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Linux Security
YEHONATAN BITTON
outline
 introduction
 Linux security modules = LSM
 Grsecurity
 Sandboxing in the kernel
Who am I?
 Yehonatan Bitton , Married +2
 Security Researcher at BGU
Introduction
 What are we protecting?
 User apps?
 Kernel modules?
 The core kernel functionallity?
Linux security modules
 Kernel hooks
 Pluggable - kernel module style
 It is not intended as a general "hook" or "upcall" mechanism
 Examples: SElinux , AppArmor, Smack, Yama, …
 Least privileges
SELinux
 Mandatory access control
 Very complicated
 Learning mode
 Just access control
 Auditing
 In mainline
GRsecurity
 More than access control module
 RBAC
 Can be stacked with LSM (not an LSM module)
 Policy learning and analysis
 PaX (will be covered later)
 Improved ASLR
 Chroot hardening (using containers)
PaX
 Least privileges protections for memory pages
 Executable space protections
 PAGEEXEC
 SEGMEXEC
 ...
 ASLR
PaX Executable space protections
 Prevent shellcode/code injection attacks
 NX-bit (none executable bit, hardware base or emulated where needed)
 Restrict mprotect syscall
 Don't work with java just in time compiler
 There are exceptions
PaX cont'
PaX - PAGEEXEC
 Uses or emulates nx-bit on architectures without hardware support
 On IA-32 - uses supervisor bit
 Using two different TLB's (ITLB, DTLB) we can determine which one will cause
protection fault and inform the kernel, it the fault is from the ITLB than PaX will
kill the process otherwise everything will be fine
 Pageexec patch overrides the fault handler and checks whether it's results
from instruction fetch
 Each fault is checked for the user address and if it's with write permissions PaX
will terminate the process.
SEGMEXEC
 Reduce process VM size to 1.5G
 The process memory is mirrored
 Mapping in the upper and lower parts is the same
 Don't double RAM usage
 Each execution is checked against the mirror if code is not paged there
PaX will terminate the process
Seccomp
 Module for sandboxing in the kernel (no virtualization)
 Restrict process system calls
 All child processes inherit the parent restrictions
 Initially used for cloud computing
 A user upload a program and it cannot abuse the server
 Seccomp v2 supports dynamic policies
 Each process defines the syscalls which he can use and then enter
seccomp mode
 On seccomp mode process can add more restrictions
Namespaces
 Create multiple processes trees
 Process from child tree cannot affect parent tree
 Ptrace
 Kill
 Each process has multiple PID's one for each nested tree
Namespaces - network mounts
 When using clone enter special network flag - CLONE_NEWNET
 Each process have different set of network interfaces
Result
Communication
 Using ssh daemon
 Create special uds device from the init process and pass it down to the
child trees
 Using TCP
CGroups
 Create separate groups for similar tasks
 Each group has restrictions
 Resource limitation - memory usage
 Prioritization - cpu share
 Control - stop, restart,… a group
 Each control group is in different namespace
 In 2007 “container”

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Linux Security Overview

  • 2. outline  introduction  Linux security modules = LSM  Grsecurity  Sandboxing in the kernel
  • 3. Who am I?  Yehonatan Bitton , Married +2  Security Researcher at BGU
  • 4. Introduction  What are we protecting?  User apps?  Kernel modules?  The core kernel functionallity?
  • 5. Linux security modules  Kernel hooks  Pluggable - kernel module style  It is not intended as a general "hook" or "upcall" mechanism  Examples: SElinux , AppArmor, Smack, Yama, …  Least privileges
  • 6. SELinux  Mandatory access control  Very complicated  Learning mode  Just access control  Auditing  In mainline
  • 7. GRsecurity  More than access control module  RBAC  Can be stacked with LSM (not an LSM module)  Policy learning and analysis  PaX (will be covered later)  Improved ASLR  Chroot hardening (using containers)
  • 8. PaX  Least privileges protections for memory pages  Executable space protections  PAGEEXEC  SEGMEXEC  ...  ASLR
  • 9. PaX Executable space protections  Prevent shellcode/code injection attacks  NX-bit (none executable bit, hardware base or emulated where needed)  Restrict mprotect syscall  Don't work with java just in time compiler  There are exceptions
  • 11. PaX - PAGEEXEC  Uses or emulates nx-bit on architectures without hardware support  On IA-32 - uses supervisor bit  Using two different TLB's (ITLB, DTLB) we can determine which one will cause protection fault and inform the kernel, it the fault is from the ITLB than PaX will kill the process otherwise everything will be fine  Pageexec patch overrides the fault handler and checks whether it's results from instruction fetch  Each fault is checked for the user address and if it's with write permissions PaX will terminate the process.
  • 12. SEGMEXEC  Reduce process VM size to 1.5G  The process memory is mirrored  Mapping in the upper and lower parts is the same  Don't double RAM usage  Each execution is checked against the mirror if code is not paged there PaX will terminate the process
  • 13. Seccomp  Module for sandboxing in the kernel (no virtualization)  Restrict process system calls  All child processes inherit the parent restrictions  Initially used for cloud computing  A user upload a program and it cannot abuse the server  Seccomp v2 supports dynamic policies  Each process defines the syscalls which he can use and then enter seccomp mode  On seccomp mode process can add more restrictions
  • 14. Namespaces  Create multiple processes trees  Process from child tree cannot affect parent tree  Ptrace  Kill  Each process has multiple PID's one for each nested tree
  • 15. Namespaces - network mounts  When using clone enter special network flag - CLONE_NEWNET  Each process have different set of network interfaces
  • 16.
  • 18. Communication  Using ssh daemon  Create special uds device from the init process and pass it down to the child trees  Using TCP
  • 19. CGroups  Create separate groups for similar tasks  Each group has restrictions  Resource limitation - memory usage  Prioritization - cpu share  Control - stop, restart,… a group  Each control group is in different namespace  In 2007 “container”

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. If things where to stay asIf things where to stay before we would have shared resources between processes in trees whitout knowing which one broke the system (why is port 80 unavailable???)