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HoneyCon 2014
jeytsai@NIT
Outline
● Ask questions any time
● HoneyCon Agenda
● CTF Time
The INFORMATION contained in
this slide are generated by random
alphanumeric and the images are
randomly selected from web.
HoneyCon Agenda
Attack Event
● Past
○ ATM 變彈珠台
○ Web ATM Vulnerability [2]
○ Website hacked [3]
○ Spam
○ Home router as botnet [4]
○ APT on government [5]
Attack Event (cont’d)
● Current
○ APT
○ Hack as a Service [6]
○ Mobile Hacking [7]
○ Heartbleed [8]
○ Orphan (DNS / NTP) Server
○ IOT Hacking
SPAM
● The email which you did not want it
○ Random generate
○ APT
● Spam contains
○ Phishing link
○ Malware
○ CryptoLocker [10]
○ ...
SPAM + Exploit
● So receive spam have no danger if I…
○ Not download the attachment?
○ Not click the link?
● Exploit on Reception Software
○ Malicious webpage
○ document preview
○ ...
DDoS
● Past
○ Ping to Death
○ SYN Flood
○ TearDrop Attack
○ Slow I/O Attack
○ …
● Design issue on program / protocol
DDoS
● Current
○ Reflected attack
○ GSM
○ LOIC (低軌道離子砲)
○ SPAM
● Attack target
○ Bandwidth / Infrastructure / Service
DDoS + DNS / NTP
● 七傷拳
○ I DDoS U === U DDoS I
● 放大攻擊 (Reflection)
○ GET request => Full webpage
○ DNS request => DNS response
○ ...
Avoid DDoS
● Illusory
○ High-End firewall
○ ISP
○ Lots of backends
● Hacker always attack the weakness
○ Load balancer / Proxy Server / DNS Server / ...
Hard to Avoid DDoS
● Pattern matching
○ Not immediately respond
○ How about simulate general user
○ Variant is easy
● Total solution
○ 鎖國政策?
○ ISP?
HoneyPot
● A trap set to detect an unauthorized user.
○ 蜜罐 / 誘捕系統
○ A logging system based on full / simulation system
● Concept
○ Assume should be hacked
○ Logging
○ Analysis
HoneyPot (cont’d)
● Low-interaction
○ Dionae / HoneyD / Kippo / Glastopf / Conpot
● High-interaction
○ Honeypot / Sebek
● Real Honeypot
○ HonEeeBox
○ Raspberry PI (潮)
HoneyPot + Analysis
● SPAM
○ Register a never used mail domain
○ Receive mail => SPAM which send to random addr
● SandBox
○ Simulate human behavior
○ Analysis the system status
HoneyPot + Analysis
● HoneyPot always be hacked
○ Too many events
○ Hard to analysis by trace the log one-by-one
● Visualization
○ 潮
CTF Time
● Capture the Flag
○ Problem solve
○ Put flat on the website
○ Protect your server
● Under the rule
○ you can do anything…
What’s CTF
HoneyCon - CTF Rules
1. Honeycon2014 會 議 期 間 參 賽 隊 伍 可 隨 時 連 線 至
WarGame主機參賽。
2. 參賽者必需維持所守護主機的網頁服務正常運作,並對外
公開服務。
3. 刻意的D[D]oS行為將被取消比賽資格。
4. 任何防礙遊戲進行之行為,將被取消比賽資格。
5. 攻防行為僅限於WarGame環境中進行。
6. 遊戲中會有GM一同參與。
7. 遊戲中可能會有中毒的風險。
8. 獲獎隊伍需進行技術分享。
Why CTF
● Practice as a hacker in legal way
● Simulate how hacker to attack
● Defence hacker
How CTF
● In the open network
○ On-line
○ Give a hink (IP address with service / binary)
○ Find the flag
● In the closed network
○ Non-limit
○ All device in subnet can be hacked
PenTest Flow
● Social Engineering
● Scan by nmap [9] (DDoS…)
● Choice one target / service
○ Web / SSH / SMB / FTP / UPnP / IRC / ...
● Hacking
Reference
1. http://www.honeynet.org/
2. http://www.i-security.tw/learn/tips_content.asp?Tid=134
3. http://www.zone-h.org/archive
4. http://hexus.net/tech/news/network/61245-easy-exploit-backdoor-
found-several-d-link-router-models/
5. http://techorange.com/2013/07/30/9th-hitcon-are-we-the-loser-in-
the-cyber-war/
6. https://blog.damballa.com/archives/330
7. http://www.ewdna.com/2014/05/phishing.html
8. http://www.ithome.com.tw/special_report/heartbleed
9. http://nmap.org/
10. http://www.ithome.com.tw/node/83226
Thanks for your attention
Q&A

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HoneyCon 2014

  • 2. Outline ● Ask questions any time ● HoneyCon Agenda ● CTF Time
  • 3. The INFORMATION contained in this slide are generated by random alphanumeric and the images are randomly selected from web.
  • 5. Attack Event ● Past ○ ATM 變彈珠台 ○ Web ATM Vulnerability [2] ○ Website hacked [3] ○ Spam ○ Home router as botnet [4] ○ APT on government [5]
  • 6. Attack Event (cont’d) ● Current ○ APT ○ Hack as a Service [6] ○ Mobile Hacking [7] ○ Heartbleed [8] ○ Orphan (DNS / NTP) Server ○ IOT Hacking
  • 7. SPAM ● The email which you did not want it ○ Random generate ○ APT ● Spam contains ○ Phishing link ○ Malware ○ CryptoLocker [10] ○ ...
  • 8. SPAM + Exploit ● So receive spam have no danger if I… ○ Not download the attachment? ○ Not click the link? ● Exploit on Reception Software ○ Malicious webpage ○ document preview ○ ...
  • 9. DDoS ● Past ○ Ping to Death ○ SYN Flood ○ TearDrop Attack ○ Slow I/O Attack ○ … ● Design issue on program / protocol
  • 10. DDoS ● Current ○ Reflected attack ○ GSM ○ LOIC (低軌道離子砲) ○ SPAM ● Attack target ○ Bandwidth / Infrastructure / Service
  • 11. DDoS + DNS / NTP ● 七傷拳 ○ I DDoS U === U DDoS I ● 放大攻擊 (Reflection) ○ GET request => Full webpage ○ DNS request => DNS response ○ ...
  • 12. Avoid DDoS ● Illusory ○ High-End firewall ○ ISP ○ Lots of backends ● Hacker always attack the weakness ○ Load balancer / Proxy Server / DNS Server / ...
  • 13. Hard to Avoid DDoS ● Pattern matching ○ Not immediately respond ○ How about simulate general user ○ Variant is easy ● Total solution ○ 鎖國政策? ○ ISP?
  • 14. HoneyPot ● A trap set to detect an unauthorized user. ○ 蜜罐 / 誘捕系統 ○ A logging system based on full / simulation system ● Concept ○ Assume should be hacked ○ Logging ○ Analysis
  • 15. HoneyPot (cont’d) ● Low-interaction ○ Dionae / HoneyD / Kippo / Glastopf / Conpot ● High-interaction ○ Honeypot / Sebek ● Real Honeypot ○ HonEeeBox ○ Raspberry PI (潮)
  • 16. HoneyPot + Analysis ● SPAM ○ Register a never used mail domain ○ Receive mail => SPAM which send to random addr ● SandBox ○ Simulate human behavior ○ Analysis the system status
  • 17. HoneyPot + Analysis ● HoneyPot always be hacked ○ Too many events ○ Hard to analysis by trace the log one-by-one ● Visualization ○ 潮
  • 19. ● Capture the Flag ○ Problem solve ○ Put flat on the website ○ Protect your server ● Under the rule ○ you can do anything… What’s CTF
  • 20. HoneyCon - CTF Rules 1. Honeycon2014 會 議 期 間 參 賽 隊 伍 可 隨 時 連 線 至 WarGame主機參賽。 2. 參賽者必需維持所守護主機的網頁服務正常運作,並對外 公開服務。 3. 刻意的D[D]oS行為將被取消比賽資格。 4. 任何防礙遊戲進行之行為,將被取消比賽資格。 5. 攻防行為僅限於WarGame環境中進行。 6. 遊戲中會有GM一同參與。 7. 遊戲中可能會有中毒的風險。 8. 獲獎隊伍需進行技術分享。
  • 21. Why CTF ● Practice as a hacker in legal way ● Simulate how hacker to attack ● Defence hacker
  • 22. How CTF ● In the open network ○ On-line ○ Give a hink (IP address with service / binary) ○ Find the flag ● In the closed network ○ Non-limit ○ All device in subnet can be hacked
  • 23. PenTest Flow ● Social Engineering ● Scan by nmap [9] (DDoS…) ● Choice one target / service ○ Web / SSH / SMB / FTP / UPnP / IRC / ... ● Hacking
  • 24.
  • 25. Reference 1. http://www.honeynet.org/ 2. http://www.i-security.tw/learn/tips_content.asp?Tid=134 3. http://www.zone-h.org/archive 4. http://hexus.net/tech/news/network/61245-easy-exploit-backdoor- found-several-d-link-router-models/ 5. http://techorange.com/2013/07/30/9th-hitcon-are-we-the-loser-in- the-cyber-war/ 6. https://blog.damballa.com/archives/330 7. http://www.ewdna.com/2014/05/phishing.html 8. http://www.ithome.com.tw/special_report/heartbleed 9. http://nmap.org/ 10. http://www.ithome.com.tw/node/83226
  • 26. Thanks for your attention Q&A