,
242 Miss. 402, 135 So. 2d 821 (1962).
vi. Witnesses were qualified to give their opinions as to the before and
after taking value of the land for whatever their opinions may have
been worth in light of their admitted lack of knowledge of certain
factors relating to such value. Mississippi State Highway Commission
v. Windham, 241 Miss. 1, 128 So. 2d 577 (1961).
vii. Witness must be acquainted with property sought to be condemned
before witness can give opinion as to fair market value of property.
Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Strong, 240 Miss. 756, 129
So. 2d 349 (1961).
viii. Admission in condemnation proceeding of opinion evidence of witness
concerning fair market value of property before taking was error,
where witness was not familiar with all property taken before taking.
Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Rogers, 240 Miss. 529, 128
So. 2d 353 (1961).
ix. Landowner was not precluded from testifying that in his opinion his
property was worth $10,000 an acre, in an eminent domain action
brought by the Transportation Department, even if his opinion was
based in part on offers from others to purchase portions of the land,
and which would not have constituted competent evidence to establish
the fair market value of the property, where his opinion was also based
upon what several neighbors paid for their lots. Rules of Evid., Rule
702. Mississippi Transp. Com’n v. Buchanan, 99 So. 3d 230 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2012), cert. denied, 98 So. 3d 1073 (Miss. 2012).
x. In eminent domain practice, a landowner may give his opinion of the
fair market value of his property; however, the landowner must be
familiar with the land and cognizant of land values of comparable
property as to quality, use, and location. Davidson v. Tarpon Whitetail
Gas Storage, LLC, 90 So. 3d 691 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).
y. Missouri
i. Owner is generally allowed to testify as to reasonable value of his
property, although ownership in itself does not qualify one to express
opinions on matters not falling within one experience. Coach House of
Ward Parkway, Inc. v. Ward Parkway Shops, Inc., 471 S.W.2d 464 (Mo.
1971).

ii. An owner of property is qualified to give an opinion as to the value of
the property. Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1970).
iii. Real estate broker who was familiar with motel which plaintiffs
purchased in reliance upon false statement of income from property
and who had listed property for sale and had been in business of
appraising and brokering hotels and motels was qualified as expert to
testify as to difference in values of property as represented and its
actual value. DeBow v. Higgins, 425 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. 1968).
iv. It is general experience and observation of expert witness that qualifies
him to testify as to value of land condemned. State ex rel. State
Highway Commission v. Barron, 400 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1966).
v. Witnesses qualified as experts on value of condemned property as
farmland are not necessarily qualified as experts on value of farmlands
for commercial purposes. Shelby County R-IV School Dist. v. Herman,
392 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1965).
vi. An agent of owner of land, in charge of its management, who for years
had been familiar with the property, its location, etc., and is sufficiently
familiar with market value of property in the neighborhood, is
competent to testify to its value. City of St. Louis v. Vasquez, 341
S.W.2d 839 (Mo. 1960).
vii. Expert witness had proper foundation to testify as to diminution in
value of landowner’s property as well as the cost to cure the damages
which occurred to his property in trespass action involving cutting of
trees; expert discussed the land in question with the landowner and the
neighbors, expert’s testimony was based upon comparable sales by way
of property cards showing valuation of properties, expert had 22 years
of experience appraising property, and expert provided specific details
as to how she arrived at her valuation of landowner’s property.
V.A.M.S. § 490.065(3). Lau v. Pugh, 299 S.W.3d 740 (Mo. Ct. App.
S.D. 2009).
viii. An owner is presumed competent to testify to the value of his real
property even though he does not qualify as an expert. Atkinson v.
Corson, 289 S.W.3d 269 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2009).
ix. Permitting witnesses, who all had lived in area of farm in question in
condemnation proceeding for easement for power line, were engaged
in farming or owned farms, were familiar with such farm both before
and after taking, and crops produced thereon, kept abreast of farm
prices in general, discussed farm and land values with real estate men

and others in county, subscribed to and read various farm publications,
and some of whom had bought and sold farms in county, to express
their opinions of value of farm before and after taking was not abuse
of discretion, notwithstanding contention that such witnesses were not
qualified as experts. Northeast Missouri Elec. Power Co-op v. Cary,
485 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
x. Admissibility of testimony of opinion of owner of real property who is
not an expert rests upon the assumption or record showing that owner
is particularly familiar with the property and knows the usages to which
the property is adapted and when assumption of special knowledge is
negated by owner own testimony his opinion loses its probative value
and should be rejected. Ward v. Deck, 419 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. Ct. App.
1967).
xi. Proprietress of sandwich shop and beer tavern was competent to
testify to value of condemned land where it appeared that she had been
resident for several years and owned and dealt with land and was
familiar with condemned land. State ex rel. State Highway Commission
v. Henderson, 381 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
xii. Persons familiar with land in neighborhood of which they lived for
number of years were competent witnesses to prove value thereof in
owner action against railroad company for damages to land by flood
waters of river flowing through highway underpass in defendant right-
of-way embankment. Buschelberg v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 289
S.W.2d 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
xiii. Witness who had had thirty-two years’ experience in the real estate
business, including ten years as a professional appraiser, was well
qualified to testify as expert regarding value of farm owned by
applicants for state old age assistance. V.A.M.S. § 208.011. Bollinger v.
State Dept. of Public Health & Welfare, 254 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App.
1953).
xiv. Witnesses testifying as to value of property are not required to be
expert or skilled in strict sense of the term in order to express an
opinion on the value, and their testimony is admissible where it appears
that they had and utilized means superior to those of the trier of fact
for forming an intelligent opinion. Dyer v. Standard Fire Ins. Co. of N.
J., 227 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950).
z. Montana

i. Landowner’s testimony regarding the value of his property which
exceeded testimony about its value pursuant to its current use as a
restaurant and casino was inadmissible in inverse condemnation action
absent any basis or foundation for such expertise; landowner’s
testimony included the value of a bowling alley, a bank, and a dental
office, and landowner merely talked about consulting with real estate
agents and getting comparables and using a computer to run analysis
without indicating any foundation of peculiar knowledge. K&R
Partnership v. City of Whitefish, 2008 MT 228, 344 Mont. 336, 189
P.3d 593 (2008).
ii. Owner of property is competent witness to testify as to reasonable
value of property for use to which he is putting it, but to go beyond
that field he must possess qualifications required of general witness as
to value. State Highway Commission v. Marsh, 165 Mont. 198, 527
P.2d 573 (1974).
iii. One who knows real property condemned and is familiar with uses to
which it may be put may testify as to its market value. State By and
Through State Highway Commission v. Bennett, 162 Mont. 386, 513
P.2d 5 (1973).
iv. Admission of testimony of landowner who had been property owner
for 15 years, lived on property for 5 years, and refurbished house inside
and out, who was familiar with nature of fertile soil on property, knew
and valued weather conditions at location of property, grew crops,
testified to uninterrupted and undisturbed convenient access, had
knowledge of sales of other property and knew that after state took
part of property property would have no value, as to his opinion of
value before taking, over objection that he did not have some particular
means of forming intelligent and correct judgment, was not abuse of
discretion. State Highway Commission v. Wilcox, 155 Mont. 176, 468
P.2d 749 (1970).
v. An owner of property can testify in a reasonable way as to its value for
use to which he is putting it, and this is particularly true where he is
shown to have some peculiar means of forming an intelligent and
correct judgment as to value of property in question beyond what is
presumed to be possessed by men generally. Dooling v. Casey, 152
Mont. 267, 448 P.2d 749 (1968).
vi. In order to give an opinion on value of property witness must have
some peculiar means of forming an intelligent and correct judgment as

to value of property beyond what is presumed to be possessed by men
generally, and one who knows real property and is familiar with the use
to which it may be put may testify as to its market value. State Highway
Commission v. Barnes, 151 Mont. 300, 443 P.2d 16 (1968).
vii. Condemnee’s value witness, who had been real estate man in area
involved for more than 20 years, who specialized in development of
residential property, who was familiar with property in question and
market for such property in area, and who testified to facts within his
own knowledge and observation, was qualified to give his opinion as
expert in case involving condemnation of portion of undeveloped land
for highway construction purposes. Montana State Highway
Commission v. Jacobs, 150 Mont. 322, 435 P.2d 274 (1967).
aa. Nebraska
i. An owner who is shown to be familiar with the value of his or her land
shall be qualified to estimate the value of such land for the use to
which it is then being put, without additional foundation; such owner is
not qualified by virtue of ownership alone to testify as to its value for
other purposes unless such owner possesses, as must any other witness
as to value, an acquaintance with the property and is informed as to the
state of the market. American Cent. City, Inc. v. Joint Antelope Valley
Authority, 281 Neb. 742, 807 N.W.2d 170 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 525 (2011).
ii. A resident owner who is familiar with his property and knows its worth
is permitted to testify as to its value without further foundation.
Brenner v. Banner County Bd. of Equalization, 276 Neb. 275, 753
N.W.2d 802 (2008).
iii. For the testimony of an expert or lay witness to be admissible on the
question of market value of real estate, the witness must be familiar
with the property in question and the state of the market. Liberty
Development Corp. v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist. of Ohama, 276 Neb.
23, 751 N.W.2d 608 (2008).
iv. Where real estate salesman had acquaintance with property and was
informed as to state of market and had some experience in rental of
similar properties, foundation was sufficient to permit him to testify as
to reasonable rental value of property involved in action for specific
performance, whether salesman be regarded as lay or expert witness.
Harre v. White, 189 Neb. 404, 203 N.W.2d 99 (1972).

v. Either lay or expert witnesses may testify as to the value of property if
it is shown that they have an acquaintance with the property and are
informed as to the state of the market. Chudomelka v. Board of
Equalization of Dodge County, 187 Neb. 542, 192 N.W.2d 403 (1971).
vi. Owner of realty taken in condemnation may testify as to its value if he
is familiar with its value. Deitloff v. City of Norfolk, 183 Neb. 648, 163
N.W.2d 586 (1968).
vii. Witness need not be an expert to testify to value of land taken in
eminent domain case, and admission of such testimony rests in court
sound discretion. First Baptist Church of Maxwell v. State, Dept. of
Roads, 178 Neb. 831, 135 N.W.2d 756 (1965).
viii. Condemnee should have been allowed to testify to value of strip
condemned for highway widening without laying of foundation.
Swanson v. State, Dept. of Roads, 178 Neb. 671, 134 N.W.2d 810
(1965).
ix. Persons shown to be familiar with particular land in question may
testify as to value of tract immediately before and immediately after
appropriation. Pieper v. City of Scottsbluff, 176 Neb. 561, 126 N.W.2d
865 (1964).
x. It is not necessary that a witness testifying as to value of condemned
property be familiar with every possible element that goes into
determination of market value. Dawson v. City of Lincoln, 176 Neb.
311, 125 N.W.2d 908 (1964).
xi. Under circumstances, staff appraiser for foreign bank who testified,
without impeachment, to his experience and knowledge of land and
property values was qualified to give his opinion of reasonable market
value of condemned property. Evans v. State Dept. of Roads, 176 Neb.
156, 125 N.W.2d 541 (1963).
xii. Real estate owner who is familiar with value of his real estate can testify
as to its value in condemnation proceedings. State Dept. of Roads v.
Wixson, 175 Neb. 431, 122 N.W.2d 72 (1963).
xiii. Either lay or expert witnesses may be used to establish the reasonable
value of land if proper foundation is laid showing that witnesses are
acquainted with the particular land and are informed as to the state of
the market, the weight and credibility of their testimony being for court
or jury. Knouse v. Knouse, 157 Neb. 748, 61 N.W.2d 388 (1953).
xiv. Generally, either lay or expert witnesses may testify as to value of land
taken by condemnation or value of land affected by condemnation

immediately before and immediately after condemnation if proper
foundation is laid showing that they have an acquaintance with the
property in question and are informed as to the state of the market,
and the weight and credibility of their testimony is for the jury.
Medelman v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 155 Neb. 518, 52 N.W.2d
328 (1952).
bb. Nevada
i. Chief executive officer who had purchased for corporation property
being taken by eminent domain and was individual owner of adjacent
lands was qualified to testify as to value of property taken. N.R.S.
37.020, subd. 2. State ex rel. Dept. of Highways v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 82
Nev. 82, 411 P.2d 120 (1966).
ii. Condemnee, as owner, was competent to testify as to value of land
taken and severance damages. State ex rel. Dept. of Highways v.
Campbell, 80 Nev. 23, 388 P.2d 733 (1964).
iii. Where owner had held land to be taken for ten years, had owned other
business properties in city, had leased the same, had been aware of
values of her own and surrounding properties and had compared
recent sales of nearby lands, owner was a competent witness to testify
as to value of property taken. N.R.S. 37.110. State ex rel. Department
of Highways v. Olsen, 76 Nev. 176, 351 P.2d 186 (1960).
iv. Where a witness in an eminent domain proceeding was chairman of the
board of directors of a bank which owned and operated realty, and
such person had been associated with the bank for approximately five
years, and was a member of the trust department of the bank and
chairman of its loan committee which appraised properties and
determined the amount of money that could be loaned on them, such
person was qualified to testify as an expert on value of the condemned
property. State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Shaddock, 75 Nev.
392, 344 P.2d 191 (1959).
cc. New Hampshire
i. Expert witness was qualified to testify as to fair market value of
property, where he was a self-employed appraiser of property with
approximately 11 years’ experience in that field, he was a college
graduate and had done work as a civil engineer, he had been city
assessor for a 10-year period, presently he was president of state society
of real estate appraisers, he was a member of international association

of assessing officers and held a certified assessment evaluation degree.
RSA 516:29. Brewster v. State, 107 N.H. 226, 219 A.2d 706 (1966).
ii. Fact that real estate experts had had little or no courtroom experience
did not make their testimony inadmissible on issue of damages in
condemnation proceeding. RSA 233:17 (supp). Parkinson v. State, 104
N.H. 534, 191 A.2d 361 (1963).
iii. Subdivider realty condemned for highway purposes was entitled to be
valued at its most advantageous use to which it could be placed on day
it was condemned. Roy v. State, 104 N.H. 513, 191 A.2d 522 (1963).
iv. A civil and construction engineer, who had a practical knowledge of
characteristics of industrial properties, was qualified to testify as to
estimates of damages in condemnation proceedings, and fact that
another engineer had been found not qualified to express an opinion
on market value did not show inconsistency or error in trial court
admission of opinion of first witness. Edgcomb Steel of New England,
Inc. v. State, 100 N.H. 480, 131 A.2d 70 (1957).
dd. New Jersey
i. In tax assessment proceeding, an expert witness can testify as to his
opinion as to sale value of the property. N.J.S.A. 54:4 “23; N.J.S.A.
Const. art. 4, § 7, par. 12. North Bergen Tp. in Hudson County v.
Bergen Blvd. Holding Co., 133 N.J.L. 569, 45 A.2d 623 (N.J. Ct. Err. &
App. 1946).
ii. Expert testimony as to value of five-story apartment building
containing 126 apartments based on capitalization of income actually
received therefrom and replacement cost less depreciation was
insufficient to overcome presumption as to correctness of assessment
of building by State Board of Tax Appeals at $270,000 for purposes of
local taxation. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Division of Tax
Appeals, 133 N.J.L. 153, 43 A.2d 271 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1945).
iii. Under circumstances, court in proceeding to condemn orchard land
properly excluded expert testimony concerning value of trees added to
value of bare land, particularly since there was proof of sales of other
orchards in vicinity and evidence that farm lands were giving way to
more profitable economic use of residential development. New Jersey
Highway Authority v. Ackerson, 73 N.J. Super. 183, 179 A.2d 521
(App. Div. 1962).
iv. Error in permitting landowner’s real estate expert in condemnation
proceeding to use third person appraisal was prejudicial error, where

jury verdict was higher than value set by State experts and must have
been influenced to some extent by testimony of landowner’s expert
and his reference to third person appraisal. State by State Highway
Com’r v. Lichtman, 66 N.J. Super. 386, 169 A.2d 184 (App. Div. 1961).
v. Permitting witness to testify as expert on value of easement
condemned for electric line was discretionary where he had made
thousands of appraisals, notwithstanding his use of alleged hearsay as
to comparable sales. N.J.S. 2A:83”1, N.J.S.A. Rockland Elec. Co. v.
Bolo Corp., 66 N.J. Super. 171, 168 A.2d 817 (App. Div. 1961).
vi. While previous experience in purchase and sale of realty or knowledge
of comparable sales may qualify a witness as an expert in eminent
domain proceeding, lack of it does not necessarily disqualify him, and
witness is required only to have peculiar and uncommon knowledge or
experience which renders his opinion of some aid to court or jury.
State by State Highway Commissioner v. Williams, 65 N.J. Super. 518,
168 A.2d 233 (App. Div. 1961).
vii. In action for value of defendant use and occupation of portion of
plaintiff land, plaintiff, who was owner and manager of apartment
house and garage on adjoining and nearby property, and who had been
in the real estate business for 35 years, and who had occasionally rented
the land involved for automobile parking, was qualified to testify as to
what the use and occupation were reasonably worth. Monaco v.
Jackson Engineering Co., 45 N.J. Super. 313, 132 A.2d 548 (App. Div.
1957).
viii. In proceeding to condemn part of dairy farm, admission of testimony
of nearby dairy farmer, who had no knowledge of real estate values
even in limited field of sales of dairy farms, that before the taking the
reasonable value of instant farm on the open market was a certain
amount, was error, and such error required reversal where the
testimony was an important factor in resolution of issue of value. New
Jersey Highway Authority v. Rue, 41 N.J. Super. 385, 125 A.2d 305
(App. Div. 1956).
ix. Only experts on a given subject can express their estimates of the value
of anything, real or personal, and there must be proof to satisfy trial
judge that witness has special knowledge of subject matter upon which
he is to express his opinion. Dawson v. Holcomb, 4 N.J. Super. 563, 68
A.2d 281 (App. Div. 1949).
ee. New Mexico

i. Lack of formal training and experience of condemnee does not make
his testimony, as to his estimate of value of property, unacceptable or
deprive it of its character as substantial. State ex rel. State Highway
Commission v. Chavez, 80 N.M. 394, 456 P.2d 868 (1969).
ii. Witness engaged in real estate and insurance business for many years
and who had been appraiser for a loan association and who personally
inspected the properties, was competent to express an opinion as to
real estate values and his testimony was not based upon mere surmise,
guess, speculation or conjecture. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 70 N.M. 11,
369 P.2d 398 (1962).
iii. Where there were no offsetting benefits or damages to remainder of
land, correct measure of damages was reasonable market value of land
taken. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist. v. Crabtree, 69 N.M. 197,
365 P.2d 442 (1961).
iv. Owners and qualified experts are competent to give opinion as to value
of property. Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., Inc., 86 N.M. 405, 524
P.2d 1021 (Ct. App. 1974).
ff. New York
i. Ordinarily opinion of expert, supported by actual sales, is regarded as
substantial evidence in condemnation case. In re Clearview
Expressway, City of New York, 9 N.Y.2d 439, 214 N.Y.S.2d 438, 174
N.E.2d 522 (1961).
ii. The qualification of a witness giving opinion testimony as to property
values need not be very great; he need not be a professional broker and
even lack of experience as to actual sales in vicinity does not disqualify
him but merely bears on weight to be given his testimony as long as he
has some knowledge of value of property in the general area. Broward
Nat. Bank of Fort Lauderdale v. Starzec, 30 A.D.2d 603, 290 N.Y.S.2d
112 (3d Dep’t 1968).
iii. Real estate broker was not qualified to testify to sound value of
building, and his testimony as to structural valuation on basis of
reconstruction costs less depreciation was without probative force in
review of property tax assessment. Kalski v. Fitzgerald, 25 A.D.2d 573,
266 N.Y.S.2d 620 (3d Dep’t 1966).
iv. Witness, who described himself as real estate broker, and operator and
builder of garages and gasoline stations, was prima facie qualified to
state an opinion as to value of gasoline station and of factors which

might be expected to affect its value. Rein v. Mottola, 6 A.D.2d 57, 174
N.Y.S.2d 714 (1st Dep’t 1958).
v. An owner may be permitted to testify as to value of his property, but
ownership alone does not qualify one who has no knowledge of value
or who is not familiar with location, quality and value of his real estate,
and it is for trial court to determine, in condemnation case, if witness is
sufficiently familiar with property to be entitled to express an opinion.
Besen v. State, 17 Misc. 2d 119, 185 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
vi. In proceeding to reduce tax, in determining proper assessment of land
and buildings thereon for taxation, court should apply the requirement
of Tax Law that property shall be assessed at the full value thereof,
applying the interpretation of full value as being the price at which the
property would sell under ordinary circumstances, considering all
elements together with the opinion of experts. Tax Law, § 8. In re
Malajo Realty Corp., 60 N.Y.S.2d 15 (Sup 1946).
gg. North Carolina
i. Landowner who made a positive assertion that he knew land values in
the vicinity of his property and had an informed opinion, satisfactory
to himself, as to the value of his property on the date of taking, was
entitled to testify as to the value of his property in condemnation
proceedings. North Carolina State Highway Commission v.
Helderman, 285 N.C. 645, 207 S.E.2d 720 (1974).
ii. Where witness testified he had lived on two tracts of land for about
four years previous to time conveyance involved in proceeding was
made and knew both tracts of land and had an opinion satisfactory to
himself as to their value and gave such opinion, evidence was
competent and its probative value, subject to being tested on cross-
examination, was for jury. Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N.C. 654, 50
S.E.2d 901 (1948).
iii. Defendant shareholder in New York corporation was qualified as lay
witness to give opinion as to value of real property owned by
corporation, in plaintiff shareholder’s action for breach of fiduciary and
other claims; defendant had extensive real estate background and
specific knowledge of specific properties owned by corporation. Rules
of Evid., Rule 701, West’s N.C.G.S.A. § 8C–1. Bluebird Corp. v.
Aubin, 657 S.E.2d 55 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
iv. A witness who has knowledge of value gained from experience,
information, and observation may give his opinion of the value of

specific real property. Department of Transp. v. Haywood Co., 604
S.E.2d 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
v. Court did not err in permitting plaintiff’s expert witness to testify as to
his opinion of fair market value of residence immediately prior to being
struck by defendant’s tanker truck, where there was evidence that
witness had been in real estate and insurance business for many years,
that he was familiar with prices of real estate in county, and that he had
been in the house. Huff v. Thornton, 23 N.C. App. 388, 209 S.E.2d
401 (1974).
vi. Son of property owner whose land was taken in condemnation had
sufficient opportunity to become familiar with the property and thus
could give an opinion as to its value where, inter alia, son managed his
mother property, he visited the land approximately four times per year,
and he spent about a day there upon each visit. State Highway
Commission v. Fry, 6 N.C. App. 370, 170 S.E.2d 91 (1969).
hh. North Dakota
i. Real property owner may testify as to the value of land without any
further qualification or special knowledge. Wolt v. Wolt, 2010 ND 26,
778 N.W.2d 786 (N.D. 2010).
ii. An owner of an existing building and parking lot was qualified to
testify as to its value, but mere fact of ownership did not qualify her as
an expert on matters other than the value of her property. Alm Const.
Co. v. Vertin, 118 N.W.2d 737 (N.D. 1962).
iii. Opinion evidence in eminent domain actions is usually admitted from
persons who are not strictly experts but who from residing and doing
business in the vicinity have familiarized themselves with land values
and are more able to form an opinion on the subject at issue than
citizens generally, and this rule is liberally applied in case of farm lands
as other evidence is often not easily obtained. Otter Tail Power Co. v.
Malme, 92 N.W.2d 514 (N.D. 1958).
iv. When owner of property offers himself as expert witness on matters
other than value of his property, he is subject to same rules as any
nonexpert witness giving opinion evidence, and, being a nonexpert,
must give facts upon which his opinion is based. In re Heart River Irr.
Dist., 78 N.D. 302, 49 N.W.2d 217 (1951).
ii. Ohio
i. As exception to general rule that testimony as to property value is not
competent and admissible unless it is the professional opinion of an

expert, an owner may testify concerning the value of his property; an
owner is presumed to be familiar with his property from having
purchased or dealt with it. Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. v.
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 140 Ohio St. 3d 248, 2014-Ohio-3620,
17 N.E.3d 537 (2014).
ii. In appropriation proceeding, refusal to allow an architect and a
consultant primarily on commercial areas to testify as to his estimate of
the value of the owner appropriated land for a shopping center, where
the witness had a limited knowledge of the value of real estate in the
area, was not an abuse of discretion and was nonprejudicial in any
event where his testimony would have been cumulative. In re Ohio
Turnpike Commission, 164 Ohio St. 377, 58 Ohio Op. 179, 131
N.E.2d 397 (1955).
iii. Under the owner-opinion rule, an owner of real property, by virtue of
his ownership and without qualification as an expert, is competent to
testify to his property’s fair market value. Rapport v. Kochovski, 185
Ohio App. 3d 309, 2009-Ohio-6880, 923 N.E.2d 1212 (5th Dist. Stark
County 2009).
iv. The owner-opinion rule, under which an owner of real property, by
virtue of his ownership and without qualification as an expert, is
competent to testify to his property’s fair market value, is based on the
presumption that the owner of real estate possesses sufficient
acquaintance with it to estimate the value of the property, and his
estimate is therefore received although his knowledge on the subject is
not such as would qualify him to testify if he were not the owner.
Rapport v. Kochovski, 185 Ohio App. 3d 309, 2009-Ohio-6880, 923
N.E.2d 1212 (5th Dist. Stark County 2009).
v. A city official who has negotiated a purchase agreement with
condemnee and who is an experienced realtor and appraiser and
familiar with property is competent to testify for condemnee as to
value fixed at that time by city with assistance of other appraisers.
Const. art. 1, § 19. In re Appropriation for Hwy. Purposes of Lands of
Goldflies Storage & Moving Co., 18 Ohio App. 2d 116, 47 Ohio Op.
2d 181, 247 N.E.2d 315 (2d Dist. Montgomery County 1969).
vi. Broker who had been such for close to twenty years and had done
business in area contiguous to property in question for about twelve
years was sufficiently qualified to give testimony as to difference in
value of house as three-family house and as two-family house with

roomers. Zander v. Blumenthal, 1 Ohio App. 2d 244, 30 Ohio Op. 2d
266, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 155, 198 N.E.2d 93 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County
1964).
vii. Condemnee witness, who was a city planner, consultant, and architect
primarily regarding commercial areas and had surveyed property for
four commercial developments in city in which condemned land was
located, was qualified to testify as to highest of best uses of condemned
property and its maximum value for which its use was available. Ellis v.
Ohio Turnpike Commission, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 438, 124 N.E.2d 441
(Ct. App. 6th Dist. Lucas County 1955).
viii. In condemnation proceeding, property owner, whether expert or not,
is entitled to state his opinion of the value of the condemned property
at time of taking. Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 70 Ohio L. Abs.
417, 124 N.E.2d 424 (Ct. App. 6th Dist. Lucas County 1955).
ix. The owner of real property is competent to testify as to its value. Brate
v. McDonald, 95 Ohio App. 448, 54 Ohio Op. 72, 120 N.E.2d 748 (2d
Dist. Franklin County 1953).
x. Nonexpert witnesses may testify as to value of real property when
witness states facts upon which he bases his opinion, although such
witness expressing an opinion does not have all-inclusive information
of every detail of elements entering into value. Bana v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., Columbia Chemical Division, 48 Ohio L. Abs. 594, 76
N.E.2d 625 (Ct. App. 9th Dist. Summit County 1947).
xi. A landowner may give opinion of market value of his land without
being qualified as expert, but cannot testify as to rental value unless
knowledge and experience upon which opinion is based are shown in
detail. Ludolph v. Tuel & Thoenen, Inc., 6 Ohio Misc. 117, 35 Ohio
Op. 2d 239, 214 N.E.2d 696 (C.P. 1965).
jj. Oklahoma
i. Owner of realty, living thereon and familiar with the value of the
property for oil and gas purposes, is a competent witness to testify as
to value of property for an oil and gas lease. Application of Harper,
1945 Okla. 141, 195 Okla. 386, 158 P.2d 472 (1945).
ii. Property owner is competent to testify as to his opinion as to value of
property which has been destroyed, and jury may consider such
opinion together with all other circumstances and facts. Poteete v.
MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 1974 Okla. 110, 527 P.2d 18 (Okla. 1974).

iii. Landowner who had been dealing in the buying and selling of real
estate for some eight to ten years and licensed realtor who in previous
years had transactions involving land in vicinity and who was familiar
with land involved in condemnation action were qualified to express an
opinion on value of land. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Maggi, 1965
Okla. 197, 409 P.2d 369 (Okla. 1965).
iv. Witness who had been in real estate business in city since 1944, second
witness who had been real estate broker and appraiser for seven years,
and third witness who had appraised condemned property 18 years
prior to condemnation and had kept up with its development were
qualified to testify as to its value when condemned. Swyden v. State ex
rel. Dept. of Highways, 1963 Okla. 276, 387 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1963).
v. In proceeding to condemn strip of land for roadway across defendant
ranch, permitting witness to testify that his opinion as to market value
of ranch after road went through ranch was based on land condition
after fences and ponds were constructed and to give his opinion as to
cost of those items to establish total amount of depreciation in value
caused by roadway was not proper manner in which to establish
damage, but testimony was not evidence of double damages, and its
admission was not prejudicial in view of other competent evidence
which amply supported jury verdict. State ex rel. Department of
Highways v. Weaver, 1956 Okla. 158, 297 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1956).
vi. Question of value of real property does not, ordinarily, involve
question of science or skill, upon which only expert possessed of
technical training can speak, and, where value of farming lands is in
issue, intelligent persons, living in vicinity of property involved, and
acquainted with market value of similar property in locality, and of
particular property in question, may express an opinion as to value of
land involved. H.D. Youngman Contractor, Inc. v. Girdner, 1953 Okla.
277, 262 P.2d 693 (Okla. 1953).
kk. Oregon
i. In action for fraud in which plaintiffs alleged that during their
negotiations for purchase of defendant house and lot defendant
represented that a septic tank could be installed on the lot, knowing
that that would not be permitted by county sanitation officials because
of lot small size, trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence of market value based on opinion of appraiser
while working for county assessor office in 1965 where testimony

represented his opinion as an expert real estate appraiser and did not
purport to represent the assessed value of the land. Maley v. Palanuk,
264 Or. 325, 505 P.2d 336 (1973).
ii. Allowing husband of record owner of property damaged by trespass to
testify as to his opinion of reasonable value of his wife property,
assuming the absence of defendant pulp and paper plant, was
improper, he being neither owner nor expert, but harmless where fact
testified to must have been obvious to jury. Davis v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 251 Or. 239, 445 P.2d 481 (1968).
iii. Barbers whose testimony was limited to rentals paid for leases of other
barbershops in city and who had no knowledge of rental value of a
particular property leased for barbershop purposes or of property
similarly situated and who did not have knowledge or experience
necessary to make an appraisal of the property were not qualified to
express opinion as to value of leasehold in condemnation case. State
Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Stewart, 236 Or. 386, 388 P.2d 113 (1963).
iv. Fact that witness, a realtor, because of his experience, relied upon his
intuition for his judgment as to value of condemned building could
only go either to his qualifications to express opinion or to weight to
be given his testimony by jury. City of Portland, By and Through
Portland Development Commission v. Therrow, 230 Or. 275, 369 P.2d
762 (1962).
v. Expert witness was entitled on direct examination to identify and
describe properties in area, recently sold, having characteristics similar
to property under condemnation and considered by the appraiser in
arriving at his opinion as to value of the subject property. State By and
Through State Highway Commission v. Parker, 225 Or. 324, 358 P.2d
274 (1960).
vi. Offers to buy or sell comparable property are not admissible to
establish the value of the land under condemnation. State By and
Through State Highway Commission v. Morehouse Holding Co., 225
Or. 62, 357 P.2d 266 (1960).
vii. For witness to be competent to testify as expert on value of property,
witness must know market value of property, and this means he must
have knowledge of value in the vicinity. State By and Through State
Highway Commission v. Arnold, 218 Or. 43, 341 P.2d 1089 (1959).

viii. A litigant who had owned less than 40 acres since 1937 and who was
familiar with such land was qualified to express an opinion as to value
of land. Hanns v. Friedly, 181 Or. 631, 184 P.2d 855 (1947).
ix. A corporate officer is not, ipso facto, entitled to testify as to value of
corporate real property without a showing of special qualifications.
State By and Through State Highway Commission v. Carmel Estates,
Inc., 15 Or. App. 41, 514 P.2d 1124 (1973).
x. Contract purchaser of farm land across which water control district
sought to acquire two easements had sufficient knowledge of property
plus its potential uses, familiarity with adjacent properties, and
knowledge of price of two adjacent five-acre tracts to qualify as value
witness in his own behalf. Junction City Water Control Dist. v. Calvert,
8 Or. App. 107, 493 P.2d 76 (1972).
ll. Pennsylvania
i. Even if there are no comparable sales available, market value of
condemned property might be established by testimony of persons
acquainted with lands, and whose knowledge and experience qualified
them to form intelligent judgment as to its proper valuation. Porter v.
Com., 454 Pa. 461, 309 A.2d 709 (1973).
ii. It is only necessary that witnesses who testify as to value of real estate
have such knowledge of subject matter as can reasonably be expected
in view of circumstances of case. Hayes Creek Country Club, Inc. v.
Central Penn Quarry Stripping & Const. Co., 407 Pa. 464, 181 A.2d
301 (1962).
iii. Landowner was, in general, competent to testify to value of his
property but he was subject to rules of evidence and occupied no
special position as witness, and where he contended that property had
no market value, his testimony was not competent. P.S.Const. art. 1, §
10. Sgarlat Estate v. Com., 398 Pa. 406, 158 A.2d 541 (1960).
iv. Courts are not restricted to receiving only expert testimony to fix value,
and market value or damages may be established by owner of property,
by expert witnesses, or by persons with knowledge and experience
qualifying them to form a reasonably intelligent judgment as to value.
Walnut St. Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Bernstein, 394 Pa. 353, 147
A.2d 359 (1959).
v. Where witness testifying as to value of property condemned had
shown familiarity with the property over a course of years and made a
special intense examination of it shortly before trial, court properly

refused to strike out his testimony and properly left it to the jury to
place such reliance upon it as they might see fit. Stevenson v. East
Deer Tp., 379 Pa. 103, 108 A.2d 815 (1954).
vi. An owner of property, taken in exercise of eminent domain, may testify
generally and give his opinion for what it may be worth of value of his
property. Hencken v. Bethlehem Municipal Water Authority, 364 Pa.
408, 72 A.2d 264 (1950).
vii. Qualification of witness, who was not a licensed broker but who had
spent 30 years buying and selling real estate for himself, to testify as
market value of real estate on appeal from triennial assessment was a
matter for the discretion of the trial judge. Morris v. Board of Property
Assessment, Appeals and Review, 209 Pa. Super. 97, 224 A.2d 772
(1966).
viii. Refusal of testimony of expert witness, who admitted that he was not
familiar with condemned property for nearly year before taking, was
not improper, especially where testimony would have been cumulative
at most. Jerome v. Laurel Pipe Line Co., 197 Pa. Super. 131, 177 A.2d
150 (1962).
ix. Owner of realty may testify as to its market value, if he has personal
knowledge of realty, with reasonable opportunity to observe its area,
uses to which it may be put, and extent and condition of any
improvements thereon, and possesses sufficient knowledge from which
to form opinion. Appeal of Stanley Co. of America, Inc., 196 Pa.
Super. 616, 175 A.2d 903 (1961).
x. Real Estate Appraisers Certification Act did not apply to persons who
performed appraisals in condemnation proceedings, and thus, trial
court abused its discretion in excluding testimony of real estate
professional, who did not possess real estate appraiser license, about
the effect of the taking on the fair market value of the condemned
property. 63 P.S. § 457.3. King v. West Penn Power Co., 946 A.2d 184
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008).
mm. Rhode Island
i. In a condemnation action of portion of petroleum bulk plant and
distribution center refusal of trial justice to accept real estate broker as
expert witness on subject of value of property taken was not an abuse
of discretion where broker possessed very limited experience as a
broker, although he was greatly experienced in the type of business

conducted by petitioner. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Director of Public
Works, 102 R.I. 696, 233 A.2d 423 (1967).
ii. Opinion testimony of laymen that granting of special exception for the
establishment of a gasoline service station would increase traffic
hazards and decrease value of neighboring property was incompetent.
Gen. Laws 1956, § 45”24”19. Our Lady of Mercy Greenwich, R. I. v.
Zoning Bd. of Review of Town of East Greenwich, 102 R.I. 269, 229
A.2d 854 (1967).
iii. In suit to partition realty, where master after preliminary examination
of witness as to training and experience in appraising realty allowed
witness to testify and although witness did not have any prior
experience in appraising rural realty he was an experienced appraiser of
urban realty and was trained in principles and practices of appraising
realty generally, sustaining the master ruling that witness was
competent to testify as to value of realty involved, was not an abuse of
discretion. Baffoni v. Baffoni, 77 R.I. 232, 74 A.2d 857 (1950).
nn. South Carolina
i. Generally, landowner, who was familiar with his property and its value,
is allowed to give his estimate as to its value or damage thereto, even
though owner is not an expert. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v.
Wilson, 254 S.C. 360, 175 S.E.2d 391 (1970).
ii. Generally, the best available proof of what land is worth is the opinion
of those who know enough of the facts, which must be a basis of the
opinion, to express their judgment about it. South Carolina State
Highway Dept. v. Rural Land Co., 250 S.C. 12, 156 S.E.2d 333 (1967).
iii. Owner of either real or personal property has right to give his estimate
as to value thereof. Nelson v. Coleman Co., 249 S.C. 652, 155 S.E.2d
917 (1967).
iv. Refusal to permit witness to express opinion as to value of condemned
property was not error in absence of attempt to qualify witness as
expert on real estate values. Bagwell v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corp., 246 S.C. 569, 145 S.E.2d 17 (1965).
oo. South Dakota
i. Although owners are generally permitted to give an opinion on the
value of their real estate, their method of valuation is subject to the
same standards as other experts. Steineke v. Delzer, 2011 SD 96, 807
N.W.2d 629 (S.D. 2011).

ii. In eminent domain proceeding, neighboring landowner is permitted to
testify as to value not because of qualifications as appraiser either by
background or experience, but rather to express such opinion on
theory that being an owner he is necessarily acquainted with value.
State Highway Commission v. Beets, 88 S.D. 536, 224 N.W.2d 567
(1974).
iii. Owner of property was qualified to testify as to its value without
qualifying as expert. Geo. A. Clark & Son Inc. v. Nold, 85 S.D. 468,
185 N.W.2d 677 (1971).
iv. Owner of property, real or personal, is qualified to express his opinion
of value. Hannahs v. Noah, 83 S.D. 296, 158 N.W.2d 678 (1968).
pp. Tennessee
i. In action for damages resulting from surveyor negligence, owner of
real property is competent to state facts about property and give his
opinion as to that property’s value; owner does not have to be qualified
as expert. Whitelaw v. Brooks, 138 S.W.3d 890 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003),
appeal denied, (June 21, 2004).
ii. Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting landowner’s
witnesses to express opinions as to value of land condemned, where
they were property owners in county or were persons of long
experience as real estate dealers. State ex rel. Moulton v. Blake, 49
Tenn. App. 624, 357 S.W.2d 836 (1961).
iii. Witness who lived in adjoining county and who had been working for
state of Tennessee as appraiser in highway department for ten years
and who had been in this type of work for about 15 years and who
prior to that time was a real estate broker in Tennessee and who had
knowledge of sale of real estate in the county prior to this particular
project was qualified to testify as to value of condemnee’s property and
value of land taken and incidental damages. Parker v. Pack, 59 Tenn.
App. 49, 437 S.W.2d 251 (1968).
iv. Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting landowner’s
witnesses to express opinions as to value of land condemned, where
they were property owners in county or were persons of long
experience as real estate dealers. State ex rel. Moulton v. Blake, 49
Tenn. App. 624, 357 S.W.2d 836 (1961).
v. A witness who is familiar with the value of property of the same
character, although he has never seen the property in question, is

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