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The Red Pill of Resilience
Kelly Shortridge (@swagitda_)
Rochester Security Summit 2017
Hi, I’m Kelly
3
Resilience begets deterrence
“The oak fought the wind and was broken,
the willow bent when it must and survived.”
“The more you sweat in peace, the less you
bleed in war.”
Resilience is about accepting reality, and
building a defensive strategy around reality
7
Stages of Grief in InfoSec
Etymology of Resilience
The Resilience Triad:
▪ Robustness
▪ Adaptability
▪ Transformability
Stages of Grief
9
InfoSec is grieving that companies will never
be invulnerable to attack
10
Denial – clinging to a false reality
“We aren’t really at risk”
11
Anger – frustration that denial can’t go on
“It’s your fault that I need security”
12
Bargaining – hope that the cause is avoidable
“Maybe we can stop attacks from happening”
13
Depression – despair over the reality
“We’re going to be hacked, why bother?”
14
Acceptance – embracing inevitability
“Attacks will happen, but I can be prepared”
15
Lack of acceptance feeds solution
fragmentation, FUD, and snake oil
16
Security nihilism isn’t the answer.
Resilience is.
Etymology of Resilience
18
1858: Engineering – strength & ductility
20th Century: Psychology, ecology, social
sciences, climate change, disaster recovery
Resilience in Complex Systems
20
Non-linear activity in the aggregate
Intertwined components, unpredictability
21
Infosec is a complex system.
Defenders, attackers, users, governments,
software vendors, service providers, …
22
Ecological resilience
Continually adapt; high degree of instability
23
Chestnut trees in eastern North America’s
forests were wiped out by chestnut blight
Oak and hickory trees grew in their stead
24
Evolutionary resilience assumes socio-
ecological systems are co-evolutionary
25
Communities can diversify agricultural
landscapes and production systems
26
Three central characteristics of resilience:
Robustness, Adaptability, Transformability
27
Hurricane Harvey – primary damage was
flooding from ongoing rain, not storm surges
28
Resilience is about the journey, not the
destination
29
Accept the risk will exist
Reduce potential damage & restructure
around the risk
30
Survival rests on embracing the unknown
and accepting that change is inevitable
Robustness
32
Robustness: withstanding and resisting
a.k.a. “engineering resilience”
33
Safe development paradox: stability allows
risk to accumulate, compromising resilience
34
Focus on just engineering resilience leads to
a maladaptive feedback loop
35
Suppressing fires in fire-adapted forests
leads to a build up of fuel over time
36
Patching & retroactive hardening of vuln-
prone systems accumulates risk
37
Levees support further human development
in at-risk floodplains
38
“Don’t treat the symptoms of bad planning
with structures”
39
Technical controls shouldn’t allow exemption
from cyber insurance requirements
40
Artificially creating a stable environment
makes the system less adaptive to disruption
41
Coral in marine preserves are less resilient
to climate disturbance than “stressed” coral
42
Design & test internal systems with the same
threat model as externally-exposed ones
43
Problem: infosec is exclusively focused on
robustness – how to stop / thwart / block
44
Infosec’s current goal is to return to
“business as usual” post-breach.
There is no such thing.
45
Other domains tried defying nature – it
doesn’t work
46
Your systems must survive even if users click
on phishing links and download pdf.zip.exe’s
47
Robustness is effective when you have
diverse and layered controls
48
NYC’s excess heat guidelines: backup hybrid-
power generators, heat-tolerant systems,
window shades, high-performance glazing
49
Diversity helps provide redundancy in
uncertain conditions
50
APT BlinkyBoxTM doesn’t help when legit
creds are used to access a cloud service
51
Don’t ignore correlated risk.
Fragmentation can inject a healthy level of
instability to foster resilience.
52
Pitfall of efficiency: more limited space in
which your operations can survive
53
Up for debate: manageability via uniformity
vs. minimized impact via diversity?
54
Decision trees are useful to map out
necessary redundancies
55
Raising attacker cost is the bridge from
robustness to adaptability
56
“Attackers will take the least cost path
through an attack graph from their start
node to their goal node.”
– Dino Dai Zovi
Adaptability
58
Adaptability: reduce costs and damage
incurred, while keeping your options open
59
Intergov’t Panel on Climate Change (IPCC):
Incremental change creates a false sense of
security – goal is managed transformation
60
Preserving habitats is unnatural &
counterproductive.
Wildlife naturally “tracks” ideal conditions.
61
Legacy systems are like preserved habitats.
We need to be able to migrate to better
conditions.
62
Example: patching inline PHP code
Instead: single class for DB queries
63
Static indicators like high coral cover or fish
abundance reflect favorable past conditions.
Erosion of coral reef resilience is dynamic.
64
Ensure your threat models aren’t based on
favorable past conditions
65
Survival strategy: comingle warm-adapted
species with cold-adapted cohorts
66
Apps built with legacy systems and libs will
not survive in an increasingly open API world
67
Uncertainty and surprise must be baked into
your approach
68
Test adaptability to attacker methods with
attack simulation or auto playbook testing
69
Chaos Monkey
70
Randomly kills instances to test their ability
to withstand failure.
It also makes persistence really hard.
71
Design your security architecture for
survival even if individual controls fail
72
Rethinking security architecture is hard.
The industry offers too much complexity.
73
Containers
74
Containers promote adaptability and
support transformability
@jessfraz | blog.jessfraz.com/post/talks
75
Containers = “isolated, resource-controlled,
and portable runtime environments”
76
Easier to determine root cause
Easier to transport to better infrastructure
Easier to kill the infection & stop spread
77
Ongoing stress like ocean warming or
overfishing makes coral less resilient in the
face of cyclones or coral bleaching events
78
Complexity will erode your resilience in the
face of new vulns or data breaches
Transformability
80
Transformability = challenge existing
assumptions & reorganize your system
81
Prior example: inline code makes it difficult
to reorganize your system vs. a single class
82
In disaster recovery policy, ideal is to change
location & remove urbanization
83
2011: 6.3mms earthquake hit Christchurch
Cost to rebuild of $40bn+
84
NZ designated a “red zone” where land is too
vulnerable & where rebuilding is uneconomic
85
Identify the red zones within your IT systems
86
Choose your own infosec redzone criteria:
Publicly exposed, legacy systems, critical
data, privileged access, overly verbose, single
point of failure, difficult to update, …
87
Example: API consuming critical data should
be in “red zone” whether it has vulns or not
88
Identify assets that fall under your red zone
criteria & migrate them to a safer system
89
Example: Planned decommission of levees to
assist migration
Prohibits becoming a permanent “fix”
90
Continually consider how you can prepare in
advance for migration
91
Complex systems require collaborative
planning across stakeholders
92
Open sharing of protections in place, what
risk remains, uncertainties in the approach
93
Partner with engineering – they benefit from
flexibility and transformability as well
94
Your role is to manage state transitions.
Consider how a resilience approach fits into
engineering workflows.
95
2FAC @ Facebook: integrated 2FA into dev
workflows without creating friction
96
“You can actually implement security
controls that affect every single thing people
are doing and still make them love it in the
process”
97
Find someone with whom to collaborate &
how security can fit into their workflows
98
Ensure your org is learning from prior
experiences – foster a security culture
Conclusion
100
Infosec resilience means a flexible system
that can absorb an attack and reorganize
around the threat.
101
Robustness is optimized through diversity of
controls
102
Adaptability minimizes the impact of an
attack and keeps your options open
103
Transformability demands you challenge
assumptions & reorganize around reality
104
“The history of evolution is that life escapes
all barriers.
Life breaks free. Life expands to new
territories. Painfully, perhaps even
dangerously.
But life finds a way.”
105
Attacks will evolve. We can evolve, too.
106
Let’s strive for acceptance of our grief, and
architect effective and realistic defense
107
The blue pill relegates us to the role of a
firefighting cat who’s drunk on snake oil
108
Instead of accepting snake oil, take the red
pill of resilience instead
“Good enough is good enough. Good enough
always beats perfect.”
– Dan Geer
110
@swagitda_
/in/kellyshortridge
kelly@greywire.net
111
Suggested Reading
▪ Engineering resilience versus ecological resilience
▪ Resilience and disaster risk reduction: an etymological journey
▪ A strategy-based framework for assessing the flood resilience of cities – A Hamburg case study
▪ Vulnerability, Resilience, and the Collapse of Society
▪ Are some forms of resilience more sustainable than others?
▪ Flood Resilience: a Co-Evolutionary Approach
▪ The oak or the reed: how resilience theories are translated into disaster management policies
▪ Rethinking Ecosystem Resilience in the Face of Climate Change
▪ Building evolutionary resilience for conserving biodiversity under climate change
▪ Complexity and Planning: Systems, Assemblages and Simulations
▪ “Windows Containers” by Microsoft
▪ “The Netflix Simian Army” by Netflix

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The Red Pill of Resilience