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HEARTBLEED && WIRELESS
New attack vectors for heartbleed:
Enterprise wireless (and wired) networks
Luis Grangeia
lgrangeia@sysvalue.com | twitter.com/lgrangeia
28 / 05 / 2014 @ Confraria IT Security - Lisbon
WHAT IS HEARTBLEED
“Catastrophic bug” on OpenSSL:
"The Heartbleed bug allows anyone on the Internet to read
the memory of the systems protected by the vulnerable
versions of the OpenSSL software. This compromises the
secret keys used to identify the service providers and to
encrypt the traffic, the names and passwords of the users
and the actual content. This allows attackers to eavesdrop
communications, steal data directly from the services and
users and to impersonate services and users.
“On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11.” - Schneier
source: xkcd.com
source: xkcd.com
WHAT IS “ENTERPRISE WIRELESS”
•WPA / WPA2 Networks
•Protected by multiuser authentication
•Tipically using a EAP Method:
•EAP-PEAP
•EAP-TTLS / EAP-TLS
•EAP-SIM / EAP-AKA
EAP AND TLS
•EAP-PEAP, EAP-TTLS, EAP-TLS
•All these use a TLS tunnel over EAP
to secure some part of the
authentication process
•EAP... OpenSSL... Heartbleed...
+ = ?
SAY HELLO TO “CUPID”
WHAT IS CUPID
•cupid is a patch for wpa_supplicant and hostapd
•Attempts to exploit heartbleed over EAP TLS tunneled
protocols:
• EAP-PEAP, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS
•Targets both endpoints: client and server
RadiusAccess PointTerminal
ATTACK VECTORS
RadiusAccess PointTerminal
ATTACK VECTORS
ATTACK VECTORS
•Option 1: Use wpa_supplicant-cupid to attack a
wireless network
•Option 2: Set up a fake wireless network with
hostapd-cupid to attack a vulnerable terminal
ATTACK VECTOR 1
Evil client
(wpa_supplicant-cupid)
heartbleed
Vulnerable Access
Point
ATTACK VECTOR 2
Vulnerable client
heartbleed
Evil Access Point
(hostapd-cupid)
TECHNICAL DETAILS
•Patch is able to heartbleed at different stages:
•before TLS Handshake (unencrypted!)
•After TLS handshake and before application data
•After application data
DEMO TIME
VULNERABLE STUFF (CONFIRMED)
•wpa_supplicant
• Android terminals, Linux devices
•hostapd
•freeradius
Must (obviously) be linked to vulnerable openssl version
VULNERABLE STUFF (POSSIBLY)
•Everything that might use openssl for EAP TLS
•iPhone, iPads, OSX?
•Managed Wireless Solutions:
• Aruba, Trapeze, Cisco / Meraki...
•Other RADIUS servers besides freeradius
•Other wireless endpoints supporting EAP:
• VoIP Phones, printers...
•Must test everything! Or patch.
ENTERPRISE “WIRELESS” && “WIRED”
•802.1x Wired Authentication (aka NAC) uses EAP
also!
•Actually, wpa_supplicant is also used on Linux to
access NAC-controlled wired networks
CUPID AVAILABILITY
•Ask me for source code in private (for damage
control)
•Will (maybe) wait a few days before releasing to
public
•Tip to vendors: do not expect responsible
disclosure for an exploit to a vulnerability
that’s almost 2 months old...
LESSONS LEARNED
•OpenSSL sucks
•Learned a bit more about:
• TLS Protocol
• EAP Protocol
•Sacred cows killed:
•“heartbleed can only be exploited over TCP
connections”
•“heartbleed can only be exploited after TLS handshake”
FUTURE WORK & RECOMMENDATIONS
•Improve patch and test ALL the things!!
•Try different wireless devices
•Compile and run wpa_supplicant-cupid on Android device
•Look more closely for interesting bits of memory
leaked.
•Patch Wireless clients & Servers!
Heartbleed && Wireless

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Heartbleed && Wireless

  • 1. HEARTBLEED && WIRELESS New attack vectors for heartbleed: Enterprise wireless (and wired) networks Luis Grangeia lgrangeia@sysvalue.com | twitter.com/lgrangeia 28 / 05 / 2014 @ Confraria IT Security - Lisbon
  • 2. WHAT IS HEARTBLEED “Catastrophic bug” on OpenSSL: "The Heartbleed bug allows anyone on the Internet to read the memory of the systems protected by the vulnerable versions of the OpenSSL software. This compromises the secret keys used to identify the service providers and to encrypt the traffic, the names and passwords of the users and the actual content. This allows attackers to eavesdrop communications, steal data directly from the services and users and to impersonate services and users. “On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11.” - Schneier
  • 5. WHAT IS “ENTERPRISE WIRELESS” •WPA / WPA2 Networks •Protected by multiuser authentication •Tipically using a EAP Method: •EAP-PEAP •EAP-TTLS / EAP-TLS •EAP-SIM / EAP-AKA
  • 6. EAP AND TLS •EAP-PEAP, EAP-TTLS, EAP-TLS •All these use a TLS tunnel over EAP to secure some part of the authentication process •EAP... OpenSSL... Heartbleed...
  • 8. SAY HELLO TO “CUPID”
  • 9. WHAT IS CUPID •cupid is a patch for wpa_supplicant and hostapd •Attempts to exploit heartbleed over EAP TLS tunneled protocols: • EAP-PEAP, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS •Targets both endpoints: client and server
  • 12. ATTACK VECTORS •Option 1: Use wpa_supplicant-cupid to attack a wireless network •Option 2: Set up a fake wireless network with hostapd-cupid to attack a vulnerable terminal
  • 13. ATTACK VECTOR 1 Evil client (wpa_supplicant-cupid) heartbleed Vulnerable Access Point
  • 14. ATTACK VECTOR 2 Vulnerable client heartbleed Evil Access Point (hostapd-cupid)
  • 15. TECHNICAL DETAILS •Patch is able to heartbleed at different stages: •before TLS Handshake (unencrypted!) •After TLS handshake and before application data •After application data
  • 17. VULNERABLE STUFF (CONFIRMED) •wpa_supplicant • Android terminals, Linux devices •hostapd •freeradius Must (obviously) be linked to vulnerable openssl version
  • 18. VULNERABLE STUFF (POSSIBLY) •Everything that might use openssl for EAP TLS •iPhone, iPads, OSX? •Managed Wireless Solutions: • Aruba, Trapeze, Cisco / Meraki... •Other RADIUS servers besides freeradius •Other wireless endpoints supporting EAP: • VoIP Phones, printers... •Must test everything! Or patch.
  • 19. ENTERPRISE “WIRELESS” && “WIRED” •802.1x Wired Authentication (aka NAC) uses EAP also! •Actually, wpa_supplicant is also used on Linux to access NAC-controlled wired networks
  • 20. CUPID AVAILABILITY •Ask me for source code in private (for damage control) •Will (maybe) wait a few days before releasing to public •Tip to vendors: do not expect responsible disclosure for an exploit to a vulnerability that’s almost 2 months old...
  • 21. LESSONS LEARNED •OpenSSL sucks •Learned a bit more about: • TLS Protocol • EAP Protocol •Sacred cows killed: •“heartbleed can only be exploited over TCP connections” •“heartbleed can only be exploited after TLS handshake”
  • 22. FUTURE WORK & RECOMMENDATIONS •Improve patch and test ALL the things!! •Try different wireless devices •Compile and run wpa_supplicant-cupid on Android device •Look more closely for interesting bits of memory leaked. •Patch Wireless clients & Servers!